The concept of "adaptation"

[TT]

Hi Ken,

Again, a very good point. The Marines certainly do use ritual to good effect but I did not know that the Army was a ‘ritual-free’ service . When I read your post, however, I was reminded of Shinseki and berets, which stands as a warning of the dangers and difficulties of trying to introduce new symbols.

The underlying points in your posts are important: to change a service culture involves a wide range of mutually reinforcing measures/initiatives (of which we have been discussing only a few), with an understanding that the specifics of any such package will differ across the services, and that it will take considerable time and concerted effort (which means continuity in leadership support). A daunting project for any service or its leadership to take on……


TT

[Rob Thornton]

Can you really do this without an outside catalyst? What are the different stimuli for change? Seems there is the outside - which for us means civilian something, and an inside which might be a grass roots from the lower ranks.

How are the two different?

Which one is more effective? In terms of it being reinforced or accepted?

Can there be a blend?

I've only read the out takes of some of the JFK speeches on national service, and the thoughts on UW - not enough to gain the context - but I do know it was not real popular with big Army - for that matter I've found allot of evidence in our 20th Century military history where SOF units and attitudes have not been well received (the creation of special units during WWII) - the argument was a diffusion of resources, but I think it may have something to do with military culture as well.

To fast forward to more recent history, many of Donald Rumsfeld's policies were also not popular with the ground services, but his push toward technology and "Transformation" were more in synch with the USAF and USN - and certainly provided the impetus for the MIL Industrial Complex to push the envelope on US Military tech (however - in my opinion it did so at the expense of people by virtue of what it emphasized).

Its hard for me to consider the trends from any other perspective other then applying the context of the ones I've lived through (with my own set of biases) to the ones which preceded them.

My hunch is that meaningful change is an evolution that occurs over decades as its institutionalized and built upon. To speed this change up in a democratic state's military will require a frank and honest discussion between the civilian leadership outlining the requirements for its policy goals over a decade or two, and the military responding with what that is going to cost - and what the risks are. Somewhere, there has to be compromise and consensus. Since it is a democracy, it has to go beyond the executive branch and include the legislative (appropriations and allocations) in a bipartisan fashion. There is significant risk on all sides - and political risk is something that many professional politicians seem to be averse toward.

Best regards, Rob

[Steve Blair]

The Army hasn't always been a ritual-free service. In fact, there used to be a pretty wide variety of rituals and traditions...but they were focused within the regiments. That all went away during World War II and never really came back.

I'd say in a way you could trace some of the anti-elite sentiments within the Army back to its Frontier experiences. Within Crook's commands there was always resentment toward his packers, who most soldiers felt got better treatment and field conditions from Crook. Scouts (both civilian and Indian) also came in for resentment; mainly because most of them made more than a corporal or (in some cases) a sergeant because they were paid on a different scale. At this time there was also a very clear distinction between Line and Staff duty, leaving a lingering resentment of any sort of service that might be considered special (most line officers were convinced that staff officers lived better - which was often true - and that they were promoted faster - which did sometimes happen).

During the Civil War there were also Volunteer units that existed mainly as headquarters guards, and for the first year or two of the war that was a common job for Regular cavalry. Cavalry was often seen as being an elite, so the saying "whoever saw a dead cavalryman" gained weight and left an impression that elites didn't do the hard work of warfare. Most of that changed after the Gettysburg campaign (when the Union cavalry really came of age), but it's an attitude that remained and would obviously find different targets within the system or culture.

[marct]

Hi Rob, TT, Ken...

The Marines could -- can, do -- use the tradition aspect to good effect; the Army less so. Our theoretical traditions are abstract and while units pay them lip service, few have anywhere near the depth of meaning that they do in other armies, particularly those who adapted from the British Army.

You're absolutely right, it is much easier in a regimental system where there is a specific focal point (the Regiment) and a specific history. The USMC is, in some ways, a Regiment writ large and, as you note Ken, it is easy to craft rituals for it.

Thus, I'm a little dubious that would work for us sans a major culture change in the US Army. Add to that todays attention spans and the fact that history in US Schools seems to be an almost proscribed subject...

Let's see what Marc comes up with. As he he says there are more esoteric rituals that might have merit. There are also some very practical efforts that could be pursued.

Thanks for the vote of confidence . Okay, before I start a couple of caveats. First, as you know, I'm a Canadian and have never been in the US military (I know the Canadian military from family tradition) so I just don't know the specifics that would work for the US Army. Second, I can come up with a suggested model for how t build them and how they would work, but I would be relying on others to get the specifics.

Okay, here goes...

I'm going to make an argument from analogy at the level of social structure, so bear with me . In many ways, military organizations parallel kinship structures. The regimental system is surprisingly similar to tribal societies: roughly BTN=Sept (or Lineage), REG=Tribe, Army=Clan, Service=Confederation, "military"="nation". Within this system, it is simple to produce "meaningful" rituals since the segmentation (sept, tribe, etc) matches he organizational structure and their are obvious connections between structure, history and structural conflict.

Because you have a continuity of membership that flows with the structure, it is easy to see how rituals develop - they are often segment specific relating to historical events and using a segment specific hagiography (i.e. specific stories about the members of the segment). This is reinforced by segment specific symbology, e.g. things like battle honours on a flag, a unit patch or some other piece of unique clothing. In this type of system, segment specific rituals ("traditions") are often spontaneously generated and, if you really want to build new ones, it's not that hard to do at all - any halfway competent symbolic Anthropologist could do it after spending three months with the group.

Now to the US Army which, alas, does not follow a regimental system but, instead, mirrors kinship and social practices in the US circa the 1920's (i.e. the Fordist model of organization which is, today, totally obsolete). This is a much trickier situation since you just don't have either the historical or the structural continuity inherent in the regimental system. It's made even trickier because the career path within the system is based on an organizational model that is designed to destroy individual connections with most structural segments (except the "branch" which is roughly equivalent to a "professional designation" within Fordist organization). In effect, the system is designed to destroy loyalty to a segment while reinforcing loyalty to the overarching organization.

That type of organizational structure can, and has, worked, but it is currently on the wane in civil society and that is where the military recruits its members from. It also, in part, explains why civil society is so anti-military on the whole (but that is another thread), and why retention bonus' in money just aren't working too well (it's not s symbol that is all that attractive in the newer civil organization - again, another thread). All of this is compounded by the fact that the current conflicts, along with many projected future ones, are not "traditional" state vs. state conflicts. In effect, the US Army is an Industrial Age organization, recruiting from an Information Age civil population fighting Information Age wars.

The structural effects of this disjunction are appalling. None of the rituals or ritual systems that serve an Industrial Age organization will work because they do not match either the civil sociey or the battlespace experience. This disjuncture started showing up in Vietnam, and has really gotten much worse during current operations.

