William S. Lind :collection (merged thread)

[slapout9]

A while back I finally found an affordable paperback copy of The Maneuver Warfare Handbook by William S. Lind. I thought it was a very impressive book especially the appendix by Colonel Wyly "The Fundamentals Of Tactics."
He lists 5:
1-Surfaces and Gaps
2-Mission Tactics
3-The Main Effort
4-Concept Of The Objective
5-Concept Of The Reserve

jmm99 from the my original post the 5 basic concepts are the difference. The first 3 have remained constant through all editions. The last 2 Objective and Reserve were deleted.....serious mistake IMO and the other 2 editions you mentioned have added other items to list without adding any real value IMO.

That is why I was so interested in seeing the original documents. The original truth. The lecture on the Objective is so critical IMO that leaving it out almost jeopardizes the whole theory. Why this was done I still don'tknow especially since some of the context on why we lost Vietnam would seem very relevant to the situation in Afghanistan and the War on Terror or whatever we are calling nowadays.

If it was applied today the Mission: would be be to kill capture UBL and his AQ associates. The Objective would have to be the Whole World!!!! otherwise you could never accomplish your mission, because each local objective (location of the enemy) could change quickly. For that reason Wyly points out that you assign Missions BUT never assign Objectives. Objectives are chosen by lower level commanders based upon what and where the enemy Currently is, which may change at any moment. Makes sense to me.

[William F. Owen]

Colonel Wyly "The Fundamentals Of Tactics."
He lists 5:
1-Surfaces and Gaps
2-Mission Tactics
3-The Main Effort
4-Concept Of The Objective
5-Concept Of The Reserve

I'm not sure this stands up to much scrutiny. The Surfaces and gaps deal is a very odd conception of reading ground and/or an enemy defence. More over how do you use it in defence?
Mission tactics or mission command?
The ME is not part of MW. It's inherent to Command, as is the Objective and the Reserve. This is also confusing for a lot of folks because they get confused between the "Mission" and the "Objective."
All pretty wooly stuff in my view.
Tactics is not one discrete area of training that can be reduced to "5 things". Tactics has to be framed within a level of Command (Platoon, Company) but that is because of how you teach it, or how it should be taught.

[Polarbear1605]

I'm not sure this stands up to much scrutiny.

Yep!...basically it didn't...but the concepts continued to build and grow with the USMC Warfighting manual FMFM 1. Remember at the time we were trying to figuer out what MW was based on the Boyd "Patterns of Conflict" Brief and all those damn arrows

[William F. Owen]

Remember at the time we were trying to figuer out what MW was based on the Boyd "Patterns of Conflict" Brief and all those damn arrows

Rorschach of Conflict is a better title. I was just re-reading "Patterns" the other day. I just don't see it personally. How this ever got as far as it did, is a mystery to me, especially in the UK.

[Polarbear1605]

Rorschach...lol...good discription! Agree but in its defense the slides are probably 25% of the information. Boyd's "Patterns" brief was 8+ hours of talking directly at and about those slides and Boyd talked like a M-60 machinegun. Unfortunately, except for the slides, Boyd never wrote his stuff down...I remember Lind and Wyly joking they were going to lock Boyd into an office and trade food for manuscript pages.

[William F. Owen]

Unfortunately, except for the slides, Boyd never wrote his stuff down...I remember Lind and Wyly joking they were going to lock Boyd into an office and trade food for manuscript pages.

...and why? I asked Bill Lind this and no one seem to know. Boyd was working in the age of video tapes and cassettes. No ever seems to have recorded his presentations as a whole or sat down with him and asked him to do it.
What we have of someone who died in 1995, and was prominent from 1982 onwards is almost nothing, except several versions of some slides and the odd bit if video.

[Polarbear1605]

...and why? I asked Bill Lind this and no one seem to know. Boyd was working in the age of video tapes and cassettes. No ever seems to have recorded his presentations as a whole or sat down with him and asked him to do it.

I am surprised Lind didn't tell you. I reason I heard Boyd never wrote it down, on several occasions, was Boyd was afraid the Russians would get it. After AWS I learned my lesson and when a student at CSC I did record the brief on cassette. I guess I need to get that converted to CD so I can post it/send it out.

[bumperplate]

Rorschach of Conflict is a better title. I was just re-reading "Patterns" the other day. I just don't see it personally. How this ever got as far as it did, is a mystery to me, especially in the UK.

