My Grand Strategy

[SteveMetz]

Several of the ongoing threads have inspired me to capsulize what I think are the flaws of current U.S. grand strategy, and what I would propose.

Here are what I consider the flawed assumptions of our current strategy:

1. It assumes that spreading liberalism is feasible. (It's not just democracy. Illiberal democracies are possible).
2. It assumes that we can succeed with half way measures, specifically without making major changes in our systems of rights and prerogatives, and without changing our petroleum addiction.
3. The criterion is uses for identifying strategic partners is too narrow. We base partnership on whether another state pursues AQ rather than whether they tolerate the ideology of Islamic extremism.

So, my grand strategy has five components:

1. Disengage as much as possible from the Islamic world
2. End our petroleum addiction
3. Develop a list of partner and non-partner states based on whether they tolerate the ideology of Islamic extremism, not just whether they chase AQ. Obvisouly, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and others would be non-parnters. End aid to, immigration from, and visas to the citizens of non-partners. Do not renew the visas of citizens of non-partherns.
4. Approach cyberspace as a key battlefield. Currently, it is the ultimate "ungoverned space." Consider hosting web sites or transmitting information which advocates violence as a hostile act. Take action against it. In other words, don't allow the extremists to hide behind the importance we place on free speech and the transnational nature of information.
5. Launch spoiling raids as necessary against hostile groups.

[T. Jefferson]

Steve Metz:

Are you recommending a cordon sanitaire around the whole Islamic world? Who would you have police cyberspace?

[Lastdingo]

Several of the ongoing threads have inspired me to capsulize what I think are the flaws of current U.S. grand strategy, and what I would propose.

Here are what I consider the flawed assumptions of our current strategy:

1. It assumes that spreading liberalism is feasible. (It's not just democracy. Illiberal democracies are possible).

It's even doubtful if it's beneficial. Demacratic Arab states could become nationalistic, merge and strong nation south of the NATO and pallied with Russia for many practical purposes. Dictators are notorious for not giving up their rule, so do never merge with other states.

2. It assumes that we can succeed with half way measures, specifically without making major changes in our systems of rights and prerogatives, and without changing our petroleum addiction.
3. The criterion is uses for identifying strategic partners is too narrow. We base partnership on whether another state pursues AQ rather than whether they tolerate the ideology of Islamic extremism.

So, my grand strategy has five components:

1. Disengage as much as possible from the Islamic world

I guess you mean physically, not diplomatically?

2. End our petroleum addiction

Oil prices as high as 50 $/bl make synthetic petroleum based on coal economically feasible. The plant-based solutions occupy too much agricultural area.

3. Develop a list of partner and non-partner states based on whether they tolerate the ideology of Islamic extremism, not just whether they chase AQ. Obvisouly, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and others would be non-parnters. End aid to, immigration from, and visas to the citizens of non-partners. Do not renew the visas of citizens of non-partherns.

I disagree on Egypt. It's one of the most promising Arab states. They actually improve the living standards of their people without much oil ressources. Furthermore they're a key to make conventional war against Israel (im)possible and a long-term friend of the USA (they received modern military tech and had joint exercises).

4. Approach cyberspace as a key battlefield. Consider hosting web sites or transmitting information which advocates violence as a hostile act. Take action against it. In other words, don't allow the extremists to hide behind the importance we place on free speech and the transnational nature of information.

Waging war in the internet would be similar to waging war in space - many nations are intent to have a peaceful zone there. Furthermore, pushing extremists into the underground just makes surveillance much harder.

5. Launch spoiling raids as necessary against hostile groups.
This is too general to be understood. What kind of attacks?

Actually, I don't think it's a grand strategy. Grand strategy should involve much more, this one is just a strategy of how to deal with a specific foe.
It's furthermore very unilateral and -I'm sorry- quite simplistic in some regards. Isolating yourself from some states won't help much.
Musharraf probably needs some intelligence service's aid to keep himself in power in his domestic struggles with Islamists. You don't want Islamists to take over the nuclear power Pakestan, don't you? So it would be more wise to keep him in power and not to cut all ties.
Quite the same applies to Saudi-Arabia, although on a lesser scale.

And what did you mean with spoiling attacks?
Attacking enemies everwhere with bombs or commandos would often violate other nation's sovereignty and I believe it's understandable that this does not help. Imagine Some third world coutnry killing dissidents in the USA - that would certainly upset some people...

