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Thread: All matters Rhodesian / Rhodesia (merged thread)

  1. #81
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    Quote Originally Posted by Condor View Post
    Getting back on track, I feel that there is A LOT of tactical and operational levels to be learned from the Rhodesian Bush War. I think the Rhodesian use of aviation assets could be very beneficial for lots of militaries around the world, especially ones who are fighting "insurgents/freedom fighters/guerrillas" in some lonely long forgotten piece of land. The problem we Americans have is that we are used to abundance and in a military that spends the equivalent of many countries yearly military budgets one weapon system like a B-2 stealth bomber or a nuclear powered aircraft carrier it can be hard to be innovative. Between our gluttonous appetite for expensive weapon systems and our ever increasing technology addiction we tend to forget that the greatest asset is the person. The less a person has the more innovative they will have to become in order to achieve success when faced with challenging circumstances. So from a pure "doing more with less" mentality most of the US and its military are poor examples of that. The one traditional exception to this role has been that of the US Marines but over the last 20 years I'm starting to believe that even Marines are becoming addicted to the "large expenditure/ fancy weapon systems" crowd. Classic examples of this are the Corps primary replacement aviation assets of the MV-22 and F-35 aircraft. Both of these aircraft are tremendously expensive and I'm still skeptical of how useful they really would be in a conflict such as the one Rhodesia found itself in. I believe aircraft like the H-60 and A-10 would be much more useful, appropriate, survival and most importantly cheap, like REALLY cheap compared to the MV-22/F-35. When you take into account the increase in night vision device technology (which itself can practically be bought off the counter now) and small cheap UAVs these things could be integrated into lethal utility without high overhead costs. You made mention about how the Rhodesian Air Force was pretty much "grounded" at night due to limitations of available night vision devices, can you image how much they would have changed the picture if your air force had access to these back then?
    Yes there are many modern technology innovations that would have been very valuable to us back then - 1st generation night vision was in use back then but we did not have it - but I suppose the Russians would have made weapons available to them too - thinking mainly anti aircraft - which would have made attacks on their external bases more difficult or impossible. So what I am saying is that technology itself does not ensure victory. It is how it is applied that makes the difference.

    In regards to inter-service rivalry, vested interests, rank structure, rules etc I think this becomes a two way street. First, I think inter-service rivalry can be healthy as it breeds competition and this competition can force people to take pride in their unit/organization and to push themselves to be better. At the local level, I've worked with every branch of the US armed forces including the Coast Guard and all of them have had their share of go-getters and a few turds sprinkled in here and there. I think the problems were are seeing today within the US have to do with leadership but I have faith that if a large enough crisis came about the cream would actually rise to the top and we'd see a completely different military than what we are seeing right now. I'm kind of a Churchill student in the sense that I have faith in my fellow citizen when the time comes for the hard work to be done. When it's easy going, the sloths seem to appear and take over (no offense to the animal).
    But the US does not fight wars where the national interest is sufficient to override the the inter-service rivalry, vested interests, rank structure, rules etc.

    Yes, I think vested interests, rules and the like can be bad especially if they become self serving and take away from the greater good. I'm an idealist when it comes to the greater good, I always hope people will set aside their petty differences to do what's RIGHT for the big picture. Unfortunately, this is often not the case as some of us well know.
    Perhaps this is jcustis was alluding to here when he said:

    "There are a great number of limitations that would make it difficult to translate the Fire Force of old into an effective counter-insurgent force for Afghanistan. Part of the problem is simple fact of training. We didn't fight that way before the Long War began (though I certainly advocated it some while ago), and trying to adapt to these tactics would require paradigm shifts of enormous proportion.that the Army and Marine Corps just simple cannot make these days."

    Your war was unique in many ways and much of what Rhodesia went through will never apply or carry over to the US. I'm sure fighting for your very existence gives one plenty of incentive to put their heart and soul into it and equally devastating when it doesn't work out.
    This failure by US forces to put themselves in the position of the combatants (especially those they side with) in foreign wars is the principle weakness.

