All matters Rhodesian / Rhodesia (merged thread)

[Jslade0]

Word. Tactical acumen cannot compensate for a failed strategy. Afghanistan anyone?

While youre point is appreciated, I don't think its related to my question. I'm trying to understand a comparison of the training and tactics of the two forces.

To discuss strategy would be like two guys talking about fire arms in WWII, and somebody else entering the conversation with a bunch of guff on the atomic bomb.

But to take your bait, was the Rhodesian Strategy really failed? I think its one thing to say your strategy is failed, when you have the best funded military in the world making little progress, but its something else to say an isolated country in an underdeveloped part of the world had a failed strategy, with almost zero trade partners, and borrowed or stolen equipment.

[Cavguy]

While youre point is appreciated, I don't think its related to my question. I'm trying to understand a comparison of the training and tactics of the two forces.

To discuss strategy would be like two guys talking about fire arms in WWII, and somebody else entering the conversation with a bunch of guff on the atomic bomb.

But to take your bait, was the Rhodesian Strategy really failed? I think its one thing to say your strategy is failed, when you have the best funded military in the world making little progress, but its something else to say an isolated country in an underdeveloped part of the world had a failed strategy, with almost zero trade partners, and borrowed or stolen equipment.

To take up Wilf's earlier point - you haven't articulated a thesis, you've articulated a topic. You still have to do that before we can truly critique you. Also, for an academic paper, you seem starting with a conclusion and looking backwards for evidence to justify it rather than observing the evidence and drawing a conclusion.

Yes, their tactical performance with little resources was brilliant, but it also didn't matter. What Steve and I are saying is that we get obsessed as a military with tactical innovation while ignoring our deficit in strategic thinking.

[Rex Brynen]

But to take your bait, was the Rhodesian Strategy really failed? I think its one thing to say your strategy is failed, when you have the best funded military in the world making little progress, but its something else to say an isolated country in an underdeveloped part of the world had a failed strategy, with almost zero trade partners, and borrowed or stolen equipment.

Actually, as I've argued elsewhere, I think it can be argued that Rhodesia's remarkable tactical and operational successes actually were strategically disadvantageous—obscuring, as it were, the inevitable political writing on the wall.

[JMA]

Word. Tactical acumen cannot compensate for a failed strategy. Afghanistan anyone?

Cute soundbite.

Are you talking about military strategy or political?

[JMA]

I would simply note that there is no country named Rhodesia today.

Makes ya think.

What exactly does it make you think?

...that poor little Rhodesia could stand up to Russian and Chinese supported and supplied insurgents but not also against Jimmy Carter and Andy Young?

[Rex Brynen]

What exactly does it make you think?

...that poor little Rhodesia could stand up to Russian and Chinese supported and supplied insurgents but not also against Jimmy Carter and Andy Young?

I suspect he means that efforts to delay or avoid black majority rule were ultimately doomed to failure.

As Steve said:

Word. Tactical acumen cannot compensate for a failed strategy. Afghanistan anyone?

Quite right. Nor can it substitute for a lack of realism at the national level about what is, or is not, achievable.

[JMA]

I suspect he means that efforts to delay or avoid black majority rule were ultimately doomed to failure.

Circa. 1960 to delay was the (historically proven) intelligent approach but to avoid would have been futile.

Perhaps your attention (and that of a few others around here) should be drawn to the Southern Rhodesia proposed Constitution 1961 where the "Europeans" (meaning whites) accepted a qualified franchise system which would have led to an "African" (meaning black) majority in parliament within 7-8 years (soonest) or 10-15 years (more likely).

But the Brits - Alec Douglas-Hume and his flunky Duncan Sandys (Commonwealh and Colonial Secretary) - being led by the nose by that other "great" African democrat and champion of one-party elections Julius Nyerere - whose country (Tanzania) under his "enlightened" leadership went from the largest exporter of agricultural products in Africa to the largest importer of agricultural products - demanded that one 5 year term of parliament leading to a one-man-one-vote... once ... was the best they could offer and the best that - "great" body of democrats and human rights activists - the Commonwealth would accept.

In addition those two liberal authors (by the US definition) of Rhodesian military history - Moorcraft and McLaughlin - state in the preface of their 2008 edition:

... Nevertheless, after nearly three decades, and in the light of the near-total destruction of the state by Robert Mugabe, many will look back and reflect that the Rhodesian rebellion, although doomed, was perhaps not so damned.

That make one think?

[JMA]

Howdy,

I'm doing a masters thesis on the idea of comparing Rhodesia's Training and Tactics to the current US. How did a little country with no resources manage to fight a COIN and train for a HIC fight so well, while the US appears to be only trying to train for one or the other.

From what I've gathered so far, the Rhodesians trained 70% of the time on force on force threats, fearing one of their many neighbors were going to eventually attack in force. So they trained for HIC, but practiced COIN, fairly successfully. (with almost every contact resulting in enemy killed).

