Controversial article about parachute operations

[RTK]

An airfield secured by a battalion or brigade is no logistical hub in conventional war as it's easily in range of artillery. There's no way how paratroopers could control a 80+ km diameter circle around the airfield.
If otherwise the threat isn't that bad, it doesn't need a whole division at all, a couple of companies could seize an airfield until air-deployable reinforcements arrive. The lack of a need for large airborne unit deployment was part of the topic here.

It's called a foothold. It's a basic principle of warfare. And why would they have to secure 80km? We don't need runways that long. Fundamentals of reconnaissance and security in addition to engagement area development would never necessitate something like that. Again, if this is one of the large sticking points, revist the two or three posts about maintaining a readily deployable Brigade sized element 24/7/365 over a period of years. This argument is pointless. It's much the same as saying the Marines don't need a capability for beachhead operations anymore.

It's a quite simple job of a couple of weeks to adapt the system to another 6x6 truck.

With the politics involved in aquisitions I'm fully confident the Army could drag that process out at least a year or two.

Well, there are still mortars. A larger quantity of incomparably lighter 120mm mortars is less prone to be the victim of Murphy's law in airborne operations than few heavy guns that don't outrange enemy artillery anyway, are as unable to shoot & scoot as the mortars and generally less responsive to battalion's needs than organic mortars (especially in disorderly operations such as airborne operations were in history).

A 120mm mortar system is exactly easy to breakdown in the dismounted mode. Remember that the artillery pieces in the Airborne aren't dragged around the battlefield by 15 soldiers hooked up to it like pack mules. And you're restricted by the amount of round you carry around. I'm not going to build my indirect fire plan around that for a prolonged period.

I've seen the M777. It's a stupid design for a division that would in case of an airborne operation need 360° coverage. Even old D-30's and gun models of the mid to late 40's are better in that regard.

I'd agree, if we were dumb enough to point them all the same direction. Have you ever seen a well trained light artillery battery shoot gunnery?

It's interesting to see this repeating pattern everywhere. Uniformed personnel of armies that hadn't to fight first-grade enemies for decades tend to be really confident in their army's capabilities and proficiency (even when it's failing in the meantime and despite in a clash between two first-grade armies there can only be one superior).

No different than the pattern of armchair quarterbacks with no operational experience. Plus I've seen how we do at Bright Star, Fowl Eagle, and any number of multi-national exercises against a bunch of armies that still fight with white light in the dark. If the insinuation is that we lost our ability to fight the high intensity conflict, I'd invite you to NTC any given week. Or see one of our many tank ranges here at Fort Knox.

[slapout9]

Lastdingo,During the period that I was in 72-75 we practiced many of the operations that you say can not be done as a matter of routine procedure. The establishment of an "Airhead" or Foothold as RTK said is Airborne Warfare 101. For all 3 years we had a Combined Arms Exercise called the "Exotic Dancer" series where the 82nd would jump about 20 miles inland and the Marines would land at Onslow Beach and we would link up to establish what is known as a "Salient" (secured and defended area)to allow for heavy follow on forces.
We jumped with our own DIVARTY 105mm and we also had what was known as TAC air support assigned to us. At that time we also had a light Armor capability. Plus and this was where I met a lot of Marines who had what they used to call ANGLICO's or something like that, they were ARTY forward observers for Naval gunfire....big gun fire. 18th Airborne Corps also has big guns 155mm. Defending an airfield would not be a problem for an Airborne Brigade. That was just one of our bread and butter type jobs. I was also what was called fully climatized meaning my unit the 2/504 had been trained in Cold weather Ops, Desert Ops,and Jungle Ops.

[Lastdingo]

The problem in defending an airhead such that an air force would dare to send lots of transport aircraft to land on that airfield is the artillery threat.

I don't know why exactly you trained that, but certainly not for conventional warfare with medium to high force densities.
Aircraft are extremely vulnerable on ground and the mere possibility that an enemy shoots a rocet salvo over 50km distance that scatters ICM on the whole airfield would let the air force generals veto such a plan.

It's possible against lesser enemies, btu even then you need to assume that this enemy is incapable to hold the airfield or at least an area nearby. You basically assume that the enemy fails to do his job. That's overly optimistic against competent enemies.

Well, you could of course just attack practically defenseless countries and end up with COIN warfare.

By the way, artillery range was much lower in the 70's, effective artillery range of mainstay guns has almost doubled in the meantime and longer-range tactical missiles are no longer exotic equipment.

There's no way how shoot & scoot missile artillery can be suppressed - even in fancy RMA scenarios in desert areas you end up with the capability to destroy them AFTER they shot their salvo, compromising their identity as MRL and not standard logistical or civilian trucks.

