Insurgency in the 21st Century

[selil]

I’ve been thinking about the concepts of terrorist, terrorism, insurgent, and what these terms mean to our resulting interest in international relations. The discussion keeps popping up to delineate the terms and codify the meanings. Coming to a common consensus on such an overloaded set of terms is fairly difficult. There are dictionary definitions, encyclopedias, and entire thesis on the origination of the terms, but for sake of discussion lets try to think of them this way.

Terrorism is a strategy utilizing unexpected violence and associated fear. What differentiates terrorism from criminal enterprise is the political motivation behind the acts of terrorism. Simple wanton violence for the sake of violence would not be terrorism it would be anarchy. Of course it would follow that a person engaged in the act of terrorism is a terrorist. Terrorism is a strategy that can be state sponsored, other than state sponsored, and individual in its execution. The motivation to create violence and fear in a population can be ideological (religion, sectarian, revenge), or it can be compensatory (cash, trade, barter). In general though there is some defining quality of attempting to create change in the larger political structure.

When I think of the insurgent I’m thinking about a politically motivated individual. Politics is not just the realm of the state though, and the religious convictions or hubris of the individual does play a part in the political power equation. The insurgent is working towards imposing violence on the nation-state through the use of tactics and strategies that may include terrorism. So an insurgent can employ a strategy that is in the role of terrorist and still maintain their political affiliation of insurgent. This is no different than an insurgent who uses guerilla warfare, aerial bombardment, swarm, or some other strategy.

As to motivation and the differences between insurgent and terrorist it might be that there is no difference. Terrorist or trigger puller the motivation of who “get’s” what when and how (politics) might not be tied to the sectarian or world of here and now. Violence can be it’s own reward, and the willful destruction of happiness and freedom their own ends. The destruction of the nation state or the governmental authority may be simple side affects of the insurgent/terrorist/guerilla warrior’s actions. Applying motivations or dogma to a group that may not have either and be dispersed over a global environment is nearing on the ludicrous.

Each cell or group may have differing perceived reasons for their apparent decision to perpetrate violence against the state. The violence itself may be it’s own reward. The dispersion of ideas and techniques are a side effect of their common bond in waging conflict but not necessarily in political fellowship. With technology the ability to coordinate over vast distances instantaneously and distribute and refine techniques quickly gives the appearance of mindful coordination. The reality is likely not a shared political will but a shared choice of perpetrating violence.


Insurgent or terrorist? Likely neither and both. We don’t call a soldier a “trigger puller” or identify them as such beyond a simple role. Similarly the term terrorist is much over used to describe the implementer of a tactic that might have broader implications. We’ve codified in law the term terrorism and the associated term terrorist without taking into account that it in reality limits the scope of the discussion inappropriately.

[mike sullivan]

Mark: I always had the feeling that “Global Insurgency” and “GWOT” were place holders for things people did not fully understand but wanted everyone to know that they did and something was being done about it.

Interesting set of questions though . . . especially #1 <<Which accepted school of International relations theory they subscribe to that accommodates this theory.(Global Insurgency)>> You might know this better than I, but I think much of the IR theory has been advanced by Western thinkers. If so, “Global Insurgencies” aka, ideologies radiating out of the Middle East may not fit a current theory. I am not an IR guy so don't spank me if I am off. If I am on – then there is your PhD dissertation.

[Mark O'Neill]

Mark: I always had the feeling that “Global Insurgency” and “GWOT” were place holders for things people did not fully understand but wanted everyone to know that they did and something was being done about it.

Interesting set of questions though . . . especially #1 <<Which accepted school of International relations theory they subscribe to that accommodates this theory.(Global Insurgency)>> You might know this better than I, but I think much of the IR theory has been advanced by Western thinkers. If so, “Global Insurgencies” aka, ideologies radiating out of the Middle East may not fit a current theory. I am not an IR guy so don't spank me if I am off. If I am on – then there is your PhD dissertation.

Hi Mike,

I believe that you are spot on about IR being largely a 'western field'. And, to my mind somewhat Euro and East- coast USA centric. Your point about whether the current models / schools can accommodate the challenges arising out of the Middle East at the moment is well made, and undoubtedly a good start point for a dissertation. I have missed the boat on that topic, as I am fast approaching the 'hump' point on my dissertation ( he typed hopefully...), and I am 100% convinced that I do not have the will to do another one!

Your observation about the ideas being 'place holders' suggests an interesting question / point. Many of the ideas that State representatives and other actors espouse,and act on ,seem to be deriative of these ideas. What does that say about some of the courses we are on if the base premise was dodgy? (rhetorical question).

There is more to this than just a 'smart' point about IR theory. I think that COIN can be 'lost' at each level of war - the tactical, operational and strategic. But I believe that it can only be 'won' at the strategic level, as that is the only point where all of the compenent elements of a nation state / society/ polity intersect and can be resolved in a conclusive fashion. This is also the level at which IR theory explains state behaviour. If we fashion strategy in response to 'global' COIN or 'terrorism' issues based on an possibly inadequate conception of state behaviour, then we are behind the proverbial eight ball before we start.

Now the IR field is not a precise social science, and many of is theoretical schools are in competition and disagreement. Imperfections notwithstanding, it remains man's best effort to understand the nature of our political world. As such I think that some knowledge of the field, beyond the 'sound bite reductionism' featured in much of commentary on either the war in Iraq or the wider 'GWOT' would be a good start point for some of the pundits offering solutions. (I am not referring to DK here, more so the proliferation of experts on the blogosphere and OPED columns).

Cheers

Mark

[Joe Dixon]

This is my first post on this blog. I am reading for my undergraduate dissertation on the use of robotics in COIN and I came across a mention of this book in P. W. Singer's Wired For War. I was disappointed to see that it seems unlikely to be published.

Is this the case, is the book likely to be published at some point, or is there some way that I could get hold of any part of it?

Thanks,

Joe.

[marct]

Hi Joe,

I haven't been able to find it online, but you might want to PM Steve and see what's happening with it; it might have come out under a different title.

Cheers,

Marc

[William F. Owen]

This is my first post on this blog. I am reading for my undergraduate dissertation on the use of robotics in COIN and I came across a mention of this book in P. W. Singer's Wired For War. I was disappointed to see that it seems unlikely to be published.

It was published. I have it, and have read it. It tells you nothing useful. I wouldn't recommend it.