Is my thesis wrong? Any ideas or suggestions for readings would be greatly appreciated.

I'm travelling at the moment so not on here every day but will certainly assist you where I can. In addition I am able to put you into contact with the (surviving) senior officers and men who were involved with policy relating to training in Rhodesia right up to the end. Due to age some are more willing than others to get involved with such commuications. Anyway, good luck with your project.

As you no doubt have noted from some of the comment below discussing this project here may be a mixed blessing. Just as you will be accussed of selecting the outcome before starting your project (as you already have been) you will find your critics may well have fixed positions on this matter and will not find any information forcing a rethink to be welcome.

I offer two quotes to deal with those who approach your task from this position:

‘Minds are like parachutes — they only function when open.’
and

A closed mind is not only closed to outside thoughts, it is often closed to itself as well. It is closed to new thoughts and anything that threatens the status quo. But if you can open the doors, maybe just a crack at first, the ideas that have been patiently waiting at your gates will flood in.

I suggest that you challenge these critics to explain their positions and not allow them to sit back and take pot-shots at your position/assertions/contentions. In other words push the boundaries.

[davidbfpo]

A question often posed by historians and many others. This post refers to 1978-1979 in Southern Africa, with Rhodesia as the key focus. For complicated reasons I have long had an interest in the history of Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe and visited once for a holiday in 1985.

Tonight a BBC Radio Four documentary 'Document' in a programme entitled 'Did UK warn Mugabe and Nkomo about assassination attempts?' reveals the facts behind:

Successive British governments have accused Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe of brutal, corrupt and incompetent rule, but new evidence suggests that without British help, he might not have lived long enough to come to power.

Link to BBC News summary, a podcast will be available tonight after the broadcast:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14311834

Some Rhodesians have blamed 'perfidious Albion' having access to Rhodesia's inner secrets, in particular using traitors and one Ken Flowers, the CIO Director (Rhodesia's external intelligence agency). So this will reinforce their suspicions, citing the British Foreign Secretary Lord Owen can clear up that mystery too:

The head of Rhodesian Intelligence, Ken Flowers, was also on our side. So I was well aware of what Ken Flowers was claiming was being done, and I used to read the reports.

Ken Flowers is deceased, as are many of those he worked with and those who suspected him.

[JMA]

A question often posed by historians and many others. This post refers to 1978-1979 in Southern Africa, with Rhodesia as the key focus. For complicated reasons I have long had an interest in the history of Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe and visited once for a holiday in 1985.

Tonight a BBC Radio Four documentary 'Document' in a programme entitled 'Did UK warn Mugabe and Nkomo about assassination attempts?' reveals the facts behind:

Link to BBC News summary, a podcast will be available tonight after the broadcast:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14311834

Some Rhodesians have blamed 'perfidious Albion' having access to Rhodesia's inner secrets, in particular using traitors and one Ken Flowers, the CIO Director (Rhodesia's external intelligence agency). So this will reinforce their suspicions, citing the British Foreign Secretary Lord Owen can clear up that mystery too:

Ken Flowers is deceased, as are many of those he worked with and those who suspected him.

David, thanks for the tip, I will certainly be listening tonight.

It needs to be said that Rhodesian counter-intelligence was poor generally.

On the positive side it should be noted that while the target was not at home when the boys arrived at least there was no "reception committee" in waiting.

[Gigalocus]

Hi all,

Just posting as I've been referred here in my search. Basically for a University assignment I'm looking at studying the Rhodesian Bush War, but the assignment relies heavily on primary sources, and so I was wandering about whether relevant sources availability to me. I can't travel to the Zimbabwean national archives for example, though some of the British archives could perhaps be doable.

But more useful to me would be online sources that deal with the War or military of Rhodesia, specifically foreign involvement in the conflict. Any involvement, not just governmental but also foreign volunteers for example. But any sources that are accessible to me that deal with the Rhodesian military would be fantastic, so if anyone knows where these types of sources could be found, I would massively appreciate it.

Thanks,
Gigalocus

[BayonetBrant]

Start here.
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=15803

After spending 2 hours reading that thread, you can start emailing the authors for more info.

[JMA]

Hi all,

Just posting as I've been referred here in my search. Basically for a University assignment I'm looking at studying the Rhodesian Bush War, but the assignment relies heavily on primary sources, and so I was wandering about whether relevant sources availability to me. I can't travel to the Zimbabwean national archives for example, though some of the British archives could perhaps be doable.

But more useful to me would be online sources that deal with the War or military of Rhodesia, specifically foreign involvement in the conflict. Any involvement, not just governmental but also foreign volunteers for example. But any sources that are accessible to me that deal with the Rhodesian military would be fantastic, so if anyone knows where these types of sources could be found, I would massively appreciate it.

Thanks,
Gigalocus

If you could be much more specific as to your exact information needs it would be helpful... then I could possibly be helpful

[davidbfpo]

From JMA:

A little personal research...I would appreciate to hear what aspects of the Rhodesian Bush War are of interest to (principally the) US reading public (as represented here). Responses will be much appreciated.

