The American Approach to Counterinsurgency

[SteveMetz]

Here are a couple of little brain farts that I had during my presentation to the Army War College Distance Education class yesterday (and now has been integrated into my "Rethinking Insurgency" presentation):

1. What's the ultimate strategic objective--government control of "ungoverned spaces" or stability? This is a crucial decision. If, as I argue, it is stability (based on the idea that protracted conflict rather than insurgent "victory" generates threats like terrorism and organized crime), the U.S. role should involve things like mediation between insurgents and government, and aiding a sectarian militia which can protect a repressed or excluded group rather than simply assistance to the government (which is our current approach). The idea of a “legitimate resistance forces” in Iraq—Sunni Arab militias--is interesting. IF the core of the conflict is fear of repression and distrust of the government by Sunni Arabs, it might make sense to give them something to protect their community other than AQ.

2. Counterinsurgency is extremely difficult. It conflicts with the American strategic culture which thrives on quick, clean, decisive outcomes. As a result, we do it half way, embroiling ourselves without demanding the reengineering of the political, economic, cultural, and social system which gave rise to the conflict in the first place.

I believe we should either do it right or not do it all. If a state facing an insuring is not willing to undertake deep changes (to include things like the empowerment of women), I believe we should opt out. Other nations should be able to choose between sustaining their "culture" or undertaking reforms which lead to prosperity and stability, but we should not bear the costs for the decision.

Think about it--what if we opt out? But, you might say, If we do, insurgents may win and take over a country! And, I reply, So what? Think of insurgent victories of Cold War--Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe. How much of a real threat did any of them become? Even what may be the worst of the lot for us--Cuba-- was no real threat, but only an imagined one sustained by Florida politics. If, in fact, insurgents seize power somewhere and become state sponsors of terrorism, we can stop them more effectively and cheaply than we could try and stop them from coming to power by propping up incompetent governments. Ultimately, insurgent victories may be less of a threat to U.S. national interests than involvement in a protracted, perhaps failed counterinsurgency campaign.

So, again I say, let's either do it right or not do it at all.

[Old Eagle]

Think you'll find an ally in Jeff Record from AirWC.

The Gordian knot, however, is what do you do when there is no alternative to becoming involved? The U.S. has major national interests, but no hope of fighting AirLandBattle Lite, the preferred course of action? My gut (it's a Shirtsoff thing) tells me that building HN and regional forces is part of the answer.

And, how does one discern what those cases are? In the early 90s, for instance, Afghanistan certainly did not pass the "so what?" test. Oops.

[SteveMetz]

Think you'll find an ally in Jeff Record from AirWC.

The Gordian knot, however, is what do you do when there is no alternative to becoming involved? The U.S. has major national interests, but no hope of fighting AirLandBattle Lite, the preferred course of action? My gut (it's a Shirtsoff thing) tells me that building HN and regional forces is part of the answer.

And, how does one discern what those cases are? In the early 90s, for instance, Afghanistan certainly did not pass the "so what?" test. Oops.

Jeff and I are fellow travelers. I wrote a dustjacket blurb for his Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win (althought the ingrate has yet to send me a copy). Where we diverge is that I think he focuses too much on Cold War style insurgencies.

What I'm trying to suggest is that there are no cases where declining involvement is impossible. We think there are, but there aren't (with the possible exception of Mexico and Canada. After all, if Canada fell to insurgents it might interrupt our strategic supply of comedians).

[tequila]

Think of insurgent victories of Cold War--Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe. How much of a real threat did any of them become?

*cough* China *cough*

I also have quibbles with the idea that some sort of wholesale transformation of a culture is necessary to win at counterinsurgency. What wholesale transformation/Westernization of society was required to defeat the Malayan Communists, the Huks in the Philippines, or the South Korean Communists 1945-1950? To beat UNITA or the Hutu genocidaires in the Congo, or bring GAM to the peace table in Aceh, or to defeat the GIA/FIS in Algeria? Or indeed, any number of South American insurgencies?

[SteveMetz]

*cough* China *cough*

I also have quibbles with the idea that some sort of wholesale transformation of a culture is necessary to win at counterinsurgency. What wholesale transformation/Westernization of society was required to defeat the Malayan Communists, the Huks in the Philippines, or the South Korean Communists 1945-1950? To beat UNITA or the Hutu genocidaires in the Congo, or bring GAM to the peace table in Aceh, or to defeat the GIA/FIS in Algeria? Or indeed, any number of South American insurgencies?