In civil society, we have evolved new structural relationships built around personal networks and virtual, contingent communities, and we are certainly starting to see these flow over into the military (SWC is a great example of this). Again in civil society, some of these communities mimic the segmentation system of the regimental system but, unlike that system, they cut across the formal structures. Just using the SWC as an example, we are starting to see the development of "rituals" - the "beer and burger" fest in DC is an example. Another, more germaine to the general topic, is the increasing use of the SWC as a place to get expert advice. Whether or not most people realize it, this is a return to the Socratic example of "ask the man who knows", and it is totally contrary to the Fordist model.

So, back to ritualization...

At the structural level, we are seeing a lot of "ritual spaces" starting to appear - again, SWC is a good example. In order to create more ritual spaces and appropriate rituals, we need to look at the current structural realities and encourage those spaces that will allow us to reinforce the "traditions" that will be important for the future. So, what are these traditions? I leave it up to the folks in service to complete the list, but there are a couple that we've talked about ad nauseum: adaptability and innovation.

Both of these share a common set of characteristics, i.e. operating outside of the book by getting external (to the Book) ideas and ways of thinking / perceiving (Regiments as Tribes?!?). This type of trait can best be introduced and reinforced (and "ritualized") very early in a military career, i.e. in the military education system. The simplest way to do this is to create assignments in courses that require students to go out to virtual communities and non-military sources for their data. Personally, if I was developing a curriculum stream, I would start this in 2nd year and run it through until graduation. I would certainly require it for any advanced education opportunities.

I would also require a course that teaches history at a structural level - i.e. patterns of action and interaction. Ideally, this course should be team taught by people who have totally different backgrounds. Think about Heilein's idea of History and Moral Philosophy as the exemplar for this.

Rob is absolutely correct that this would have to be institutionalized - the question is where such institutionalization should take place. I would suggest that many of the MOS' be used as the basis for institutionalization, possibly by arranging for "exchanges" between the private sector and the military (probably work best in the policy, analysis, engineering, law enforcement, etc. areas - definitely not the combat ones ). In this case, we are attempting to "ritualize" personal networks by creating situations where people create non-military networks they can draw on.

With the type of structure we are seeing now, the best way to "create" traditions and rituals is to help create ritual spaces that allow for them to come into existence. If we go back to the kinship analog that started this post, we actually have seen this happen in a number of different cultures with the development of occupation based "secret societies", and this is the type of model that I can see working in the US Army.

Marc

[Ken White]

Perceptive...

"Now to the US Army which, alas, does not follow a regimental system but, instead, mirrors kinship and social practices in the US circa the 1920's (i.e. the Fordist model of organization which is, today, totally obsolete). This is a much trickier situation since you just don't have either the historical or the structural continuity inherent in the regimental system. It's made even trickier because the career path within the system is based on an organizational model that is designed to destroy individual connections with most structural segments (except the "branch" which is roughly equivalent to a "professional designation" within Fordist organization). In effect, the system is designed to destroy loyalty to a segment while reinforcing loyalty to the overarching organization."

The Army not only follows that model, most of our education and training institutions and techniques DATE from that model. I could even make the case that most of our tactical, operational and strategic precepts do as well. The Army that came back from WWI really learned its lessons well. Those guys created an educational and social model that used the WW I experience to good, even outstanding, effect. That enabled them to relatively rapidly create a good (if not great), very functional and ultimately capable Army with which to fight WW II. The models and techniques were successful, no question. They also served us fairly well in Korea and to a lesser -- and obviously declining -- extent in Viet Nam.

Unfortunately, after each of those three wars, the Army went right back to the pre-WW II state and while that is a sweeping generalization and has many notable exceptions, it was the rule.

An example of this unfortunate trend is the Pentomic Army of the late '50s. The concept was not nearly as operationally and tactically flawed as it has been painted. It really could have worked well and it was tactically and operationally flexible. It suffered, really from three synergistic issues. (1) It was such a sweeping change that the support systems and infrastructure could not keep up. Extremely simplistic example; Companies had no Supply section -- yet the demands of the property book system and something as simple the Quartermaster Laundry system demanded such a section. (2) Many -- not all -- of the Field grades and the senior NCOs could not adapt their thinking around the tactical flexibility required to maneuver five elements instead of three (more on this later). (3) The physical demands were too much for fifty year old Colonels. All those factors seem inconsequential yet all combined with other factors to create a cultural resistance in the Army to the design.

Fast forward a few years; ROAD. The concept was that maneuver Battalions would serve in any rotational model under any Brigade, a small light tactical headquarters. A good, innovative and flexible design. That didn't even get off the ground; the Colonels insisted on full time Command of three battalions. They also complained of the potential burden of being tasked to control more than three maneuver elements...

Further forward; Shy Meyer was going to rebuild the Army. He tried and he did some great things. His remake of the Personnel System and a true Regimental concept foundered on the shoals of the bureaucracy; the Military Personnel system just waited him out; no way they were going to see their staff diminished. TRADOC also waited him out; not because his ideas on remodeling the Officer Basic and Advance Course were wrong, they, IMO, were not -- but they would have decreased Instructor Contact hours, the bureaucratic Staffing Guide measurement tool that determined service school staffing and thus, the Schools would have lost personnel spaces.

All that boring foregoing is a lead in to the point Marc makes; we are way behind the times.

The 1920s model served us well in one war and acceptably in two more, however we have been a PROFESSIONAL Army since the mid '70s --and we're still operating an education and training system that is designed to support a large mobilization of the nation to fight industrial age battles. We need to put that successful model on the shelf to be pulled out in event of future need and get into the 21st Century. It would to my mind be criminal to still be operating essential the same training model a hundred years after its inception, yet, that is precisely where we are headed.

That is partly due to bureaucratic inertia; it is also partly due to a societal anachronism. In the 1920s, the Signal Corps got the best and the brightest because Radios were complex. Aviators and FOs were officers due to the knowledge and raw intellect requirements. Not a single one of those jobs requires an Officer today (the Armys use of Warrant Aviators is a 1920s social construct designed to placate the Air Force, not a military requirement, same thing applies to the USN / USMC discontinuance of enlisted aviators). The Armed forces of the US are indeed operating on a non-egalitarian (and arguably not nearly as merit based as we like to think) 80 year old model. On the one hand, that is not a major problem -- yet, as it affects our military performance and capability, it is a problem. A big problem

Because that social model not only inhibits, it positively discourages innovation and initiative. It also is wasteful of manpower because it keeps many 'jobs' about simply because the innovators who wish to dispense with such waste are ignored. Not to mention that those 'jobs' amount to spaces for someone...

When I was at Knox, many years ago, there was a reorganization to improve training. We rearranged the deck Chairs. In the process, on long sought elimination of an organization with about a fifty space saving was halted dead in its tracks when it was realized that the elimination would cause the loss of one Armor Colonel space. So the Army got to keep fifty one folks plus or minus out of TOE units and in the tail to preserve one space. Yeah, I understand the 'whys' of that -- I also understand that it is wrong...