Islamists aren't a solic bloc, but a huge crowd that communicats with each other but co-ordinates largely through what their ideology allos or not (afaik). So it would be a possible strategy to reduce the level of threat by spreading disunity and let factions oppose each other. Other than islamist factios could be strengthened (not so much with compromising direct aid, but otherwise) in important regions. National leaders and faction could be allowed to humiliate the west on some occasions to strengthen them in comparison to Islamists.

What you propose is a slightly isolationist policy with some offensive actions that do not involve large contingents abroad. It sounds a lot like a collection of "that will make us feel better" measures.
Nevertheless, it could evolve into something that would convince me if this strategy would include more co-operation with partners and more specifically tailored solutions to specific problems.

[SteveMetz]

Actually, I don't think it's a grand strategy. Grand strategy should involve much more, this one is just a strategy of how to deal with a specific foe.
It's furthermore very unilateral and -I'm sorry- quite simplistic in some regards. Isolating yourself from some states won't help much.
Musharraf probably needs some intelligence service's aid to keep himself in power in his domestic struggles with Islamists. You don't want Islamists to take over the nuclear power Pakestan, don't you? So it would be more wise to keep him in power and not to cut all ties.
Quite the same applies to Saudi-Arabia, although on a lesser scale.

And what did you mean with spoiling attacks?
Attacking enemies everwhere with bombs or commandos would often violate other nation's sovereignty and I believe it's understandable that this does not help. Imagine Some third world coutnry killing dissidents in the USA - that would certainly upset some people...

Islamists aren't a solic bloc, but a huge crowd that communicats with each other but co-ordinates largely through what their ideology allos or not (afaik). So it would be a possible strategy to reduce the level of threat by spreading disunity and let factions oppose each other. Other than islamist factios could be strengthened (not so much with compromising direct aid, but otherwise) in important regions. National leaders and faction could be allowed to humiliate the west on some occasions to strengthen them in comparison to Islamists.

What you propose is a slightly isolationist policy with some offensive actions that do not involve large contingents abroad. It sounds a lot like a collection of "that will make us feel better" measures.
Nevertheless, it could evolve into something that would convince me if this strategy would include more co-operation with partners and more specifically tailored solutions to specific problems.

On Egypt, this is an interesting essay:

...In May and June, Egyptian State Security arrested Amr Tharwat, Ahmed Dahmash, Abdelhamid Mohamed Abdelrahman, Ayman Mohamed Abdelrahman, and Abdelatif Sayed, who are all members of the "Quranist" network. On June 21, they were charged with "insulting Islam."

These Quranists promote a reformist view based entirely on the Koran (www.ahl-alquran.com) and are committed to religious freedom and an open society. They oppose a penalty of death for apostasy since the Koran nowhere mentions it. Amr Tharwat had coordinated the monitoring of Egypt's June Shura Council elections on behalf of the pro-democracy Ibn Khaldun Center, headed by prominent Egyptian democracy activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim. Former Jemaah Islamiya member Tawfik Hamid told me that it was Quranists who gave him the space to develop critical thinking and so helped wean him away from jihadism.

State Security has now also leveled charges against Quranist founder Ahmed Subhy Mansour, who formerly taught Islamic history at Cairo's Al-Azhar University, the major center of Sunni learning. He was fired because of his views and imprisoned in 1987. Subsequently he found asylum in the United States and lives in Virginia. Also charged is Dr. Othman Mohamed Ali, who lives in Canada.

These arrests are part of the Egyptian government's double game in which it imprisons members of the Muslim Brotherhood when the latter appear to become too powerful, while simultaneously trying to appear Islamic itself and blunt the Brotherhood's appeal by cracking down on religious reformers, who are very often also democracy activists. A similar strategy was followed in the February 22 arrest of blogger Abdel Kareem Nabil, who was sentenced to four years in prison--one year for insulting President Hosni Mubarak, and three for "insulting Islam..."

[John T. Fishel]

What are your goals/objectives/ends?

How do you propose to achieve them? For example, how do you propose to end petroleum addiction? And what instrumentality is achieved by doing so?

What are the means/resources required to achieve the goals of your grand strategy? and how will you apply them?

