4GW & Other Myths

[Merv Benson]

After their Tet offensive failed, the communist insurgency was never able to threaten conquest of South Vietnam. It had been defeated for all practicle purposes. The Hanoi leadership recognized this and eventually won using a "convential" or combat persiting strategy that was successful when the Congress denied the South Vietnamese the air support we had earlier promised them.

[Bill Moore]

Merv,

You have provided several thought provoking ideas, and I'm undecided if I agree with your analysis on what you are calling failed attacks. I think you're right reference Vietnam, because the TET offensive was an attempt to defeat us militarily, but the enemy noted an unintended effect on the American population (eroded our will), so they kept pushing that button to pressure us out of Vietnam. What a different world we could be living in today if the press actually reported the battle results accurately as a major defeat for the communist forces. It can be argued we left Vietnam as winners with a relatively secure S. Vietnam, but one that wasn't capable of repulsing a conventional N. Vietnam offensive without our promised help. Our help didn’t arrive because their previously failed attacks effectively eroded our will to stay in the fight, so it can be argued that their failed attacks worked so in the end I still remain undecided.

In Iraq I don't think the enemy has any intention of defeating us militarily and all of their attacks are directly focused on America's will to stay in the fight, so whether they're successful from a tactical stand point or not isn't the true measure of effectiveness. Rather it is their effect on the intended audience. I think the terrorists grossly underestimate the will of the American people to stick it out, but then again that national will must be stoked by effective leadership in the White House. Our President’s recent speeches admitting mistakes seem to be working with the American public. Now he is a gladiator in the arena instead of a by stander making statements that just didn’t ring true with the American public. If he can keep rebuilding his support base, I think we’ll do fine.

[War Hammer]

Some weaknesses of 4GW are:

(1): Misrepresentation of Clausewitz and Clausewitz's followers

“Unlike Clausewitzian warfare, which envisions war as an act of policy in a contest between states, 4GW more resembles a boxer versus a viral infection.”

Clausewitz is generally depicted as describing only state vs. state conflicts. The adherents of Clausewitz are then depicted as “state-centric” warriors who only can only deal with state to state conflicts.

However many Clausewitzians believe On War is a descriptive work not a prescriptive one. It describes war as it is, in its universal nature, rather than how it ought to be. They apply Clausewitz to non-state actors as well as state actors. They argue the trinity of primordial violence, blind chance and reason are conceptual and apply to any warfighting entity (i.e. non-state actor or state). They are not focused on state vs. state wars nor do they believe that Clausewitz was focused on state vs. state conflicts.

Colin Gray being an example:

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/P...pring/gray.htm

(2): Misrepresentation of Mao

If Mao is the epitome of 4GW, Eastern Warfare and Sun-Tzu why did he frame his perception of warfare within the paradigm of the Clausewitzian Trinity? Why did Mao insist that all wars were political in nature? Why did he argue that there was never a war that was not political? Mao’s insistence that war is nothing but politics with bloodshed is in stark contrast to the 4GW theory as set out by William Lind:

“Now, as then, many different entities, not just governments of states, will wage war, and they will wage war for many different reasons, not just “the extension of politics by other means.”

[Merv Benson]

Bill,

I agree with you on the importance of maintaining the national will and I am glad that Bush has reengaged on this aspect of the war. I think the commanders also should be educating the public on the significance of events. If you recall during the first Gulf War, Iraq captured a small town in Saudia Arabia while the coalition was still in the "shaping the battlespace" phase, i.e. the preinvasion bombing. Gen. Schwartkoph was emphatic in stating that the attack on Kafje was not important and would not divert the plan of attack on liberating Kuwait. As I recall the Iraqis were eventually driven out by the Saudi National Guard troops, because the Saudis thought it was significant. My point is that the General did a good job of shaping perceptions and he was in a much better position to do so than the President. Unfortunately in Iraq the briefings are no longer making a splash on the news back in the states. Perhaps Gen. Pace can command a larger audience. Getting accurate information to the public is clearly an important aspect of this war and unfortunately the media is not likely to cooperate.

