Al Qaeda in Iraq

[Jedburgh]

CTC, 23 Jul 08: Bombers, Bank Accounts, and Bleedout: al-Qa'ida's Road in and Out of Iraq

This report analyzes al‐Qa`ida in Iraq’s (AQI) operations from spring 2006 to summer 2007 and is being issued with a trove of AQI documents captured by coalition forces near Sinjar, Iraq. The documents include almost 600 AQI personnel records for foreign fighters crossing into Iraq, AQI contracts for suicide bombers, AQI contracts for fighters leaving Iraq, narratives written by al‐Qa`ida’s Syrian smugglers, and AQI financial records. The CTC also acquired demographic information on all Third Country Nationals (TCNs) in detention at Camp Bucca, Iraq. Most of this data has not previously been released to the public.....

[Jedburgh]

CTC, 16 Mar 09: Dysfunction and Decline: Lessons Learned From Inside Al‐Qa`ida in Iraq

Al‐Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) is a shadow of its former self, primarily because broad sectors of Iraq’s Sunni population rejected it after more than three years of active and tacit cooperation. That AQI’s ideological extremism alienated many Iraqis is well understood, but radicalism alone does not fully explain AQI’s decline: poor leadership, vulnerable communication mechanisms, tension between Iraqi and foreign members, and weak indoctrination efforts contributed to strategic and tactical blunders that alienated even other Sunni insurgents. In lieu of major social and political shifts (which are possible) that offer AQI a sustained safe‐haven, these dynamics are unlikely to change dramatically; they serve as important obstacles to AQI’s resurrection. Conversely, al‐Qa`ida elements elsewhere, primarily along the Afghanistan‐Pakistan border, are hindered less by these weaknesses. There are lessons from the fight against AQI that are applicable in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but al‐Qa`ida’s operations there are likely to be much more durable than those in Iraq.

Section I of this paper traces al‐Qa`ida in Iraq’s transition from welcome partner to mortal enemy of Iraq’s Sunni insurgents, focusing particularly on the Islamic Army of Iraq. Section II draws on declassified internal AQI correspondence and open sources to describe how external pressures—from U.S. forces and tribal sources—exacerbated AQI’s fallout with other insurgents while rending the movement from within. Section III assesses AQI’s prospects in Iraq and the impact of AQI’s failure on the future of the global jihadist movement. Section IV offers recommendations for containing AQI in the future and for applying the lessons of AQI’s demise to other elements.....

Complete 36-page paper at the link.

[Bob's World]

The very flawed concept of "Global Insurgency" has caused most to really mis-understand AQ in general, and AQI specifically.

It is far more accurate to look at AQ as a non-state organization that has no populace, but that through the power of the information tools of globalization is able to take advantage of a legal "sanctuary of status," as well as to a lesser degree sanctuary of poorly governed populaces and sanctuary of state borders to conduct a very state-like unconventional warfare campaign. This campaign is primarily to take down the Saudi Monarchy, but also other western legitimized governments of the region; with a secondary and supporting objective of breaking US support to the region in order to facilitate success of the primary objective.

So:

AQI is not part of the Iraqi Insurgency, they are there conducting UW to incite, guide, and support the Iraqi insurgency.

There are three general categories of insurgency, and all three existed in Iraq: Separatist (Kurd), revolutionary (Sunni), and resistance (Shia) in rough breakdown. None of these are AQ, and all are made up of Iraqis. Iran conducted UW as well in support of the Shia insurgency.

"Foreign fighters" in AQI are largely nationalist insurgents from Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Lybia, Algeria, and Morocco that want to change their own governance at home and who traveled to Iraq to support the second objective of breaking the US support to the region. Expect this brand of support to shift to Afghanistan along with the US. Where we go, they will go.

