A Flawed Strategy for the "War on Terror"

[marct]

That's a good point, FL, and it brings up one really important issue, loosely paraphrased as - "what is a nation state that you are mindful of it"?

Modern nation states are just one form of social organization, and a pretty recent one at that. The idea that a "government" should "give services and protection for people" is also quite new, and derives out of the concept of western feudal obligation. "Services and protection" are, when you get right down to it, nothing more than a set of mutual obligations and responsibilities, and these can appear in any number of different forms.

When Steve noted that

Our strategy is based on the assumption that democracies will be liberal democracies.

there is also another implicit assumption that the organizations involved will only be nation states which, to my mind, is a fatal flaw.

Marc

[SteveMetz]

there is also another implicit assumption that the organizations involved will only be nation states which, to my mind, is a fatal flaw.

Marc

Agree. I kind of played with that idea in my Rethinking Insurgency monograph. During the prep seminars for Unified Quest over the winter, I was struck by the idea that in our conceptualization of counterinsurgency, the "end state" is that a government is in full control of its territory and has no challengers as a provider of security. Given what I see in the world, that is swimming against the tide of history which seems to be moving toward less effective national governments, not more.

That said, I have yet to come up with an alternative. Should we be able to form alliances with militias? Can we form alliances with and declare war on PMCs?

[marct]

Hi Steve,

Agree. I kind of played with that idea in my Rethinking Insurgency monograph. During the prep seminars for Unified Quest over the winter, I was struck by the idea that in our conceptualization of counterinsurgency, the "end state" is that a government is in full control of its territory and has no challengers as a provider of security. Given what I see in the world, that is swimming against the tide of history which seems to be moving toward less effective national governments, not more.

I certainly agree that the "end state" is always viewed in that way . I also agree that the general trend is away from effective nation states. Personally, I think that that assumption is just a reworking of the "and they lived happily ever after" of the high romantic fairy tale genre.

That said, I have yet to come up with an alternative. Should we be able to form alliances with militias? Can we form alliances with and declare war on PMCs?

Already been done. On the first point, look at the Cold War ops in, say Angola or Nicaragua or any number of other "countries". As to the second point, again the answer is yes - does the name Mike Hoare ring a bell or Executive Outcomes ?

I think one of the main reasons for restricting "official" international politics to nation states is to maintain the position that the only legitimate type of government is a nation state. This is an ideological illusion that serves a number of domestic political purposes.

Marc

[SteveMetz]

Hi Steve,



I certainly agree that the "end state" is always viewed in that way . I also agree that the general trend is away from effective nation states. Personally, I think that that assumption is just a reworking of the "and they lived happily ever after" of the high romantic fairy tale genre.



Already been done. On the first point, look at the Cold War ops in, say Angola or Nicaragua or any number of other "countries". As to the second point, again the answer is yes - does the name Mike Hoare ring a bell or Executive Outcomes ?

I think one of the main reasons for restricting "official" international politics to nation states is to maintain the position that the only legitimate type of government is a nation state. This is an ideological illusion that serves a number of domestic political purposes.

Marc

I meant formal alliances with legal standing.

[marct]

Hi Steve,

I meant formal alliances with legal standing.

That just ties back to my comments about fairy tales . Okay, does a government contract have legal standing? Also, whose legal system? What do we mean by a "formal alliance"? Did the US have one with the FLNA in Angola? Does a state recognize a non-state faction as a state as the only way to justify the existence of an alliance (vide the PRC vs. Taiwan)?

Let me step back from these issues for a second and bring up the other end of the scale, to whit, trans-national organizations (TNO) - e.g. the UN, the WHO, the IMF, the WTO, the World Bank, etc. Technically these groups are not nation states, but at least one of them enjoys protections under the Vienna Protocols (the UN) which implies a recognition of some form of sovereignty. Many nation states have entered into what are certainly de facto if, in some cases, not de jure "alliances" with these organizations.

Another example of a TNO which is being treated as a de facto "state" is AQ; witness the current US declaration of a de facto war against AQ and he current questions / concerns over the exact status and rights of prisoners captured during this war (e.g. gitmo).