I'd certainly like to see this grand strategy fleshed out as it seems to have some promise.

[SteveMetz]

What are your goals/objectives/ends?

How do you propose to achieve them? For example, how do you propose to end petroleum addiction? And what instrumentality is achieved by doing so?

What are the means/resources required to achieve the goals of your grand strategy? and how will you apply them?

I'd certainly like to see this grand strategy fleshed out as it seems to have some promise.

The goals are the same as during the Cold War: thwart the opponent while preserving our prosperity, democracy, and way of life. Just as communism faltered once it could no longer expand, Islamic extremism will, I believe, collapse if its ability to scapegoat is removed.

The petroleum addiction clearly will take a broad approach of incentives for lessening the use of petroleum and developing alternatives, and disincentives for using petroleum. Maybe start with $8 a gallon gas, initially a break for diesel until the rail system can be revived.

Of course, this ain't fleshed out at this point. I just thought of it about two hours ago, smoking an H. Uppmann in the hammock.



I once attended a talk by a crusty old admiral which he started by saying, "I do my best thinking in the shower. If I had a bigger hot water heater, I'd be a lot smarter." Same with me, but I'd be a lot smarter if I could afford longer cigars.

[Lastdingo]

Just as communism faltered once it could no longer expand, Islamic extremism will, I believe, collapse if its ability to scapegoat is removed.

I believe the socialistic system rather collapsed once it had accumulated enough problems over time. The primary problem being that they competed on even level in the arms race with much less economic power from the beginning. The Soviet Union spent about a quarter of its GDP on military, while the western nations spent never more than one tenth. Imagine the west playing total war for fourty years and you'll see why the Warsaw Pact had to collapse.
It's indeed a huge accomplishement that the held out for so long, the planning economy and one-party dictatorship must have been a huge success (in the wrong direction), very different from our usual perceptions.


I don't believe that the Islamists need the scapegoat function - it's likely necessary to direct energies against the west, but not for keeping islamism prospering. After all, gaining power in a nation has primarily to do with domestic problems. The Persian Shah was not removed from power for his relationship with the USA - he was removed for domestic reasons.
The strongest alternative to Islamism in the Arab world is afaik nationalism - not much better if viewed from our perspective.

[Bill Moore]

Response to the Grand Strategy

Steve I really enjoyed your white paper titled Rethinking Insurgencies, but in the end disagreed with your recommendations. I agree with Kilcullen's statement when he said, "if this was easy, we would have figured out the answer by now".

1.

Disengage as much as possible from the Islamic world

That implies leaving that global segment of the market open to Chinese, Russian, and French influence for economic gain (I only listed three of several countries), and put our corporations at a competitive disadvantage. We can't afford to the Middle East into another Cuba, hell we can't afford to do it in Cuba.

2.

End our petroleum addiction

Easier said than done, it is not only big business interests that encourages the addiction, it is the limits of science that makes this part of the strategy infeasible, so it also discredits number 1 above in my mind.


3.

Develop a list of partner and non-partner states based on whether they tolerate the ideology of Islamic extremism, not just whether they chase AQ. Obvisouly, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and others would be non-parnters. End aid to, immigration from, and visas to the citizens of non-partners. Do not renew the visas of citizens of non-partherns.

Here we go again with our Cuban approach, which has failed miserably. If we allowed our business men to work in Cuba, and tourists to go there, Castro would have become a nobody. Isolation doesn't work. Nixon opened the doors to China through engagement, not isolation. Where has it ever worked?

4.

Approach cyberspace as a key battlefield. Currently, it is the ultimate "ungoverned space." Consider hosting web sites or transmitting information which advocates violence as a hostile act. Take action against it. In other words, don't allow the extremists to hide behind the importance we place on free speech and the transnational nature of information.

We can assist the market with this, but if the government tries to do it, instead of encouraging others better atuned with how people outside the military think and respond to cyber stimuli, it will be a wasted effort. On the other hand I think there is huge potential here. I think there is a quiet majority that has yet to be mobilized that clearly realize AQ type terrorism cannot be justified, yet they seem to have no voice in the media that many folks listen to.

5.

Launch spoiling raids as necessary against hostile groups.