None of these are "Terrorists," though all use terrorist tactics. If you describe your foes by their purpose for action it is far easier to separate them and design effective tactics for dealing with each. If you conflate them all as "terrorists" you are just shooting your way into a quagmire. Similarly misrepresenting AQ as waging "global insurgency" confuses our solutions for dealing with them as well.

[Jedburgh]

The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 25 Nov 09:

Al-Qaeda in Iraq Operations Suggest Rising Confidence Ahead of U.S. Military Withdrawal

.....At the moment, the goals for the insurgents are less territorially defined and more aimed at encouraging the anarchical conditions that support the survival and influence of their organizations. Today, several factors contribute to a growing operational space for insurgent activity by promoting discouragement and subverting reconciliation efforts:

• The U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq’s urban areas on June 30, in accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), has left behind a less capable Iraqi Security Force (ISF) to carry on the mission of ensuring protection and confronting terrorists.

• The growing Arab-Kurdish divide over the ownership of “disputed territories,” especially in Ninawa province, has provided an effective venue for insurgents to exploit security disparities and ethnic divisions (see Terrorism Monitor, October 23).

• The continued reluctance of the Shi’a-dominated government to integrate Sunni fighters from the Awakening (Sahwa) Movement into the Iraqi security and civilian sectors has led to growing suspicions and uncertainty amongst some Sunnis over Baghdad’s long term intentions vis-à-vis their status and use.....

[Jedburgh]

RAND, 15 Dec 10: An Economic Analysis of the Financial Records of al-Qa'ida in Iraq

This monograph analyzes the finances of the militant group al-Qa‘ida in Iraq (AQI) in Anbar province during 2005 and 2006, at the peak of the group’s power and influence. We draw on captured financial records that recorded the daily financial transactions of both one specific sector within Anbar province and the AQI provincial administration. To our knowledge, this monograph offers one of the most comprehensive assessments of the financial operations of AQI or any other contemporary Islamic militant group....

[AdamG]

In an exclusive extract from his new book, A History of the World since 9/11, Dominic Streatfeild explains how despite expert warnings, the US let al-Qaida buy an arsenal of deadly weapons – then tried to cover it up.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011...ida-us-failure

The arrival of al-Qaida

Initially, looters at Qa'qaa had targeted consumer goods such as fridges and air-conditioners. Although munitions had been taken, no one really knew what to do with them. It soon dawned, however, that they might be intrinsically valuable. Weaponry was rapidly emerging as a second currency.

"After the invasion, we started seeing these Arabs, these foreign fighters," recalls Haki, "Palestinians, Egyptians, Libyans." Most Yusifiyans were wary of these new arrivals, but a number of local tribes took them in: "Karagol, Jenabies, Rowissat . . ."

Yusuf, an emerging leader in the insurgency who belongs to one of these tribes, confirms the story. "We allowed the Arabs into our houses and our farms. We welcomed them properly. Some of them even married our daughters." The fact they were Arab strangers was sufficient to ensure hospitality, but these foreigners had extra pull. They were fedayeen. They were al-Qaida.

They also informed the tribes that some of Qa'qaa's contents were considerably more valuable than rocket launchers and pistols. It wasn't long before Yusuf finally stumbled upon Qa'qaa's real treasure. "We found something that we didn't recognise. It was like a powder. It was stored in specific conditions, in special barrels." Yusuf had no idea what it was, but he thought he might as well take some. Only later would he learn that it was pure, crystalline high explosive.

Following the rush to appropriate munitions, Yusifiyans had to figure out where to store their loot. Many hid it in their homes. This soon led to tragedy. Rival groups fired rocket-propelled grenades into each other's houses, knowing they were full of explosives. Accidents also led to fatalities. One of Yusuf's barns blew up.

[AdamG]

Two Iraqi refugees in U.S. charged in terrorism-related case

Two men are charged with sending cash, explosives and missiles to Iraq for use against Americans. Their case underscores gaps identified in the U.S. refugee vetting process before last year.

http://www.latimes.com/news/politics...,6989529.story