Are we talking about de facto reality or de jure illusions? I'm not asking this to be silly; the answer will have really serious implications on planning and the creation of strategies.

Marc

[FascistLibertarian]

To be a nation state you need (among other things) to be able to rasie taxes and have a standing army. This is why the EU and UN could never (in my view) be nation states.

[marct]

Hi FL,

To be a nation state you need (among other things) to be able to rasie taxes and have a standing army. This is why the EU and UN could never (in my view) be nation states.

As a note, Hamas raises taxes and has a standing army, the EU and the UN have provisions for gaining revenue (taxes on governments in the EU case and "contributions" for the UN) and raising military forces. Right now, at least three nation states do not have standing armies: the Vatican, Lichtenstein and Monaco.

Marc

[Pragmatic Thinker]

Steve you wrote -- "Second, while the administration is right that the foundation of the threat we face is the ideology which generates extremists, it has come up with a strategy that focuses on killing or capturing extremists rather than undercutting the hostile ideology. America's primary "partners" in the conflict--Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan--tolerate and even support the ideology which gives rise to violent extremists. Our strategy tolerates this. It is a fatal flaw"

I think that capturing/killing extremists (terrorists, insurgents, guerillas,...) is important in a sense that our message is that if you join these ranks bad things can happen to you. This gets solidified everytime we hear the enemy saying "I am slightly demoralized and scared because my buddy Abdul just got captured last night in a raid, I am not sure I want to be a jihadist anymore..." Of course, I made that quote up but my point is this is a measurable way to do something. Also, I disagree with those who would contend that capturing/killing these guys hurts us. I will say that we will never "win" in Iraq and Afghanistan by this method alone but I will say that it is important part of the overall strategy which is what the military was created to do. However, I think our civilian government (mostly Department of State) has done a terrible job politically getting these countries "fixed", which they say is difficult to do based on the security situation and foreign investors unwilling to risk life and money in projects. So the cycle continues, we attempt to improve security (capturing/killing bad guys) and on the cheap we try to "rebuild" but there isn't nearly the impetus in rebuilding as there is in securing. I believe a major flaw in Iraq came when this administration shut out any outside foreign investors from going into Iraq and rebuilding. This is not an example of our government doing what was best for the Iraqi people, but what was good for the U.S. businesses. It is a shame that Iraqi's still lack basic electricity and running water four years after the war.

Now you mention that we tolerate Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan which I am assuming means that our support to these regimes is causing the militancy in the first place and secondly these regimes are mostly non-democratic from a western point of view and there are strong undercurrents of social discontent within those three countries. Sooo...my question is what should we do? Cut ties with them? In the case of Saudi Arabia that goes without saying, we have strong economic ties with them plus long standing political relationships that I still don't fully understand but they are there; in the case of Egypt we have strong interests in seeing someone we can deal with in charge of the Suez Canal; and in the case of Pakistan I think we continue with poor foreign policy in that one... Bottom line, I am not sure I know how to defeat an ideology. I know how to find and kill individuals who would like to bring physical harm to our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, but I don't know how you defeat that drive in them to commit these acts. When foreign policy (war simply being an extension) is driven by economics and politics, and not truly morally or security driven you are going to have a messy conflict. People are pissed off because the Americans came into their country under the banner of "bringing prosperity and democracy" and all that has ensued is lots of violence and little overall prosperity. We can't have both...we either commit to these campaigns to truly bring prosperity which in my mind would mean any company (U.S. or otherwise) that is willing to come in and rebuild infrastructure should be allowed that opportunity. Also, you realize that when a country contains several disparate ethnic groups who have a long history of hating each other that removing the dictator isn't going to create a condition where love toward fellow man will follow. It is called a power grab and everyone wants their agenda met. We should have learned this lesson in Bosnia and Kosovo, but the only guy who really sounded off was General Shinseki and look what that bought him...