Pretty new to the site...I've read a lot of your stuff and I'm not as well read as you are.
I currently teach tactics to LTs. I teach them about the OODA loop. I try to find holes in it, but I can't. I go back to my time in graduate school and compare research from those like Lazarus and his "appraisal theory", which states that every stimulus is appraised, then run through the 'CPU' and a reaction is then set into motion. Lazarus doesn't really give much consideration to any hard-wiring and instinctual reactions, even the startle reflex.
Then you have researchers like Davidson who wholeheartedly believe in some hard-wiring and would probably endorse a bit of a hybrid of appraisal and predispositions.
Even surveying vision research, and accepting the position that visual stimuli is received without us acknowledging it, visually, does not clearly elucidate what happens in our brains when something happens "out there".
All this taken into consideration, I cannot find a plausible reason to throw out the OODA loop, from a psychophysiological perspective.
We observe, orient, decide and act....I cannot find an alternative. If that was not the case we could not condition ourselves for immediate action drills, or to exercise tactical patience.
Whether or not Boyd got to the right answer by the wrong means is not so much my concern. I think it's a sound concept and it's a vital part to understanding how we win the tactical fight.
Also, there are quite a few seasoned professional that have been in many more two-way firefights than I have, and they completely endorse the utility of understanding "patterns" and the OODA loop.
I think it's a very useful construct and plays well with the study of maneuver warfare principles or any others you feel vital to winning at the tactical level.

So, I realize you are not "buying it", but I can't understand why. Knowing what goes on within the anterior cingulate cortex and how omnipresent its activation is with just about every volitional act, there is no alternative for a layman's perspective than to express it as an OODA loop. I'm sure Boyd had no idea and had no intention of linking his patterns or OODA loop to any psychophysiological data, but it meshes rather well in my opinion.

[William F. Owen]

Pretty new to the site...I've read a lot of your stuff and I'm not as well read as you are.

Do not be fooled! Reading means nothing in this game unless you can translate that into clear advice and guidance.

I currently teach tactics to LTs. I teach them about the OODA loop. I try to find holes in it, but I can't.

The OODA loop describes one possible set of actions. Looking, understanding, making a decision and then acting upon it, are things that people do. However it does not describe how people actually think for real. It describes one possible sequence of decision making. What if the observation is coloured by action already taken? It describes a possible process. It does not guide you as to how make decisions.

I think it's a very useful construct and plays well with the study of maneuver warfare principles or any others you feel vital to winning at the tactical level.

Well I think Manoeuvre Warfare is at best a crutch for poor understanding.

So, I realize you are not "buying it", but I can't understand why.

Do you teach the "Core Functions." FIND, FIX, STRIKE, EXPLOIT? Far more useful than the OODA loop. They provide clear explicit guidance, and each action is only successful if the previous one has been performed effectively.

Does that help?

[davidbfpo]

Wilf cited:

Do you teach the "Core Functions." FIND, FIX, STRIKE, EXPLOIT? Far more useful than the OODA loop. They provide clear explicit guidance, and each action is only successful if the previous one has been performed effectively.

From my "armchair" and for very different reasons I found the F3EA concept very useful; yes similar to Wilf's text: Find, Fix, Finish, Evaluate & Analyse. There are a few open source references to the concept.

[slapout9]

I'm not sure this stands up to much scrutiny. The Surfaces and gaps deal is a very odd conception of reading ground and/or an enemy defence. More over how do you use it in defence?
Mission tactics or mission command?
The ME is not part of MW. It's inherent to Command, as is the Objective and the Reserve. This is also confusing for a lot of folks because they get confused between the "Mission" and the "Objective."
All pretty wooly stuff in my view.
Tactics is not one discrete area of training that can be reduced to "5 things". Tactics has to be framed within a level of Command (Platoon, Company) but that is because of how you teach it, or how it should be taught.

Higher HQ just gave me another misssion I have to go do. I will respond later.

[slapout9]

I'm not sure this stands up to much scrutiny. The Surfaces and gaps deal is a very odd conception of reading ground and/or an enemy defense. More over how do you use it in defense?
Mission tactics or mission command?
The ME is not part of MW. It's inherent to Command, as is the Objective and the Reserve. This is also confusing for a lot of folks because they get confused between the "Mission" and the "Objective."
All pretty wooly stuff in my view.
Tactics is not one discrete area of training that can be reduced to "5 things". Tactics has to be framed within a level of Command (Platoon, Company) but that is because of how you teach it, or how it should be taught.

1-Surfaces and Gaps seems pretty easy to me. Weapons will usually be surfaces and gaps will be the ranges of theirs vs. yours. It works in the defense the same way as the offense. The ME would be the unit and location from which you expect the attack to occur, and be prepared to change that based upon the situation.

