Thomas P.M. Barnett - Army America needs versus the wars Americans prefer to wage

[Lastdingo]

Hmm, I would say that the American style of war dates back to 1917 when the French educated the American officers on modern warfare, including their point of view on firepower and battle plans (wow, some americans will hate me for this!).

Drawing the line back to Ancient Greece does not really help, as the USA was coined by a Europe that had lost the characteristic of waging decisive wars in the meantime (especially in the 16th and 18th century) in favour of rather limited warfare.

Classical Greece wasn't coined by decisive warfare anyway before the Peloponnesian War and later on the even more violent Philipp II./Alexander the Great makedons. They most often only marched a day or two, aligned into a Phalanx, marched to each other and the war was over without pursuit or capturing of cities once one phalanx broke in battle and fled.

It's correct that there will be another major war, and it would be surprising if one knew about it even as little as three years in advance. It will most likely turn out being as surprising in its nature as WW1 because there were so few major wars in the past decades.
It's also correct in my opinion that mroe small wars will break out with western participation, although I consider that as easily avoidable.

I fail to see how insurgents somewhere in distant places are a threat for our security and therefore need to be combatted. There no real "need" for small wars proficiency in our armies as long as our politicians avoid stupid adventures in my opinion.

So the big war faction is in my opinion correct. Neither counter-insurgency campaigns nor amateurish peacekeeping missions without real mandate like Bosnia are unavoidable.
And in fact it would be quite possible to keep the whole NATO out of conventional conflicts for decades if our people and political elites truly wanted that.
But that won't happen. Wel'll see more peacekeeping about five to ten major wars with NATO country participation till the end of the century and a bit less large counter-insurgency campaigns, the next one at the latest around 2040 when the memories of Iraq and Afghanistan have faded.
Well, that's my guess - based on my feeling and on a look into 20th and 19th century history.

[tequila]

Note also that the "decisive battle" noted in Classical Greece often had little in the way of actual decision. Very rarely were the city-states involved decimated or otherwise critically harmed during phalanx battle. The incessant and endemic warfare during that timeframe testify to the remarkable indecisiveness of classical Greek warmaking, which as in all warfare also involved far more usage of skirmishing and raiding than portrayed in the classical texts, which were written by and for hoplite elites.

Decisive war had to wait for the Macedonians.

[whsieh]

I fail to see how insurgents somewhere in distant places are a threat for our security and therefore need to be combatted. There no real "need" for small wars proficiency in our armies as long as our politicians avoid stupid adventures in my opinion.

In terms of ground warfare, I find it far more plausible in the next 10-15 years that US land forces have to deal with stabilizing a collapsed Pakistani or North Korean state, while attempting to secure both regimes' nuclear weapons, than any sort of conflict that would require high-end "conventional" operations.

I mean, who exactly are we going to fight a conventional ground war with massed armor formations with? Worst case scenarios in the Taiwan Strait would lead to air and naval combat, along with maybe a modest (and light) expeditionary force of Marines and the most mobile Army forces to defend the island. Does anyone actually think we are going to invade China? Or that the Russians will roll into Poland?

But in addition to North Korea and Pakistan, there are all sorts of ramshackle states the United States may find itself having to deal with at some point. Whatever happens in Iraq, Afghanistan is still a live issue, along with chunks of Africa. Whether or not it's wise to intervene in an individual failed state depends on each individual circumstance, but I can think of cases where important US interests will lead to some kind of intervention.

WH

[Rob Thornton]

Seems to me he has this question right:

This intra-military debate should focus America's attention on the real question at hand: Do we see a future world full of messy Iraqs and Somalias and Haitis? Or should we pull back from that long war focus and prepare for conventional conflict with China?

Given the course of events since 9/11, which pathway seems more realistic to you?

However, how about these as follow ons:

What kind of role should the United States play over the next 25 years in order to provide security to its citizens at home and abroad?

Why do many of us say we must think differently about security?

Must the United States be involved on a global scale in order to achieve
those ends?
What should be the shape of that commitment?