[SteveMetz]

Steve you wrote -- "Second, while the administration is right that the foundation of the threat we face is the ideology which generates extremists, it has come up with a strategy that focuses on killing or capturing extremists rather than undercutting the hostile ideology. America's primary "partners" in the conflict--Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan--tolerate and even support the ideology which gives rise to violent extremists. Our strategy tolerates this. It is a fatal flaw"

I think that capturing/killing extremists (terrorists, insurgents, guerillas,...) is important in a sense that our message is that if you join these ranks bad things can happen to you. This gets solidified everytime we hear the enemy saying "I am slightly demoralized and scared because my buddy Abdul just got captured last night in a raid, I am not sure I want to be a jihadist anymore..." Of course, I made that quote up but my point is this is a measurable way to do something. Also, I disagree with those who would contend that capturing/killing these guys hurts us. I will say that we will never "win" in Iraq and Afghanistan by this method alone but I will say that it is important part of the overall strategy which is what the military was created to do. However, I think our civilian government (mostly Department of State) has done a terrible job politically getting these countries "fixed", which they say is difficult to do based on the security situation and foreign investors unwilling to risk life and money in projects. So the cycle continues, we attempt to improve security (capturing/killing bad guys) and on the cheap we try to "rebuild" but there isn't nearly the impetus in rebuilding as there is in securing. I believe a major flaw in Iraq came when this administration shut out any outside foreign investors from going into Iraq and rebuilding. This is not an example of our government doing what was best for the Iraqi people, but what was good for the U.S. businesses. It is a shame that Iraqi's still lack basic electricity and running water four years after the war.

Now you mention that we tolerate Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan which I am assuming means that our support to these regimes is causing the militancy in the first place and secondly these regimes are mostly non-democratic from a western point of view and there are strong undercurrents of social discontent within those three countries. Sooo...my question is what should we do? Cut ties with them? In the case of Saudi Arabia that goes without saying, we have strong economic ties with them plus long standing political relationships that I still don't fully understand but they are there; in the case of Egypt we have strong interests in seeing someone we can deal with in charge of the Suez Canal; and in the case of Pakistan I think we continue with poor foreign policy in that one... Bottom line, I am not sure I know how to defeat an ideology. I know how to find and kill individuals who would like to bring physical harm to our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, but I don't know how you defeat that drive in them to commit these acts. When foreign policy (war simply being an extension) is driven by economics and politics, and not truly morally or security driven you are going to have a messy conflict. People are pissed off because the Americans came into their country under the banner of "bringing prosperity and democracy" and all that has ensued is lots of violence and little overall prosperity. We can't have both...we either commit to these campaigns to truly bring prosperity which in my mind would mean any company (U.S. or otherwise) that is willing to come in and rebuild infrastructure should be allowed that opportunity. Also, you realize that when a country contains several disparate ethnic groups who have a long history of hating each other that removing the dictator isn't going to create a condition where love toward fellow man will follow. It is called a power grab and everyone wants their agenda met. We should have learned this lesson in Bosnia and Kosovo, but the only guy who really sounded off was General Shinseki and look what that bought him...

Personally, I think we should consider downgrading our ties to those countries. I mean, what do we really get from them? How constructive a role is Egypt playing in the Palestinian dispute? With the Saudis, it's not like they're not going to sell oil if we stop cozying up to them.

One way you defeat an ideology is by delegtimizing it. All three of those states help legitimize the extremist ideology. Basically, we said "you're for or against us" and we then allowed those three to play both sides. If there is an "axis of evil" today it is states that supply transnational terrorists and funds for them. At the top of the list is Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan.

[Pragmatic Thinker]

Personally, I think we should consider downgrading our ties to those countries. I mean, what do we really get from them? How constructive a role is Egypt playing in the Palestinian dispute? With the Saudis, it's not like they're not going to sell oil if we stop cozying up to them.