[DDilegge]

Kafji was insignificant to a point. The fact that the Iraqi's crossed into Saudi Arabia had the potential to influence the perceptions of the Muslim members of the coalition. The SANG took back Kafji with substantial U.S. support and went a long way in building up the confidence level of the SANG and other coaltion partners who had no previous combat experience or extensive training in the type of operations that were about to be conducted.

[Merv Benson]

It was certainly more significant than any action initiated by the enemy since the end of major combat operations in the second Gulf War. However Schwartzkoph was determined not to let it be a distraction to his plan to liberate Kuwait, and he took action with the media to make certain that they did not turn it into something it was not. I think commanders in Iraq need to be more proactive in explaining the significance and insignificance of events. It is clear to me that the media does not comprehend the difference.

[War Hammer]

The number one thing that 4GW lacks is basis in primary source documentation. For example, the claim that Mao is a paragon of 4GW warfare. How can a paragon of 4GW warfare say things like this:

"War is the continuation of politics." In this sense war is politics and war itself is a political action; since ancient times there has never been a war that did not have a political character.” Mao-Tse Tung

From Lin Biao

"The essence of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of army building is that in building a people's army prominence must be given to politics, i.e., the army must first and foremost be built on a political basis. Politics is the commander, politics is the soul of everything. Political work is the lifeline of our army. True, a people's army must pay attention to the constant improvement ot its weapons and equipment and its mlilitary technique, but in its fighting it does not rely purely on weapons and technque, it relies mainly on politics, on the proletarian revolutionary consciousness and courage of the the commanders and fighters, on the support and backing of the masses."

If Mao and Lin-Biao analyzed warfare today, they would still comment that 21st century warfare is still an extension of politics. Because that belief was at the heart of their worldview and war planning strategy. Hardly 4GW archetypes.

[War Hammer]

We also hear from the 4GW that the U.S. Army is so state centric that it is unable to deal with non-state actors. The 4GW further blames this on Clausewitz. How is it Clausewitz's fault if the U.S. military is geared to fighting states? Why would be Clausewitz's fault if some in the U.S. military misread his work and believed that all conflicts are state centric?

Clausewitzian critics have often accused him of being the granddaddy of "total war" or "absolute war." However, "absolute war" was a conceptual tool that Clausewitz used to show how real war is an extension of politics. He used "absolute war" to show how why war does not have its own logic. Clausewitz never advocated "absolute war" because he did not believe it existed.

4GW authors have argued jthat war is governed by its own logic and that it is separated from politics. The British military historian and anti-Clausewitzian John Keegan has also argued that war has its own logic.

Clausewitz anticipated and argued against theorists who contend that war has its own logic. Clausewitz devised the concepts of “absolute war” and “real war” to show why warfare can never be isolated from the politics that drives it. “Absolute war” is an abstract description of how warfare would operate in a state where it is disconnected from politics. “Real war” is how war actually operates as an extension of politics. Absolute war is divorced from politics and guided by its own logic of three reciprocal extremes. Each side in war is compelled to meet its opponent’s action reciprocally which in turn causes war, in theory, to be pushed to extremes. The first reciprocal law of “absolute war” is violence driven to the utmost extreme. During “real war” the amount of violence and effort committed to ending a war is determined and limited by the political objective. The second reciprocal law is the complete disarming of the enemy. In “real war” the disarming or complete defeat of the enemy is not the only way to victory. Clausewitz stated, “...that in war many roads lead to success, and that they do not all involve the opponent’s outfight defeat.” The third reciprocal law is that opponents in war will exert the most extreme effort and resources in destroying each other. In “real war” logistics, geography, the uncertainties of combat and political objectives will limit a state’s effort and commitment of resources. Clausewitz uses “absolute war” as a vehicle to show how politics describes the behavior of real war.

[Strickland]

Please excuse my ignorance with 4GW; however, it appears as if several others are asserting that what Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, or Tamil Tigers do is not an extension of politics or political in nature, due to the fact they are not State entities? I would argue that these groups follow an obvious extension of politics as Mao or Clausewitz understood it.