To look at the current organization. In all our wars, we have really fought as Brigades (or Legions, RCT, CC, Groups -- Brigades by another name) with two exceptions; North Africa in WW II and Desert Storm. Those two were exceptions because the terrain would support Division maneuver, in all other cases, Revolution through Iraq today, the Brigade echelon was better adapted to terrain constraints and was more flexible. Yet we resisted organizing logically because the social structure demanded Divisions. Recall the early plans in this reorganiztion eliminated the Division. Good plan, IMO -- yet they're still with us...

As Marc said:

"In effect, the US Army is an Industrial Age organization, recruiting from an Information Age civil population fighting Information Age wars."

The solution sounds quite simple:

"This type of trait can best be introduced and reinforced (and "ritualized") very early in a military career, i.e. in the military education system. The simplest way to do this is to create assignments in courses that require students to go out to virtual communities and non-military sources for their data. Personally, if I was developing a curriculum stream, I would start this in 2nd year and run it through until graduation. I would certainly require it for any advanced education opportunities."

However, that will be terribly difficult to implement because this:

"With the type of structure we are seeing now, the best way to "create" traditions and rituals is to help create ritual spaces that allow for them to come into existence. If we go back to the kinship analog that started this post, we actually have seen this happen in a number of different cultures with the development of occupation based "secret societies", and this is the type of model that I can see working in the US Army."

while generally correct will be absolute anathema to the social institution -- not the military institution -- that is the US Army. Lets hope the military institution wins this one. It's due...

[TT]

Marc, Rob, Steve and Ken,

There is much food for thought in all this and it all requires a good think. The clashing of gears I am hearing in my head means these are but some initial tentative thoughts. And really any particular logical order.

First, Marc, thank you very much, that was extremely helpful, as it furnishes a useful way to approach to think about the issue. Our militaries are, as you say, based on an industrial age organizational model but I have never thought about the kinship structures the way you have. Yet what you say is does fit, for when examining any military organization one does take account of the individual services, or if looking at a specific service at the internal ‘tribal’ maps (infantry, artillery, and so on), as these may or will reveal different attitudes and mindsets.

In effect, the US Army is an Industrial Age organization, recruiting from an Information Age civil population fighting Information Age wars.

This in particular is neat way to think about the problem, with some added insight that may of potential value. This reminds of how Brian Michael Jenkins summed up the problem: ‘The enemies of yesterday were static, predictable, homogeneous, rigid, hierarchical, and resistant to change. The enemies of today are dynamic, unpredictable, diverse, fluid, networked, and constantly evolving.’ The issue is how to get from the organizational model that worked on these earlier enemies to one that is effective against the current enemies. But in thinking about this I never considered closely the point you make – our militaries are ‘recruiting from an Information Age civil population’.

This ties to a question Rob raised:

Can you really do this without an outside catalyst? What are the different stimuli for change? Seems there is the outside - which for us means civilian something, and an inside which might be a grass roots from the lower ranks.

How are the two different?

Which one is more effective? In terms of it being reinforced or accepted?

Can there be a blend?

My hunch is that meaningful change is an evolution that occurs over decades as its institutionalized and built upon. To speed this change up in a democratic state's military will require a frank and honest discussion between the civilian leadership outlining the requirements for its policy goals over a decade or two, and the military responding with what that is going to cost - and what the risks are. Somewhere, there has to be compromise and consensus. Since it is a democracy, it has to go beyond the executive branch and include the legislative (appropriations and allocations) in a bipartisan fashion. There is significant risk on all sides - and political risk is something that many professional politicians seem to be averse toward.

There are two different answers to this in the extant literature on innovation in military organization. One argument is that change requires the intervention of the civil authorities, but also suggests that the civil authorities are more likely to be able to effect change if they work with innovative officers. The other line of argument is that change can be effected by flag officers with the vision and authority to lead a campaign of innovation (and tied this is the observation that as part of this is a need to create promotional pathways consistent with the innovative practices for those more junior officers that join the ‘campaign’). The motivations for civil intervention are usually considered to be clear changes in the strategic environment that pose serious challenges, while for the ‘internal’ visionary officer(s) it may be the changed strategic environment (or defeat in war) or new technologies that suggest a new way of war (ie, the development of helicopters and there use in the 1950s ). Other internal motivations may also include institutional pressures to bolster military resources, legitimacy and/or effectiveness (these motives can be harnessed in support of change stemming from the other motivations as well).

I would add here that most innovation studies do not focus on changing culture (or the ‘organizational society’) which is a key part of any serious rethinking of our militaries but the change management literature also generally agrees that the right leadership is a requirement (the details on how to effect change are differing in this literature, however, and our military organizations are not quite the same as business organizations)

As I have mentioned earlier, the only clear case of a bottom-up (driven by junior to command rank – but below flag rank) that I am aware of was the introduction of maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps, and in this particular case the main motive falls under the changed strategic environment (which does include the perceived need to improve effectiveness on the battlefield) .

Can a blend of top down and bottom up exist and work? Certainly. The visionary officer needs to have other officers who buy into the vision. So, ideally what you want is a civil authority and a military leadership working in tandem, with a solid cadre of junior officers who agree with and work for the change this combined leadership advocates.. Moreover, although I am not aware of a particular case where this occurred, one would think that a large cadre of junior to field command officers could influence the civil and military leadership on the content (and direction) of the change, particularly if the leadership is willing to engage in open debate and listen to the debate.

This connects to the point Marc made about recruiting from an Info Age society. A civil and military leadership committed to transforming the industrial ages model into an information aged model, with the support of a significant proportion of the junior to field command officers and a steady inflow of new officers with an Info Age social awarne wsa and practice, would have a reasonable chance of success. And yes, even under these favourable conditions large scale change such as seems to be being argued for will take a lot of time (and so can be seen as evolutionary).

But, and this is a big but, there are host of potential obstacles. Ken in his post directly or indirectly identifies a number of these. One could add others, such as particular cultural traits of the organization (these are particularly tough nuts when they are linked to resource capture in the bureaucratic sense). But with respect to the model of change I have broadly outlined above, an important issue is continuity in leadership, for our civil leadership changes every 3 to 5 years, and our military leadership changes within a similar time frame. And it takes more than 3-5 years to implement the programme of initiatives to effect the desired change, to gain full acceptance of the required change (a paradigm shift), and then embed the change – and doing this is easier when one is speaking of a new operational concept or a new branch (again helicopters as an example) than is the case of changing the culture, which is pretty much what we are talking about. The many and varied obstacles to change that exist in a military organization are such that the time frame for accomplishing the change is long.