Walter Isaacson wrote a great OP/ED in the Post today
Excerpt

Now we are again faced with a new and dangerous global threat, the rise of jihadist terrorism. But more than five years after the Sept. 11 attacks, we have not yet responded with the creativity displayed at the outset of the Cold War. Instead, we are either disparaging Cold War institutions or, at best, tinkering with them to make them play a role for which they were never designed.

With a presidential election approaching, we should push the candidates to provide some imaginative ideas and a vision that match the creativity exhibited 60 years ago. Here, for example, are proposals they could explore:

I think he is on the mark.
Regards, Rob

[whsieh]

Must the United States be involved on a global scale in order to achieve
those ends?
What should be the shape of that commitment?


Regards, Rob

As a major beneficiary of the current way the world is more or less setup, I think the United States has to be involved on a global scale. So much of our general day-to-day world is dependent on a global economy that is in turn dependent on relative stability, which has to be safeguarded against destabilizing forces like Jihadism and the like, never mind the whole issue of physical security. And before people think this is just about the West's addiction to mass-consumption economies, I find it hard to believe how developing world economies can be lifted out of poverty without a reasonably stable system of international markets that allows them to exploit advantages in comparative advantage and the like. This is not to say that the current scheme of "globalization" is perfect, but I don't see any positive alternatives to take its place if the whole system were to, say, collapse, due to a catastrophic geopolitical disaster in the Middle East that led to an unprecedented energy shock.

The devil is obviously in the details, though. Even if we stipulate a commitment has to exist, what shape it takes is open to debate.

WH

[Merv Benson]

One of the reasons few people are willing to challenge us in "conventional" warfare is that they do not think they can beat us. We need to get to that point with insurgency warfare. If we do not, we will see it used much more.

[Granite_State]

In terms of ground warfare, I find it far more plausible in the next 10-15 years that US land forces have to deal with stabilizing a collapsed Pakistani or North Korean state, while attempting to secure both regimes' nuclear weapons, than any sort of conflict that would require high-end "conventional" operations.

I mean, who exactly are we going to fight a conventional ground war with massed armor formations with? Worst case scenarios in the Taiwan Strait would lead to air and naval combat, along with maybe a modest (and light) expeditionary force of Marines and the most mobile Army forces to defend the island. Does anyone actually think we are going to invade China? Or that the Russians will roll into Poland?

But in addition to North Korea and Pakistan, there are all sorts of ramshackle states the United States may find itself having to deal with at some point. Whatever happens in Iraq, Afghanistan is still a live issue, along with chunks of Africa. Whether or not it's wise to intervene in an individual failed state depends on each individual circumstance, but I can think of cases where important US interests will lead to some kind of intervention.

WH

Good post. Our enemies aren't stupid, they've all seen what happens when a state challenges us conventionally, as in Iraq (twice). Nuclear weapons have also changed the rules of the game, as Martin Van Creveld pointed out. We should be regarding small wars and non-state adversaries as the main challenge of the next century.

[BScully]

We should be regarding small wars and non-state adversaries as the main challenge of the next century.

I suppose the challenge this presents is developing a sufficient capability to deal with small wars and non-state adversaries without weakening our conventional capabilities to the point that nation's believe they can challenge us conventionally again. Is this doable? And if it is doable, the real question is how?

My opinion is that this is not doable right now because it is not a military solution or fix. It will require a whole of government fix and the rest of government isn't ready to move in this direction yet.

Brian

[Ken White]

Hmm, I would say that the American style of war dates back to 1917 when the French educated the American officers on modern warfare, including their point of view on firepower and battle plans (wow, some americans will hate me for this!).

. . .

It's correct that there will be another major war, and it would be surprising if one knew about it even as little as three years in advance. It will most likely turn out being as surprising in its nature as WW1 because there were so few major wars in the past decades.
It's also correct in my opinion that mroe small wars will break out with western participation, although I consider that as easily avoidable.

I fail to see how insurgents somewhere in distant places are a threat for our security and therefore need to be combatted. There no real "need" for small wars proficiency in our armies as long as our politicians avoid stupid adventures in my opinion.