2-ME is part of MW based upon the book, it's just different based upon your war fighting philosophy.

3-Wyly goes into great detail over the confusion over Mission vs. Objective which is why I thought and think that was one of his most important lectures. And it is very relevant to today's current situation. IMO the definition of the "objective should be confined to a location from which you can best accomplish your mission". And be prepared to change that constantly based upon how the enemy acts and reacts.

4-I understand what you mean by tactics can be unit variable and I agree with that. The tactics of a company have to be different than that of a platoon or squad or there wouldn't be any reason to have such organizations. But what I think Lind and Wyly were driving at were the guiding principles that underlie all Tactics and I think they did a pretty good job overall.

5-The principles of tactics may be 5 things or maybe less, Wyly and Lind made a good start. Mission,ME,Surfaces and Gaps need to be there but I might add Time as the fourth principle. Indeed Time may be the ultimate principle. Just my opinion.

[Chris jM]

1-Surfaces and Gaps seems pretty easy to me. Weapons will usually be surfaces and gaps will be the ranges of theirs vs. yours. It works in the defense the same way as the offense. The ME would be the unit and location from which you expect the attack to occur, and be prepared to change that based upon the situation.

There is one part in the MW Handbook I recall, where Lind talks about the surfaces and gaps issue. With a commander talking about the difficulties in identifying a genuine gap and in a trap (i.e. a path of less resistance that will lead you into the enemy's killing area) he states that it is an art, and some people will have the skills, imagination and flair and others will not.

The mentality that we bypass all obstacles and enemy strengths in order to find the indirect approach through which we can, with minimal attrition, dislocate his ability to defend against us is a little on the optimistically ethereal side, in my opinion. Better we are prepared to come up against an enemy position, apply overwhelming force through combined arms through which he can't resist and then exploit as required rather than rely upon the orchestrated, undefinable artistry of the so-called 'manoeuvrist approach'.

As I said earlier, I think MW has got a lot right for the wrong reasons.

The whole narrative-imposed-where-narrative-does-not-fit reminds me very much of a quote from a recent New Yorker article:

"as the Bacchae knew, we always tear our Gods to bits, and eat the bits we like... Certain kinds of truth are only convincing in a narrative. The idea, for instance, that the ring of power should be given to two undersized amateurs to throw into a volcano at the very center of an enemy's camp makes sound and sober sense, of a kind, in Tolkein; but you would never expect to find it as a premise at the Middle Earth Military Academy."

Indeed, surface-and-gaps makes sense in the MW reading of warfare but it doesn't have all that much utility to a commander under fire and fatigued when he has to penetrate an enemy defensive position without walking into a pre-planned EA.

[slapout9]

Indeed, surface-and-gaps makes sense in the MW reading of warfare but it doesn't have all that much utility to a commander under fire and fatigued when he has to penetrate an enemy defensive position without walking into a pre-planned EA.

1-both Lind and Wyly talk about it and yes if you blindly follow easy terrain sooner or later you will end up right in the middle of an ambush. There suggestion was, if you run up against a surface where there is no apparent gap then find the weakest part of the surface. The whole defensive perimeter is not going to be of equal strength, which is why one of them (I think Wyly) called it soft spot tactics.

2-In later additions they talk about Combined Arms just as you have, in fact that became one of the later added principles of MW. To my way of thinking it just adds confusion to the idea of the main effort. To me the ME could very well be an artillery unit or air unit used to blow a hole in the enemies surface and make your own gap instead of just blindly walking or riding around searching for one.

[Chris jM]

1-both Lind and Wyly talk about it and yes if you blindly follow easy terrain sooner or later you will end up right in the middle of an ambush. There suggestion was, if you run up against a surface where there is no apparent gap then find the weakest part of the surface. The whole defensive perimeter is not going to be of equal strength, which is why one of them (I think Wyly) called it soft spot tactics.

Certainly, that's one perspective. I just see the construct of surfaces/gaps to be of little utility to the commander on the ground. As a way of analysing combat it's fine, but it isn't robust or solid enough a tool to be employed by a commander. It's too open to external factors, the least of all being a perceived knowledge of the enemy in the midst of battle that's simply unrealistic.

As unattractive as the idea is, and it was brushed upon earlier, competent drills, SOPs and tactics will be of far greater assistance. Knowing how to advance to contact, the battle drills to go through and how to apply them to the situation remains fraught with uncertainty and demands flexibility - but the battle drills provide a framework for success.

