Al Qaeda in Iraq

[carl]

I just finished reading "The Terrorists of Iraq" by Malcolm Nance, who I believe is also Abu Buckwheat. It was informative and the central arguement of the book, that Former Regime Loyalists (FRLs) are the majority (80-83%) and driving force of the insurgency with Iraqi Islamic Extremists (15-17%) and AQI (2-5%) making up the rest, was very convincing.

With this and the recent "tribal revolt" phenomena some questions were raised in my mind.

These revolts are all described as being against AQI, which I will take to mean AQI and the Iraqi Islamic Extremists.

And, taking Ramadi as an example (I am depending here on Cavguy's long post about the events there), these "revolts" have involved hard fighting. The severity of the fighting seems to indicate that perhaps more than 20% of the insurgency is being revolted against. Again using Ramadi as an example, once the "revolt" succeeds, the insurgency mostly stops.

Considering these things, here are my questions:

1. Did AQI and the Iraqi Islamic Extremists grow in power to the extent they
displaced the FRLs as the driving force in the insurgency?

2. Are the "tribal revolts" against more than AQI, are they also against
parts of the FRL insurgency?

3. Are the FRLs still the relatively cohesive group Malcolm describes in his
book?

4. Have the FRLs, or some of them, given up pursuing the insurgency? If so, for how long and why?

I am not trying to express a back door opinion here. The only thing I know from personal experience about Iraq is how long some of the runways are. These questions truly puzzle me.

[Global Scout]

Carl, having served in a couple of different regions in Iraq, and having been in all, the dynamics of the conflict(s) are different in each, so I don't think even someone who is a so called expert on Iraq can answer your questions with more than educated speculation.

1. Did AQI and the Iraqi Islamic Extremists grow in power to the extent they
displaced the FRLs as the driving force in the insurgency?

This is a great question, but it is also possible that the FRLs are funding any Sunni group that is anti-coalition. While they may fight one another in the future, or even fight one another now, I wonder is FRLs expats are funding AQI?

2. Are the "tribal revolts" against more than AQI, are they also against parts of the FRL insurgency?

I have seen tribal revolts against JAM also (a Shi'a militia group).

3. Are the FRLs still the relatively cohesive group Malcolm describes in his
book?

4. Have the FRLs, or some of them, given up pursuing the insurgency? If so, for how long and why?

I don't know, but I wonder is the FRLs see the Shi'a as a greater threat to their objectives than the coalition forces?

[Ron Humphrey]

Having just had the opportunity to read said posting I would have to agree with the presentation strictly from an analytic standpoint.

This being said I think several questions come to mind which I would love direction in finding research materials to answer.

1- When changes such as have begun in varying parts of Iraq reference new end games with possible outcomes not necessarily considered plausible by the populace in the past, how does this affect those who make up those very base of these FRL's.

Considering the fact that they and their families are a part of the landscape which is Iraq.

2- Even though many a well researched individual might be able to follow the line of thinking presented does it not seem wiser that when presenting the big picture within the context of information to the masses; that it be kept as simple and direct as possible.

( The bad guys are those who are shooting at us and / or the populous and they are against us so they are with the bad guy you know; AQ)

3- The fact that AQ seems to be the fall guy for everything bad that happens is a bad idea why?

( It doesn't seem that many other shall we say organizations throughout the world have any problem with letting them be out there as the tip of the spear.)


I just like to think that those who have worked so hard to encourage it's success will find themselves falling on that spear sooner or later.

Call me an optimist KISS principle always worked for me

[kehenry1]

I always think these questions interesting.

First, in the beginning, AQI was in Iraq under different names as is their usual practice of multiple leaders recruiting their own forces, housing them and paying them. It took them some time to coalesce into an organized force.

Second, I recall (without referencing links, but having a decent memory) that the FRL and AQI (under whatever name they called their individual groups) were issuing statements attempting to assert their rightful leadership of the "resistance" or at least their legitimate claim to being in the fight at all. In some statements, they praised each other, but attempted to convince the other to follow their guidance in the matter. even in the beginning, their were questions about what targets were being attacked, the civilian death toll and other issues. They also, if I am not mistaken, occasionally exchanged fire with one another and accused the other of trying to injure their people and cause. All with flowery language still attempting to come to some sort of agreement for cooperation.

I don't think I am incorrect in these statements. I also believe that this was the first sign of how we would and should "divide and conquer". Aside from recent developments regarding the split, after several years of reading Iraqi blogs, it seems that Iraqis were rather xenophobic regarding outsiders. Particularly after Saddam had brought in large numbers of "Palestinians" whom he gave preferential treatment to including housing, money and education.

Which brings me to point number three: We are often too busy looking at the pronouncements of "AQI" from the point of view of a domestic audience. Which is interesting since we often talk of "strategic communications" in a "small war" that is global in nature (such as recruiting, funding and IO). Who was this information aimed at?