    Remember, the US went through a Great Civil War many decades ago. I often think about what it must have been like for those people back then whenever I read about the US Civil War. The thought of taking up arms against men who I had previously served with in combat is unfathomable to me but remember this was the norm when the Civil War broke out. Men who had come into the service together, went through schooling together, fought in other wars together, then woke up one day, switched uniforms (if they went with the South) and then engaged in mortal combat with their former brothers-in-arms. People can say what they want about General Robert E. Lee, but here is a guy who fought and served the US and when war broke out between the states, he had to make the decision which side he would take. When he took it, it meant fighting against the very country he had served all the while throwing the lives of thousands of his (Southern) countrymen into the cauldron of fire. When defeated he laid down his arms and asked that his men join him in defeat and not to continue the hate against their former enemy (who had once been their former countrymen-talk about a mind trip).
    If you can get your head arround that you can start to figure out the ultra complex issues around wars and insurgencies around the world.

    So in closing, the truth is a strange animal. I think there are many things about the experiences in Rhodesia that are worth studying and remembering. I also know that the innovation and approach to some of the issues you all dealt with will never apply to the US. However, for the man who is willing to dedicate his life to the profession of arms to dismiss another conflict because of its differences is a grave mistake. It is only with open discourse and rigorous study can someone become a better rounded person who can help find his way when things start to become dark. Hubris, arrogance, and complacency are sure to get you killed no matter how big a stick you carry.
    Yes indeed, I remember right here on the Council some guy stated that because the French had resorted to torture in algeria there was nothing to be learned from that conflict. Appalling logic.

    However, superficial study is worse than no study.

    Thank you for taking the time to respond in detail. Much appreciated.

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    Default Mark,

    Yes indeed, I remember right here on the Council some guy stated that because the French had resorted to torture in Algeria there was nothing to be learned from that conflict. Appalling logic.
    I "recalled" the same "memory", but the "halibut" was not "recalling" in which SWC thread. Initially, France's war in Algeria: telling the story, seemed the likely candidate - it begins with A Lesson About Torture, Half Century On. Your comment caused me to read through the thread (only 7 pages), which includes for 2010 over a dozen posts by each of such as Wilf (William F. Owen), JMA and jmm99 - some have actually stood the test of time.

    The thought occurs that compilations of some "interactive" SWC threads (which often involve "peer review" plus) would be more useful to the practitioner than an equal number of SWJ articles - but, I digress (well, not too much).

    "Alas", in the Algeria thread, I found no idiot ("useful" or otherwise) whose equation was "French resort to torture in Algeria = Nothing to be learned from that conflict".

    Perhaps, however, this post by you in another thread, Counterinsurgency and Its Discontents, is what we remember (#116), which was your negative review of Demarest, Let's Take the French Experience in Algeria Out of US COIN Doctrine. (2010; in Military Review !).

    Your BLUF on that was:

    Study the Algerian war and read what Galula and Trinquier have to say and then figure it all out from there. Because it was a brutal war (from both sides) and where torture was the order of the day does that necessarily detract from other measures adopted such as the quadrillage system?

    Why does it have to come down to selecting one person's idea and trying to force fit it into every insurgency situation you experience? The strategy options should be like a set of golf clubs. Pick what club you need for the shot you face.
    Which is a good point, but you make another one:

    I really don't understand the US military. They had McCuen and it seems he was as good as you get and he was a product of the US system speaking the same language and sharing the common culture but he was all but ignored.
    Yeah, Jack McCuen was (r.i.p.) a Troll from below the Mackinac Bridge and I'm a Yooper; but that's not a good reason to ignore him (besides, ya gotta watch them Trolls from Lower Michigan).

    That led me to ask how often McCuen has been mentioned on SWC.

