All matters Rhodesian / Rhodesia (merged thread)

[Jslade0]

I understand there were a few incidents where either the SAS or RLI encountered armored units. And while fighting camps with populations in the low thousands, wouldn't it be fair to say there were at least vs. company sized engagements going on?

My thesis is roughly that the US should try learn several lessons from the Rhodesian Security Forces, mainly don't train whole brigades in COIN while neglecting HIC, keep cadre fresh from the fight, focus on Small unit tactics (like start printing 7-8 again), scouting is important to COIN, and again, scouting is important to COIN.

[William F. Owen]

I understand there were a few incidents where either the SAS or RLI encountered armored units. And while fighting camps with populations in the low thousands, wouldn't it be fair to say there were at least vs. company sized engagements going on?

As I said, "Sub-unit." Units are Battle Groups or Battalions. Do you have a military background? If not this would be an extremely challenging area for you to study. Challenging. Not impossible. Does your supervisor have a military background?

My thesis is roughly that the US should try learn several lessons from the Rhodesian Security Forces, mainly don't train whole brigades in COIN while neglecting HIC, keep cadre fresh from the fight, focus on Small unit tactics (like start printing 7-8 again), scouting is important to COIN, and again, scouting is important to COIN.

So the US should learn sub-unit tactics from the RLI? Sorry, but my opinion is that you should train to fight as a Brigade (Formation.) Formation level skills are essential. You cannot fight a bunch of clowns like Hezbollah without them.

Sub-unit Tactics are easy. It's a couple of weeks of Coy level training. It's all skills and drills stuff. This is extremely important, but it's cheap and easy to become proficient in this area - IF you know what you are doing to begin with.

Fighting at the Formation level is a whole game up, and the one most folks cannot do.

[JMA]

As I said, "Sub-unit." Units are Battle Groups or Battalions. Do you have a military background? If not this would be an extremely challenging area for you to study. Challenging. Not impossible. Does your supervisor have a military background?


So the US should learn sub-unit tactics from the RLI? Sorry, but my opinion is that you should train to fight as a Brigade (Formation.) Formation level skills are essential. You cannot fight a bunch of clowns like Hezbollah without them.

Sub-unit Tactics are easy. It's a couple of weeks of Coy level training. It's all skills and drills stuff. This is extremely important, but it's cheap and easy to become proficient in this area - IF you know what you are doing to begin with.

Fighting at the Formation level is a whole game up, and the one most folks cannot do.

Not sure a I agree that it is more difficult to operate at formation level. For whom would that be? Only for the brigade commander ... for the rest it is IMHO easier.

Sub-unit operations down to fire team level (four men) is not easier for the Brit forces. Corporals and Lance Corporals are not trained to apply the required degree of operational leadership and discretion that is required for such independent operations. How a typical US fireteam would perform independently on a (say) five day patrol I can't say.

[William F. Owen]

Sub-unit operations down to fire team level (four men) is not easier for the Brit forces. Corporals and Lance Corporals are not trained to apply the required degree of operational leadership and discretion that is required for such independent operations. How a typical US fireteam would perform independently on a (say) five day patrol I can't say.

Formation level operations require practising skills to that have a major flow down effect. For the fire team, there may not be a lot of difference, but for Coy Commanders on up, there will be, and very little can be adequately practised doing a CPX.

EG: A Formation level passage of lines, at night to launch to one battle group into an opposed obstacle crossing.

Training fire teams is cheap and easy. Training formations is vastly expensive and very complicated.

Why would you need bridging kit to facilitate a 4-man fireteam crossing a river?

You need bridging kit for all the vehicles, plus you need multiple bridging sites

[JMA]

Formation level operations require practising skills to that have a major flow down effect. For the fire team, there may not be a lot of difference, but for Coy Commanders on up, there will be, and very little can be adequately practised doing a CPX.

EG: A Formation level passage of lines, at night to launch to one battle group into an opposed obstacle crossing.

Training fire teams is cheap and easy. Training formations is vastly expensive and very complicated.

You need bridging kit for all the vehicles, plus you need multiple bridging sites

Having spent time as a staff officer (GSO3-Ops) at a brigade HQ I have to agree fully with you that the potential for a mark one c*ock-up threatened where the staff had not been exercised live and often.

That said I believe if I understand the context of this thread correctly it is the dexterity of the soldier in his ability to switch from a conventional operation to COIN ops without having to undergo training. I believe we got fairly close to this in the RLI and again the key to success was the understanding at corporal level.

[William F. Owen]

Having spent time as a staff officer (GSO3-Ops) at a brigade HQ I have to agree fully with you that the potential for a mark one c*ock-up threatened where the staff had not been exercised live and often.

....and not only. If BG staffs have never had to plan a relief in place, and the Coys never done a proper hand-over it all goes to rats very quickly. A lot of of the really challenging stuff really only happens at the Formation level, where Battle Group Staffs have to liaise and co-operate.

