William S. Lind :collection (merged thread)

[Rifleman]

Wilf,

What interests me about Lind's writings is the whole non-nation state enemy idea. It has serious implications for law enforcement. I know there's always been battles between a nation's military forces and networks, tribes, cartels, mafias, etc., but Lind seems to be talking about them having a "monopoly" on violence in the future. If that turns out to be true then LE will be a bigger player than ever before.

As far as MW, DO, 4GW and other Lind ideas go, I don't know. He may be out to lunch from a military perspective. But I read Lind from an LE perspective.

[jcustis]

2. Could someone tell me WHY D.O. is required? Not why the USMC wants to do it, but why anyone would be doing it?

I thought about your question above in more depth as I drove home from work today. As I said above, I'm a little on the fringe when it comes to what Colonels and Generals alike have said about why we need DO, but at the core (and beyond the sexiness) I think the impetus may be an urge to match enemy assymetric capabilities.

Think of Taliban/AQ elements in the Afghanistan context. We haven't done that good of a job running them to ground while lumbering around in large formations. In the current scheme of things, the lowest-level unit capable of extended and independent operations may be X size. Well, we aren't killing a lot of bad guys with X size units, so some probably feel we need to reduce our signature and footprint in order to gain that edge in surprise.

The problem is that while it may have worked okay enough when both antagonists in a conflict were foreigners (Germans vs. Commonwealth in N. Africa...Chindits vs. Japanese in S.E. Asia...etc.) in a strange land, things become a bit more tenuous when the enemy is swimming in the sea and you're nothing more than a fisherman trying to avoid falling out of the canoe. That's why I think we need to have the ability to revert to DO when the time/space permits itself, but we are in for an ass-whoopin' if we want to kid ourselves that that is the only way to go, and we can just aggregate to meet larger threats.

[William F. Owen]

I thought about your question above in more depth as I drove home from work today.

Humbled by your concern!

The problem is that while it may have worked okay enough when both antagonists in a conflict were foreigners (Germans vs. Commonwealth in N. Africa...Chindits vs. Japanese in S.E. Asia...etc.) in a strange land, things become a bit more tenuous when the enemy is swimming in the sea and you're nothing more than a fisherman trying to avoid falling out of the canoe. That's why I think we need to have the ability to revert to DO when the time/space permits itself, but we are in for an ass-whoopin' if we want to kid ourselves that that is the only way to go, and we can just aggregate to meet larger threats.

Excellent point and I have high lighted your very useful insight. Many thanks!

[William F. Owen]

Wilf,

What interests me about Lind's writings is the whole non-nation state enemy idea. It has serious implications for law enforcement. I know there's always been battles between a nation's military forces and networks, tribes, cartels, mafias, etc., but Lind seems to be talking about them having a "monopoly" on violence in the future. If that turns out to be true then LE will be a bigger player than ever before.

Well let's not forget LE was originally a military task. The dividing line between LE and Military is pretty blurred sometimes. We, the British, got it more right than most in terms of our colonial experience.

To my mind, LE is about countering commercial endeavours, while military is about countering violent political endeavours. Where they cross, you get the fusion or synthesis of the two areas (or should). Look at Colombia, Sierra Leone and the Niger delta for a snap shot of this type of event. Where the enemy are your countrymen, and/or acting in your sovereign territory, then the police should have primacy.

...now pretty much all the serious thinkers in this area, including yourself, can reach this conclusion without too much trouble, yet Lind seems to live in some other reality where supporting the idea, regardless of the evidence, seems paramount.