    "McCuen" has been mentioned only 75 times on SWC, with a limited number of people doing the mentioning and discussing him substantively:

    jmm99 - 34 posts

    JMA - 17 posts

    Cavguy - 6 posts

    Ken White - 4 posts

    The balance of the remaining 14 posts include McCuen only in quotes, or are one-timers.

    "McCuen's" adds 16 posts; 1 isolate and:

    jmm99 - 11 posts

    JMA - 2 posts

    Cavguy - 2 posts

    I suspect that McCuen is generally ignored because of ignorance of his concepts (the book isn't read); but then there may be some slam dunk argument that debunks him. I've yet to see it.

    Of course, McCuen can enter the discussion without his explicit mention. E.g., here's a conversation in the Algeria thread (not based on Algeria, but generalized from Country "X") that Wilf and I had, where my take on the concurrent "military struggle" (Wilf) and "political struggle" (jmm99) was largely based on Jack McCuen (at least in my mind) - #79, #81, #82, #83, #86, #87, #88, #89. Our conversation ended there - obviously, it could have gone on from novella to novel. Wilf always wanted to steal "my" Special Branch.

    Just some of my generalized thoughts, hopefully not extraneous here.

    Regards

    Mike
    Last edited by jmm99; 02-09-2014 at 12:15 AM.

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    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    I "recalled" the same "memory", but the "halibut" was not "recalling" in which SWC thread. Initially, France's war in Algeria: telling the story, seemed the likely candidate - it begins with A Lesson About Torture, Half Century On. Your comment caused me to read through the thread (only 7 pages), which includes for 2010 over a dozen posts by each of such as Wilf (William F. Owen), JMA and jmm99 - some have actually stood the test of time.

    The thought occurs that compilations of some "interactive" SWC threads (which often involve "peer review" plus) would be more useful to the practitioner than an equal number of SWJ articles - but, I digress (well, not too much).

    "Alas", in the Algeria thread, I found no idiot ("useful" or otherwise) whose equation was "French resort to torture in Algeria = Nothing to be learned from that conflict".
    Spent a good few minutes looking for that offending post myself. Closest I came was this one in the Journal:

    Galula Relevant Anymore?

    My comment was:

    by JMA (not verified) | November 16, 2010 - 8:42am
    Why the attempt to narrow the field of study? If anything students of war should widen their area of study and absolutely resist the temptation of hooking onto one particular view. Earlier we saw an attempt to to write off lessons from Algeria because the French used torture (so there, I guess, goes every war). Open minds must function like sponges there can be not limit to what can be studied.
    Not sure how much earlier that was... clearly before November 2010.

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    Default Mark,

    Your negative review of Demarest was 8 Aug 2010.

    The comments on Galula also include one by Gian Gentile (snips):

    by gian p gentile (not verified) | November 15, 2010
    ...
    Moreover, why the defense of him? sheesh, how would it sound if I were calling for the complete relevance, at the operational and strategic levels, of Enrst Junger and "Storm of Steel"? In a sense we have elevated the tactics and operational method proposed by David Galula, based on his experience as an infantry company commander in an area about 10k by 10k in the mountains of North Algeria with about 10,000 local inhabitants and a handful of insurgents, to the level of high relevance. In short, Galula was a tactician of coin, hence the comparison to Junger as a tactician of offensive maneuver in WWI trench warfare.
    ...
    Besides, and back to the comparison to Junger, remember that the French lost in Algeria. But the consumption with the tactics of coin causes folks to overlook this essential fact. It is not that Galula should not be read because he should, but the danger is to place faith in the notion that better tactics at coin can rescue failed strategy and policy. What saved the French in Algeria was not the better tactics of David Galula, but the better policy of de Gaulle when he decided to leave.
    To understand what Gian is talking about, one must have at least passing familiarity with Enrst Junger's "Storm of Steel", and Galula's "Pacification in Algeria" (freebie), which indeed describes Galula's "experience as an infantry company commander in an area about 10k by 10k in the mountains of North Algeria with about 10,000 local inhabitants and a handful of insurgents." (JMM: a bit more than a "handful").

