William S. Lind :collection (merged thread)

[Steve Blair]

What does this mean? (1) The military does not accurately reflect the demographics of the American population from which it is drawn. If projections of ethnic group growth are accurate, and enlistment patterns remain the same, this difference will only increase. (2) Non-defense investments (i.e. education) is important in establishing the quality of recruits prior to them ever stepping into a recruiter's office. Today, only 1 in 4 candidates 17-29 are estimated to be eligible for enlistment. (3) This is the origin of the divergence thesis between the armed forces and the population - if the people are different, so are the values, and what are the consequences for the country and democratic governance if its military is not drawn from the same population as society at large?

Considering that this is the way the military was recruited prior to World War II, I'd wager that the country will survive. As soon as you look at the pre-wartime draft military you see this sort of thing. And as for small manpower? Simply not true. The cost per solider is obviously much higher, but in terms of numbers the army has indeed been much smaller than it is currently, and for most of its organizational history.

If you study the history of the military in the United States, you'd realize that what we're seeing now is a return to normal as it existed prior to the Cold War.

[AmericanPride]

Considering that this is the way the military was recruited prior to World War II, I'd wager that the country will survive. As soon as you look at the pre-wartime draft military you see this sort of thing. And as for small manpower? Simply not true. The cost per solider is obviously much higher, but in terms of numbers the army has indeed been much smaller than it is currently, and for most of its organizational history.

If you study the history of the military in the United States, you'd realize that what we're seeing now is a return to normal as it existed prior to the Cold War.

The issue here is that the pre-WW2 and post WW2 Americas are worlds apart. So in some ways we may be returning to historical norms in the long view of American history regarding the size of the force, but at the same time we are not returning to the pre-WW2 limited international engagements. Before World War II, there was no NATO, the US did not have combatant commands or bases in 100+ countries, or material interests in nearly every country around the world. Nor did the United States have a self-ascribed global police function as the centerpiece of the international political order. I don't think it's useful with these two different periods to use the pre-WW2 military as a baseline for measuring the current one.

EDIT: Also, let's talk about what 'normal' really is. It's been 237 years since 1776. It was 214 years between 1776 and 1991, 51 years of which included World War II and the Cold War (1940 - 1991). That's 23.8% of American history. Adding the 23 years between 1991 and 2014, the proportion increases to 31.2% of American history. So almost a third of American history has had a relatively large, permanent standing army. How long will it take for that to be considered the new normal?

[Steve Blair]

The issue here is that the pre-WW2 and post WW2 Americas are worlds apart. So in some ways we may be returning to historical norms in the long view of American history regarding the size of the force, but at the same time we are not returning to the pre-WW2 limited international engagements. Before World War II, there was no NATO, the US did not have combatant commands or bases in 100+ countries, or material interests in nearly every country around the world. Nor did the United States have a self-ascribed global police function as the centerpiece of the international political order. I don't think it's useful with these two different periods to use the pre-WW2 military as a baseline for measuring the current one.

EDIT: Also, let's talk about what 'normal' really is. It's been 237 years since 1776. It was 214 years between 1776 and 1991, 51 years of which included World War II and the Cold War (1940 - 1991). That's 23.8% of American history. Adding the 23 years between 1991 and 2014, the proportion increases to 31.2% of American history. So almost a third of American history has had a relatively large, permanent standing army. How long will it take for that to be considered the new normal?

My point is simply that we've been here before. Comparing the current reality with the artificial construct that was the Cold War isn't helpful, either. You need to consider that the military's current position of privilege is very much an outgrowth of the first Gulf War and lingering elite guilt about the way the Vietnam military was treated (in the aftermath of the Gulf War, at least...such feelings were noticeably absent during the 1980s and before). It's not a historical norm in the United States.

Popular sentiment has never really favored long-term external engagement. It could be swayed and to an extent justified by the Cold War, but once that ended popular enthusiasm faded (and I suspect a strong case could be made that it was fading during Vietnam). How much of your external engagement is really remnants of the Cold War? It's also interesting to note that the draft-era army was always considered something of an emergency force, and that its strength fell drastically in the 1950s. It was built back up for Vietnam, and then moved back to the more traditional (for the United States) volunteer force.

If you're going to talk about normal, you need some understanding of where that normal came from and if what you consider is normal is in fact something else. In the wider scope of American history (that two-thirds you mentioned), a large military (and especially one based on conscription) has never been considered normal by a fair chunk of the population. And for the bulk of its non-draft history (and even its draft history after the mid-1950s when deferments became more common) the army has never been especially representative of the population (either in the officer corps or the enlisted ranks). Very, very few of the issues you bring up are new, although the scale might be (although a compelling case can be made that the army that served on the Frontier between 1848 and 1892 faced many similar challenges in terms of distance, support structure, and very low strength).