I'm waiting for an air force guy to describe what AF officers would think about sending C-130 or C-17 onto an airfield that's periodically hit by ICM.
They could for example say that dud removal from the runway alone would require minutes after each single incoming rocket - if several several specialist mineclearing vehicles were flown in early and not lost to air defense or artillery.

[jcustis]

The problem in defending an airhead such that an air force would dare to send lots of transport aircraft to land on that airfield is the artillery threat.

I don't know why exactly you trained that, but certainly not for conventional warfare with medium to high force densities.
Aircraft are extremely vulnerable on ground and the mere possibility that an enemy shoots a rocet salvo over 50km distance that scatters ICM on the whole airfield would let the air force generals veto such a plan.

It's possible against lesser enemies, btu even then you need to assume that this enemy is incapable to hold the airfield or at least an area nearby. You basically assume that the enemy fails to do his job. That's overly optimistic against competent enemies.

Well, you could of course just attack practically defenseless countries and end up with COIN warfare.

By the way, artillery range was much lower in the 70's, effective artillery range of mainstay guns has almost doubled in the meantime and longer-range tactical missiles are no longer exotic equipment.

There's no way how shoot & scoot missile artillery can be suppressed - even in fancy RMA scenarios in desert areas you end up with the capability to destroy them AFTER they shot their salvo, compromising their identity as MRL and not standard logistical or civilian trucks.

I'm waiting for an air force guy to describe what AF officers would think about sending C-130 or C-17 onto an airfield that's periodically hit by ICM.
They could for example say that dud removal from the runway alone would require minutes after each single incoming rocket - if several several specialist mineclearing vehicles were flown in early and not lost to air defense or artillery.

LD, you seem to be in a debating mood, so entertain me these questions:

-I'm curious what "competent" adversaries there are out there that can achieve the appropriate degree of accuracy to sling a rocket (or salvo) 50km with the required accuracy to influence (I'll not go so far as to say stop expeditionary airfield operations. I mean, c'mon, we put thousands of troops under the possible umbrella of SCUD-delivered WMDs just over four years ago. Can we agree it is a stretch to say we wouldn't risk a few aircraft (that won't be sitting on any runway for long).

-Do you really think MRL can be effectively disguised as simple logistical or civilian trucks, and then exercise the required command and control to set into a fire position, receive fire missions, and shoot? They can hide for a while, but if we are going to protect a airhead (or beachead for that matter) we are going to employ a wider range of shooter/sensors than an airborne force would bring in on its own. Expand your mind a bit to consider that.

-Have you ever seen dud ICM neutralized? It's remarkably easy using the appropriate personnel. It doesn't take a mineclearer, believe me.

[RTK]

LD, you seem to be in a debating mood, so entertain me these questions:

-I'm curious what "competent" adversaries there are out there that can achieve the appropriate degree of accuracy to sling a rocket (or salvo) 50km with the required accuracy to influence (I'll not go so far as to say stop expeditionary airfield operations. I mean, c'mon, we put thousands of troops under the possible umbrella of SCUD-delivered WMDs just over four years ago. Can we agree to say it is a stretch to say we wouldn't risk a few aircraft (that won't be sitting on any runway for long).

-Do you really think MRL can be effectively disguised as simple logistical or civilian trucks, and then exercise the required command and control to set into a fire position, receive fire missions, and shoot? They can hide for a while, but if we are going to protect a airhead (or beachead for that matter) we are going to employ a wider range of shooter/sensors than would an airborne force would bring in on its own. Expand your mind a bit to consider that.

-Have you ever seen dud ICM neutralized? It's remarkably easy using the appropriate personnel. It doesn't take a mineclearer, believe me.

J,

You got the fight. I'm breaking contact and bypassing.

[Lastdingo]

LD, you seem to be in a debating mood, so entertain me these questions:

-I'm curious what "competent" adversaries there are out there that can achieve the appropriate degree of accuracy to sling a rocket (or salvo) 50km with the required accuracy to influence (I'll not go so far as to say stop expeditionary airfield operations. I mean, c'mon, we put thousands of troops under the possible umbrella of SCUD-delivered WMDs just over four years ago. Can we agree to say it is a stretch to say we wouldn't risk a few aircraft (that won't be sitting on any runway for long).

-Do you really think MRL can be effectively disguised as simple logistical or civilian trucks, and then exercise the required command and control to set into a fire position, receive fire missions, and shoot? They can hide for a while, but if we are going to protect a airhead (or beachead for that matter) we are going to employ a wider range of shooter/sensors than would an airborne force would bring in on its own. Expand your mind a bit to consider that.

-Have you ever seen dud ICM neutralized? It's remarkably easy using the appropriate personnel. It doesn't take a mineclearer, believe me.

OK, one after another.

- Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Iran, Algeria, North Korea, Colombia, Venezuela, Brasilia, Chile, Peru, Mexico. Just to name a few. It doesn't take more than standard artillery and motivated men.

- The South African Valkiri is a MRL that cannot be recognized as MRL in travel mode. Towed versions of BM-21 MRL could easily be camouflaged as normal trailer. The military components of a BM-21 can be removed and put onto a civilian truck in a backyard repair shop. It's easy to cover that launcher.
Long-range MRL can be scattered over such a large area and still reach out to the airfield that securing the Iraqi borders is easy in comparison to finding such a vehicle.
It's also not that difficult to aim with a MRL. All you need is your position and the airfield position on a 1:50,000 map plus a meteological rocket shot into the air and observed with optics as well as a bit meteorological information that helps you guess the wind between the MRL and the airfield in the relevant altitudes. That's no high-tech, it's barely Korean War level tech.

The U.S. military knew that Iraq had no functioning Scuds left in 2003. The whole rocket fuel issue prevented that. The fuel degrades within weeks, and they had no supply for years. Besides that the U.N. had found almost all examples and documented their destruction.

- ICM dud neutralization is not difficult once they're spotted, but that's something different if stones from nearby explosions are scattered over the runway as well and if you want to clear a runway of almost a km length and 30+ m width within less than the couple of minutes as I mentioned. Artillery ICM is also usually much smaller than bomb submunitions are.
And even if you simply shot the dud with a .50cal, you would likely still be required to clear the runway of sharp metal fragments. One such fragment is no problem, dozens on every take-off or landing are a problem.


The whole idea that C-17 alike aircraft would land on an airfield that's only secured with a safety distance of a couple of miles is simply unrealistic. That's good for very nice propaganda pictures when congress needs to be convinced to pay for the C-17, but no air force in the world would do that, not even the Russians.

[Lastdingo]

80 km = 40 km to left and 40 km to the right, enough safety distance to most enemy artillery. That's where 80 km diameter comes from. Of course nobody needs 80km runway. But just securing an airfield to use it while under artillery fire is BS.

M777/LW155 batteries (why batteries in the first place with modern tech?) set up facing in different directions. The gun has a traverse of +/-400 mils, 360° is for Americans 640 mils, so you'd need 8 batteries (guns) to cover all 360°, probably 7 if some range is wasted and emplacement optimized for traverse coverage.
Anything beyond that +/-400mils traverse requires to move the spade out of the ground (never gets stuck, of course!), turn with manpower, ram it again into the ground and fire. Requirement for that was 2-3 minutes. For an action that some other towed gun designs do in 10-20 seconds since about sixty years.

[/quote]And I thought MRL systems were Korean War-simple, yet you make them out to be inefficient as it suits you:

The responsiveness to different missions (different munitions) is also better, and accuracy is better for unguided munitions. Minimum range is smaller. I meant this for the 30 km range, without BB or RAP.

Are you reading all of this out of your copy of Jane's, or a Tom Clancy novel?[/quote]

I don't read Clancy, and I don't need Jane's A&A for such fundamentals.
Artillery aiming is relatively simple in comparison to much of today's other military activities, unobserved indirect artillery fire is more than 100 years old. A target like a long runway can easily be hit and even more easily be threatened.
Yet at the same time rocket artillery cannot as quickly respond to different missions as howitzers and mortars, as you cannot simply in a couple of seconds unload the DPICM rockets to load WP and switch to HE for some cratering or else. A military professional should not doubt such facts.
But maybe you can actually prove that anything in above quote (well, my part of the quote) was wrong instead of resorting to polemic?

Well, anyway. Why should I care. As long as it's not my people I shouldn't care if other armies try missions like seizing an airhead and using it with 250 million $ airplanes loaded with dozens of soldiers while under artillery fire.

Airfield operation under artillery fire has been done before. It eliminated much of the Luftwaffe's transport aircraft inventory in winter 1942/1943 near Stalingrad.
Of course, no enemy that the USA will attack in the next years will be as sophisticated as the Red Army in 1942/43...operating rocket artillery is too challenging... the enemies are too dumb... Murphy's Law doesn't exist... no one would emplace mines below the runway to blow it up in time... U.S. presidents have the guts to send thousands of relatively lightly armed troops behind enemy lines... no one would simply build some concrete obstacles on the runway or blow it up in advance as the own air force cannot use it anyway... no one would pre-register artillery or even mortars on possible infiltration points...howitzers have a longer minimum firing distance than a MRL...MRL unguided rockets have less dispersion than howitzer rounds...HIMARS is fine for obscuration missions...whatever. I learned a lto today.


I'll tell you something. All I'd need to make any airfield useless and unacceptable for forced entry missions is to cover parts of it with garbage. Ah, and I'd set up some snipers with IR sights and passive IR movement sensors to cover it.
The uncertainty if the runway could be made usable in time and if it's even left or already blown up would make the whole airfield useless for the planners.