So the big war faction is in my opinion correct. Neither counter-insurgency campaigns nor amateurish peacekeeping missions without real mandate like Bosnia are unavoidable.
And in fact it would be quite possible to keep the whole NATO out of conventional conflicts for decades if our people and political elites truly wanted that.
But that won't happen. Wel'll see more peacekeeping about five to ten major wars with NATO country participation till the end of the century and a bit less large counter-insurgency campaigns, the next one at the latest around 2040 when the memories of Iraq and Afghanistan have faded.
Well, that's my guess - based on my feeling and on a look into 20th and 19th century history.

In order :

Actually it dates back much further in the History of European involvement in the North American Continent and reached a nadir of sorts during our Civil War which was the gestation point of the education of the French (who did not pay attention), British (who had too many small wars going on to get around to it) and Germans (who did pay attention) in 'modern' warfare. By the time of WW I, everyone was learning from everyone and one thing the Etats Uniens determined to do was to avoid trench stalemates...

That a major war will occur is correct and I agree with your hypothesis with one exception. The small Wars will break out but they won't be easily avoidable because "There no real "need" for small wars proficiency in our armies as long as our politicians avoid stupid adventures in my opinion." while correct, too easily dismisses the stupidity of politicians. So we can, in the end, somewhat agree.

Thus, the US needs to be prepared for total spectrum warfare with a near term emphasis on the low intensity capabilities simply on the basis of probability.

[Presager]

Seems to me that there is the distinct possibility of Pakistan going fundamentalist. We would then have a truly horrendous scenario, which India would also be sucked into. How India would treat a fundamentalist Pakistan I do not know, but the likelihood of war between those two nuclear powers would then greatly increase.

The West could surely not afford to allow the existence of a fundamentalist, basically Al-Qaida inspired nuclear Pakistan. So I envisage a future where the West (even including our foot-dragging German and French brethren) and India wage war against Pakistan. This promises to be a fairly apocalyptic affair. Meanwhile, expect to see a regional Mid-East conflict once the U.S. and Britain have withdrawn their troops from Iraq. Perhaps Council members don't see an imminent (within 18 months at most) withdrawal of the majority of U.S. forces from Iraq as likely. However, that is certainly the majority view here in Britain, where there is certainty that British forces will be withdrawn some time before those 18 months are up, indeed before 12 months are up. As you know, areas of the British sector are being handed over to the Iraqi government, and British troops withdrawn, in an almost covert but nonetheless exponential manner already.

As Reagan once remarked, 'you ain't seen nothing yet.'

[Ken White]

the Islamists doing some significant over reaching and arousing Europe and thus beginning a segue into a minor apocalypse is too possible.

[SteveMetz]

Seems to me that there is the distinct possibility of Pakistan going fundamentalist.

I can't resist the urge to quibble in the name of accuracy. Technically, a "fundamentalist" is someone who believes that their religious script is complete and the unerring word of God. By definition, all Muslims are fundamentalists (but not all Christians are). Personally, I think "extremist" is a more accurate word to describe what we fear Pakistan becoming.

[cjmewett]

It's correct that there will be another major war, and it would be surprising if one knew about it even as little as three years in advance. It will most likely turn out being as surprising in its nature as WW1 because there were so few major wars in the past decades.
It's also correct in my opinion that mroe small wars will break out with western participation, although I consider that as easily avoidable.

I fail to see how insurgents somewhere in distant places are a threat for our security and therefore need to be combatted. There no real "need" for small wars proficiency in our armies as long as our politicians avoid stupid adventures in my opinion.

So the big war faction is in my opinion correct. Neither counter-insurgency campaigns nor amateurish peacekeeping missions without real mandate like Bosnia are unavoidable.
And in fact it would be quite possible to keep the whole NATO out of conventional conflicts for decades if our people and political elites truly wanted that.
But that won't happen. Wel'll see more peacekeeping about five to ten major wars with NATO country participation till the end of the century and a bit less large counter-insurgency campaigns, the next one at the latest around 2040 when the memories of Iraq and Afghanistan have faded.
Well, that's my guess - based on my feeling and on a look into 20th and 19th century history.

In order :

Actually it dates back much further in the History of European involvement in the North American Continent and reached a nadir of sorts during our Civil War which was the gestation point of the education of the French (who did not pay attention), British (who had too many small wars going on to get around to it) and Germans (who did pay attention) in 'modern' warfare. By the time of WW I, everyone was learning from everyone and one thing the Etats Uniens determined to do was to avoid trench stalemates...