    If our world were perfect, Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, would be the theoretical preface-introduction to his practical "Pacification in Algeria". That sequence (short theoretical introduction; longer practical historical exemplars) was, of course, Jack McCuen's method of presentation. From "Pacification":

    298 Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958

    III.
    A Few Concluding Remarks

    1. Better a bad plan than no plan at all. The one offered here has the merit of existing.

    2. A better plan will certainly be found, but only if one draws on the experience of all the cadres who, whatever their position, were confronted with the various problems raised by pacification in Algeria. They are groping now. One has the right to grope, but not forever. For instance, one can imagine ten methods to make a census, but there is surely one better than the others; this is the one that must be chosen, widely applied, and generally imposed.

    3. The best way to assess a plan is to test it in the field. Its imperfections will then appear. It is only thereafter, when the plan has been revised, that one has the right to apply it everywhere. For the experience to be profitable, it must be conducted, not only with the leaders in charge of implementing the plan in the test area, but also with a crowd of observers, who will follow the experiment from A to Z, will take part in its final critique, and will subsequently move elsewhere, not to implement it directly themselves but to instruct and control the local cadres.

    March 21, 1957
    Captain D. Galula
    Colonial Infantry
    45th B.I.C.
    S.P. 86-836 AFN
    Perhaps, that would have slowed down those (apparently Zenpundit, Mark Safranski, among them) who seem to insist that, since Galula looks to Mao for theory, commies and poor people are requisites for insurgencies (revolutions), and thus for Galula's "counterinsurgency warfare" ("counterrevolutionary warfare"). Of course, reading Galula's two books together requires one to absorb the fact that the Algeria revolution was primarily Islamic-nationalistic (although it certainly had communist states among its cheerleaders and materiel supporters).

    So, those who ignore the history before them, are ... bound to be ignorant.

    Regards (one "sponge mind" to another )

    Mike

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    It is disappointing to me that Gian would be so dismissive of Galula's experience. Galula spent almost the whole time between the end of WWII and his assumption of his command directly observing, sometimes very directly observing small wars (the Chinese Civil War post 1945 maybe being not so small) on two continents and at least four countries. That is a very great depth of experience to which he added practical command experience.

    There are few contemporary Americans who can match that.
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

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    Default Carl:

    Gian can defend himself - my only comment is that he read both of Galula's books (unlike some other Galula critics) and only then delivered his opinion - albeit, not what I'd say about Galula (which agrees with your comment re: his pre-Algeria and post-Algeria experiences).

    But then, I've followed up Galula's two books with Galula: The Life and Writings of the French Officer Who Defined the Art of Counterinsurgency; and Galula in Algeria: Counterinsurgency Practice versus Theory; as well as some articles in French - e.g., DAVID GALULA: “LE CLAUSEWITZ DE LA CONTRE-INSURRECTION”.

    Depends on how much of an Info-Sponge one becomes.

    Regards

    Mike

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    Default Hey Goose,

    Weed out your PM Inbox - It's at its 50 PM limit. Then I'll re-send the PM.

    Regards

    Mike

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    Quote Originally Posted by carl View Post
    It is disappointing to me that Gian would be so dismissive of Galula's experience. Galula spent almost the whole time between the end of WWII and his assumption of his command directly observing, sometimes very directly observing small wars (the Chinese Civil War post 1945 maybe being not so small) on two continents and at least four countries. That is a very great depth of experience to which he added practical command experience.

    There are few contemporary Americans who can match that.
    But many contemporary Americans are trying to match that... and a few others including an Aussie too.

    It appears that to establish themselves they need to demeen those before them. This is a pity and IMHO diminishes the critics more than those being criticised, in this case Galula.

    However in the posted quote Gentile says: "It is not that Galula should not be read because he should, but the danger is to place faith in the notion that better tactics at coin can rescue failed strategy and policy."