Amen to this one. Getting involved in an insurgency, counterinsurgency, regime change, etc. should only be undertaken under extreme circumstances, and if certain elements are identified present that make victory possible. In many situations we'll just to have to realize we can't make the world the way we want it to be, and further realize it isn't that big of deal if we don't in most cases. We need to relearn to think strategically again.

[SteveMetz]

Response to the Grand Strategy

Steve I really enjoyed your white paper titled Rethinking Insurgencies, but in the end disagreed with your recommendations. I agree with Kilcullen's statement when he said, "if this was easy, we would have figured out the answer by now".

1.

That implies leaving that global segment of the market open to Chinese, Russian, and French influence for economic gain (I only listed three of several countries), and put our corporations at a competitive disadvantage. We can't afford to the Middle East into another Cuba, hell we can't afford to do it in Cuba.

2. Easier said than done, it is not only big business interests that encourages the addiction, it is the limits of science that makes this part of the strategy infeasible, so it also discredits number 1 above in my mind.


3.

Here we go again with our Cuban approach, which has failed miserably. If we allowed our business men to work in Cuba, and tourists to go there, Castro would have become a nobody. Isolation doesn't work. Nixon opened the doors to China through engagement, not isolation. Where has it ever worked?

4.

We can assist the market with this, but if the government tries to do it, instead of encouraging others better atuned with how people outside the military think and respond to cyber stimuli, it will be a wasted effort. On the other hand I think there is huge potential here. I think there is a quiet majority that has yet to be mobilized that clearly realize AQ type terrorism cannot be justified, yet they seem to have no voice in the media that many folks listen to.

5.

Amen to this one. Getting involved in an insurgency, counterinsurgency, regime change, etc. should only be undertaken under extreme circumstances, and if certain elements are identified present that make victory possible. In many situations we'll just to have to realize we can't make the world the way we want it to be, and further realize it isn't that big of deal if we don't in most cases. We need to relearn to think strategically again.

I'm just not buying the Cuba analogy. We've had massive economic engagement with Saudi Arabia for decades and look what it's got us--the society which provides the most ideological and financial support for transnational terrorism today. In fact, I think the China comparison supports my idea: we are able to trade with that nation without influencing their politics or claiming to "spread democracy" there.

I'm not seeing how American political and military disengagement from the Islamic world is going to leave "that global segment of the market open to Chinese, Russian, and French influence for economic gain." They don't produce much of value except oil anyway. In terms of being a customer of America, I'm not seeing that there is a great preference to "buy American" in the Islamic world anyhow. And even when there is, it isn't because we are politically and militarily engaged there. It's because a specific product or service we are selling is better. Political and military disengagement won't change that.

And I didn't say "isolation." I said separation. We--and I'm speaking of the West here--allow our enemies to migrate to and travel within our countries. They take advantage of our freedoms to harm us.

I have two problems with the idea that "here is a quiet majority that has yet to be mobilized that clearly realize AQ type terrorism cannot be justified, yet they seem to have no voice in the media that many folks listen to." First, I'm not sure it's true. While it's probably true that most Muslims do not favor terrorism, I believe most are willing to overlook it so long as it is targeted against the West. It's a very different thing to not favor terrorism and to take action to oppose it. Second, even if your statement is true, how are we to mobilize this silent majority? Mobilizing it would challenge the elites--the Mubaraks, the Sauds, and the Musharaffs--who are our friends. The Palestinian Authority gives an indication of what a real democracy looks like in that part of the world. As I argued above, it is illiberal democracy.

[Tacitus]

I don't have a comprehensive, well thought out, strategy in my back pocket that I can pull out here. Before tackling grand strategy, the Small Wars Council might want to start another parallel thread for the desired post-war situation. Identifying where it is that we are trying to go needs to be clarified in this war, before coming up with a proper strategy on how to get there. If you don't know where you are going, any old road will do.

I believe the socialistic system rather collapsed once it had accumulated enough problems over time. The primary problem being that they competed on even level in the arms race with much less economic power from the beginning. The Soviet Union spent about a quarter of its GDP on military, while the western nations spent never more than one tenth. Imagine the west playing total war for fourty years and you'll see why the Warsaw Pact had to collapse.
It's indeed a huge accomplishement that the held out for so long, the planning economy and one-party dictatorship must have been a huge success (in the wrong direction), very different from our usual perceptions.