That a major war will occur is correct and I agree with your hypothesis with one exception. The small Wars will break out but they won't be easily avoidable because "There no real "need" for small wars proficiency in our armies as long as our politicians avoid stupid adventures in my opinion." while correct, too easily dismisses the stupidity of politicians. So we can, in the end, somewhat agree.

Thus, the US needs to be prepared for total spectrum warfare with a near term emphasis on the low intensity capabilities simply on the basis of probability.

I must admit that I'm a bit stunned by your agreement here. Beyond the simple suggestion that "history shows there will always be conventional wars," what reason is there to believe that the United States will be involved in one any time soon? Does it not seem far more likely that, in an age of unquestioned American (conventional) superiority and proliferation of nuclear weapons to several regional powers, great power war is a thing of the past?

It's correct that there will be another major war, and it would be surprising if one knew about it even as little as three years in advance. It will most likely turn out being as surprising in its nature as WW1 because there were so few major wars in the past decades.

Can you give an example of how this might go, or why? Is three years just an arbitrary number?

I fail to see how insurgents somewhere in distant places are a threat for our security and therefore need to be combatted. There no real "need" for small wars proficiency in our armies as long as our politicians avoid stupid adventures in my opinion.

It's ironic that this sentiment should be expressed in a thread centered around the work of Barnett. One could argue -- and he does, convincingly -- that there is no greater threat to American interests in the modern age than anti-globalist, rejectionist, even nihilist fringe groups sabotaging their countries' attempts to connect to the American-led global political and economic system. While one might contend that such groups and conflicts aren't a direct threat to the lives of American citizens, they are certainly a threat to American prosperity and economic interests. Further, if such groups are successful in their attempts to establish polities that are "off the grid" so to speak, they certainly threaten American security by creating un-governed or under-governed areas from which physical threats to American life can originate (see pre-2001 Afghanistan, modern Iraq, Pakistan's northwest frontier, the horn of Africa, the Colombian interior, etc).

I won't attempt to provide Barnett's entire rationale here, but I think you're expressing an outmoded approach to national interest and sensible foreign/security policy. The idea that better national leadership consists of "avoiding stupid adventures" is certainly correct, but it's worth considering whether your definition of "stupid adventures" is a useful one.

This is, of course, a question of grand strategy above all. But how else can we approach reorganization of the military (and the entire interagency apparatus that supports uniformed forces in postconflict situations) than by trying to understand our national priorities? There's a bigger question than "how do we win the wars that happen?," namely "how do we decide what wars we need to fight?"

I think most people in this community understand and acknowledge that victory in the Long War doesn't simply mean killing a lot of terrorists, but dramatically reshaping the terrain on which current conflicts are being fought. This will continue to be necessary long after the bulk of American troops have left Iraq. It seems to me that America's future wars will largely be a question of asserting control over un- and under-governed territory, supporting the forces of government and establishment, and combating rejectionist insurgencies. These realities won't go away simply because we ignore them, or because someone's definition of political wisdom can be summed up along the lines of "we don't do nation-building."

*I should note here that the quoted passages I've referenced specifically are not Ken White's, and that the way I've formatted this message might be somewhat confusing. By quoting Ken White's reply I meant to show that I disagree with the consensus reached by the two cited posters, though lastdingo's original sentiments are what I've chosen to respond to specifically.

[reed11b]

So how does Russia resurgent (or at least re-aggressive) affect this discussion?
Reed

[AmericanPride]

Forgive my inexperience, but I would like to know how we can possibly call our current "small wars" small wars at all, given the cost and burdens placed upon the services and the nation politically and economically. The terminology seems misleading and somewhat disingenuous because the type of conflict (conventional or not) does not seem to have any relation whatsoever with the scope of the conflict (which is what the terminology implies). Another poster stated the US needs to continue "dramatically reshaping the terrain" in its small wars. So is Iraq a "small" war? Is/was the Russian campaign in Georgia a "big" war? Seems to me there's an inverse relationship between the type (big/small) of war and the objectives sought? I understand the necessity of expert groups to invent or redefine terms for their own use, but I'm not sure if the terminology is actually useful? Clausewitz talked about a culminating point of victory in big wars -- is there a similar concept in small wars where our objectives become so numerous, complex, and detailed that they become burdensome to waging the war? I'm not yet certain its about the dichotomy of conventional/unconventional war because I do not yet think the distinction is sufficient to actually alter the nature of war itself. I admit my insight in this subject is simple because of my lack of hands-on experience with it, and I'm tempted to continue returning to On War as my war bible, so I'll defer to the experts. I want to believe!

