While youre point is appreciated, I don't think its related to my question. I'm trying to understand a comparison of the training and tactics of the two forces.
To discuss strategy would be like two guys talking about fire arms in WWII, and somebody else entering the conversation with a bunch of guff on the atomic bomb.
But to take your bait, was the Rhodesian Strategy really failed? I think its one thing to say your strategy is failed, when you have the best funded military in the world making little progress, but its something else to say an isolated country in an underdeveloped part of the world had a failed strategy, with almost zero trade partners, and borrowed or stolen equipment.
To take up Wilf's earlier point - you haven't articulated a thesis, you've articulated a topic. You still have to do that before we can truly critique you. Also, for an academic paper, you seem starting with a conclusion and looking backwards for evidence to justify it rather than observing the evidence and drawing a conclusion.
Yes, their tactical performance with little resources was brilliant, but it also didn't matter. What Steve and I are saying is that we get obsessed as a military with tactical innovation while ignoring our deficit in strategic thinking.
Totally true on all counts.The Rhodesians showed great tactical competence in an existential war, a really rather common occurrence.
In our last existential war, 1942-45, the US showed tactical competence. I have little doubt we will again when needed -- right now for most people, it simply is not needed, adequate will suffice. That's unfair to the guys and gals on the ground now but that's the way it has always been and is likely to stay. Democracies will not invest in really good and hard training short of existential wars -- the Mothers get too upset at the 2-5% casualty rate caused by rigorous training. So does Congress, it's expensive to pay those folks for the damage to their little bods thus incurred and in a tight recruiting market, unnecessary (in the eyes of the budgeteers and politicians) losses are frowned upon.
All the lessons from Rhodesia are readily available and have been studied, some are applicable, some are not. Those that have applicability have already been adopted. Ever notice how the US Troopie carries a weapon now versus say 15 years ago? That may be why some of us cannot understand what you're trying to do.
In any event, the tactical side isn't a problem, the politics of restraint, risk avoidance and getting out of Dodge are the problem. Regrettably, the Rhodesian tactical lessons don't cover that. Their strategic error let down all those great tactical moves. Ours looks about to repeat the flaw...
If you do not get the strategy right, you are not going to succeed tactically even though there will be (and are, in Afghanistan; were in Iraq...) a number of great tactical ploys, moves and operations. The TTPs aren't the problem, the politics are.
Yes in that it was indeed an existential war. Remind me of some other existential wars?
MaybeIn our last existential war, 1942-45, the US showed tactical competence. I have little doubt we will again when needed -- right now for most people, it simply is not needed, adequate will suffice. That's unfair to the guys and gals on the ground now but that's the way it has always been and is likely to stay. Democracies will not invest in really good and hard training short of existential wars -- the Mothers get too upset at the 2-5% casualty rate caused by rigorous training. So does Congress, it's expensive to pay those folks for the damage to their little bods thus incurred and in a tight recruiting market, unnecessary (in the eyes of the budgeteers and politicians) losses are frowned upon.
Studied by whom?All the lessons from Rhodesia are readily available and have been studied, some are applicable, some are not. Those that have applicability have already been adopted. Ever notice how the US Troopie carries a weapon now versus say 15 years ago? That may be why some of us cannot understand what you're trying to do.
Carries his weapon? Hanging a weapon on a sling around your neck (hands free) is called carrying a weapon?
Every aspect deserves study as competence is required at every level. Regardless of Carter's success in defeating Rhodesia politically any tactical lessons as there may be still stand.In any event, the tactical side isn't a problem, the politics of restraint, risk avoidance and getting out of Dodge are the problem. Regrettably, the Rhodesian tactical lessons don't cover that. Their strategic error let down all those great tactical moves. Ours looks about to repeat the flaw...
"Tactically" means what happens at tactical level. Success there like "they never lost a battle" is meaningful (even if not fully true) regardless of what the politicians foulded up or they could not withstand in terms of international pressure.If you do not get the strategy right, you are not going to succeed tactically even though there will be (and are, in Afghanistan; were in Iraq...) a number of great tactical ploys, moves and operations. The TTPs aren't the problem, the politics are.
Many in the US. Not least the Infantry School and RAND (as Jslade0 mentioned).You miss that?No. That's called hanging your weapon around your neck (hands free). The pictures below shows the new and the old carry. The Recruiting Poster is from whence we learned it. You miss that, too?Carries his weapon? Hanging a weapon on a sling around your neck (hands free) is called carrying a weapon?It's meaningful to those who fought those battles -- to others, not so much. And as you say, even if not fully true. Add that if, in the end, for whatever reason if the tactics were great and Rhodesia is no more, then the strategy was flawed. Rightly or wrongly, the actions of the US , UK and moist of the Europeans were fairly predictable -- as were those of Russia and China."Tactically" means what happens at tactical level. Success there like "they never lost a battle" is meaningful (even if not fully true) regardless of what the politicians foulded up or they could not withstand in terms of international pressure.
You guys did good because you had to, that lends an impetus missing today. That simple.
Last edited by Ken White; 10-27-2011 at 01:20 AM.
Must have.
You see I am researching for a book on the RLI right now and have found there are very few published sources on this topic. I should be forgiven for asking what source documents they are using for this study?
Well what you may have missed was that when I arrived in Rhodesia in 1973 most weapons were carried on the shoulder (hunting style) and the RLI operated in shorts and t-shirts with no camo cream. Once the war got hotter and the casualty rate increased and the dots were connected we moved into full camo with all exposed skin camo'd. There were some hold outs who insisted on wearing shorts and Tshirts and camo'd their legs and arms.No. That's called hanging your weapon around your neck (hands free). The pictures below shows the new and the old carry. The Recruiting Poster is from whence we learned it. You miss that, too?
And of course the weapons moved to the ready at all times. (Daily "pokey drill" was done when in camp to strengthen the required muscles in this regard.)
Competence at every level is meaningful. For the private soldier skill at arms and combat competence are the most important thing for him and his mates. All armies should provide the training at that (and all levels) which will allow their soldiers to have the skill at arms edge over the enemy of the day.It's meaningful to those who fought those battles -- to others, not so much. And as you say, even if not fully true. Add that if, in the end, for whatever reason if the tactics were great and Rhodesia is no more, then the strategy was flawed. Rightly or wrongly, the actions of the US , UK and moist of the Europeans were fairly predictable -- as were those of Russia and China.
That said the political issues may be a whole lot more complicated and problematic but that does not diminish the personal skill of the soldiers nor the combat effectiveness of fire teams/sections/platoons.companies/battalions when viewed separately and specifically.
I will leave the comment on the geopolitics as the Rhodesian military can be studied with only limited reference to the political mistakes and who screwed who...
There was a wide variation in quality between the regular units, the national service (conscripts), the Territorial units (reserves), the police and the various militias. Everyone can carry a weapon but not everyone makes a good fighting soldier. Yes, when going the extra mile is directly motivated by keeping families, wives, children and the lot safe (when they live an hour or twos drive from the "operational area") it is not too difficult to get the troops up for that.You guys did good because you had to, that lends an impetus missing today. That simple.
Having a low grade enemy also helped.
Last edited by JMA; 11-09-2010 at 10:39 AM.
They mostly come at night. Mostly.
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