This model above maps on the approach I suggested earlier. To be repetitive (but hopefully not pedantic ): changing the ‘narrative’ requires in part that both civil and/or military leadership articulate and support ad nausea the required change (and creating new rituals and hero-warrior icons). The second is to effect a change in ‘behaviour’ (which encompasses the junior to field command ranks) which includes revamping training, which teaches the tangibles of ‘what to think’ and what the answers ought to be, and revamping the education system to impart to these more junior officers the intangibles of ‘how to think’ and what the questions ought to be (Marc’s suggestions above re the education system fit very well here). And there should be convergence between education and training. And finally there needs to be a perception that the changes have ‘benefit’, which again where the junior to field command officer are important, for the most important benefit are on performance and success on the battlefield – if they do not see any benefits on the battlefield, the change very likely will fail, whereas if they see benefit they will continue to support and even drive the change.

I am with Marc, in that I would have to rely on others for the specifics. But I think Marc has provided useful food for further thought.

Best

TT

[Ken White]

Some stream of consciousness thoughts.

From Rob:

"Can you really do this without an outside catalyst? What are the different stimuli for change? Seems there is the outside - which for us means civilian something, and an inside which might be a grass roots from the lower ranks."

Good question and there are several ramifications to any answer. "Civilian something" implies the Executive or Congress. Given previous efforts, I am not optimistic about either; there is a ferocious tendency to put quick fixes in place and these are rarely effective. I can cite my favorite whipping boy, DOPMA and there are other examples of well intentioned but ill informed and unproductive tampering. I suggest that given out governmental milieu, a better approach is to present a logical plan and expect them to tweak it (and they will...), hopefully not too badly.

I think Rob's comment implies that many of us would not expect a cutting edge solution from the current senior leadership and thus it will be a bottoms up -- or mid level up -- effort. Probably true. TT mentions the tribes and they are ever with us -- they dominate any talk or concept of reform. Simply put, it is illogical to expect a person who's spent 30 years or so in a tribe not to be colored by that and to expect him or her to oversee the diminishment of that tribe -- much less its dissolution.

"How are the two different?"

My suspicion is that the difference is the civilian solution will opt to the domestically politically attractive while the military solution will debase into a tribal squabble. In my view, it would be great if we could elect a broad consensus on a future strategy for the use of force (an extremely difficult proposition, I know) and the course of our Foreign Affairs ove the next decade or two (even more difficult). While that's in the 'hard' box, I do not believe it's in the 'too hard' box.

Then a design of a force to support that strategy could be undertaken. Blank sheet of paper type. That may well be in the too hard box...

However, I'm a firm devotee of "ask for 20, expect ten and get five..."

Which leads to:

"Which one is more effective? In terms of it being reinforced or accepted?"

My guess would be the military solution would be better accepted and reinforced. If a civilian solution is imposed, it if unloved will not be reinforced by the armed forces; deviously perhaps -- but there it is. Conversely, if the military solution is sensible and achievable, it will be supported by the civilians to include the Nation at large (as or more important than Congressional acceptance) and will be reinforced by the system that designed it.

"Can there be a blend?"

Obviously there must be but the key is who initiates.

TT says:

"I would add here that most innovation studies do not focus on changing culture (or the ‘organizational society’) which is a key part of any serious rethinking of our militaries but the change management literature also generally agrees that the right leadership is a requirement (the details on how to effect change are differing in this literature, however, and our military organizations are not quite the same as business organizations)"

Totally correct in my observation and yet, a MAJOR cultural change is what's needed. Ergo...

He also says:

"...And yes, even under these favourable conditions large scale change such as seems to be being argued for will take a lot of time (and so can be seen as evolutionary)."

Which is important and correct -- it will take a generation to get such a sweeping change implemented and embedded -- and our penchant for quick fixes will inevitably be at cross purposes to that. The interesting thing will be the tiffs between the "I want this done on my watch" types versus "This will not happen on my watch " types. The greater good of the Nation and the forces in totality should be the driving parameters but we're still dealing with humans.

TT again:

"...The second is to effect a change in ‘behaviour’ (which encompasses the junior to field command ranks) which includes revamping training, which teaches the tangibles of ‘what to think’ and what the answers ought to be, and revamping the education system to impart to these more junior officers the intangibles of ‘how to think’ and what the questions ought to be (Marc’s suggestions above re the education system fit very well here)..."

Raise them right and teach them well and they will do well. We have to start with the Basic Courses -- Officer and NCO, you cannot change one without changing the other -- and they will change the system and processes as they grow.

I'm also a firm devotee of "It is better to ask forgiveness than to seek permission" and the old Staff Officers watch words -- "Answer the question that was asked, answer the questions your answer will generate and answer the question that should have been asked." I alway liked the SAS Motto, too -- but I like the SBS Motto better, the original, not the new one...

[Rob Thornton]

You know we got this brief up in D.C. by a guy who was part of a team working on a pitch to Army leadership on how best to skin the advisory cat (there are several out there - this one was different then LTC Nagl's and John Bonin's). It was a pretty good pitch, but when he started off I asked him if he was pushing the Tom Barnett "SysAdmin" type force. The briefer told me jokingly that the Chief would hang me if he heard that. My remark was also kind of an ice breaker to see where the briefer was taking his pitch - but what it did tell me is that the institution is only willing to go so far in deviating from what it considers acceptable.

I picked up the Barnett books and I'm not sure that we should try and become something which might preclude us from doing the large scale breaking and killing if we ever have to do that task again either, but I think I am willing to consider new options in light of changing circumstances/conditions.

You know you hear historical figures sometime referred to as "ahead of their time" or as "visionary", but do you ever stop and wonder why? I think the answer might be as simple as the label itself - the conditions their their thinking addressed were not seen as solutions until after all the dust had cleared and the facts were known. Where these visionaries are comfortable operating in the unknown, the institution is not. If its a CEO of his own firm (a Google, Fed-Ex, Wal-Mart, etc.) risk is a more viable option then it is for an institution upon which a larger institution depends, and upon one where accountability/responsibility is ingrained.

I took the family out to Gettysburg again today (last time we just took in the cemetery and the Visitor's Center) to do the auto tour. We were up on Little Round Top above the Devil's Den and I was explaining to my son the value of the position - its discovery, its occupation and the fight for it. After pointing out that it commanded the field between Meade and Lee and while the Union owned it was useful in disrupting Confederate charges within range, but if the Confederates seized it they could in turn roll up the Union flank and put enfilade fire on and even behind Union lines my son asked a question: Dad, if this position was so important, why did it take so long for both generals to order its occupation and defense / try and seize it - I mean if you can see there from here, can't you see here from there?"

"Well son," says I - "they had a bunch going on at the time, and while there were people below them who could see its critical importance, the powers that be had other competing priorities and responsibilities."

Afterwards I had another thought - awful easy for me to sit up in the big NY monument and think, "man, this seems like a no brainer" without considering the many other things going on at the time, what went on before and trying to entertain what might happen the next day.

Considering change is hard enough, committing to it and departing from the past another one entirely.