    In this he is quite obviously correct.

    However, he makes the same mistake as many youngsters trying to make a name for themselves in haste whereby he uses the win/lose words too freely and fails to understand - yes I mean that - that soldiers at the tactical level can only refine and develop better and more effective theatre specific tactics and methods and have very little effect on strategy and policy.

    My guess is that - in keeping with my theory - that he never spent a few years as a young officer learning his trade commanding a platoon in war. This would diminish his opinion greatly IMHO.

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    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    Gian can defend himself - my only comment is that he read both of Galula's books (unlike some other Galula critics) and only then delivered his opinion - albeit, not what I'd say about Galula (which agrees with your comment re: his pre-Algeria and post-Algeria experiences).

    But then, I've followed up Galula's two books with Galula: The Life and Writings of the French Officer Who Defined the Art of Counterinsurgency; and Galula in Algeria: Counterinsurgency Practice versus Theory; as well as some articles in French - e.g., DAVID GALULA: “LE CLAUSEWITZ DE LA CONTRE-INSURRECTION”.

    Depends on how much of an Info-Sponge one becomes.

    Regards

    Mike
    Very good Sponge-Mike... impressed.

    Lets hope the sponge thing will go viral...

    Then let's follow up with the bag of golf clubs analogy.

    14 clubs allowed in a bag... that means we can allow 14 references in the bag of soldiers trying to understand insurgencies and counterinsurgent 'methods' (used to include policy, strategy and tactics)

    So the task is to list 14 references/books/etc which should be continually studied (not just read and then discarded) which will provide young officers a solid foundation of understanding in respect of counter-insurgency.

    I get first shot and nominate:

    1) The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War - John J McCuen.
    2) ...
    3) ...
    etc

    (PS: if anyone knows the heirs to the McCuen estate please prevail on them to get a reprint and a Kindle version as Amazon prices of $150 is outrageous.)

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    Default Eleven 'clubs'

    JMA's challenge:
    Then let's follow up with the bag of golf clubs analogy.

    14 clubs allowed in a bag... that means we can allow 14 references in the bag of soldiers trying to understand insurgencies and counterinsurgent 'methods' (used to include policy, strategy and tactics)

    So the task is to list 14 references/books/etc which should be continually studied (not just read and then discarded) which will provide young officers a solid foundation of understanding in respect of counter-insurgency.
    My first 'clubs' are all books on my bookshelf, my reading is due to a variety of "armchair" interests and stretches over forty years. Not in priority:

    1. Street Without Joy by Bernard Fall (French Indo-China)
    2. Victory at Any Cost by Cecil Currey (General Giap)
    3. Selous Scouts: Top Secret War by Ron Reid Daly (Rhodesia)
    4. Koevoet by Jim Hooper (SW Africa Namibia)
    5. Accidental Guerilla by David Kilcullen
    6. The Frontier Scouts by Charles Chevenix-Trench (NW Frontier India)
    7. Low Intensity Operations by Frank Kitson
    8. SAS: Operation Oman by Tony Jeapes
    9. SAS: The Jungle Frontier by Peter Dickens (Borneo)
    10. War Comes to Garmsir: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier by Carter Malkasian (contemporary Afghanistan)

    Not on my bookshelf, but left a profound impression:

    11. A Savage War of Peace by Alistair Horne (Algeria)

    SWC has a number of reading lists on COIN and IIRC CT. They often cause much debate as to their value.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-10-2014 at 11:04 AM.
    davidbfpo

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    However, he makes the same mistake as many youngsters trying to make a name for themselves in haste whereby he uses the win/lose words too freely and fails to understand - yes I mean that - that soldiers at the tactical level can only refine and develop better and more effective theatre specific tactics and methods and have very little effect on strategy and policy.
    Absolutely. Gian provides two more examples of that. Once years ago in a Journal comment a National Guard Special Forces SGT said that Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare helped him a lot when he was in Afghanistan. Gian jumped all over him about how it wasn't a good book. And in another case there was a Blog article (I think) about how the Marines were having their guys read West's The Village. Gian got upset because he didn't think that provided the proper historical depth and breadth.