That said I believe if I understand the context of this thread correctly it is the dexterity of the soldier in his ability to switch from a conventional operation to COIN ops without having to undergo training. I believe we got fairly close to this in the RLI and again the key to success was the understanding at corporal level.

I would broadly concur, but almost always you can get time to train. Deployed Units even trained during WW1, 10 miles back from the trenches.
Yes, if you get it right at the platoon and Company level, almost all else will fall into place a great deal more easily than if not.

[William F. Owen]

not just their Light Infantry battalion (as you state RLI), was an integration of police, civilian, intelligence, regular and irregular combat units?

Well that's not tactics. It's Policy and Strategy. Those are all direct products of the British "Committee system". You may also want so study how the Committee system was used in Malaya, and Northern Ireland.

If all the basic rifle platoon is asked to do, is this easy stuff you say, what is going on in a brigade sized exercise? just them practicing those skills and drills over and over again? it seems that your recommendation means we should only worry about training a brigade staff, in some sort of rigorous tocx. I don't understand.

Sorry, but you are very mistaken. Formation level skills are about practising fighting as a formation. You can be very skilled at the Company level and utterly fall down at the Formation level.

Yes, a well trained brigade staff is essential. For example, the IDF has allocated considerable resources to training Brigade Staffs since 2006. You cannot do without them. - and CPX's (TOC-X?) do not cut it, when it comes to doing a Battle Group passage of lines to launch another Battle Group, into an opposed obstacle crossing. - and plan and execute that in < 4 hours. You actually need to go and get cold and wet out on the ground, and know how long it takes to move the bridging kit from the hide area into the launch site, and who moves when and where.

[davidbfpo]

Apart from scouring the various threads on SWC, their links and recommendations I would recommend a PM to those who have studied Rhodesian training, or undergone it.

Then I'd look at the literature written after 1980, by those who did serve; I say after 1980 as it will cut out the Soldier of Fortune material and the PR.

Have a look at some of the well known texts: Reid-Daly on the Selous Scouts, the two tomes on the RLI and RAR. Then 'No Mean Soldier' by Peter McAleese, a British professional NCO who served there.

I expect Rhodesian training was far more than a local variant on UK training, for example what was the impact before 1974 of the Portuguese? Plus South Africa, where after 1965 I expect much of the higher training took place.

Quite a few here would be interested in seeing the end product.

[Chris jM]

Interesting question, I'd be interested in reading your views on it as the topic progresses.

I think I have an e-copy of Rhodesian COIN doctrine somewhere, if that would be of benefit.

[The Westphalian Post]

... see 'Counterinsurgency in Africa: the Portuguese way of war, 1961-1974' by John P. Cann.


Ian Smith's regime was supported primarily by Portugal and Portugal had to fight in three different theatres in Africa.

[JMA]

Apart from scouring the various threads on SWC, their links and recommendations I would recommend a PM to those who have studied Rhodesian training, or undergone it.

Then I'd look at the literature written after 1980, by those who did serve; I say after 1980 as it will cut out the Soldier of Fortune material and the PR.

Have a look at some of the well known texts: Reid-Daly on the Selous Scouts, the two tomes on the RLI and RAR. Then 'No Mean Soldier' by Peter McAleese, a British professional NCO who served there.

I expect Rhodesian training was far more than a local variant on UK training, for example what was the impact before 1974 of the Portuguese? Plus South Africa, where after 1965 I expect much of the higher training took place.

Quite a few here would be interested in seeing the end product.

The Rhodesian Training evolved to meet local circumstances and was certainly based on British TTPs. Trained Brit soldiers who joined up were required to attend the "COIN phase" of recruit training (the last 7 weeks of the 19 weeks core training programme) the first 12 weeks being what we termed "conventional warfare" training which which the Brits knew all about.

The Portuguese taught us much about the basics of fire force operations as they had gunships with side mounted 20mm canons and were conducting heli bourne sweeps. We adopted those but realised that unless you have a stop line or cut-off groups that you sweep the insurgents into the sweep exercise is pointless (hence mowing the lawn futility in Afghanistan).

Also operating with the Portuguese and independently in Mozambique honed the fighting skills the SAS, RLI and the RAR would need later when the war came home.

South Africa's value was that Rhodesians attended their Command and Staff College (as did some Israelis), and they provided training in armour, artillery training and attached airforce choppers and crews and allowed use of strike craft and submarines for insertion of small teams into Mozambique up the coast. And in fact in late 1979 they had battalions in the South of the country operating and doing fire force ops. They were great friends (mostly) until the US (Carter) got them to sell Rhodesia out.

[JMA]

Well that's not tactics. It's Policy and Strategy. Those are all direct products of the British "Committee system". You may also want so study how the Committee system was used in Malaya, and Northern Ireland.


Sorry, but you are very mistaken. Formation level skills are about practising fighting as a formation. You can be very skilled at the Company level and utterly fall down at the Formation level.