All of that to say what Ken succinctly said (and said very well) in a paragraph

I think Rob's comment implies that many of us would not expect a cutting edge solution from the current senior leadership and thus it will be a bottoms up -- or mid level up -- effort. Probably true. TT mentions the tribes and they are ever with us -- they dominate any talk or concept of reform. Simply put, it is illogical to expect a person who's spent 30 years or so in a tribe not to be colored by that and to expect him or her to oversee the diminishment of that tribe -- much less its dissolution.

I continue to learn and think, so its a good day

Best regards, Rob

[wm]

To achieve a ‘new mindset’ is not an act of ‘creation’, it is an act of ‘recreation’. ‘Recreation’ from something extant is much harder than ‘creating’ something new from scratch. What in effect we are discussing if we are speaking of wide ranging substantive change is, in effect, a Kuhnian ‘paradigm shift’. The anomalies in the ‘worldview’ (culture) of our militaries (which has been pretty much focused on 'conventional warfare', has been 'reactive', has been, well. ‘so and so forth’) have, because of operational experience, become too pervasive and too significant to ignore anymore.( it may be that Yingling’s and others’ critique of the ‘Generals’ are a symptom of these anomalies no longer being ignorable). In effect, we are talking about a paradigm shift in the mindset of the militaries, in, to repeat myself, how the military (and/or individual services) perceive ‘who are they’ and ‘what is it we do’. Paradigm shifts in the sciences these days are generally believedto occur gradually, rather than as a ‘revolution’. This seems to me to be very much the case in seeking to change our militaries, if only because, as I think it was Kuhn himself who observed, the shift from the old paradigm to the new one is only complete when the last believer in the old paradigm has died. ‘Recreating’ (or insert ‘altering’ or ‘changing’ here if you will) the mind set or culture of the US military (or any other) to create the 'good foundation' so that it becomes accomplished at traditional and non-traditional forms of conflict will take a lot of time.

TT--First, thanks for the positive strokes on my icon comments in the "Great Generals" thread. What's that British saying about blind pigs and acorns?

I agree in principle on the perspective of providing a paradigm shift. However, the world of armed conflict is not exactly like the world of scientific investigation. If, as Kuhn proposed, a paradigm only shifts when the last beliveir in the old one passes on, then we will probably never see a paradigm shift in armed conflict. One country's armed forces will always run ionto some other organization that is fighting " the old way." This seems to be a big part of our problem in the current AORs--the bad guys are fighting in ways that we have gone past long ago.

Instead, I propose that we work on a "tweaking" of the paradigm, one that places greater emphasis on the unconventional, small war but does so in the context of the conventional, large war. I submit that we ought to try to explain small war doctrine in terms of what folks already know about big fights. We can show the family resemblence between the two and then apply the big war principles to the small war situations, mutatis mutandis , extrapolating to develop new insights.

MarcT suggested that we need to ritualize the changeover. I am not so sure that ritualization would be appropriate in the sense that I think most of us understand that term. However, I do believe that we should do something akin to ritualization. THat would be to use military fables to inculcate the behaviors and traits we seek to emphasize. I am thinking of stories like the "noble lies" Plato suggested for the young Guardians in his Republic. Or stories like those used by the Japanese Samurai to stress bushido virtues; see the Hagakure for an example. (I'm sure readers remember the Samurai stories told by Lt Castillo on Miami Vice, as another example).

We can pull from history (and fiction) both good examples and bad examples--sometimes in the same person. Chivington in Colorado would be a bad exemplar; Lord Roberts at Kandahar might be a good one. Henry M. Stanley on the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition falls in the "mixed bag" category, as does Lettow-Vorbeck in WWI East Africa. Perhaps most important would be to find appropriate mentors--people like LT Rasczak in Heinlein's Starship Troopers come to mind.

Not an easy task, but as Super Chicken is wont to say, "You knew the job was dangerous when you took it."

[selil]

Mr. Thornton you bring up some interesting points about the concepts of visionary. In science many things we take to have been invented by such and such, or father of this and that, were actually copying somebody else even generations earlier. Bill Bryson wrote a book "A history of everything" that is quite readable and brings to the front all of the times in history when discoveries were blocked, ridiculed, and then finally adopted as the actual ideal.

In thinking about the institutional challenges of accepting new ideas it becomes obvious that the military is likely much like academia or science. The institutional inertia of past methods and concepts keep new ideas from being even evaluated and rarely adopted. In previous threads along this topic a book by General Hammes "Sling and Stone" was suggested and I recently picked that up. I haven't read it so if I misunderstood the context please forgive. What I'll be looking at are the changing techniques of war and balancing that on the ideas of paradigm by Thomas Kuhn. Not I believe a new idea but critical for some other work I'm doing.

The changes we see and the associated objections and obstructions to change we perceive even in the face of mission failure I think hinge on these concepts of paradigm and practices of adoption. With Bryson the earlier idea generator introduced ideas, and the later accepted inventor followed after the controversy had cooled and ideas had a chance to take hold. I'm no expert at organizational behavior we have anthropologists like MarcT who explain to us technologists in small words and pictures how people behave. I find though these concepts are linked to another concept of risk. If the cost of conservatism is so high that lack of adaption/adoption of new paradigms incurs financial or societal hardship there may be a way to quantify that and ameliorate any negative feedback.

Sorry if I went off on a tangent but the risks of adaption/adoption failure seem interesting.

[Ken White]

Interesting you mention Barnett and the SysAdmin Force. My son and I were talking on the phone and I had belated flash when he mentioned it. When I first read Barnett's books a few years ago, I had two hangups on the SysAdmin thing. One was what you allude to. Which service is going to offer to be or do that? The very obvious answer is not one of them; they'll fight that to the death. However, I couldn't figure out what the other hangup was, just something that made me uneasy. While we were talking tonight about advisory training and efforts it finally, two years later, broke into my (nominal) conscious brainlet. Do we really want to do that?

Do we really want to wander about the world and get engaged in the Gap -- I'm not talking about the Armed Forces, they'll do what's required of them. I'm speaking of the US of A. Do we want to do that? I suspect the answer is no. We want the Gap eliminated, we want to help others, we want unfettered global commerce. Sure, no question we want those things but I'm not at all convinced that most Americans will buy into a military force -- no matter how benign -- that goes about doing good works.

An even more interesting question is does the Gap wants us to do that? My suspicion is that, again, the answer is no. If most Americans would be somewhat leery of SysAdmin and most recipients would be not enthusiastic about it, why should we consider it? I think we need a Plan B on that.

You mention breaking and killing. We do that well, always have. We do not have the patience to sit out a lengthy campaign -- we, the Nation -- and that is a critical shortfall that we should consider in our future planning. I mentioned that to my son and we started rambling and we both recalled that for a couple of hundred years, we pushed American commerce and unfettered access and rarely used force; when we did it was generally a short sharp action and we withdrew. Omitting the Phillipines because we're unlkely to do that again, only the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Nicaragua were exceptions but the general rule when confronted with force or bad attitudes was to land the Marines, burn the Pirate craft or the Customs House and get back aboard the ship and sail away.

