The American Approach to Counterinsurgency

[Steve Blair]

I would also disagree with systematic change being a requirement for US assistance/involvement. Each country, and each situation, is different. Marc's correct in that such an approach does make us look like the Soviet Union with its commitment to support all "wars of national liberation."

Our fixation on systematic change, I think, reflects our own conviction that our system is the "best" and that to be worthy of our support other countries should adapt it as well. Some countries do quite well with blended monarchies, while others wouldn't know what to do with one. And our track record in many places with supporting democracies (or what we called democracies...look at Latin America) isn't all that great. Democracies can easily be spun into dictatorships by "fathers of the people" or "fathers of the country" if the proper social networks aren't in place.

Stability operations are a slightly different ball of wax in that the visible level of commitment on the part of the US is lower, so more options are available. I tend to feel that as the level of commitment rises, rhetoric (from the press, politicians, and others) actually limits the options we have available as the situation molds itself into a "victory or death" type framework.

[SteveMetz]

I would also disagree with systematic change being a requirement for US assistance/involvement. Each country, and each situation, is different. Marc's correct in that such an approach does make us look like the Soviet Union with its commitment to support all "wars of national liberation."

Our fixation on systematic change, I think, reflects our own conviction that our system is the "best" and that to be worthy of our support other countries should adapt it as well. Some countries do quite well with blended monarchies, while others wouldn't know what to do with one. And our track record in many places with supporting democracies (or what we called democracies...look at Latin America) isn't all that great. Democracies can easily be spun into dictatorships by "fathers of the people" or "fathers of the country" if the proper social networks aren't in place.

Stability operations are a slightly different ball of wax in that the visible level of commitment on the part of the US is lower, so more options are available. I tend to feel that as the level of commitment rises, rhetoric (from the press, politicians, and others) actually limits the options we have available as the situation molds itself into a "victory or death" type framework.

By systemic change I didn't mean to make them like us, or even to make them representative democracies. What I'm getting at is that there are certain elements of some states which invariably hinder development and security. For instance, I agree with Ralph Peters that no culture that represses women is going to be competitive in the globalized world, and cultures which are not competitive are prone to instability and violence. I'm not drawing a casual link but there is some sort of affiliation.

What I'm therefore suggesting is that if we go to a state and say, "A, B, and C" are the characteristics of competitive, stable states in the modern world. And they say, "We can't do that because it runs counter to our culture." Then our response should be, "See you around. Have a nice war."

[SteveMetz]

Hi Steve,



That's an interesting question. While I would agree with you in the abstract, historically there has been a very strong tie between setting the conditions of economic activity and recognition and support for the government that allows this to happen. That's why I chose the free trade example...

I agree that stability operations do not, again of necessity, require support for a given regime, and it's one of the reasons why I actually approve of more of a move to stability operations . The problem I was trying to raise was in situations where commitments have already been made.



I totally agree with you on being selective about which regimes you make agreements with. It has certainly been a problem in the past and is still a problem. I will, however, disagree with you on a requirement to make systematic change. In some instances, that is probably both necessary and desirable for all concerned, but in others, say Thailand, it is ridiculous. It is the sort of requirement that led to the monarchy not being restored in Afghanistan (which has increased resentment here).

Taken to its logical conclusion, which, I'll admit, is a bit of a reductio ad absurdam , this puts the US squarely back into the same role of the 5th Comintern - a regime that is bent solely on exporting reflections of itself.
If that sounds silly, which I'll admit it does, how do you think people in other nations will view it?

I'm being purposely confrontation here, Steve, because I'm hoping that you will start to think about this outside the US-centric box (try thinking like a Canadian ). I don't really think that the US will start acting like the Soviets , but WMs scenario of isolationism is a definite possibility.

Marc

I think, at least, that I am working outside the US-centric box because I'm not saying that if other nations won't adopt our institutional framework, we eschew involvement. What I'm saying is that there are, as Ralph Peters pointed out, identifiable signs of non-competitive societies. If our erstwhile partners don't want to address these things, we're setting ourselves up for failure by supporting them.