I can't prove that, but this seems a pretty believable explanation of the collapse of the USSR. Or at least a one paragraph explanation. Since communism was a transnational movement that ulltimately had to be defeated in the minds of those working for it, it is natural to look to the Cold War as an example on how to deal with the challenge from an international movement like Al Qaeda.

But since containment by means of keeping an army in Western Europe and falling back on mutually assured destruction seems ill-suited to deter this foe, the Cold War might not give us any useful clues.

Can anybody think of any other conflicts with international movements in history that might provide some insight? Some have invoked the Anarchist movement, but are there any others that come to mind? We shouldn't be too proud to borrow or adapt a strategy from those who came before us, if one already exists. I know history never exactly repeats itself, but as Mark Twain said, it sure does seem to rhyme.

[Lastdingo]

Can anybody think of any other conflicts with international movements in history that might provide some insight? Some have invoked the Anarchist movement, but are there any others that come to mind? We shouldn't be too proud to borrow or adapt a strategy from those who came before us, if one already exists. I know history never exactly repeats itself, but as Mark Twain said, it sure does seem to rhyme.

There were some ideological movements, but most were too easy to defeat to give much insight.
The Boxer uprising was interesting, for example.

[Dr Jack]

What are your goals/objectives/ends?

How do you propose to achieve them? For example, how do you propose to end petroleum addiction? And what instrumentality is achieved by doing so?

What are the means/resources required to achieve the goals of your grand strategy? and how will you apply them?

I'd certainly like to see this grand strategy fleshed out as it seems to have some promise.

I agree with John T. Fishel; I think that a grand strategy should include some greater vision of the end state as the start point... How does the world at the end of the day under this grand strategy? What is the role of the United States and its allies in this new vision?

The end state depends a great deal on how you perceive the world today: as a Thomas P.M. Barnett "core" and "non-integrating gap"; as Huntington's "civilizational" divide; as the Toffler's "three waves"; as Kaplan's "anarchy" at the seams; as Friedman's "Lexus and the Olive Tree" (globalization vs. localization); or some other characterization. The grand strategy should have a baseline view of the world and then envision how to change that worldview to a different reality.

Once the end state is clearly envisioned, then move on to the specific COAs to get there (ways) and the resources to be applied (means) to achieve those ends.

[Bob T]

One can disagree with Steve that some of the assumptions underlying our purported grand strategy are flawed and one can disagree in detail with his fixes. One can even disagree over what a “grand” strategy should be and do. But is the basic, down-deep, real problem we face today one of the strategy’s substance, or is it a structural problem regarding strategic planning, coordination and implementation?

Since the fall of Bagdad (hard to say the end of combat operations), I’ve become more and more convinced the core problem is just that, structural. I don’t pretend to have an answer, but it might pay for those of you who share some agreement with me about structure being a very big part of our problem to take a look at the shorter Fournoy and Brimley article on strategic planning in the Joint Forces Quarterly No. 41 at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pa...i41_iad_01.pdf Or better yet, the longer paper on which it is based at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/pa...agencyQNSR.pdf

I’ve also wondered of late what an alien standing on the Moon would think about the potential potency of our military and economic power while applying Clausewitz’s secondary Trinity of the People, the Government, and the Military Services. The first two are fractured with the first, to paraphrase Sam Huntington, increasingly not knowing who they are, and the second working hard, legislative and executive alike, to surpass the Athenian Assembly during the Peloponnesian War. We all know what happened with the demise of that empire: the democratic experiment disappeared until we resurrected it some two thousand years later. The last leg of the Trinity: the Land components are, if not yet broken, badly cracked and the Air and Naval appear to be looking for a place.

As I look forward to what appears to me to be the set of possible futures following our ultimate withdrawal from Iraq (whatever shape that might take), I can’t help but wonder whether, after more than a few failures to achieve our stated ends, we will possess, as a people, the willingness and fortitude necessary to fulfill the international role we have consciously and unconsciously assumed. Thinkers like Colin Gray and Niall Ferguson see no alternative to our actively playing that role. Gray’s The Sheriff: America’s Defense of the new World Order completed in Nov ’03 and Ferguson’s
2004 article “International Relations: A World without Power” make for interesting and to a degree compelling reading even given the course of events since they were written. http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3009996.html. There is the usual expected chorus of those others who much prefer we pull back and to a greater or lesser degree be less active, depending of on their parochial interests in an issue.