You plan on doing counterinsurgency support in China?

But, your point is an interesting one. Let me tell you how I addressed (or, depending on your perspective, danced around) the Malaya issue during my talk yesterday.

In 2003 I was part of a team led by Steve Biddle (then a colleague of mine at the Strategic Studies Institute, now at the Council on Foreign Relations) which examined the conventional campaign of March-April 2003. Steve's conclusion was that the Iraq military and political leadership was so incompetent that the operation neither validated or invalidated defense transformation. It was an inadequate test.

I contend that Malaya was the same. The insurgents were, to put it in technical terms, absolute blundering boobs. The Brits probably could have beaten them with a couple of dozen drunk Manchester soccer fans (although that would have entailed significantly more human rights abuses). It may be an inadequate test, yet we have derived a whole theory of counterinsurgency from that conflict.

I don't know enough about your other two examples. I am reminded, though, that the Huk conflict write large took several centuries (if you remember that the Spanish and we fought them before the Filipino government did). And, Korea did, in fact, undergo a systemic and cultural change.

So, what I'm getting it is that if the insurgents are morons, our doctrine and strategy are perfectly adequate. I'm not sure, though, that it is for truly serious insurgents.

[Tom Odom]

[I]
1. What's the ultimate strategic objective--government control of "ungoverned spaces" or stability? This is a crucial decision. If, as I argue, it is stability (based on the idea that protracted conflict rather than insurgent "victory" generates threats like terrorism and organized crime), the U.S. role should involve things like mediation between insurgents and government, and aiding a sectarian militia which can protect a repressed or excluded group rather than simply assistance to the government (which is our current approach). The idea of a “legitimate resistance forces” in Iraq—Sunni Arab militias--is interesting. IF the core of the conflict is fear of repression and distrust of the government by Sunni Arabs, it might make sense to give them something to protect their community other than AQ.

Steve,

The immediate exception that jumps out at me--by exception the case where stability is not the preferred choice--is Pakistan and the tribal lands. There the government itself has chosen stability (also known as survival) and we have to date gone along with that choice.

The other issue I have with this is that we do not often make a clear choice for either stability or government control. We drift or back into things based on a combination of foreign policy and domestic politics.

I will say that in OIF I believe we are going to gave to make the choice very soon--or perhaps change our original choice from government control to stability. Either way we will have to accept more instability in the interim.

Counterinsurgency is extremely difficult. It conflicts with the American strategic culture which thrives on quick, clean, decisive outcomes. As a result, we do it half way, embroiling ourselves without demanding the reengineering of the political, economic, cultural, and social system which gave rise to the conflict in the first place.

I believe we should either do it right or not do it all. If a state facing an insuring is not willing to undertake deep changes (to include things like the empowerment of women), I believe we should opt out. Other nations should be able to choose between sustaining their "culture" or undertaking reforms which lead to prosperity and stability, but we should not bear the costs for the decision.

COIN is diffficult. But what you propose is social and cultural imperialism. The only choice that has any hopes for success under this model is opt out. This also argues against your first point where stability maybe the goal rather than government control. Nothing could be more destablizing than attempted re-engineering using force. We are now in the 4th year of that in Iraq.

In some cases, however, I believe we are going to have to bite the bullet and force change where it affects us most directly. The case I have in mind is Saudi Arabia and the royals. Pakistan is a very close number two on the same list.

Best

Tom

[SteveMetz]

Steve,

The immediate exception that jumps out at me--by exception the case where stability is not the preferred choice--is Pakistan and the tribal lands. There the government itself has chosen stability (also known as survival) and we have to date gone along with that choice.

The other issue I have with this is that we do not often make a clear choice for either stability or government control. We drift or back into things based on a combination of foreign policy and domestic politics.

I will say that in OIF I believe we are going to gave to make the choice very soon--or perhaps change our original choice from government control to stability. Either way we will have to accept more instability in the interim.



COIN is diffficult. But what you propose is social and cultural imperialism. The only choice that has any hopes for success under this model is opt out. This also argues against your first point where stability maybe the goal rather than government control. Nothing could be more destablizing than attempted re-engineering using force. We are now in the 4th year of that in Iraq.

In some cases, however, I believe we are going to have to bite the bullet and force change where it affects us most directly. The case I have in mind is Saudi Arabia and the royals. Pakistan is a very close number two on the same list.