[Ken White]

comments may not muddy the water too much...

The terminology seems misleading and somewhat disingenuous because the type of conflict (conventional or not) does not seem to have any relation whatsoever with the scope of the conflict (which is what the terminology implies).

While that is true, on balance the net commitment of troops and effort to these wars is relatively small compared to most previous wars -- to include Korea which was mostly conventional but still a small war not requiring a major mobilization.

With respect to:

...given the cost and burdens placed upon the services and the nation politically and economically.

Personally, I don't see any great political burden; the economic cost is, while quite large, easily affordable and far less than the commitment of national resources required for such 'big' wars as the Civil War, WWI and WW II. the burden on the services is thus commensurately larger due to the lessened expenditure -- and, of course, the far smaller Armed Forces than those other wars required or had available. When one compares the regrettable but quite small casualty rates with any of those wars (or Korea or Viet Nam for that matter), these are emphatically small wars.

This is also true with respect to the cost, compared to percentage of GDP or other benchmarks, the dollar cost of this war is less than Viet Nam (a mid-size war) and Korea (a small war with medium intrusions in spots).

So is Iraq a "small" war? Is/was the Russian campaign in Georgia a "big" war?

Yes to the first; a qualified no to the second.

Clausewitz talked about a culminating point of victory in big wars -- is there a similar concept in small wars where our objectives become so numerous, complex, and detailed that they become burdensome to waging the war?

Depends on the type of conflict. Basically, if a COIN effort is involved, there is not going to be a culminating point (In Herr C's day, there could be by killing them all; can't do that today, the BBC gets upset...). If an insurgency is entailed, the best one can achieve is an acceptable outcome. Even if not (see Korea), a limited national objective may mean there is no culminating point.

I'm not yet certain its about the dichotomy of conventional/unconventional war because I do not yet think the distinction is sufficient to actually alter the nature of war itself.

It doesn't alter war; it can alter warfare (i.e. the way the war is fought -- and ended).

I admit my insight in this subject is simple because of my lack of hands-on experience with it, and I'm tempted to continue returning to On War as my war bible, so I'll defer to the experts.

In inverse order, an Expert is an EX, a has been, and a 'spert' is a drip of water under pressure. There are no experts and opinions are a dime a dozen. Mine are no more worthy than yours, others will have opinions that differ from both ours -- and that ought to be okay; there are no hard and fast answers. All the experience in the world still leaves one with more questions than answers...

All bibles are written by men, translated by other men and read by yet others -- that's three possibilities for error. No one is infallible and again, there are no hard and fast answers and there is absolutely no Grand Guru who is invariably correct.

[BayonetBrant]

So is Iraq a "small" war? Is/was the Russian campaign in Georgia a "big" war?

Yes to the first; a qualified no to the second.

How about "yes" and "not yet", respectively?

[Ken White]

I must admit that I'm a bit stunned by your agreement here...

I have no idea who he's talking to in that statement. He ends with this:

*I should note here that the quoted passages I've referenced specifically are not Ken White's, and that the way I've formatted this message might be somewhat confusing. By quoting Ken White's reply I meant to show that I disagree with the consensus reached by the two cited posters, though lastdingo's original sentiments are what I've chosen to respond to specifically.

Nor do I understand all I know about this statement of his...

Apparently his argument was with lastdingo, not me -- but who knows. He was absolutely correct in saying "...the way I've formatted this message might be somewhat confusing." Probably just as well I missed it earlier, who needs me erupting all over the screen...

However, to get up to date, on Reed11b's question; beats me -- time will tell...