William S. Lind :collection (merged thread)

[AmericanPride]

Carl,

Your inconsistency is humorous. On the one hand, you want the military to reflect fighting "values" - on the other, you want the military to respect your [civilian] values. These are not necessarily the same thing. The problem, as I have pointed out repeatedly, is that as society changes, so does its values. And as those values change, so will society's expectations of the military. The internal view that the military has become a "5th column of socialists" or a social experiment in "equality and diversity" is in fact a minority view and is at odds with society's perceptions of the armed forces. The very problem that you are ascribing to wm is a result of your own insistence that the military maintains a strict, insulated, and privaleged culture carved out and standing apart from the rest of society.

[carl]

Carl,

Your inconsistency is humorous. On the one hand, you want the military to reflect fighting "values" - on the other, you want the military to respect your [civilian] values. These are not necessarily the same thing. The problem, as I have pointed out repeatedly, is that as society changes, so does its values. And as those values change, so will society's expectations of the military. The internal view that the military has become a "5th column of socialists" or a social experiment in "equality and diversity" is in fact a minority view and is at odds with society's perceptions of the armed forces. The very problem that you are ascribing to wm is a result of your own insistence that the military maintains a strict, insulated, and privaleged culture carved out and standing apart from the rest of society.

Like I said before, if you can't follow what I say, don't reply because it is tiresome to refute arguments I didn't make. But tiresome is an occasional hallmark of the quotidian (yea! I got to use that word in a sentence) life so here goes.

First off I assume you are referring to post #240, my reply to Wm.

My primary point in that post was the military is subject to civilian command. The military must obey civilian leaders. That is a Constitutional or a chain of command matter. It has nothing to do with lack of martial values. There is no conflict with having and exemplifying classic martial virtues and recognizing the primacy of civilian command as dictated by the Constitution. In fact in our system it is a martial virtue to recognize the primacy of civilian command.

That is a matter of whose orders must be obeyed, it is not a matter of whose values must be adopted, especially if those values radically vary. The martial values must remain to the forefront in the military because the ultimate purpose of the military is to kill people and break things. In order to do that in a controlled way, as we strive to, a certain set of values must be held high in the military despite all. The reason for that is what the citizen/civilians expect and want from the military, to win wars. That is the prime expectation the citizen/civilian has of the military, to win and to do it without getting too many young relatives killed in the process. That may not be the prime expectation of the chattering classes and would be social engineers during peace time, but it is the primary expectation of us flyover people at all times. And I suspect that those chattering social engineers would suddenly expect the same of the military when they actually see the bloody face of war staring at them hungrily one day, as they inevitably will.

My "own insistence that the military maintains a strict, insulated, and privaleged culture carved out and standing apart from the rest of society."? Well refuting arguments I didn't make is a burden I said I would undertake this morning. Strict? Hell yes, as far martial virtues and values are concerned. Insulated? I don't understand where that one came from so I'm a little flummoxed on how to respond. Let's say that given soldiers are citizens and will again one day be civilians, many of the civilian citizens have been or will be soldiers and we are all under the Constitution (not to mention base housing can't hold everybody) that is a moot point.

Privileged culture? Again provenance unknown, but I will say this. When I was a policeman, I never figured I had any perqs or privileges beyond anybody else. What I had were responsibilities and duties beyond everybody else, duties and responsibilities that I was honor bound to fulfill.

[JMA]

Came across this piece by Lind going back to february 2009.

On War #293: The Price of Bad Tactics

In Congressional testimony, Secretary of Defense Gates said that unless we stop killing Afghan civilians in airstrikes, “we are lost.”

Then this issue will overlap with the issue of the type of aircraft used for CAS (close air support) which has been the subject of another debate.

Interested to hear from those who served as infantry in close combat as to this multi-faceted issue.

[former_0302]

Came across this piece by Lind going back to february 2009.

On War #293: The Price of Bad Tactics



Then this issue will overlap with the issue of the type of aircraft used for CAS (close air support) which has been the subject of another debate.

Interested to hear from those who served as infantry in close combat as to this multi-faceted issue.