Yes, a well trained brigade staff is essential. For example, the IDF has allocated considerable resources to training Brigade Staffs since 2006. You cannot do without them. - and CPX's (TOC-X?) do not cut it, when it comes to doing a Battle Group passage of lines to launch another Battle Group, into an opposed obstacle crossing. - and plan and execute that in < 4 hours. You actually need to go and get cold and wet out on the ground, and know how long it takes to move the bridging kit from the hide area into the launch site, and who moves when and where.

I'm sure now you have missed the plot. Brigade staff don't carry out patrols and ambushes.

Why would you need bridging kit to facilitate a 4-man fireteam crossing a river? They can float it (watermanship) or get dropped by chopper.

[JMA]

I understand there were a few incidents where either the SAS or RLI encountered armored units. And while fighting camps with populations in the low thousands, wouldn't it be fair to say there were at least vs. company sized engagements going on?

My thesis is roughly that the US should try learn several lessons from the Rhodesian Security Forces, mainly don't train whole brigades in COIN while neglecting HIC, keep cadre fresh from the fight, focus on Small unit tactics (like start printing 7-8 again), scouting is important to COIN, and again, scouting is important to COIN.

I suggest that one should learn to differentiate between HIC and COIN in that HIC is fought by battle groups and formations while in COIN it becomes a "corporals war" except where through risk aversity no operations are carried out in less than platoon strength.

Units should have the ability to switch from one form of warfare to the other without having to undergo training or a refit.

[Tuberk]

Hello all at SWC,

I am new to the community and the level of discussion, so hay.

This post caught my eye. I agree with the proposition that you may find most of Rhodesia’s innovative tactics have been incorporated into modern COIN, maybe with the exception of some of the more adventurous partnering operations with ‘turned’ enemy carried out by the Scouts.

A few years back I tried to explain in a short essay why South Africa was successful in stopping an insurgent war from developing in its own territory, which was the government’s major preoccupation once it became clear Rhodesia would fall. This was interesting because not only did SA have some innovative ideas on how to treat the local population, which differed from Rhodesia’s great failure to protect or win over its own population, but there was also some interesting kinetic COIN tactics in the border regions if I remember. I think they took the best of Rhodesia’s men, ideas and tactics after they fell and remembered not to beat on the population. Obviously, there are many other factors contributing to the outcome in Rhodesia's case, isolation being a major one, but it may prove interesting to you.

[Jslade0]

i got no answers earlier, so I'll try again...

Did Rhodesians read their own printed doctrine?
how often was it updated?
What was the best way for passing around lessons learned?
Was the school house training useful? or was field experience the primary trainer?
What were battle drills that were trained?
Was there the concept of the "strategic corporal"?

[William F. Owen]

Did Rhodesians read their own printed doctrine?

...and what if they did? Generally that makes no difference. Doctrine is merely "what is taught." What they did in practice is what is relevant.

Was there the concept of the "strategic corporal"?

Hopefully not. That was a very poor concept, poorly articulated. At best it just said, "we're not very good, and we need to be." That was the bit most people missed.

[JMA]

Hopefully not. That was a very poor concept, poorly articulated. At best it just said, "we're not very good, and we need to be." That was the bit most people missed.

Let me know what I missed again please.

[William F. Owen]

Let me know what I missed again please.

a.) You cannot have a "Strategic Corporal." Everything a Corporal does is tactical. Yes, tactics must serve strategy, but that's true for everybody. Did anyone ever say "Strategic Soldier?" No? Why? Cos it would be dumb to say it.

b.) At best you have a Corporal who "does not undermine Policy by doing something stupid." - my favourite example being the sinking of the Lusitania - OK, not a Corporal but an example of minor tactical action that changed Policy, and had strategic implications, but its actually very hard to find good examples of where decisions by NCO's have ACTUALLY changed Policy and had a real strategic effect. It's extremely rare at best.

c.) Poor concept because it explicitly aimed to put an un-realistic burden on the Corporal, when what it was really meant to do was raise the bar to a useful minimum level. - so "We have to be a lot better." - or "Doing stupid stuff, will always be stupid." The implications for training men to believe that their every action might weigh on Policy was and is horrendous.

The British Army never took it seriously - at least no one I know. BUT Gen. Krulack, did do some good stuff with the "Three Block War." I used to "um and err about that", but actually the idea can be made into something useful.

[JMA]

i got no answers earlier, so I'll try again...

Did Rhodesians read their own printed doctrine?
how often was it updated?
What was the best way for passing around lessons learned?
Was the school house training useful? or was field experience the primary trainer?
What were battle drills that were trained?
Was there the concept of the "strategic corporal"?

I suggest you start with the Rhodesian COIN manual first.

Then we can take it from there.

[JMA]

A few years back I tried to explain in a short essay why South Africa was successful in stopping an insurgent war from developing in its own territory, which was the government’s major preoccupation once it became clear Rhodesia would fall.

Is this essay of yours available online?