Sorry for double posts, the forum first showed me page 3 as last page and I bet one post of double length wouldn't be an easier read.

[jcustis]

I'll tell you something. All I'd need to make any airfield useless and unacceptable for forced entry missions is to cover parts of it with garbage. Ah, and I'd set up some snipers with IR sights and passive IR movement sensors to cover it.
The uncertainty if the runway could be made usable in time and if it's even left or already blown up would make the whole airfield useless for the planners.

By all means Napoleon, have at it. You win! You sunk my battleship!?! Maybe I'll trump your sniper with my AC-130 Spectre? Oh wait, I forgot that those snipers will be wearing their invisibility cloaks...no...aw crap, that's the Harry Potter stuff...

Gotta remember to take my eldest to the midnight freakshow at Borders so she can pick up her copy.

[Mike Spight]

Until SGM Grumpy forwarded the link to Meyer's webzine, I didn't know (or care) who he was. After reading the article (and his previous issue in which he stated that the creation of USSOCOM was a bad idea) I did care.

As most eveyone here has stated, he's clearly a moron...ill equipped to comment on a capability and community in which some of us have spent many years.

I exchanged emails with Meyer but will not post here. Let's just say that his defensive, wise assed response to my courteous query regarding his military credentials was exactly what I expected and spoke volumes.

ATW,

Mike

[RTK]

Until SGM Grumpy forwarded the link to Meyer's webzine, I didn't know (or care) who he was. After reading the article (and his previous issue in which he stated that the creation of USSOCOM was a bad idea) I did care.

As most eveyone here has stated, he's clearly a moron...ill equipped to comment on a capability and community in which some of us have spent many years.

I exchanged emails with Meyer but will not post here. Let's just say that his defensive, wise assed response to my courteous query regarding his military credentials was exactly what I expected and spoke volumes.

ATW,

Mike

I e-mailed the SOCOM article to a retired SF officer. His response was extremely appropriate; "Clearly someone with an opinion without all the facts." A good outlook that can be applied to just about any of his essays on that site.

Welcome to the forum, Sir!

[Mike Spight]

Thanks RTK; it's been a while since I've visited and it's good to be back.

ATW...

Mike

[Bill Moore]

Is there an Airborne Mafia? Yes. Is there an Armor Mafia? Yes Is there a Stryker Mafia? Yes. Is the Marine Corp one big Mafia? Yes Does each mafia look after the family business? Yes

I think many of us in this council have been on planning teams for numerous contingencies, and we have all experienced every service, and sub-elements of the services trying to get in on a mission, whether their particular capability fit our not. You go to joint schools and then work in joint commands you quickly learn that the best plan isn't the best plan, but rather the most purple plan is the best plan. Jointness has become a mantra that has over rode common sense. Our entire system is flawed, and yet we hear more call for more jointness! Jointness is good when it facilitates needed dovetailing, but it is evil when it forces illogical combinations. We seem to have a some sort of perverted combination of a socialist and capitialist mentality in the military, where our socialist side begs for equal participation, and our capitialist side urges us to compete with our fellow American Warriors for a key position in the fight. Everyone gets to take credit for it, and everyone can use Operation Whatever to justify future budget requests. I'm not sure there is a solution, maybe one service? If that was the case it should clearly be led by a combination of the Army Airborne and SOF

120mm you're clearly wrong, there is no more important capability than the Airborne!

[RTK]

Is there an Airborne Mafia? Yes. Is there an Armor Mafia? Yes Is there a Stryker Mafia? Yes. Is the Marine Corp one big Mafia? Yes Does each mafia look after the family business? Yes

I think many of us in this council have been on planning teams for numerous contingencies, and we have all experienced every service, and sub-elements of the services trying to get in on a mission, whether their particular capability fit our not. You go to joint schools and then work in joint commands you quickly learn that the best plan isn't the best plan, but rather the most purple plan is the best plan. Jointness has become a mantra that has over rode common sense. Our entire system is flawed, and yet we hear more call for more jointness! Jointness is good when it facilitates needed dovetailing, but it is evil when it forces illogical combinations. We seem to have a some sort of perverted combination of a socialist and capitialist mentality in the military, where our socialist side begs for equal participation, and our capitialist side urges us to compete with our fellow American Warriors for a key position in the fight. Everyone gets to take credit for it, and everyone can use Operation Whatever to justify future budget requests. I'm not sure there is a solution, maybe one service? If that was the case it should clearly be led by a combination of the Army Airborne and SOF

120mm you're clearly wrong, there is no more important capability than the Airborne!

The Airborne Mafia has never had a problem when the Armor Mafia shows up when they're in contact...