Best

Tom

But what is the REAL threat to U.S. national interests if the Northwest Tribal Area is run by primitive extremists? Or even if Afghanistan is?

Just seems to me that it would be a better strategy to launch attacks against any AQ bases in those areas and REALLY focus on homeland security (to include strict controls on people from states which foster Islamic extremism) than to try to go into those areas and drag them kicking and screaming into the 19th century.

[tequila]

Steve,

Sorry - the only reason I mentioned China is because it was a classical Cold War insurgency which resulted in a rather significant national security threat to U.S. interests in Asia for decades.

Saying that the Huk movement extended back hundreds of years is a bit erroneous in my view. The Huks were more than just a peasant rebellion.

I would argue that Korea did not undergo the sort of massive systemic and cultural shift you are talking about during the time it took to defeat the Communist insurgency in the south. In fact, such a shift only took place after the insurgency and the conventional war was long past.

So, what I'm getting it is that if the insurgents are morons, our doctrine and strategy are perfectly adequate. I'm not sure, though, that it is for truly serious insurgents.

The question of whether or not our doctrine and strategy are adequate is not the same thing as necessitating massive cultural reform to defeat an insurgency. Algeria 1992-2001 is a good modern example, and I don't think anyone can claim that the FIS/GIA were not truly serious.

[Tom Odom]

But what is the REAL threat to U.S. national interests if the Northwest Tribal Area is run by primitive extremists? Or even if Afghanistan is?

Just seems to me that it would be a better strategy to launch attacks against any AQ bases in those areas and REALLY focus on homeland security (to include strict controls on people from states which foster Islamic extremism) than to try to go into those areas and drag them kicking and screaming into the 19th century.

I would agree with you. The real threat is another AQ sanctum and the answer maybe to hit them repeatedly. I agree completely on US security--which 12 million illegals standing around arguing about their "rights" suggests is a complete joke. And I certainly agree that large scale conversion to 21st Century Western values is a non-starter.

But this is one of those cases where we are in bed with the government but not in bed with its internal policies. If we chose to strike the tribal lands in a sustained fashion, we will be writing off Musharaff's government. The choices are neither clear nor easy.

Personally I believe that we have thrown much of what we learned in the "Cold War" about containment out prematurely. We contained areas of the world and we made choices just as you suggest. I do not agree with the prattle about changes in warfare suddenly going back to ethinicty and blood rather than purely ideology. Conflicts around the globe in the Cold War combined all three. The Cold War was never simply about ideology. I also believe that we cannot simply say we don't like COIN and refuse to participate. Our participation may well be dictated by events beyond our control.

Best

Tom

[SteveMetz]

I would agree with you. The real threat is another AQ sanctum and the answer maybe to hit them repeatedly. I agree completely on US security--which 12 million illegals standing around arguing about their "rights" suggests is a complete joke. And I certainly agree that large scale conversion to 21st Century Western values is a non-starter.

But this is one of those cases where we are in bed with the government but not in bed with its internal policies. If we chose to strike the tribal lands in a sustained fashion, we will be writing off Musharaff's government. The choices are neither clear nor easy.

Personally I believe that we have thrown much of what we learned in the "Cold War" about containment out prematurely. We contained areas of the world and we made choices just as you suggest. I do not agree with the prattle about changes in warfare suddenly going back to ethinicty and blood rather than purely ideology. Conflicts around the globe in the Cold War combined all three. The Cold War was never simply about ideology. I also believe that we cannot simply say we don't like COIN and refuse to participate. Our participation may well be dictated by events beyond our control.

Best

Tom

Well, I still think we need to seriously consider whether there really are instances where we cannot avoid involvement. I think we convince ourselves that we can't but if we hold up the costs of resisting involvement with the costs of involvement, the deal takes on a different look.

Speaking of "prattle about changes in warfare suddenly going back to ethnicty and blood rather than purely ideology" I followed the advice of my hero Frank Hoffman and started Ralph's new book last night. As usual, I agree with about 75% of it and have no real trouble wading through the of gratuitous insults to get to the meat of the analysis (although I know a lot of people do).

[wm]

What I'm trying to suggest is that there are no cases where declining involvement is impossible. We think there are, but there aren't (with the possible exception of Mexico and Canada. After all, if Canada fell to insurgents it might interrupt our strategic supply of comedians).

