The American Approach to Counterinsurgency

[SteveMetz]

Here are a couple of little brain farts that I had during my presentation to the Army War College Distance Education class yesterday (and now has been integrated into my "Rethinking Insurgency" presentation):

1. What's the ultimate strategic objective--government control of "ungoverned spaces" or stability? This is a crucial decision. If, as I argue, it is stability (based on the idea that protracted conflict rather than insurgent "victory" generates threats like terrorism and organized crime), the U.S. role should involve things like mediation between insurgents and government, and aiding a sectarian militia which can protect a repressed or excluded group rather than simply assistance to the government (which is our current approach). The idea of a “legitimate resistance forces” in Iraq—Sunni Arab militias--is interesting. IF the core of the conflict is fear of repression and distrust of the government by Sunni Arabs, it might make sense to give them something to protect their community other than AQ.

2. Counterinsurgency is extremely difficult. It conflicts with the American strategic culture which thrives on quick, clean, decisive outcomes. As a result, we do it half way, embroiling ourselves without demanding the reengineering of the political, economic, cultural, and social system which gave rise to the conflict in the first place.

I believe we should either do it right or not do it all. If a state facing an insuring is not willing to undertake deep changes (to include things like the empowerment of women), I believe we should opt out. Other nations should be able to choose between sustaining their "culture" or undertaking reforms which lead to prosperity and stability, but we should not bear the costs for the decision.

Think about it--what if we opt out? But, you might say, If we do, insurgents may win and take over a country! And, I reply, So what? Think of insurgent victories of Cold War--Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe. How much of a real threat did any of them become? Even what may be the worst of the lot for us--Cuba-- was no real threat, but only an imagined one sustained by Florida politics. If, in fact, insurgents seize power somewhere and become state sponsors of terrorism, we can stop them more effectively and cheaply than we could try and stop them from coming to power by propping up incompetent governments. Ultimately, insurgent victories may be less of a threat to U.S. national interests than involvement in a protracted, perhaps failed counterinsurgency campaign.

So, again I say, let's either do it right or not do it at all.