The fact that the Chindit ops faced constrants is the point. When you read the DO theory you see a tendency to use future tech promises to remove the effects of weather, terrain, enemy and relative mobility. In the case of the Chindits the Jungle, the air commando, the jungle skills, the use of FWCAS, and OSS/indig forces gave the Chindits realtive superiority. The radios they carried, the air resupply capability and indig foces gave them a level of communication and aggregation-deaggregation capability the enemy could not match. It was of course a unit designed to fight in jungle terrain only,, it was not intended to fight in open conflict and when pressed to do so as at Mytkynia they suffered. Historical examples are only capable of providing a perspective, what can work, what has worked and what is ineffective and what should be shelved. DO has a lot of open questions we should not write off any past close approximations. LRDG and LRPG are very similiar and neither is an exact guide for future DO.