A loss of Canada might also produce a pretty serious interruption to the strategic supply of the natural gas that is used to power generators that provide the electric power we use to do things like communicate on this discussion board!

Methinks there's a lot more global interconnectivity than seems to have been considered prior to making the proposal to disengage on a fairly global basis. We are no longer living in a world like the periods of the Cleveland Presidency--thanks to Teddy Roosevelt.

[SteveMetz]

A loss of Canada might also produce a pretty serious interruption to the strategic supply of the natural gas that is used to power generators that provide the electric power we use to do things like communicate on this discussion board!

Methinks there's a lot more global interconnectivity than seems to have been considered prior to making the proposal to disengage on a fairly global basis. We are no longer living in a world like the periods of the Cleveland Presidency--thanks to Teddy Roosevelt.

I've never found the economic justifications for counterinsurgency persuasive. Even if insurgents take over a country, they're unlikely to stop selling whatever it is their nation produces. They themselves are going to face extensive demands from all the people they promised a better life, and they'll need money to address that.

Plus, we can put this in the context of Iraq. We are worried about an insurgent victory there affecting the petroleum market. But what if we'd spent what we've now sunk into Iraq on developing domestic oil production or alternatives? I suspect we'd be better off.

[Old Eagle]

Steve,

Have you seen the SO JOC? It's 4 cases are much broader than anything you envision.

[SteveMetz]

Steve,

Have you seen the SO JOC? It's 4 cases are much broader than anything you envision.

Check. In a way, that follows the ideas I'm trying to make--that we think more in terms of stability ops/peacekeeping than in terms of warfighting. What I'm struggling with is that our current conceptualization of counterinsurgency sees it as a variant of warfighting, meaning that the strategic objective is "victory." What I'm trying to say is that victory requires reengineering a flawed society, and we're not willing to pay the cost to do that. So we've put ourselves in a situation where we can't attain our own strategic objectives.

Stability ops are different because the strategic objectives are not necessarily "victory." Stability I think we can attain.

[Ken White]

Check. In a way, that follows the ideas I'm trying to make--that we think more in terms of stability ops/peacekeeping than in terms of warfighting. What I'm struggling with is that our current conceptualization of counterinsurgency sees it as a variant of warfighting, meaning that the strategic objective is "victory." What I'm trying to say is that victory requires reengineering a flawed society, and we're not willing to pay the cost to do that. So we've put ourselves in a situation where we can't attain our own strategic objectives.

Stability ops are different because the strategic objectives are not necessarily "victory." Stability I think we can attain.

toss words around that feed perceptions that are inimical to what we want to do.

Leaving aside the 'heroes,' 'warfighter' and such cinematic or media excesses, I'll also reluctantly forebear commenting on the current fad for naming operations in grandiose and vastly overstated terms (OEF, OIF) which themselves send a bad message subject to manipulation.

Instead, let me just suggest that the very term 'war' applied to a counterinsurgency sends bad messages and the use of words like victory, defeat and such in the context of such an effort where the best outcome can only be an acceptable conclusion sends a terrible message that can and will be used, domestically (regardless of which party is where) and internationally to our detriment.

You are correct IMO in that we in the US are not prepared to pay the price -- or be patient enough, some of both I think -- to wage a successful counterinsurgency in the classic mode. Stability ops are possible and we should head that way.

I have never subscribed to the "American's don't want casualties" routine. While it's certainly true in a relative sense, it has been used as a propaganda tool by many and is vastly misunderstood. There is no question that some Americans do not want any casualties and that some relatives of those hurt or killed will be angry but they are a small minority, most Americans will accept high casualties as long as the goals are clear and the operation(s) are successful. Failure, bungling and sloppy work turn off more Americans than do body bags. As we have seen...

A military capability is required, no question but it needs to be focussed and far better trained to be effective and quick. We have the capability, the potential is there but Congress is a big part of the problem.

Simply put, big hardware items that bring benefit to multiple States and Districts are a better sell in Congress then are a few small high end pieces of materiel from small suppliers and in small quantities for smash and grab raids or the cost of training to get the 'conventional' forces to a level of capability required to perform the operations that can be effective. This tends, unfortunately, to drive the Army in a quest for a bigger budget to go where the money is.

Put most but not all of the heavy and medium stuff in the ArNG, congress will buy that and you can have the best of both worlds.