[AmericanPride]

Carl,

Also, about New York City schools. I can't speak to their quality, but I can tell you that New York is ranked 18th out of quality enlistees as a state. In fact, the mid-west and northeast tends to score higher than the south in terms of quality. The lowest state is Mississippi which also ranks 44th in education spending per student. That's not a coincidence. Education matters. And spending on education also matters.

[carl]

Carl,

Also, about New York City schools. I can't speak to their quality, but I can tell you that New York is ranked 18th out of quality enlistees as a state. In fact, the mid-west and northeast tends to score higher than the south in terms of quality. The lowest state is Mississippi which also ranks 44th in education spending per student. That's not a coincidence. Education matters. And spending on education also matters.

You spoke about education and spending. I commented about education and spending.

The 18th ranking would only be of use if you relate it to how New York ranks in state spending per student, which I have. New York in 2011 was no. 1 in spending per student at 19k per. Now if results were directly related to gross spending you would expect NY to score a bit higher that 18th. No. 18 in spending is North Dakota which spends per student 11.4k followed by Ohio and Nebraska.

[AmericanPride]

Carl,

Here are some statistics on the relationship between education spending and quality recruits. This includes all 50 states plus Washington DC.

The first is the relationship between education spending by state and the proportion of category I (those who scored 91 - 99 on AFQT) recruits:



Essentially, the higher the spending, the higher proportion of quality recruits.

Second image: the relationship between recruitment rate and quality.



The higher the proportion of quality recruits, the lower the enlistment rate.

Last image: the relationship between education spending and recruitment rate.



The higher a state spends on education, the less likely its students are to enlist. In sum, the data suggest that well-funded education programs produce higher quality enlistments but also discourages such candidates from enlisting in the first place.

These things you mention "employment, education opportunities, skills training, and social normalization" are all well and good. But they are all byproducts of a military the purpose of which is to fight and win.

Hence the distinction between 'mission' (fight and win wars) and 'function' (implicit or unintended outcomes). Fighting the nation's wars is the stated intent but it's not the only reason for which we maintain a standing professional army. Some of it is deliberate - like the politics - and some of it is structural, like the economics of it.

The people of the country are pretty smart and if you said to them "What do you guys want? Really now what do you want, a military that will win wars or one that precisely reflects the demographic %s?" I figure they would want to win.

Based on what evidence? Which segment of the population are you referring to?

Now you say junior officers were leaving because no appeal was made to their patriotism.

I never said that. Reread my statement.

That isn't an appeal to patriotism, it's bribery which you say didn't work in retaining junior officers.

Again, reread my statement. I'll quote it:

And people stay for many of the same reasons, which is why when the Army was hemorrhaging junior officers, it didn't appeal to their patriotism; it offered them material incentives to stay. And it still does this today for enlisted soldiers.

Material benefits like cash bonuses, MOS reclassification, and non-deployability did work in increasing retention. Your ideal of unwavering patriotism is a myth - it may attract some to the military and may even keep some there, but like I stated, people join and stay for many different reasons. When recruiters make their pitches, they don't rely on appeals to patriotism; they try to illustrate all the benefits to service from the adventure of it, to the professional skill development and experiences, to the rates of promotion and pay. It's your comments that this amounts to 'bribery' is what is insulting. Mythologizing military service obstructs the implementation of sound policy in improving the armed forces. You're not the only one that does this; military service members are guilty of it too, and it's that cognitive dissonance that probably goes a long way in explaining the disillusionment. And that brings us full circle to self-selection.

Although an older study, this research sums it up:

This report focuses on whether such differences arise because of socialization processes involved in military training and service, or because of prior differences in values and beliefs among those who select to enter military service....These findings among seniors closely replicate earlier research comparing soldiers, sailors, and civilians; taken together, the data suggest that self-selection is the dominant factor and that actual service may not substantially enhance prior attitude differences.

The military does a poor job of making itself attractive to those who are not already attracted to it. In the context of sequestration, intensely competitive budget priorities, the nature of the international security environment, the country's changing demographics to minority-majority and urbanization, and globalized media, it's more important now than ever that the military constructively engages with the public. It can't bury its head in the sand and say "if it has nothing to strictly and directly do with fighting the nation's wars, we want no part in it!" That won't sell to the public. This is a democratic country last I checked and the military needs to make an effort to be responsive and accountable to the public to which it is subordinated. It won't do that by holding on to dated processes and ideas, a hyper-masculine culture, and disinterest in the social dynamics of the population from which it is trying to draw soldiers, leaders, and public endorsement.