Personally, I don’t believe we have the choice of being less active. Our interests are going to be involved; we are far from being the self-sufficient nation we once were; and the issues this discussion group focuses on will be somewhat more than nagging, but not the only ones. I just don’t see how we can intelligently address interests and issues and be pro- rather than reactive without a reasonable structure for development, planning and implementation. Without it, I only see more failures.

What one hammock and a good cigar have wrought.

Bob T

[SteveMetz]

One can disagree with Steve that some of the assumptions underlying our purported grand strategy are flawed and one can disagree in detail with his fixes. One can even disagree over what a “grand” strategy should be and do. But is the basic, down-deep, real problem we face today one of the strategy’s substance, or is it a structural problem regarding strategic planning, coordination and implementation?

Since the fall of Bagdad (hard to say the end of combat operations), I’ve become more and more convinced the core problem is just that, structural. I don’t pretend to have an answer, but it might pay for those of you who share some agreement with me about structure being a very big part of our problem to take a look at the shorter Fournoy and Brimley article on strategic planning in the Joint Forces Quarterly No. 41 at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pa...i41_iad_01.pdf Or better yet, the longer paper on which it is based at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/pa...agencyQNSR.pdf

I’ve also wondered of late what an alien standing on the Moon would think about the potential potency of our military and economic power while applying Clausewitz’s secondary Trinity of the People, the Government, and the Military Services. The first two are fractured with the first, to paraphrase Sam Huntington, increasingly not knowing who they are, and the second working hard, legislative and executive alike, to surpass the Athenian Assembly during the Peloponnesian War. We all know what happened with the demise of that empire: the democratic experiment disappeared until we resurrected it some two thousand years later. The last leg of the Trinity: the Land components are, if not yet broken, badly cracked and the Air and Naval appear to be looking for a place.

As I look forward to what appears to me to be the set of possible futures following our ultimate withdrawal from Iraq (whatever shape that might take), I can’t help but wonder whether, after more than a few failures to achieve our stated ends, we will possess, as a people, the willingness and fortitude necessary to fulfill the international role we have consciously and unconsciously assumed. Thinkers like Colin Gray and Niall Ferguson see no alternative to our actively playing that role. Gray’s The Sheriff: America’s Defense of the new World Order completed in Nov ’03 and Ferguson’s
2004 article “International Relations: A World without Power” make for interesting and to a degree compelling reading even given the course of events since they were written. http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3009996.html. There is the usual expected chorus of those others who much prefer we pull back and to a greater or lesser degree be less active, depending of on their parochial interests in an issue.

Personally, I don’t believe we have the choice of being less active. Our interests are going to be involved; we are far from being the self-sufficient nation we once were; and the issues this discussion group focuses on will be somewhat more than nagging, but not the only ones. I just don’t see how we can intelligently address interests and issues and be pro- rather than reactive without a reasonable structure for development, planning and implementation. Without it, I only see more failures.

What one hammock and a good cigar have wrought.

Bob T

My point was not that we disengage, but that we selectively engage. To misuse Colin Gray's metaphor (and I wrote a dust jacket blurb for that book), we didn't assign the whole West to one sheriff. Smart sheriffs knew to stay out of Comanche territory and stick to keeping the town orderly.

[Bob T]

My point was not that we disengage, but that we selectively engage. To misuse Colin Gray's metaphor (and I wrote a dust jacket blurb for that book), we didn't assign the whole West to one sheriff. Smart sheriffs knew to stay out of Comanche territory and stick to keeping the town orderly.

And a fine blurb it is.

I agree we cannot disengage; our interests won't allow us to do so. Selectively engage? Yes, when we have a reasonable chance of success. But can we be sure we have that reasonable chance if we don't have a structure/process which ensures all relevant factors are considered in developing strategy/plans, have all those various departments and agencies whose resources/skills are necessary for a reasonable chance of success on board and playing their role in a coordinated manner?

We had it under Eisenhower's planning board and operations coordinating committee setup. Kennedy threw it out and we have only once since seen a glimmer with the Nixon/Kissinger NSC system where we at least tried to give all voices a place at the table.

I remain concerned that we may just have a so soured and lost the populace that it will be for some period of time very difficult to gain their confidence and support for engagements that do not clearly represent survival or vital interests.