I'm not advocating a return to gunboat diplomacy, not at all. I am suggesting that sending John Twiggs Myers to Tangier worked (well, sort of ) and that we should do what we do well and avoid that which we do not do well. I am suggesting that the use of better trained, equipped and more strategically mobile SOF DA elements for precise strikes is possible (given the political will and willingness to take some risk -- both sometimes dicey) and the reservation of the conventional forces for those warranted entry and destruction operations followed by a short stay deserves consideration as an alternative to extended forays into nation building and internal development by the Armed Forces when a revamped and enhanced State Department might be a better choice. With a few MAAGs here and there...

The above just some wild eyed thoughts for consideration. If you're going to trifle with the 'tribes' you'll probably need to offer them some blankets if you want a Manhattan.

Or, conversely, assure them they won't get sent to New Jersey...

Gettysburg was an interesting battle. The guy with the good eye for the terrain was John Buford, service on the plains with the 1st Dragoons taught him that. He also read enough to appreciate the value and sense of De Peyster's idea on skirmishers. He was bold and self confident enough to trust himself and try something new -- and risky. Even more important, he was an intuitive leader and commander. He did even more good things in the rest of his short remaining time alive. Guys like that are born, not made. Any recasting of the system needs to select those guys and the "anyone can do it" approach needs to go. We already do that for many jobs, we need to do it for combatant commanders and leaders at all levels.

Just like to complicate things for everyone.

Actually, instead of complicating Adaptation, institution of such a process might aid it...

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Ken,

I've done some thinking on the benefits of a permanent Advisory Corps. I think it has much merit. The down side of course it the cost (particularly if done right) - it would probably take 2-3 of the BCTs of the planned increase off line as conventional BCTs (but should allow the remaining BCTs more focus and less personnel turbulence with individual taskings for TTs.)

The benefits though could help bring about the types of changes we've been discussing. By having it set up as an assignment with a permanent HQs, soldiers would rotate through at the appropriate times in their development (based on the size and composition of the effort). The training and experience set they'd pick by virtue of the mission could be exported back into the main stream Army as they rotate back to regular BCTs, Higher HQs and the Institutional Army in general.

To do it right there would be a solid train up focused on an identified upcoming advisory mission (about 1 year out) that at least got the team in the right geographic ball park - for languages, specific culture type training, etc. - plus gave the team enough time to do its specific team training that allowed it to operate in a reduced support environment. If you had about 2 years left after that year you could break it up for something around an 8 month mission, 8 month break and refit, 8 month 2nd deployment. Or you could do a one year deployment, then come back and act as cadre for the next year. I think you could even break it up in a series of long and shorts, or just a series of shorts - the key is identifying it up front so the team leadership knows their cycle and can plan appropriately.

You remember the question in another thread I asked you about UW? I also think this could assist in providing a supporting effort to SOF in a campaign where UW required the bulk of our SOF resources, and a larger supporting effort was required.

In that regard, I'd almost say we need to go beyond labeling it an Advisory Corps, and consider something along the lines of a Special Service Corps for GP forces where one of the key METL tasks was FID (others might be associated with small unit UW), and the other tasks were related. However, this is going to make some people nervous for many of the aforementioned reasons. I do think it could become a clearing house for infusing soldiers and leaders in the non-SOF Army with some of the skill/abilities/traits and attributes we want in main stream Army.

Again, those are the general thoughts I have on the subject of why it might be a good thing beyond our identified requirements of OIF/OEF.


Best Regards, Rob

[slapout9]

Hi guys, Zenpundit has posted a short video of a Barnette lecture explaining a lot of what you guys are talking about. The link is posted below, it is pretty funny to.

http://www.zenpundit.blogspot.com/

[TT]

Gentlemen, one and all,

Again, thank you for furnishing more intellectual calories of the brain (will too many brain calories make me a fathead? )

Ken

My guess would be the military solution would be better accepted and reinforced. If a civilian solution is imposed, it if unloved will not be reinforced by the armed forces; deviously perhaps -- but there it is. Conversely, if the military solution is sensible and achievable, it will be supported by the civilians to include the Nation at large (as or more important than Congressional acceptance) and will be reinforced by the system that designed it.

In my view, it would be great if we could elect a broad consensus on a future strategy for the use of force (an extremely difficult proposition, I know) and the course of our Foreign Affairs ove the next decade or two (even more difficult). While that's in the 'hard' box, I do not believe it's in the 'too hard' box.

I agree that a solely civilian solution imposed on the military would not work – the military might adopt some changes that it thought worthwhile, but I strongly expect that many if most changes would be fairly superficial (amazing how every piece of desired technology and piece of desired equipment suddenly became ‘transformational’). Ideal, as you say, would be for the civil leadership to articulate a consistent foreign policy strategy for the next decade or so that would provide the framework for the military to make the appropriate adjustments. Yet such a consistent and sustained foreign policy strategy would indeed be, as you correclty note, 'hard', if only because of the consequences of subsequent real world exigencies and contingencies (never mind the attention deficit of many civil leaders).

The other approach that you suggest is for the military to provide the solution that the civilian authorise accept. I would agre that this seems the most plausible way forward given that few among the elected civil authority have any military experience and have at best a limited understanding of the military and the challenges to be faced. But once the civil authorities accept it, they cannot just ignore it, they need to continually articulate/demonstrate their support for the effort.

Rob

is that the institution is only willing to go so far in deviating from what it considers acceptable.

wm

I propose that we work on a "tweaking" of the paradigm, one that places greater emphasis on the unconventional, small war but does so in the context of the conventional, large war.

First, as a bit of an aside: I did not mean to imply in my discussion of ‘paradigm shifts’ that the US military should become little more that an irregular warfare military (or a SysAdmin force - yuck). For I do not believe it should – rather the US and indeed all of our militaries need to accept that COIN/IW is part of what they do, as well as being able to do ‘conventional, large war.’ (allied militaries that are small – which are almost all of them - will have some very hard choices to make, however). I do, however, believe that accomplishing this will take more than a ‘tweaking’ – altering the military mindset or culture usually takes a lot of sustained effort.

That noted, your observations are very astute. The important point both of you two (and Ken, re his Manhatten vs New Jersy analogy) are making is, I think, that the desired changes needs to be introduced in a manner that is as consistent as possible with the current mindset/culture of the military to minimize resultant organizational culture turmoil and backlash. This is a very important point – any changes that fundamentally challenge or clash with organizational cultural traits will certainly run into serious obstacles. So, even before any changes are implemented the military leadership (or whoever is driving the change) needs to think through the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th order implications of initiatives to identify potential bureaucratic and cultural clashes (ie obstacles) and work through the means to manage and overcome those obstacles, up to and including ‘tweaking’ the initiatives so that they do not clash with cultural traits. Not easy, I agree, but essential, IMO, for the sort of substantial change in culture that is on the table.