In which case, it seems rather important that we divide the insurgency into "local" and "foreign", assigning much of the atrocities to AQI. While it gave them the publicity they wanted for their global jihad and they were quite willing to take it, in the end it allowed for several actions. Basically, damaging their global standing as "defenders of Islam" while allowing the FRLs an "out" whenever they felt inclined to return to the political process. Obviously, they can and have blamed some of the worst episodes on the "foreigners", true or not.

Further, in regards to AQI "taking credit" willingly, they did everything in their power to assert their position of supremacy over this insurgency in order to stir support for their greater cause trans-nationally. Zarqawi beheading people on video and other propaganda from AQI cannot be dismissed. For quite some time, it was the strongest and most voluble propaganda coming out of Iraq. It colored all other pronouncements from all other groups within Iraq.

It is clear that even during 2005 and 2006, prior to the great "awakening" their was a serious split over agenda and power between these two groups. Who was the "largest" v. who had the "power" v. "end state" was always going to be a question with these groups. It's fairly obvious that there were significant numbers of indigent FRL or other anti-government organizations and people within Iraq, but leadership, power and organization are not always about who has the most people.

As Zarqawi once wrote to Zawahiri, it is about being "victorious" or perceived as such. Who has the strongest "sword arm" in his terminology. Clearly, AQI was, at least publicly, the "strong horse" in the arena. I believe that this led many smaller indigent organizations and individuals linking with AQI or affiliate "armies", enlarging their cadre and over all power. Eventually, leading to AQI becoming the governing force and organizer of the insurgency.

However, the "cracks" were apparent in 2005 when several letters were being written to Zawahiri directly, by passing Zarqawi, complaining of some of the leaders that were taking money from the "mujihadeen" who were arriving, leaving them with little food, sub-standard housing, demanding mostly martyrdom attacks and poor leadership all together. There were also complaints regarding the targeting of civilians and the atrocious beheading videos. Which I believe prompted Zawahiri to write a letter to Zarqawi telling him to tone it down and cautioning him against trying to debate or enforce any religious ideology when he was not "educated" in the matter.

Iraqi bloggers explained that AQI was generally Salafist Wahabi in nature while the Anbar tribes were largely from the Hanafi school of jurisprudence with a few other groups like Matridi, etc thrown in.

As important (or more so) as the religious orthodoxy, AQI and several indigent criminal or insurgent gangs duked it out in Al Qaim in 2005. Later reports indicated this was over control of the smuggling routes and other traditional methods of income for those tribes on the border. AQI was obviously trying to control these routes to smuggle in money, men and weapons, by passing the "middle man" while possibly bringing the area under their total control.

Of course, by cutting off the traditional money making methods of these tribes, they were cutting into the traditional power of the local sheiks and tribes. Which is why the Marines and other forces began providing money and jobs through the auspices of the local sheiks and other power structures within these tribal lands. All politics are local, as they say.

Recall also Zawahiri's letter requesting funds be sent to them in Afghanistan and bin Laden's recent plea for unity and money. Pleas that have been repeated more than once throughout this period.

Later, Zarqawi was relegated to the role of a "military commander" and an umbrella council was set up to manage the multiple connections with the other insurgent groups. This is one area that AQ in general was successful in the past. Recalling that Al Qaeda means "the base" and was essentially bin Laden's managerial and organizing skills that had lists of mujihadeen from the Afghan/Russo conflict who he contacted and began organizing for this current global conflict. They attempted to use these same managing and organizing skills in Iraq.

The umbrella council was essentially a response to complaints regarding the continued encroachment on these FRL organizations' power by AQI, Zarqawi's style and a belated realization that they needed to put an Iraqi face on the insurgency. That after we had labeled it largely AQI, blamed them for the worst of the worst and, through their own actions and our IO, gave the Iraqi people someone else to hate and blame for their misery. And, provided the backdrop for political reconciliation since the Shi'ites and other Iraqis were not going to feel too friendly towards the "insurgency" if it was all blamed on indigenous forces.

I think we'll see similar activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan by AQI. Take, for instance, the recent release on As Sahab (AQ media) of the Afghan Taliban leader asserting his leadership of the Afghan "insurgency" while declaring allegiance to bin Laden. Are the Pashtuns going to fight a war for a bunch of Saudi, Egyptian, Yemeni, Libyan, Uzbek, etc outsiders? Or, are they fighting for their own people and power?

They are apparently copying our own tactics by trying to assert some legitimate indigenous group as the having the "right" to legitimate resistance while simultaneously maintaining the facade of a global Islamic conflict. They were simply too late in doing that in Iraq. Zarqawi's ego, the zealous nature of the foreigners and their attempts to assert absolute control had already ruined that.

Back to the council and Zarqawi's demise as both a leader and literally. In Zawahiri's letter, he warned Zarqawi, not too subtly, either that his ego and inability to "get along" was going to get him killed by someone in the organization like a leader in Afghan (who was killed, some say, on the orders of Zawahiri for being "outside" of their control) or that he already had a traitor in his midst and that he should watch out. That is an interesting question since, not long after that letter, we nearly apprehended Zarqawi and he was severely wounded. Then, a few months later, we followed someone in his organization, eventually leading to Zarqawi's location and death.