    I couldn't understand that. If a SGT on the spot said a book helped him, it is by definition of value. The Marines were recommending something that might help privates and SGTs do a better job, not write better papers in history class. Like you say, if it helps the people down low it is good even if it doesn't, in some people's view, properly address 'strategy'.

    My vote for inclusion in the bag of clubs:

    The Village by West.

    (I don't mean to pick on Gian but he always make an impression and his name is easy to remember.)
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

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    Default McCuen Reprint

    (PS: if anyone knows the heirs to the McCuen estate please prevail on them to get a reprint and a Kindle version as Amazon prices of $150 is outrageous.)
    Amazon and AbeBooks range from $135 to $250 used.

    The McCuens did the reprint idea in 2005 with a small publisher, Hailer Publishing, in St. Petersberg, Florida. Hailer republished a number of rare military works, including McCuen. It was in business in Apr 2011 when I cited McCuen here at SWC, but has since gone defunct (its webpage is now a link to small self-publishing houses). Hailer's books were paperbacks, but used good scans of the originals - McCuen was about $15-20.

    There probably are more used copies of McCuen floating around South Africa than in the US; as I ran into this in looking for Hailer and McCuen - Vigilantes: A contemporary form of repression (1989), which has these snips re: Beaufre (another one I've sponged up) and McCuen:

    The explicit adoption of low intensity conflict strategy by South Africa's security establishment appears to fall into two phases. The adoption and implementation of the military establishment's current strategic blueprint coincided with the entrenchment of the influence of the military establishment through the accession to power of P W Botha and General Magnus Malan. This blueprint is a direct application of the military theories of the French General Andrew Beaufre. Beaufre, who was a general in the Algerian civil war, argued in his book 'Introduction to Strategy' for a military approach that acknowledged the existence of an extended battlefield. In Beaufre's theory, the battlefield must be extended to encompass all aspects of a civil society, particularly social and ideological spheres, such as the radio and the classroom. According to Beaufre, the proper concern of the military should be extended to co-ordinating all aspects of a civil society.

    The dissolution of the boundaries between military and civil society as Beaufre proposed has now passed into South African political lexicon - 'total strategy' in response to 'total war'. The clearest adoption of Beaufre's recommendations, and equally the clearest expression of the influence of the military establishment in South African politics is the elaborate co-ordinating security structure known as the Joint Management Security System. It should be mentioned that a young South African lieutenant, Magnus Malan, served as a military observer in Algeria in the very regiments under the command of General Beaufre. Beaufre's book has long been prescribed reading at the South African Military Academy.

    In the mid-1980s, South African strategists appeared to be swinging towards the more practical theories of Colonel J. J. McCuen, who developed his theories of counter-insurgency warfare in Vietnam. McCuen's writing belongs to the genre known as low intensity conflict theory. This school of thought is now dominant amongst United States counter-insurgency theories, particularly over the 'Westmoreland strategy' applied in Vietnam. General Westmoreland's approach to counter-insurgency was to make maximum military use of technologically superior resources and firepower to smash a third world enemy. The Westmoreland school believed in 'asphalting Vietnam'.
    ...
    In 1986 General Meiring, the former general of the South West Africa Territory Force, expressed his preference for McCuen's theories over the abstractions of Beaufre. They are more practical, more explicit on the particular 'hard war' steps such as the creation of counter-revolutionary groups, and 'soft war' (WHAM) steps including electrification of townships the military should undertake in its WHAM strategy. In late 1986, McCuen's theory had been precised to a 75-page document entitled 'The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare' and distributed throughout the Management Security System.

