Quote Originally Posted by Condor View Post
Getting back on track, I feel that there is A LOT of tactical and operational levels to be learned from the Rhodesian Bush War. I think the Rhodesian use of aviation assets could be very beneficial for lots of militaries around the world, especially ones who are fighting "insurgents/freedom fighters/guerrillas" in some lonely long forgotten piece of land. The problem we Americans have is that we are used to abundance and in a military that spends the equivalent of many countries yearly military budgets one weapon system like a B-2 stealth bomber or a nuclear powered aircraft carrier it can be hard to be innovative. Between our gluttonous appetite for expensive weapon systems and our ever increasing technology addiction we tend to forget that the greatest asset is the person. The less a person has the more innovative they will have to become in order to achieve success when faced with challenging circumstances. So from a pure "doing more with less" mentality most of the US and its military are poor examples of that. The one traditional exception to this role has been that of the US Marines but over the last 20 years I'm starting to believe that even Marines are becoming addicted to the "large expenditure/ fancy weapon systems" crowd. Classic examples of this are the Corps primary replacement aviation assets of the MV-22 and F-35 aircraft. Both of these aircraft are tremendously expensive and I'm still skeptical of how useful they really would be in a conflict such as the one Rhodesia found itself in. I believe aircraft like the H-60 and A-10 would be much more useful, appropriate, survival and most importantly cheap, like REALLY cheap compared to the MV-22/F-35. When you take into account the increase in night vision device technology (which itself can practically be bought off the counter now) and small cheap UAVs these things could be integrated into lethal utility without high overhead costs. You made mention about how the Rhodesian Air Force was pretty much "grounded" at night due to limitations of available night vision devices, can you image how much they would have changed the picture if your air force had access to these back then?
Yes there are many modern technology innovations that would have been very valuable to us back then - 1st generation night vision was in use back then but we did not have it - but I suppose the Russians would have made weapons available to them too - thinking mainly anti aircraft - which would have made attacks on their external bases more difficult or impossible. So what I am saying is that technology itself does not ensure victory. It is how it is applied that makes the difference.

In regards to inter-service rivalry, vested interests, rank structure, rules etc I think this becomes a two way street. First, I think inter-service rivalry can be healthy as it breeds competition and this competition can force people to take pride in their unit/organization and to push themselves to be better. At the local level, I've worked with every branch of the US armed forces including the Coast Guard and all of them have had their share of go-getters and a few turds sprinkled in here and there. I think the problems were are seeing today within the US have to do with leadership but I have faith that if a large enough crisis came about the cream would actually rise to the top and we'd see a completely different military than what we are seeing right now. I'm kind of a Churchill student in the sense that I have faith in my fellow citizen when the time comes for the hard work to be done. When it's easy going, the sloths seem to appear and take over (no offense to the animal).
But the US does not fight wars where the national interest is sufficient to override the the inter-service rivalry, vested interests, rank structure, rules etc.

Yes, I think vested interests, rules and the like can be bad especially if they become self serving and take away from the greater good. I'm an idealist when it comes to the greater good, I always hope people will set aside their petty differences to do what's RIGHT for the big picture. Unfortunately, this is often not the case as some of us well know.
Perhaps this is jcustis was alluding to here when he said:

"There are a great number of limitations that would make it difficult to translate the Fire Force of old into an effective counter-insurgent force for Afghanistan. Part of the problem is simple fact of training. We didn't fight that way before the Long War began (though I certainly advocated it some while ago), and trying to adapt to these tactics would require paradigm shifts of enormous proportion.that the Army and Marine Corps just simple cannot make these days."

Your war was unique in many ways and much of what Rhodesia went through will never apply or carry over to the US. I'm sure fighting for your very existence gives one plenty of incentive to put their heart and soul into it and equally devastating when it doesn't work out.
This failure by US forces to put themselves in the position of the combatants (especially those they side with) in foreign wars is the principle weakness.

Remember, the US went through a Great Civil War many decades ago. I often think about what it must have been like for those people back then whenever I read about the US Civil War. The thought of taking up arms against men who I had previously served with in combat is unfathomable to me but remember this was the norm when the Civil War broke out. Men who had come into the service together, went through schooling together, fought in other wars together, then woke up one day, switched uniforms (if they went with the South) and then engaged in mortal combat with their former brothers-in-arms. People can say what they want about General Robert E. Lee, but here is a guy who fought and served the US and when war broke out between the states, he had to make the decision which side he would take. When he took it, it meant fighting against the very country he had served all the while throwing the lives of thousands of his (Southern) countrymen into the cauldron of fire. When defeated he laid down his arms and asked that his men join him in defeat and not to continue the hate against their former enemy (who had once been their former countrymen-talk about a mind trip).
If you can get your head arround that you can start to figure out the ultra complex issues around wars and insurgencies around the world.

So in closing, the truth is a strange animal. I think there are many things about the experiences in Rhodesia that are worth studying and remembering. I also know that the innovation and approach to some of the issues you all dealt with will never apply to the US. However, for the man who is willing to dedicate his life to the profession of arms to dismiss another conflict because of its differences is a grave mistake. It is only with open discourse and rigorous study can someone become a better rounded person who can help find his way when things start to become dark. Hubris, arrogance, and complacency are sure to get you killed no matter how big a stick you carry.
Yes indeed, I remember right here on the Council some guy stated that because the French had resorted to torture in algeria there was nothing to be learned from that conflict. Appalling logic.

However, superficial study is worse than no study.

Thank you for taking the time to respond in detail. Much appreciated.