[tequila]

• Restrictions on the free flow of information.
• The subjugation of women.
• Inability to accept responsibility for individual or collective failure.
• The extended family or clan as the basic unit of social organization.
• Domination by a restrictive religion.
• A low valuation of education.
• Low prestige assigned to work.

These are the markers of failure according to Peters. He doesn't really go into the mix of how many of these are necessary for success or failure, but I think Peters is assigning far too much value to some very hazy variables here. Moreover, he is specifically talking about requirements for becoming an advanced, postindustrial knowledge economy based on services --- many countries would love to hit basic industrialization in the first place, and the example of India vs China shows that there is something to be said for industrializing first before jumping straight to services.

[SteveMetz]

[/LIST]These are the markers of failure according to Peters. He doesn't really go into the mix of how many of these are necessary for success or failure, but I think Peters is assigning far too much value to some very hazy variables here. Moreover, he is specifically talking about requirements for becoming an advanced, postindustrial knowledge economy based on services --- many countries would love to hit basic industrialization in the first place, and the example of India vs China shows that there is something to be said for industrializing first before jumping straight to services.

His list may or may not be right, but what makes Ralph valuable is that he is at least willing to grapple with the idea that some intrinsic elements of some cultures may make them uncompetitive. Unfortunately, the concept of failed or flawed cultures is something academic simply is unwilling to grapple with, therefore there is little or no truly rigorous research on what the signs of failure are.

[marct]

Hi Steve,

By systemic change I didn't mean to make them like us, or even to make them representative democracies.

Good . Part of the reason why I brought that up is that that has been a fairly consistent rhetorical message that has been coming out of the US Executive branch for the past 50+ years. As Steve Blair just noted, we've seen it time and time again in Latin America, Africa, etc.

What I'm getting at is that there are certain elements of some states which invariably hinder development and security. For instance, I agree with Ralph Peters that no culture that represses women is going to be competitive in the globalized world, and cultures which are not competitive are prone to instability and violence. I'm not drawing a casual link but there is some sort of affiliation.

Certainly there are elements that hinder both security and development - I totally agree. Sometimes, however, the elements that hinder development are the same elements that lead to stability, so it's not a good idea to lump the two together - sometimes it is an either / or situation.

Let's take this element of "represses women". First, who defines what "represses" is? This has been a real fight inside the women's movement globally when, for example, wearing a hijab was listed by some as a form of repression and by others as a form of freedom. Second, a rapid change in gender roles inevitably leads to massive social instability - look at the first women's movement (1890's), the effects of the Suffragette movement and the second women's movement in the 1960's-70's. It has taken Western societies over 100 years to change the social definition of women's roles and it is still causing instability.

Okay, let's look at the idea that "cultures which are not competitive are prone to instability and violence". I'm assuming that that refers to economically competitive. While I would agree that there has to be an outlet for inherent competition within a society, I would disagree that it has to be economic competition - that's only one form of institutional outlet amongst many, although it is an important one.

What I'm therefore suggesting is that if we go to a state and say, "A, B, and C" are the characteristics of competitive, stable states in the modern world. And they say, "We can't do that because it runs counter to our culture." Then our response should be, "See you around. Have a nice war."

<sigh> And how is this different from replicating the US or other Western nations which are the very data points used to define "competitive, stable states"? It's only running the same replication strategy through the black box of academia.

Okay, having said that, there are ways to do it that do not cause massive instability because of the cultural engineering that you are requiring. Malinowski's The Dynamics of Culture Change goes into how to do this but, as a caution, it requires a very long term commitment and, at the same time, quite a few resources.

I think, at least, that I am working outside the US-centric box because I'm not saying that if other nations won't adopt our institutional framework, we eschew involvement.

Sorry, I should have made my point more clearly. What I was asking you to do was to think / feel / react like someone who is being told by the US that they have to change regardless of what they want. It's that, let's call it an emotional reaction, that is crucial in both politics and diplomacy that I was after.

What I'm saying is that there are, as Ralph Peters pointed out, identifiable signs of non-competitive societies. If our erstwhile partners don't want to address these things, we're setting ourselves up for failure by supporting them.

