I always think these questions interesting.

First, in the beginning, AQI was in Iraq under different names as is their usual practice of multiple leaders recruiting their own forces, housing them and paying them. It took them some time to coalesce into an organized force.

Second, I recall (without referencing links, but having a decent memory) that the FRL and AQI (under whatever name they called their individual groups) were issuing statements attempting to assert their rightful leadership of the "resistance" or at least their legitimate claim to being in the fight at all. In some statements, they praised each other, but attempted to convince the other to follow their guidance in the matter. even in the beginning, their were questions about what targets were being attacked, the civilian death toll and other issues. They also, if I am not mistaken, occasionally exchanged fire with one another and accused the other of trying to injure their people and cause. All with flowery language still attempting to come to some sort of agreement for cooperation.

I don't think I am incorrect in these statements. I also believe that this was the first sign of how we would and should "divide and conquer". Aside from recent developments regarding the split, after several years of reading Iraqi blogs, it seems that Iraqis were rather xenophobic regarding outsiders. Particularly after Saddam had brought in large numbers of "Palestinians" whom he gave preferential treatment to including housing, money and education.

Which brings me to point number three: We are often too busy looking at the pronouncements of "AQI" from the point of view of a domestic audience. Which is interesting since we often talk of "strategic communications" in a "small war" that is global in nature (such as recruiting, funding and IO). Who was this information aimed at?

In which case, it seems rather important that we divide the insurgency into "local" and "foreign", assigning much of the atrocities to AQI. While it gave them the publicity they wanted for their global jihad and they were quite willing to take it, in the end it allowed for several actions. Basically, damaging their global standing as "defenders of Islam" while allowing the FRLs an "out" whenever they felt inclined to return to the political process. Obviously, they can and have blamed some of the worst episodes on the "foreigners", true or not.

Further, in regards to AQI "taking credit" willingly, they did everything in their power to assert their position of supremacy over this insurgency in order to stir support for their greater cause trans-nationally. Zarqawi beheading people on video and other propaganda from AQI cannot be dismissed. For quite some time, it was the strongest and most voluble propaganda coming out of Iraq. It colored all other pronouncements from all other groups within Iraq.

It is clear that even during 2005 and 2006, prior to the great "awakening" their was a serious split over agenda and power between these two groups. Who was the "largest" v. who had the "power" v. "end state" was always going to be a question with these groups. It's fairly obvious that there were significant numbers of indigent FRL or other anti-government organizations and people within Iraq, but leadership, power and organization are not always about who has the most people.

As Zarqawi once wrote to Zawahiri, it is about being "victorious" or perceived as such. Who has the strongest "sword arm" in his terminology. Clearly, AQI was, at least publicly, the "strong horse" in the arena. I believe that this led many smaller indigent organizations and individuals linking with AQI or affiliate "armies", enlarging their cadre and over all power. Eventually, leading to AQI becoming the governing force and organizer of the insurgency.

However, the "cracks" were apparent in 2005 when several letters were being written to Zawahiri directly, by passing Zarqawi, complaining of some of the leaders that were taking money from the "mujihadeen" who were arriving, leaving them with little food, sub-standard housing, demanding mostly martyrdom attacks and poor leadership all together. There were also complaints regarding the targeting of civilians and the atrocious beheading videos. Which I believe prompted Zawahiri to write a letter to Zarqawi telling him to tone it down and cautioning him against trying to debate or enforce any religious ideology when he was not "educated" in the matter.

Iraqi bloggers explained that AQI was generally Salafist Wahabi in nature while the Anbar tribes were largely from the Hanafi school of jurisprudence with a few other groups like Matridi, etc thrown in.

As important (or more so) as the religious orthodoxy, AQI and several indigent criminal or insurgent gangs duked it out in Al Qaim in 2005. Later reports indicated this was over control of the smuggling routes and other traditional methods of income for those tribes on the border. AQI was obviously trying to control these routes to smuggle in money, men and weapons, by passing the "middle man" while possibly bringing the area under their total control.

Of course, by cutting off the traditional money making methods of these tribes, they were cutting into the traditional power of the local sheiks and tribes. Which is why the Marines and other forces began providing money and jobs through the auspices of the local sheiks and other power structures within these tribal lands. All politics are local, as they say.

Recall also Zawahiri's letter requesting funds be sent to them in Afghanistan and bin Laden's recent plea for unity and money. Pleas that have been repeated more than once throughout this period.

Later, Zarqawi was relegated to the role of a "military commander" and an umbrella council was set up to manage the multiple connections with the other insurgent groups. This is one area that AQ in general was successful in the past. Recalling that Al Qaeda means "the base" and was essentially bin Laden's managerial and organizing skills that had lists of mujihadeen from the Afghan/Russo conflict who he contacted and began organizing for this current global conflict. They attempted to use these same managing and organizing skills in Iraq.

The umbrella council was essentially a response to complaints regarding the continued encroachment on these FRL organizations' power by AQI, Zarqawi's style and a belated realization that they needed to put an Iraqi face on the insurgency. That after we had labeled it largely AQI, blamed them for the worst of the worst and, through their own actions and our IO, gave the Iraqi people someone else to hate and blame for their misery. And, provided the backdrop for political reconciliation since the Shi'ites and other Iraqis were not going to feel too friendly towards the "insurgency" if it was all blamed on indigenous forces.

I think we'll see similar activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan by AQI. Take, for instance, the recent release on As Sahab (AQ media) of the Afghan Taliban leader asserting his leadership of the Afghan "insurgency" while declaring allegiance to bin Laden. Are the Pashtuns going to fight a war for a bunch of Saudi, Egyptian, Yemeni, Libyan, Uzbek, etc outsiders? Or, are they fighting for their own people and power?

They are apparently copying our own tactics by trying to assert some legitimate indigenous group as the having the "right" to legitimate resistance while simultaneously maintaining the facade of a global Islamic conflict. They were simply too late in doing that in Iraq. Zarqawi's ego, the zealous nature of the foreigners and their attempts to assert absolute control had already ruined that.

Back to the council and Zarqawi's demise as both a leader and literally. In Zawahiri's letter, he warned Zarqawi, not too subtly, either that his ego and inability to "get along" was going to get him killed by someone in the organization like a leader in Afghan (who was killed, some say, on the orders of Zawahiri for being "outside" of their control) or that he already had a traitor in his midst and that he should watch out. That is an interesting question since, not long after that letter, we nearly apprehended Zarqawi and he was severely wounded. Then, a few months later, we followed someone in his organization, eventually leading to Zarqawi's location and death.

Al Masri and AQI attempted to step back and become "the king makers" behind the FRLs, but the cracks were too great. Multiple denouncements and attempts at reconciliation were flying back and forth, eventually leading to al Junabi's insurgency media denouncing Omar al Baghdadi, the nominal "Iraqi face" of the council, as a fake. He said that the insurgency could not swear allegiance to someone without a face and whose father no one knew (considering the Arab/Muslim attachment to ancestors tracing back to Muhammed, that was a good indication of the FRLs contempt for that theatrics). All the while, the "awakening" was gaining power in the tribal lands.

Then we see the insurgency virtually collapse back on itself. Which view is correct? Do the numbers count or don't they?