Removing SF and CA from SOCom and putting them to work on their primary designed missions while leaving, even expanding, JSOC would be helpful. However, a well trained Infantry Battalion can ride helicopters, fast rope and kick doors as well as those guys can. The MEU-SOC effort worked but can be improved and the Army is equally capable of doing it. We are going to be confronted with a high number of second and third term enlisted guys who are Grunts and they'll have some good experience. The key is in the training; it is good now -- it can be better.

Whoops. Inadvertent lie, there. The Key is in getting the 'senior leadership' to adapt. ALL of them...

[wm]

I've never found the economic justifications for counterinsurgency persuasive. Even if insurgents take over a country, they're unlikely to stop selling whatever it is their nation produces. They themselves are going to face extensive demands from all the people they promised a better life, and they'll need money to address that.

Plus, we can put this in the context of Iraq. We are worried about an insurgent victory there affecting the petroleum market. But what if we'd spent what we've now sunk into Iraq on developing domestic oil production or alternatives? I suspect we'd be better off.

I wasn't arguing for an economic justification to COIN. I was instead arguing that your view of the potential US place in the world (as a "rugged individualist" standing alone in a corner at the prom, refusing to take to the floor except with those select few partners who dance the way we like) is rather outmoded, pre-20th Century, in fact.

We could choose to be like Feudal Japan (sort of your suggestion) until the world decides to encroach. We could also choose to work within the context of the world as a partner and aid other nations rather than play the heavy who has to have everyone else do it our way (that is, be victorious in the "conquering" sense). However, this latter option seems rather short sighted.

While I think we must play in the international arena, we are not forced to make it a zero-sum game. Several alternatives outcomes are possible--Win-win (playing the stab ops card perhaps); win-lose (playing the military victory card almost for sure); lose-lose (my take on the outcome of playing your proposed disengagement card).

Regarding the last part of your post--I think you would be pretty amazed to discover just how energy independent we could be today, were we not playing the same kind of economic games in the oil industry that others on this thread have alluded to with regard to our acquisition and budget practices vis-a-vis the defense industry.

[SteveMetz]

I wasn't arguing for an economic justification to COIN. I was instead arguing that your view of the potential US place in the world (as a "rugged individualist" standing alone in a corner at the prom, refusing to take to the floor except with those select few partners who dance the way we like) is rather outmoded, pre-20th Century, in fact.

We could choose to be like Feudal Japan (sort of your suggestion) until the world decides to encroach. We could also choose to work within the context of the world as a partner and aid other nations rather than play the heavy who has to have everyone else do it our way (that is, be victorious in the "conquering" sense). However, this latter option seems rather short sighted.

While I think we must play in the international arena, we are not forced to make it a zero-sum game. Several alternatives outcomes are possible--Win-win (playing the stab ops card perhaps); win-lose (playing the military victory card almost for sure); lose-lose (my take on the outcome of playing your proposed disengagement card).

Regarding the last part of your post--I think you would be pretty amazed to discover just how energy independent we could be today, were we not playing the same kind of economic games in the oil industry that others on this thread have alluded to with regard to our acquisition and budget practices vis-a-vis the defense industry.

I wasn't arguing for isolationism. I was arguing in favor of moving away from our current model of more or less bilarteral counterinsurgency support to try and prop up a flawed system. And, I was arguing that I don't think it makes sense to say that we should be involved in counterinsurgency in a place simply because it produces oil or some other resources (whether Iraq, Nigeria, or somewhere else). Even if insurgents took over those places, they'd still need to sell oil.

[marct]

Steve, I think that you are fixating on the wrong level of analysis. Supporting government operations in states that are undergoing an insurgency is not necessarily about "winning a war" or securing strategic resources. A lot of it comes back to a really simple point: is the US' word any good?

Diplomacy, as someone once put it, relies on credit established on the battlefield. Nobody would trust a country who said "we are your friend, so give us free trade, but we won't help you defeat those people who are trying to destroy you". This is reminiscent of Achilles grumping around in his tent .

Having said that, I would also like to point out that your two categories, COIN and Stability Ops, are also problematic . First, they are not discrete, they are a continuum. Second, by casting them solely in kinetic terms you are leaving out other possible solutions.

It strikes me that a far better way of casting the entire problem set would be to recognize that "stability operations" are multi-faceted from natural disaster recovery through refugee issues and economic displacement to outright insurgencies. These types of operations should be, especially towards the natural disaster end, should be an automatic action rather than a diplomatic action (it's a case of is your word good when you [the US] says that X, Y, and Z are your values). The issue of supporting your allies should not be a question, although the issue of making some one or some faction your allies should be.