Al Masri and AQI attempted to step back and become "the king makers" behind the FRLs, but the cracks were too great. Multiple denouncements and attempts at reconciliation were flying back and forth, eventually leading to al Junabi's insurgency media denouncing Omar al Baghdadi, the nominal "Iraqi face" of the council, as a fake. He said that the insurgency could not swear allegiance to someone without a face and whose father no one knew (considering the Arab/Muslim attachment to ancestors tracing back to Muhammed, that was a good indication of the FRLs contempt for that theatrics). All the while, the "awakening" was gaining power in the tribal lands.

Then we see the insurgency virtually collapse back on itself. Which view is correct? Do the numbers count or don't they?

[kehenry1]

Now, to the question of whether AQI was more or less of the insurgency than any public statement said it was.

I want to re-assert this thought: numbers do not mean power. If it did, then our presence there with over 100,000 soldiers at any given time would have eliminated the possibility or probability of an insurgency. Further, the number of dead and wounded "insurgents" would have quickly finished it off. That was not true. So, I have to wonder if "numbers" of AQI v. indigenous insurgents make it any more true for control of the insurgency?

Whether it was 20% AQI and 80% locals, it seems clear that AQI had control over the insurgency by mid 2005. The organization, types of attacks, and targets with the number of foreign fighters and suicide attacks makes that a reality. I would add that the information, such as maps and organization records, gathered from exploiting the site where Zarqawi died, with subsequent re-organization of our own battle plans that rolled up a huge portion of the insurgency seems to also indicate AQI had operational control.

Their spiraling loss of control in mid to late 2006, post Zarqawi's death, and the damage we were able to inflict on the "insurgency" using this exploited information through 2007, seems to have led the FRLs to the conclusion that it is better to negotiate for internal power than give it to AQI who were never going to leave and had a totally different agenda for the end state of Iraq than the FRLs. And, had they maintained that association with AQI, might have seen themselves and the rest of the Sunni tribes smashed into nothing without any political, economic or military power. Possibly totally dispossessed and constantly on the defensive in a future Iraq ruled by Shia and Kurds.

In numbers, does it matter that AQI was only "20%" of the insurgency with "80%" being indigenous if, in power and operational control, they were 60-80%? Do the numbers change the tactics or delegitimize any claims that AQI was the "real" enemy in Iraq?

Do public statements by politicians, the SoD or commanders in the field represent a failure to recognize the complexity of the insurgency? Is this why we were slow to change tactics? Were such statements purposefully misleading for political reasons (ie, to keep domestic political support for staying in Iraq)? Or were they based on our first clumsy attempts to separate the insurgency from the people of Iraq, managing any support for its on going efforts by claiming it was "foreign", and basically kill two birds with one stone by damaging AQs claims to be "defending" Islam and Muslims at the same time?

Or, were we right all along that AQ represented the power and organizing force behind the insurgency and our failure to change tactics was an internal military and political philosophy? A philosophy and organization that wanted nothing to do with fighting another counter-insurgency and performing nation building post Viet Nam and the much vaunted "Powell Doctrine"? Instead, was geared towards conventional war fighting and killing as many "tangos" as possible? A political, military and popular idea that war should look like GW1?

Was the culmination point of victory a combination of all of these things with the addition of AQI damaging itself through a bad strategic decision to declare war on Shi'ites and anybody else that didn't fit their idea Muslim or go along with their religio-political ideology or accept their plan for an "Islamic State of Iraq"?

The focus on the exact numbers or "percentages" that either group represents seems too narrow a focus to try to evaluate the how or why of this war or any future insurgency. What seems more important is to be able to identify the different groups involved, their amount of operational and political control or influence and determine any differing agendas among them. Using this calculation to split the group into smaller and smaller pieces, pealing it like an onion as they say.

In repeating a previous question, was making AQI "the fall guy" a bad idea in the whole scheme of things considering current outcomes?

[Norfolk]

An outstanding pair of posts Kat. Fantastic work.

[Ron Humphrey]

Kehenry-

" In numbers, does it matter that AQI was only "20%" of the insurgency with "80%" being indigenous if, in power and operational control, they were 60-80%? Do the numbers change the tactics or delegitimize any claims that AQI was the "real" enemy in Iraq? "

Thank you very much for explaining it in such a detailed fashion.

I couldn't have asked for better explanation

[Jedburgh]

MES-MCU, Sep 11: Al-Qaida, the Tribes and the Government: Lessons and Prospects for Iraq’s Unstable Triangle

Dealing with tribal systems has posed a continuing challenge to Al-Qaida as it operates in the Middle East and Africa,where a tribal environment is still an integral part of society in many of the countries. How Al-Qaida views and manages the tribal system within its individual areas of operation in many cases can mean the difference between success and failure, and the jihadist movement cannot ignore this issue, which has been a major factor affecting its prospects, especially in Iraq. This study examines Al-Qaida’s experience dealing with the tribes in Iraq in terms of a triangular relationship involving the Sunni tribes, Al-Qaida, and the government (or the United States as the governing authority in the initial stages), with latter two entities often competing for the allegiance of the tribes....