This RFI appeared on the long running, popular Rhodesian COIN thread, but a new thread may attract more attention and responses. Link to thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=2090

[Condor]

Moderator's Note: thread created to help JMA and gain hopefully responses (ends)

I would appreciate to hear what aspects of the Rhodesian Bush War are of interest to (principally the) US reading public (as represented here).

Responses will be much appreciated.

Aviation operations in general with an emphasis on rotary wing operations in support of the ground forces. Also did the Rhodesian ground forces use some version of a Forward Air Controller (FAC) to help coordinate aviation assets with the guys on the ground?

[JMA]

Aviation operations in general with an emphasis on rotary wing operations in support of the ground forces. Also did the Rhodesian ground forces use some version of a Forward Air Controller (FAC) to help coordinate aviation assets with the guys on the ground?

Thank you for the comment. Taken onboard.

One of a very books written from the airforce side (all aviators were airforce) is:

DINGO FIRESTORM: The Greatest Battle of the Rhodesian Bush War

Also available on Kindle.

Ian Pringle has done that operation justice with this book and sat the same time providing an unique airforce / aviator perspective.

Prior to the war army officers were sent on FAC courses which involved the use of ground panels etc. During the war this fell away. Effectively all jet FAC (except for small teams operating externally in Zambia and/or Mozambique) was done by the ubiquitous piston engined Lynx (Cessna 337) either by 'talk-on' or target marking with rocket smoke or what ever.

We the ground troops, used a simplified form of FAC - called GAC (Ground Air Control). Simply put this was to mark FLOT (forward line of own troops) with smoke then indicate target with a flare (normally a pencil flare as distances were close - hence the term close air support). When the pilot announced he was 'turning in live' the ground troops gave covering fire to distract the enemy sufficient to minimise the ground fire.

The only time we pulled back was when there was to be a jet strike. There was no safety distance for a gun run (twin 30 Brownings), while SNEB rockets were used at any range if there was a need. The 15 gallon Frantan (Napalm) was used as a pinpoint weapon on rocky areas and small caves and the fireball at close range was spectacular (and troopies needed to warned to keep a tight a..hole

Being a small military we got to know all the pilots - helos and fixed wing - personally and by name as we (the RLI) based with them at the airfields and had beers together if we recovered back to base at night. So, importantly, we knew them, they knew us as we worked together all the time. This allowed for a great degree of flexibility on the ground.

GAC training was given down to stick commander level - lance corporal but clearly not all were capable of that. On fire force ops when there was a gunship (with senior pilot and army commander onboard) overhead it (they) would talk on the fixed wing and instruct the troops on the found to mark their positions etc. Dust from 20mm HE from the gunship would usefully generate dust to mark the target as well.

[carl]

I am interested in I guess the human factor. In the US we seem to be all about machines. Back then Rhodesian didn't have recourse to machines so much so it seems to me that they had to make up for that with imagination.

Another thing is how bush skills came into it, tracking and things like that, though that may have been covered elsewhere.

Also what David said, about retention of loyalty of the black population and turning people.

And, it seems to me the Rhodesian gov lost the public relations fight for world opinion. That was of vital importance. Was that seen as important as it turned out to be? Did it influence the war at the sharp end? Was there much thought given to how to fight that particular fight?

[Biggus]

I am another who is interested in the human factors.

The level of technical and tactical innovation and inventiveness also fascinates me. Much of the modern MRAP's history seems to stem from developments in Rhodesia (and South Africa too, possibly to an even greater extent).

It's a pretty good case study for fighting a war on a miniscule budget with very little external support. It's also an excellent case study on how easily world opinion can be manipulated.

[JMA]

I am another who is interested in the human factors.

The level of technical and tactical innovation and inventiveness also fascinates me. Much of the modern MRAP's history seems to stem from developments in Rhodesia (and South Africa too, possibly to an even greater extent).

It's a pretty good case study for fighting a war on a miniscule budget with very little external support. It's also an excellent case study on how easily world opinion can be manipulated.

If you haven't already read this, here is a start point:

The Pookie - A History of the World's first successful Landmine Detector Carrier - by Dr J.R.T. Wood

The key was this: "The net result was that ZANLA would stop laying landmines on roads regularly swept by the Pookie and lay them elsewhere in the hope that they would not be found before they could achieve their objective."

[davidbfpo]

Cited in part:

The level of technical and tactical innovation and inventiveness also fascinates me. Much of the modern MRAP's history seems to stem from developments in Rhodesia (and South Africa too, possibly to an even greater extent).

There are a couple of books on vehicle development. Rhodesian contacts were proud of their record and as part of the relationship with South Africa gave the SADF full access, even one example of each vehicle. After 1980 IIRC they were amazed to see how much the SADF had developed the concepts further, usually putting them into service in SW Africa (Namibia now) and annoyed they had not been updated.