I think you under estimate the importance of Saudi Arabia as a political ally in the region. They are considered extremely influential in the region, especially with their neighbors and more importantly within OPEC. The energy argument is indeed valid, but for the US the implication resides in their (Saudi) ability to control pricing within OPEC and not so much physical oil supply. We as a nation are more dependent upon Canadian sand tar crude then Saudi sweet, but that is a whole other discussion. I do agree with you that they allow people within their population to spread this radical Islamic ideology that is so embraced by Al Qaeda and other groups throughout the globe, however, I believe it is too dangerous (especially economically) to simply cut ties with the Saudi's. They punished us in 1973 with the Arab Oil Embargo, and they could similiarily punish us again (and our "global economy" partners like China, India, and many others) today by either slowing production to create increases in oil prices, push to convert petro dollars to euros which would put this economy into an economic meltdown greater than the Depression, or any other various measures that would have sever economic consequences at home. People talk about global markets and economies as a good thing, but a smart warrior and analyst would know that economic inter-dependence directly relates to how we craft foreign policy which directly effects military operations. I have simplified my point but the bottom line remains we need ($$) these countries on our "side" so to speak and not actively against us.

[Ski]

PT

There is also a vast amount of Saudi money invested in the United States, and if that money was suddenly go away, I think there would very serious economic (and therefore political) repercussions. Egypt and Pakistan don't have anywhere near the economic influence on the US as Saudi Arabia does. But they are important because Egypt is the largest Arab country in terms of population (and that Suez Canal is still as important today as it was the day it opened for business), and Pakistan because of the nukes and AQ connection in Waziristan.

[SteveMetz]

PT

There is also a vast amount of Saudi money invested in the United States, and if that money was suddenly go away, I think there would very serious economic (and therefore political) repercussions. Egypt and Pakistan don't have anywhere near the economic influence on the US as Saudi Arabia does. But they are important because Egypt is the largest Arab country in terms of population (and that Suez Canal is still as important today as it was the day it opened for business), and Pakistan because of the nukes and AQ connection in Waziristan.

I don't think the Saudi regime is suicidal. I mean, what are they going to do with all that money if they pulled it out of the United States? We need to get over this myth that they have leverage of us because of their oil and money but we don't have any leverage over them.

[BRUZ_LEE]

... I was struck by the idea that in our conceptualization of counterinsurgency, the "end state" is that a government is in full control of its territory and has no challengers as a provider of security. PMCs?

That's exactly why it was this BIG strategic blunder to topple Saddam (who was "in full control" of Iraq) without being able to provide a proper replacement for him (democracy or not).
Wasn't that the reason behind Schwarzkopf being stopped in 1991 from marching to Bagdad? The fear of the implosion of Iraq as a state actor and resulting from that a much more volatile, instable and dangerous region than with keeping Saddam in place?

Well,...now we are facing exactly that.

So much about the effects-based approach to operations in practice...
BRUZ

[RTK]

That's exactly why it was this BIG strategic blunder to topple Saddam (who was "in full control" of Iraq) without being able to provide a proper replacement for him (democracy or not).
Wasn't that the reason behind Schwarzkopf being stopped in 1991 from marching to Bagdad? The fear of the implosion of Iraq as a state actor and resulting from that a much more volatile, instable and dangerous region than with keeping Saddam in place?

Well,...now we are facing exactly that.

So much about the effects-based approach to operations in practice...
BRUZ

I think the official reason was that we were there to eject Iraq from Kuwait and upon doing so, we completed the mission. The operational estimates of taking Baghdad were high casualties and possible chemicals. I buy your reason as more probable but don't think it was ever presented as THE reason.

[tequila]

Well, several leaders have articulated the reasons for not going all the way in 1991.

Dick Cheney:

I think if we were going to remove Saddam Hussein we would have had to go all the way to Baghdad, we would have to commit a lot of force because I do not believe he would wait in the Presidential Palace for us to arrive. I think we'd have had to hunt him down. And once we'd done that and we'd gotten rid of Saddam Hussein and his government, then we'd have had to put another government in its place.

What kind of government? Should it be a Sunni government or Shi'i government or a Kurdish government or Ba'athist regime? Or maybe we want to bring in some of the Islamic fundamentalists? How long would we have had to stay in Baghdad to keep that government in place? What would happen to the government once U.S. forces withdrew? How many casualties should the United States accept in that effort to try to create clarity and stability in a situation that is inherently unstable?
I think it is vitally important for a President to know when to use military force. I think it is also very important for him to know when not to commit U.S. military force. And it's my view that the President got it right both times, that it would have been a mistake for us to get bogged down in the quagmire inside Iraq.