    What is apparent in McCuen's theory, and in the speeches of its South African proponents, is that the creation of a political solution requires not a commitment to political bargaining, not even top-down reform, but a bottom-up reconstruction of political forces. The move from total strategy to (active) low intensity conflict is the subtle move from controlling dissent to reorganising politics. Phillips and Swilling date the shift as occurring in 1985/6, the same time that vigilantes emerged.
    (footnotes omitted).

    Mark, you have discussed Beaufre and McCuen before in the context of South African military education - so, I toss the ball back to you with a question: Did Beaufre and McCuen have any impact in Rhodesia; or was that too much earlier than their acceptance in South Africa ?

    Regards

    Mike

    PS:

    I get only one choice, and McCuen is taken; so, to continue the list:

    1. The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War - John J McCuen - JMA

    2. Street Without Joy by Bernard Fall - David

    3. The Village by West - Carl

    4. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (Third Edition) - jmm99

    5. .....

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    Default Trinquier....

    Don't forget Roger Trinquier-Modern Warfare.

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    Default Slap, We Won't Forget Him,

    but do you want Roger Trinquier-Modern Warfare as your choice (one per customer) to the 14-club golf bag - aka subaltern's ruck ?

    Be definite.

    Regards

    Mike

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    Yes, I would Trinquier to be read....it is a very how to do it book.


    McCuen is the best especially for Americans but as you say it is taken. I have the Hailer edition sorry to hear the company went bad. I had an issues with the delivery of the book. Made 1 phone call and problem was solved at their expense.


    How come davidfpro gets 11 clubs and all the rest just get 1.


    McCuen also has the best overall concept as it is a Counter Revolution.......Counter Insurgency is a weird word to describe what is actually happening........ which is a Revolution and it's Counter. Just some extra free advice to clear things up for everyone.

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    Default The List Grows

    1. The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War - John J McCuen - JMA

    2. Street Without Joy by Bernard Fall - David

    3. The Village by West - Carl

    4. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (Third Edition) - jmm99

    5. Roger Trinquier - Modern Warfare - Slapout9

    6. ...

    -----------------------------------------
    I'm following the "rules" set by JMA - it's his thread; his "command", as they say.

    David was only being his usual helpful self; proving that a Sponge-David soaks up more than a Sponge-Mike. But, I ruthlessly kept only his first entry on his list.

    Someone had to be "adjutant" for this list; anyone else wants it, they are welcome.

    Regards

    Mike

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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    Don't forget Roger Trinquier-Modern Warfare.
    Roger Trinquier - Modern Warfare.pdf

  18. #98
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    Thanks Mike, appreciate you taking care of the staff work on this one.

    David please confirm that is your choice.



    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    1. The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War - John J McCuen - JMA

    2. Street Without Joy by Bernard Fall - David

    3. The Village by West - Carl

    4. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (Third Edition) - jmm99

    5. Roger Trinquier - Modern Warfare - Slapout9

    6. ...

    -----------------------------------------
    I'm following the "rules" set by JMA - it's his thread; his "command", as they say.

    David was only being his usual helpful self; proving that a Sponge-David soaks up more than a Sponge-Mike. But, I ruthlessly kept only his first entry on his list.

    Someone had to be "adjutant" for this list; anyone else wants it, they are welcome.

    Regards

    Mike

  19. #99
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    Here are some secondary selections that other people should pick.

    Slow Burn by De Forest

    Silence Was a Weapon by Herrington

    War Comes to Long An by Race

    The entire body of work by Bing West.

    What may be a surprise selection to some but it was actually Robert Thompson who came up with this one.-any of the Jim Corbett books on hunting man-eaters. The reason for this one is it gives the best picture of what living under the threat of terror coming for you in the night is like.

    War Comes to Garmser by Malkasian (I stole this from David).

    The Philippine Insurrection books by Brian Linn, especially accounts of the intel work against the shadow governments done by Lt. William T. Johnston.

    Small Wars Manual by USMC.
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

  20. #100
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    Another one that somebody else should submit.

    All the interviews Octavian Manea has done for SWJ.
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

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