Does that apply to the US as well? Should the European nations of NATO demand that the US institute universal medical care because all advanced societies (outside of the US) have it? Given that an insane amount of the US' GDP will go into their health care system over the next 20 years, this is clearly a sign of a social trend towards both instability and non-competitiveness. Why should we support you ?

Marc

[marct]

Hi Steve,

His list may or may not be right, but what makes Ralph valuable is that he is at least willing to grapple with the idea that some intrinsic elements of some cultures may make them uncompetitive. Unfortunately, the concept of failed or flawed cultures is something academic simply is unwilling to grapple with, therefore there is little or no truly rigorous research on what the signs of failure are.

There has actually been a fair amount of research on it, it just isn't taught that much any more. The Malinowski book I mentioned in my last post is one example, and there have also been studies on failed cultures and failed attempts at cultural engineering.

I do agree with you that there hasn't been that much rigorous research on the issue recently, but that is partly because the underlying unilinear evolutionary assumptions are rejected now by most Anthropologists and Sociologists.

Marc

[Steve Blair]

But the Soviet Union also had universal health care...and I'd say that their competitiveness wasn't as great as it could have been....

That said, I think Peters' list has some value, but more as an internal checklist or list of things to consider BEFORE getting involved or approaching another nation. I don't see it as a list of demands to be met but rather as a tool for evaluating a state or a first step in developing such a tool.

The US has a tendency to do many of these things in a very public way, shackling us to policies or states before any real think-through has been done (at least in my view). That's partially press-driven and partly a result of a political system that is more or less totally focused on internal processes (read elections and maintaining power) and less on outside events and factors. While many bemoan the lack of military experience among current politicians, I think it's just as disturbing (or maybe more so) to see how many are lawyers or the like with precious little exposure to history (American or foreign) or international events as a whole. I think this creates a knee-jerk reaction something like "How will these pictures of starving children impact my chances for reelection if I don't do something (or appear to do something)" as opposed to "This is tragic, but how does it fit in with events in the region or other international events and considerations." Our system conditions a short view with a very US-centric focus and desire for quick results.

[SteveMetz]

Hi Steve,



Good . Part of the reason why I brought that up is that that has been a fairly consistent rhetorical message that has been coming out of the US Executive branch for the past 50+ years. As Steve Blair just noted, we've seen it time and time again in Latin America, Africa, etc.



Certainly there are elements that hinder both security and development - I totally agree. Sometimes, however, the elements that hinder development are the same elements that lead to stability, so it's not a good idea to lump the two together - sometimes it is an either / or situation.

Let's take this element of "represses women". First, who defines what "represses" is? This has been a real fight inside the women's movement globally when, for example, wearing a hijab was listed by some as a form of repression and by others as a form of freedom. Second, a rapid change in gender roles inevitably leads to massive social instability - look at the first women's movement (1890's), the effects of the Suffragette movement and the second women's movement in the 1960's-70's. It has taken Western societies over 100 years to change the social definition of women's roles and it is still causing instability.

Okay, let's look at the idea that "cultures which are not competitive are prone to instability and violence". I'm assuming that that refers to economically competitive. While I would agree that there has to be an outlet for inherent competition within a society, I would disagree that it has to be economic competition - that's only one form of institutional outlet amongst many, although it is an important one.



<sigh> And how is this different from replicating the US or other Western nations which are the very data points used to define "competitive, stable states"? It's only running the same replication strategy through the black box of academia.

Okay, having said that, there are ways to do it that do not cause massive instability because of the cultural engineering that you are requiring. Malinowski's The Dynamics of Culture Change goes into how to do this but, as a caution, it requires a very long term commitment and, at the same time, quite a few resources.



Sorry, I should have made my point more clearly. What I was asking you to do was to think / feel / react like someone who is being told by the US that they have to change regardless of what they want. It's that, let's call it an emotional reaction, that is crucial in both politics and diplomacy that I was after.



Does that apply to the US as well? Should the European nations of NATO demand that the US institute universal medical care because all advanced societies (outside of the US) have it? Given that an insane amount of the US' GDP will go into their health care system over the next 20 years, this is clearly a sign of a social trend towards both instability and non-competitiveness. Why should we support you ?