Norman Schwarzkopf:

On the question of going to Baghdad. If you remember the Vietnam war, we had no international legitimacy for what we did. As a result we, first of all, lost the battle of world public opinion and eventually we lost the battle at home.


In the Gulf War we had great international legitimacy in the form of eight United Nations Resolutions, every one of which said "Kick Iraq out of Kuwait", did not say one word about going into Iraq, taking Baghdad, conquering the whole country and hanging Saddam Hussein. That's point number one.

Point number two, had we gone on to Baghdad, I don't believe the French would have gone and I'm quite sure that the Arab coalition would not have gone, the coalition would have ruptured and the only people that would have gone would have been the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

And, oh by the way, I think we'd still be there, we'd be like a dinosaur in a tar pit, we could not have gotten out and we'd still be the occupying power and we'd be paying one hundred percent of all the costs to administer all of Iraq.

...

But I think, more importantly, there's a strategic consideration. Saddam Hussein portrayed that war from the very beginning as "This is not a war against Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. This is the Western colonial lackey friends of Israel coming in to destroy the only nation that dare stand up to Israel, that is Iraq".

Had we proceeded to go on into Iraq and take all of Iraq, I think that you would have millions of people in that part of the world who would say Saddam was right, that that was the objective.

...

So the bottom line, as far as I'm concerned, is that sure, emotionally I would have loved to have gone to Baghdad and grabbed Saddam Hussein, but this was not an emotional decision, it was a strategic decision, and strategically we were smart enough to win the war and win the peace.

George Bush & Brent Scowcroft:

While we hoped that popular revolt or coup would topple Saddam, neither the U.S. nor the countries of the region wished to see the breakup of the Iraqi state. We were concerned about the long-term balance of power at the head of the Gulf. Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq, would have violated our guideline about not changing objectives in midstream, engaging in "mission creep," and would have incurred incalculable human and political costs.
Apprehending him was probably impossible. We had been unable to find Noriega in Panama, which we knew intimately. We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would instantly have collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger and other allies pulling out as well. Under those circumstances, furthermore, we had been self-consciously trying to set a pattern for handling aggression in the post-cold war world. Going in and occupying Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the U.N.'s mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of international response to aggression we hoped to establish. Had we gone the invasion route, the U.S. could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land. It would have been a dramatically different--and perhaps barren--outcome.

[BRUZ_LEE]

Well, several leaders have articulated the reasons for not going all the way in 1991. ...

Thanks for the quotes. They are really spot-on.

BRUZ

[FascistLibertarian]

We should also remember that Sadam and the Taliban did not have 100% control over their own countries. Why should we expect we will do better?

If having a standing army is not a requirement for being a nation state, only the ability to raise one, then all sorts of organizations that are not usually considered to be nation states share that ability, including trans-national corporations (which, historically, I should point out often had the right to tax as well).

It still brings us back to the point hat nation states are just one type of organization amongst many that provide the same "services".

Hi Marc!

I am just saying that to be a nation state you need the ability to raise an army. Not that everyone that can is a nation state.

The issue of services is spot on. I see it in two ways
1) You can pay so you hire Blackwater
2) You are poor, your house gets bombed, the non-state organizations which we label terrorist are able to provide better service. People naturally will trust the non state player which is looking out for them. Plus these people get targeted by the powerful countries which makes them look like heros and us like bullies.

Transnational corps are building their own armies...... Its the thing that makes sense. I dont really see what can be done to stop considering we live in market economies.
Shell has to either hire mercs in Nigeria or leave.
Traditionally these companies were National (ie Dutch or British joint stock companies).
National companies still exist of course.

The nation state is a construction, if it cant provide people will lose faith.
I love Canada (best country in the world!), how long that would be true if I couldnt get power and the French were bombing our cultural symbols I dont know.

I think for Iraq the question is how unified should the country be? Ie Regional autonomy and local forces?