To address his three points:

1) "Hubris and intellectual sloth" is, I think, a bit harsh, though not entirely unjustified. I think most of the guys I've known as infantry officers are reasonably well-read for 20 to 30-something year old people. The particular problem with our tactics in Iraq and Afghanistan, IMO, is that the tools we have and have been taught to use from the beginning of our service, are analogous to using sledgehammers to kill flies against the enemies we face there. You don't build Javelin, TOW and Hellfire missiles, 2000-lb JDAMs, 155mm howitzers, and the like to go fight 5-10 man teams of insurgents carrying AKs and RPGs... but that's what we have, so that's what we take to the fight. As it happens, I think we need them, for the reasons I'll address below.

To me, the point of "tactics" is to find a way to exploit whatever advantage you have over your enemy. IMO, our only overwhelming advantages in a fight in Iraq or Afghanistan were/are firepower and armor. The Afghan/Iraqi is much lighter and faster than we are, whether dismounted or mounted, because of all the armor we are obliged to wear/drive around in. He almost invariably has the advantage of starting a fight, because he is almost always indistinguishable from any noncombatant in the area. This allows him to engage us at his leisure, on his terms, at a time and in circumstances when it is most advantageous for him. Our position in daytime is almost never unknown to any enemy within a 5 km radius. We have a marked advantage at night, but the enemy chooses not to fight at night, nullifying that advantage. Additionally, it's their turf; even if a unit's been in a given location for a year, it's still likely that the enemy knows it better. Oh, and every next step we take, or next meter you drive, might be onto a pressure plate.

So our main tactical advantages are the ability to bring bombs, artillery, missiles, etc., to bear against people with AKs, RPGs and IEDs who aren't playing by the same rules we are, and enough armor to withstand a fair portion of what they bring to bear. Frankly, it's a pretty stupid way to fight, but how do you change it? The only thing I can think of is changing the rules... but company grades don't make that decision.

2) There is a some free play training done in the Marine Corps. Not enough in my opinion, but it does happen. Frankly, I don't think we train enough, period, but a lack of training isn't really the issue in Iraq and Afghanistan. To use the catchphrase, it's all about how their asymmetrical advantages stack up against ours, and it's basically a stalemate. You only break the stalemate by changing the rules...

3) Absolutely no argument from me on this one. Our personnel system does leave a lot to be desired, and the reasons he brings up are valid, among others.

Don't know if that's what you were looking for, but there it is.

[JMA]

Thank you for that and hopefully others will also comment.

When you say 'change the rules' what exactly would that entail?

To address his three points:

....

[former_0302]

Thank you for that and hopefully others will also comment.

When you say 'change the rules' what exactly would that entail?

I guess the simplest way to say it is that only certain tactics are possible within the set of policies we fight under, and with the tools we're using. I think it's possible that if some policies were changed, or if a few different tools were used, a different outcome might come out of it...

But also maybe not. Pretty sure John Paul Vann thought something similar in Vietnam.

[Granite_State]

Came across this piece by Lind going back to february 2009.

On War #293: The Price of Bad Tactics



Then this issue will overlap with the issue of the type of aircraft used for CAS (close air support) which has been the subject of another debate.

Interested to hear from those who served as infantry in close combat as to this multi-faceted issue.

We are currently a long, LONG way from light infantry tactics, for a variety of reasons, most bad. Risk aversion and force protection are near the top of the list.

From my pretty limited perspective (five years as a USMC infantry officer, Afghanistan twice):

1. Don't agree with "sloth and hubris" at all. Anyone I've worked with who was any good despaired about how much better we could be, and didn't engage in a ton of pats on the back. Some of that stuff creeps into the service journals, definitely flows into political speeches, but I don't see a lot of it at the company or battalion level. Maybe higher up the ladder.

2. Dead-on about free play. I have done very little of this, and all of the bigger (division) exercises I have gone to are a non-dynamic rehearsal of live fire combined arms procedures. It is extremely frustrating, and a waste of valuable training time. Our Basic Officer Course has added a free play final exercise, but I have heard mixed reviews from guys teaching over there.

3. Could not agree more about our personnel system. Broken. Unit cohesion is an afterthought, guys are treated as interchangeable parts, and we lose many good officers and enlisted as a result. "Up or out" is a big part of the problem.