On the issue of an insurgency in Canada - not only would you loose your supplies of comedians and natural gas, but you also might want to check out how much petroleum, hydro electric power and fresh water you get from us as well . Believe me when I tell you that the Canadian public would be quite happy to stop exporting gasoline to the US if we could get it ourselves at even a 100% markup over the oil sands production cost of $15.85 (CDN) per barrel !

Marc

[SteveMetz]

Steve, I think that you are fixating on the wrong level of analysis. Supporting government operations in states that are undergoing an insurgency is not necessarily about "winning a war" or securing strategic resources. A lot of it comes back to a really simple point: is the US' word any good?

Diplomacy, as someone once put it, relies on credit established on the battlefield. Nobody would trust a country who said "we are your friend, so give us free trade, but we won't help you defeat those people who are trying to destroy you". This is reminiscent of Achilles grumping around in his tent .

Having said that, I would also like to point out that your two categories, COIN and Stability Ops, are also problematic . First, they are not discrete, they are a continuum. Second, by casting them solely in kinetic terms you are leaving out other possible solutions.

It strikes me that a far better way of casting the entire problem set would be to recognize that "stability operations" are multi-faceted from natural disaster recovery through refugee issues and economic displacement to outright insurgencies. These types of operations should be, especially towards the natural disaster end, should be an automatic action rather than a diplomatic action (it's a case of is your word good when you [the US] says that X, Y, and Z are your values). The issue of supporting your allies should not be a question, although the issue of making some one or some faction your allies should be.

On the issue of an insurgency in Canada - not only would you loose your supplies of comedians and natural gas, but you also might want to check out how much petroleum, hydro electric power and fresh water you get from us as well . Believe me when I tell you that the Canadian public would be quite happy to stop exporting gasoline to the US if we could get it ourselves at even a 100% markup over the oil sands production cost of $15.85 (CDN) per barrel !

Marc

I don't think that trading with us requires us to make a commitment to a given regime. And that's what our traditional approach to COIN was. That's what I'm getting at--stabilization operations don't entail support to a given regime. Traditional--or what Frank Hoffman and others call "classical"--COIN does.

And on our word being any good, what I'm suggesting is that we should be more selective in regimes we make a commitment to. In the past, we've made a commitment to any regime facing first a communist, now an Islamic extremist threat. I believe we should only make such a commitment to a regime that is truly committed to systemic change, not just to its own survival.

[marct]

Hi Steve,

I don't think that trading with us requires us to make a commitment to a given regime. And that's what our traditional approach to COIN was. That's what I'm getting at--stabilization operations don't entail support to a given regime. Traditional--or what Frank Hoffman and others call "classical"--COIN does.

That's an interesting question. While I would agree with you in the abstract, historically there has been a very strong tie between setting the conditions of economic activity and recognition and support for the government that allows this to happen. That's why I chose the free trade example...

I agree that stability operations do not, again of necessity, require support for a given regime, and it's one of the reasons why I actually approve of more of a move to stability operations . The problem I was trying to raise was in situations where commitments have already been made.

And on our word being any good, what I'm suggesting is that we should be more selective in regimes we make a commitment to. In the past, we've made a commitment to any regime facing first a communist, now an Islamic extremist threat. I believe we should only make such a commitment to a regime that is truly committed to systemic change, not just to its own survival.

I totally agree with you on being selective about which regimes you make agreements with. It has certainly been a problem in the past and is still a problem. I will, however, disagree with you on a requirement to make systematic change. In some instances, that is probably both necessary and desirable for all concerned, but in others, say Thailand, it is ridiculous. It is the sort of requirement that led to the monarchy not being restored in Afghanistan (which has increased resentment here).

Taken to its logical conclusion, which, I'll admit, is a bit of a reductio ad absurdam , this puts the US squarely back into the same role of the 5th Comintern - a regime that is bent solely on exporting reflections of itself.
If that sounds silly, which I'll admit it does, how do you think people in other nations will view it?

I'm being purposely confrontation here, Steve, because I'm hoping that you will start to think about this outside the US-centric box (try thinking like a Canadian ). I don't really think that the US will start acting like the Soviets , but WMs scenario of isolationism is a definite possibility.

Marc