Marc

I'm not saying any nation is obligated to change the way that we want. I'm just saying that I don't want my tax money going to those who refuse the address the root causes of their problems.

That's the same way I feel about domestic politics. I don't think the government should force people to make good life decisions (don't drop out of school, don't have illegitimate babies, don't use drugs, don't smoke cigarettes, save for retirement) but I don't feel that taxpayers should subvent bad life decisions.

So, in counterinsurgency support, we should be explicit on what the requirements are for our assistance. If those requirements are unacceptable to the potential partner, then no deal.

As is, we base our decision to support a partner more on the ideology of their opponent than on their willingness to meet our requirements.

At this point, I don't exactly what the right requirements are. But I do feel strongly that we need to develop them.

[marct]

Hi Steve,

But the Soviet Union also had universal health care...and I'd say that their competitiveness wasn't as great as it could have been....

And just look at how unstable they became since adopting US institutions !!!

That said, I think Peters' list has some value, but more as an internal checklist or list of things to consider BEFORE getting involved or approaching another nation. I don't see it as a list of demands to be met but rather as a tool for evaluating a state or a first step in developing such a tool.

Agreed. Honestly, I am playing Devil's Advocate in this thread, in part because of the cultural-political traits you noted. Some type of criteria, publicly available and updated based on the best understandings available, would be an invaluable tool for development and alliance building.

Marc

[Ken White]

four years (generally) at the political appointee level in DoD and DoS do not help. The creeping increase of said appointees at the expense of senior Civil Service folks is also a detriment (not that some of such do not improve things with their departure...).

Nor, for that matter, is the too frequent rotation of Flag Officers throughout DoD much help.

[SteveMetz]

Honestly, I am playing Devil's Advocate

Cool--now we're up to three uses for an anthropologist!

[Tom Odom]

Cool--now we're up to three uses for an anthropologist!

Now that was culturally sensitive...

[SteveMetz]

Now that was culturally sensitive...

Well, I think Bernard Shaw's quip when asked what he thought about culture in America ("it would be a good idea") applies to me as well. After all, I am a plumber's son from Elk Hills, West Virginia.

[marct]

Hi Steve,

I think we're up to 4 uses now, if you count sauce differences !

[SteveMetz]

Hi Steve,

I think we're up to 4 uses now, if you count sauce differences !

My bad. Never was any good at math.

[wm]

Since this thread seems to have slipped into a more humor-oriented discussion, I thought I'd pass on this story to illustrate a problem with the whole "competitiveness" notion.

A Harvard MBA goes on vacation to Cabo San Lucas. There he sees a fisherman who puts out to sea each day in his row boat with a pole and some bait. He also see the fisherman return each day with a single fish.
The MBA goes to the fisherman and says, "I have a great deal of expertise in process improvement. I believe we can reassess your approach to fishing and increase your catch quite dramaticly."
The fisherman responded, "Why would I want to do this, senor? Right now I fish whenever I want and am happy with my catch"
The MBA answered," With more productivity, you could sell more fish and make more money."
The fisherman asked, "What would I do with this extra money?"
The MBA replied, "Why invest it into more fishing boats to increase your catch even more, thereby increasing your revenues and profits still more."
The fisherman: "Why do this?"
The MBA: "You invest those funds into a canning plant, export the output and become a billionaire, of course."
The fisherman said, "Once I became a billionaire, what would I do next?"
The MBA said, "Why take time off and come to places like Cabo San Lucas to fish whenever you liked and be happy with what you catch."


The values that underlie the normative judgements one makes regarding success do not necessarily have to be the same as those of American business tycooon wannabes.

[marct]

Hi WM,

The values that underlie the normative judgements one makes regarding success do not necessarily have to be the same as those of American business tycooon wannabes.

I love it! It really points out the problems with any hypertrophied cultural trait .

[Mark O'Neill]

Hi WM,



I love it! It really points out the problems with any hypertrophied cultural trait .

Careful... that barbecue can be fired up really easily!

[SteveMetz]

Careful... that barbecue can be fired up really easily!

We need a name for this dish. My suggestions:

1. Doc Kebob
2. Scholar on a Spit
3. Deconstructionist Hash