Could Someone Please Explain the "Surge Strategy" to Me

[SteveMetz]

Dave Kilcullen's blog statement, quoted in part below, is as succinct a description of the "surge" strategy - at least the security part of it - as any. It is different from what the US and the Iraqi government have done before. But, it is hardly new. In some ways, it is a classic inkblot approach focused on the human terrain.

"These operations are qualitatively different from what we have done before. Our concept is to knock over several insurgent safe havens simultaneously, in order to prevent terrorists relocating their infrastructure from one to another, and to create an operational synergy between what we're doing in Baghdad and what's happening outside. Unlike on previous occasions, we don't plan to leave these areas once they’re secured. These ops will run over months, and the key activity is to stand up viable local security forces in partnership with Iraqi Army and Police, as well as political and economic programs, to permanently secure them. The really decisive activity will be police work, registration of the population and counterintelligence in these areas, to comb out the insurgent sleeper cells and political cells that have "gone quiet" as we moved in, but which will try to survive through the op and emerge later. This will take operational patience, and it will be intelligence-led, and Iraqi government-led. It will probably not make the news (the really important stuff rarely does) but it will be the truly decisive action.

"When we speak of "clearing" an enemy safe haven, we are not talking about destroying the enemy in it; we are talking about rescuing the population in it from enemy intimidation. If we don't get every enemy cell in the initial operation, that's OK. The point of the operations is to lift the pall of fear from population groups that have been intimidated and exploited by terrorists to date, then win them over and work with them in partnership to clean out the cells that remain – as has happened in Al Anbar Province and can happen elsewhere in Iraq as well.

"The "terrain" we are clearing is human terrain, not physical terrain. It is about marginalizing al Qa’ida, Shi’a extremist militias, and the other terrorist groups from the population they prey on. This is why claims that “80% of AQ leadership have fled” don’t overly disturb us: the aim is not to kill every last AQ leader, but rather to drive them off the population and keep them off, so that we can work with the community to prevent their return."

I believe this can be read that the major effort must come from the Iraqi government with coalition help. Yet, I am concerned that I have not seen in any statements coming from Gen Petraeus or Dr Kilcullen that explain how an insurgency led by and mainly manned by Sunnis who were the core supporters of the Saddam regime (according to Abu Buckwheat who makes this case extremely well) has morphed into an AQ (AQI?) dominated insurgency. Is this merely propaganda - not untrue but not the whole truth either - or have they deceived themselves or did it really change in this way?

JohnT

That's kind of my point, John--that describes the operations. That I get. I just can't make sense of the "new" strategy. Isn't that what we did in Vietnam--try different operational methods without a coherent strategy?

[Dr Jack]

Dr. Kilcullen describes in his blog that the “surge” is not a strategy; I agree that the additional forces are not a strategy, but are additional means to accomplish the strategy.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...surge-with-th/

JP 3-0 defines “strategy” as “a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives” (JP 3-0, GL29). JP 3-0 further defines “theater strategy” as “strategic concepts and COAs directed toward securing the objectives of national and multinational policies and strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power” (JP 3-0, I-10).

I use the rather simple definition of strategy as “the integration of ends, ways, and means to accomplish national objectives.” At the theater level, commanders secure the objectives of national and multinational policies and objectives (ends) through synchronized and integrated concepts and COAs (ways) that employ military forces and other instruments of national power (means). The “surge” forces are additional means; how they are used in a synchronized manner with other forces and instruments of power are the ways; and the theater objectives are the ends; accomplishment of the theater level objectives should lead to the national level objectives.

President Bush described the “ends” at his latest speech on June 28th at the Naval War College; he described the goals of his new strategy in Iraq—

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/relea...070628-14.html

“Its goal is to help the Iraqis make progress toward reconciliation -- to build a free nation that respects the rights of its people, upholds the rule of law, and is an ally against the extremists in this war.”

President Bush also described some of the components of the “ways” in the same speech:

“…to help the Iraqis secure their population, to go after terrorists, insurgents, and militias that incite sectarian violence and to help get this capital of Iraq under control.”

President Bush gave greater details on getting Baghdad under control:

“…Our top priority must be to help the Iraqi government and its security forces protect their population from attack -- especially in Baghdad, the capital.…we have launched a wider offensive, called Operation Phantom Thunder, which is taking the fight to the enemy in the capital as well as its surrounding regions. This operation focuses on defeating al Qaeda terrorists, the insurgents, and militias, denying the extremists safe havens, and breaking up their logistics, supply, and communications.”

And, finally:

“…This is more than a military operation….the Iraqis have got to be making tough decisions towards reconciliations. And that's why I will keep the pressure on Iraqi leaders to meet political benchmarks they laid out for themselves. At home, most of the attention has focused on important pieces of legislation that the Iraqi Parliament must pass to foster political reconciliation -- including laws to share oil revenues, hold provincial elections, and bring more people into the political process… With the help of our troops, the Iraqi security forces are growing in number, they are becoming more capable, and coming closer to the day when they can assume responsibility for defending their own country. Not all this progress is even, and we're going to keep pressing the Iraqis to keep their commitments. Yet we must keep in mind that these benchmarks are aimed at improving life for the Iraqi people -- and that is the standard by which they should be judged.”

The strategy in Iraq seems to be to enforce security as much as possible to buy time for the Iraqis to build capacity -- and push the Iraqi government and forces to take a greater role in that security mission, as well as to push towards reconciliation.

It may not work, because the Iraqi government and military/police forces may never step up to the plate... but the most likely option is a complete disintegration into even further violence. In many ways, the political debates in the United States are probably helpful because it provides an incentive and a timeline (before the 2008 U.S. elections) for the Iraqis...