Ken

Raise them right and teach them well and they will do well. We have to start with the Basic Courses -- Officer and NCO, you cannot change one without changing the other -- and they will change the system and processes as they grow.

I wholeheartedly agree – start at the very beginning of their entry and sustain it through out their careers. And definitely include NCOs. This, combined with the current generation of junior to field command officers, is essential to long run success. The process and the people, however, will face resistance from a great many quarters and for a great variety reasons, not least the top echelons of the hierarchy (the McMaster case?). For this reason I think that there is a real need for some senior military leaders with authority who are willing and able to fight the good fight if only to create space and time for the process to unfold.

Guys like that are born, not made. Any recasting of the system needs to select those guys and the "anyone can do it" approach needs to go. We already do that for many jobs, we need to do it for combatant commanders and leaders at all levels.

You are right that not everyone ‘can do it’ (my current HoD is a disastrous example of this – why so many academics think that a PhD in politics means they have leadership skills utterly baffles me ). The education and training systems can identify these individuals, and enhance their skills, but it is the promotion system that needs to be fixed for them to succeed.

Rob

You know you hear historical figures sometime referred to as "ahead of their time" or as "visionary", but do you ever stop and wonder why? I think the answer might be as simple as the label itself - the conditions their their thinking addressed were not seen as solutions until after all the dust had cleared and the facts were known.

I would very much agree with this (and Selil’s follow-up on this). This is a very critical problem when considering effecting far reaching change to enhance or create capabilities for some uncertain and ultimately unknowable future. This is in effect the ‘benefits’ issue – if no immediate benefit is seen, then many members of organization will not buy into, or will opt out of, the attempted change.

This issue was the main problem that undermined Gen. Charles Krulak;s efforts as Commandant (95-99) to prepare the Marine Corps for future, 21st C battlefields. Most Marines seemingly could not make the ‘jump into the future’ that he was asking, even though there was a broad agreement on the general character of these battlefields, as most could not see any real benefit for what there were doing ‘today’ or tomorrow and the day after tomorrow that Krulak was aiming for was a step too far.
Interesting is that today the Marine Corps is picking up a lot of what he was back then arguing was required and picking up many of the initiatives through which he sought to create Marines who were prepared for the battlefields of the 21st C. (and kudos to the Corps for doing so – even though it makes wrong my ‘published’ conclusion that Krulak was only partially successful, for now I have to say that the jury is out on the success of what Gen Kulak was attempting to achieve ).


wm

MarcT suggested that we need to ritualize the changeover.

I do not speak for Marc but to me developing appropriate rituals is part of embedding the process rather than part of fostering the change. Marc’s explanation was very helpful, for what he talked about was creating space for rituals to develop naturally, instead of trying to create rituals that are perceived as artificial and therefore very likely rejected.

Marc

In effect, the system is designed to destroy loyalty to a segment while reinforcing loyalty to the overarching organization.

I concur with this but your observatoin does raise a couple of questions for me. You do speak of creating space for rituals to emerge from informal networks, which is an interesting idea if for no other reason that this is a way to mitigate ‘service’ and ‘tribal’ boundaries (blockages). But I was wondering how this fits with the question of ‘loyalty’? I guess I am thinking here mainly of the hierarchical structure of military organizations, as I cannot see militaries becoming networked organizations (Info Age) as 'opposed' to hierarchical organizations (Industrial age). in addition, there is the question of how the hierarchy might react to such networks, particularly if they grow concerned that 'loyalty' might be shifting towards such networks? I ask this recognizing that every individual does hold multiple loyalties, but hierarchies do tend to be jealous.

So, a second order question is whether somewhere in your thinking about this you are contemplating some form of hybrid organization? To speculate, say a hierarchical command structure through which are interwoven formal (and informal?) crosscutting networks? The steady progress to jointness might possibly be seen as a form of developing crosscutting networks (and I suppose jointness could be used to foster such crosscutting networks).

Best

TT

[marct]

Hi Folks,

First, a great big "Thanks You" to everyone - I start teaching my course in applied epistemology (aka theory and methods in interdisciplinary studies) this coming Thursday, and this thread is really helping to hone my mind for it .

What I'll be looking at are the changing techniques of war and balancing that on the ideas of paradigm by Thomas Kuhn. Not I believe a new idea but critical for some other work I'm doing.

The changes we see and the associated objections and obstructions to change we perceive even in the face of mission failure I think hinge on these concepts of paradigm and practices of adoption.... I find though these concepts are linked to another concept of risk. If the cost of conservatism is so high that lack of adaption/adoption of new paradigms incurs financial or societal hardship there may be a way to quantify that and ameliorate any negative feedback.

Sam, there is an interesting problem here that I've run across before, and it has to do with the concept of "cost". All too often in human history, we have seen that people are willing to pay almost any cost as long as they don't have to change their beliefs. I've been reading a fair bit of cognitive neuroscience lately (another project) and I think that the "conservatism" regarding paradigms (loosely construed) is actually rooted in how humans neurophysiologically construct their perceptions (I'd postulated that in my dissertation, but now we are getting some really good MRI evidence of it). Anyway, the point I am trying to make is that he key locus of resistance to change is not rooted in financial or societal risk but, rather, in personal risk - a point that Kuhn alludes to, even though he was writing in the neuropsycological dark ages (i.e. pre-1973).

I don't think that any form of quantification of risks will work, at a general social level, unless it is matched with a concurrent social movement that "re-programs", for want of a better term, cultural perceptions of those risks in personal terms. Basically, you have to convert a static symbol with positive emotional connotations, to a dynamic symbol with both positive and negative connotations. Or, in maketingspeak, "sell them a problem with a built in solution".

Marc

[marct]

Hi TT,

I concur with this but your observation does raise a couple of questions for me. You do speak of creating space for rituals to emerge from informal networks, which is an interesting idea if for no other reason that this is a way to mitigate ‘service’ and ‘tribal’ boundaries (blockages). But I was wondering how this fits with the question of ‘loyalty’? I guess I am thinking here mainly of the hierarchical structure of military organizations, as I cannot see militaries becoming networked organizations (Info Age) as 'opposed' to hierarchical organizations (Industrial age).

I think we are already seeing a partial shift towards networked militaries. Part of this comes from the perceptions of the recruits, part from changes in communications technologies, part from tactical innovations, etc. Anyway, here's an interesting blindspot in most of the Information Age literature assumptions - that the adoption of networks means a disappearance of hierarchies. It doesn't.

In some cases, we have a situation of network nodes being loci for hierarchies (think about high tech project teams or SF detachments as examples). Even within networks, people are not equal, and no network which assumes they are will survive any type of conflict. What we tend to find developing is "situational leadership" (think "matrix organizations" in the ideal type).

You are right that this conflicts with the Industrial Age model where, at least in the bureaucratic ideal type, the person holding an office is assumed to have the qualifications, skills and abilities to do so. This is one of the problems identified in the Officer Retention thread when people are talking about the automatic promotions currently available, i.e. they are seeing "unqualified" people being promoted. One key change that must take place in the personelle system is a recognition that not all Captains (etc.) are "equal". Some limited type of situational leadership, at least in the field, has to be introduced, and there has to be the possibility of a "negative career enhancement" for failure. These are really minor modifications, but they can be spun as a form of quality control within the hierarchical system - something that has been popular within business for the past 30 years.

in addition, there is the question of how the hierarchy might react to such networks, particularly if they grow concerned that 'loyalty' might be shifting towards such networks? I ask this recognizing that every individual does hold multiple loyalties, but hierarchies do tend to be jealous.

Oh too true! One of the reasons for regularizing the networks or, at least, the ritual spaces for them, is to incorporate the networks into the hierarchical paradigm and use them. The RC church did this with the occupational groups during the middle ages (and there are a number of other examples - much more obscure ).

The trick behind loyalty in this instance is to have the hierarchical organization holding "ultimate" loyalty, while the networks hold "proximate" loyalty. This was the type of system that was broken by the Fordist model, but it is easy enough to return to it - as long as the personal consequences of not supporting such a return are made brutally clear to anyone who would obstruct it <evil grin>.

So, a second order question is whether somewhere in your thinking about this you are contemplating some form of hybrid organization? To speculate, say a hierarchical command structure through which are interwoven formal (and informal?) crosscutting networks? The steady progress to jointness might possibly be seen as a form of developing crosscutting networks (and I suppose jointness could be used to foster such crosscutting networks).

Yes, it would actually have to be something along those lines. Let me think about how such an organization could work and I'll try and post later.

Marc

[TT]

Marc,

Thank you very much for your clarifying answers! I look forward to your thoughts on how such an organization could work.

Best

TT

[Rob Thornton]

On the drive back today I was thinking about the last post I'd put up on the benefits of some sort of Advisory Corps/Special Service something or another. I began wondering why Army SF changed into a branch vs. an assignment - and then I thought, well I'll ask Ken.

The reason I got to thinking about it was after I'd put the post up the two questions that keep coming back are:

Why not just take 3 BCTs and assign them the METL tasks we need vs. making something different?

and...

If we're talking about more SOF or SOF like capability, why not just invest more into those types of units?

One answer to the first question I think is that organizationally and culturally its a hard sell - you are basically telling them to break up the BCT and figure it out with an MTO&E and doctrinal references that are wrong for the tasks. Overcoming the natural tendency and loyalties would probably cause friction, inhibit change, and cause confusion.

One answer to the second question is that creating SOF of the utility and quality we now require is a longer and larger investment then perhaps what would be needed - GP forces are proving they are more capable then they might have been given credit for in the past.

A second answer to the second question goes back to my question to Ken. If this were exclusively a SOF mission set, then we lose this as a vehicle to change / adapt the mainstream Army

Ken TT & Sam - great posts - you guys are wearing out my grey matter - Marc - could you write a bit more on the relationships between the different types of risk?

Anyway, the point I am trying to make is that he key locus of resistance to change is not rooted in financial or societal risk but, rather, in personal risk - a point that Kuhn alludes to, even though he was writing in the neuropsycological dark ages (i.e. pre-1973).

Best Regards, Rob

[Ken White]

SF as you know was -- is -- disliked by the 'conventional' Army. Several Chiefs of Staff (and even more DCSOPS of the Army and local commanders) had rocky relations with them. Because of that, a lot of Officers who rotated through SF jobs got confined to purgatories of one sort or another. The guys couldn't get promoted (similar to the then and current problem with Foreign Area Officers. Due to the Eagle Claw mission problems, there was a lot of fomentation in Congress to create a separate Special Operations Command. DoD and the Army fought it tooth and nail. Then MG Barbwire Bob Kingston was one of the people who disagreed and he spent a lot of time lobbying Congress during the early '80s to disregard DoD and set up the Command. Wayne Downing was at that time a BG and was in the five sided funny farm, he was also lobbying for a SF Branch. The formation of aviation Branch in 1983 had greased the skids a bit, Downing -- a persuasive guy -- worked on John Wickham, then the CofSA and the branch was created in 1987 IIRC. USSOCOM followed a couple of years later.

Mixed bag, in my view. Folks in the branch are better protected but that cross fertilization with the rest of the Army is sorely missed by both sides. Though I'm sure many disagree, I think it was it very beneficial. I also think USSOCOM should keep the shooters and some CA but that all SF should revert to the Army with the bulk of the CA units. Sigh. Nobody ever listens to me -- until it's too late and they've already stepped on their string.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't the 1st ID supposed to be headed into that advisory role???

One problem with the SF (and SOF, though they're two different critters to my mind) expansion is the number of people who truly can adapt into the jobs. It is not for everyone. One thing I discovered in my SF time was that I do not have the patience required to do that job. I can kick doors with the best of 'em but instructing surly indigenous types who didn't want to be there on a half bowl of rice and a rotting fish every other day was, er, trying. I did okay but not as well as I should have, wrong temperment. I later got to be one of the guinea pigs for the SFSB and that proved I was too demanding and impatient.

My wife will not hear of that remark, please -- I can't stand it when she goes into the ROFLOL mode.

Anyway, I'm not at all sure they can be expanded much without a major quality problem -- and that, either use, DA or ID, is no place for quality problems.

I strongly agree with you the GP units can do much more than we ask of them; all that's required is proper training (and we do not yet have that right) for the job they're head for. That, as opposed to schools which should train to levels higher than the next job, is necessary due to unit turnover.. A decently trained Infantry Battalion can do anything a Ranger battalion can do -- and at far less cost; give any Battlion the training time, gear and money a Ranger Battalion has and he'll be close enough in capability for government work.

As an aside why on earth do we not send the same units to the same theater and to the same locations as much as possible. Guy learns the people and the territory, returns a year later and they stick him in another province. That ain't smart.

I don't think ID is a pure SF mission. The Army as an entity needs to do that and units can be trained to do what's required. It would be beneficial in my opinion to transfer the SF units back to the Army and they could assist in training GP units to do the ID mission as well as enhancing the ID effort itself in the country(ies) of choice. The Army has got to be a total spectrum force, not three block but rather two pastures, a date plantation, two industriail complexes, fifty blocks and the mountains beyond. The whole spectrum...

[jcustis]

I'm going to have to re-read this entire thread...slowly...to ensure I get it all, but I think a few points are in order concerning one David Stirling, and LtGen J.N. Mattis.

I'm going to have to put a lot more thought into it, but I think Mattis' efforts as the architect of the Corps' return to Iraq in 2004 demonstrate how transition doesn't necessarily require years.

More to follow...