MW and battle-drills aren't mutually exclusive, but I don't see MW as adding anything of great value to the battle-drills concept. Tactics will succeed when combined arms are applied properly, regardless of how one views 'tempo', 'surfaces', 'mission command' and so forth. MW might be right in parts (the God we tear to bits and consume what we like) but it isn't the whole picture, and it isn't a silver-bullet to victory.

2-In later additions they talk about Combined Arms just as you have, in fact that became one of the later added principles of MW. To my way of thinking it just adds confusion to the idea of the main effort. To me the ME could very well be an artillery unit or air unit used to blow a hole in the enemies surface and make your own gap instead of just blindly walking or riding around searching for one.

Combined arms is, IMHO, absolutely the most important tactical construct that has to be taught and employed for combat success. I have seen it become confusing due to poor thinking - for example, I have seen it defined as the combination of Battlefield Operating Systems so that suddenly logistics becomes a 'combined arms'. Sure, supply is essential but surely combined arms are those things we have that affect the enemy.

I'd suggest your view of MW that assumes knowledge of the enemy - more so than ever will be possible. MW, I believe, is right in parts but for the wrong reasons. Instead of trying to being clever, as MW tells us, we are far better off focussing upon being technically proficient at tactical drills at all levels.

I don't think MW is dangerous but rather that it represents unnecessary complication. It won't directly lead us to disaster but it does not represent the best possible practise.

[slapout9]

I'd suggest your view of MW that assumes knowledge of the enemy - more so than ever will be possible.

That is not my view...that is how I understand the Handbooks view. Someone once asked me if I was a maneuverist or an attritionist. My response was I am a bothist Fire and Maneuver compliment each other so I don't see the need to pick one or the other. In something as tricky as combat I would always want to have both, if maneuver worked or could work thats fine but I wouldn't want to bet my life on it.

[Ken White]

...he states that it is an art, and some people will have the skills, imagination and flair and others will not.

Totally true and while even the best artist isn't infallible, a good artist will be beat a good mechanic at his art.

...Better we are prepared to come up against an enemy position, apply overwhelming force through combined arms through which he can't resist and then exploit as required rather than rely upon the orchestrated, undefinable artistry of the so-called 'manoeuvrist approach'.

That is the mechanical solution -- it is necessitated by the democratic nations rather foolish effort to be fair in promoting people to command; if one cannot have an artist, one must give his mechanic all the tools available and if one uses more mechanics than artists, then one must have tons of tools...

As I said earlier, I think MW has got a lot right for the wrong reasons.

We can agree on that as a generalization but Lind and others are correct on the Art versus science bit and the benefit of having a few artists.

Indeed, surface-and-gaps makes sense in the MW reading of warfare but it doesn't have all that much utility to a commander under fire and fatigued when he has to penetrate an enemy defensive position without walking into a pre-planned EA.

Not necessarily; depends on the Commander. For most, generally mechanics, you're obviously correct. For the rather more rare artists, not necessarily -- far more often than not they'll pull it off, even against the odds...

The problem is that a democratic and 'fair' personnel system in a bureaucracy cannot tolerate artists..

Until there's a big, real, tough war (see Freyberg, B) ...

[Chris jM]

Totally true and while even the best artist isn't infallible, a good artist will be beat a good mechanic at his art....Lind and others are correct on the Art versus science bit and the benefit of having a few artists.:

How, though, do we identify the artists vice mechanics? Training is able to produce and test competency based upon known, established and proven criteria. Some flair and artistry is allowed within this framework - charismatic leaders often get promoted, for example. Beyond that, the most successful military commanders are really products of their own organisation and training (at least, in my view of things). Claiming someone is an 'artist' is really just saying we can't identify or understand his or her way of working.

I see the science-vs-art debate as placing overly simplistic guidelines upon military undertakings. Better we look at competent vs less-competent within the framework of what we do know and can assess.

And if popular perceptions are correct, artists are only appreciated only once they're dead. I'm not sure that depending upon post-death popularity is that desirable a quality for military leadership

[Ken White]

That's not an insult, just an observation. The world in that respect is divided into those who wish to apply them and those who do not...

How, though, do we identify the artists vice mechanics?

By observation and subjective judgement. Subjectivity is anathema to bureaucracies and politicians because it is, after all, only an opinion. Whereas objectivity produces empirical results. Which can be and often are fudged...

Training is able to produce and test competency based upon known, established and proven criteria. Some flair and artistry is allowed within this framework...

But not much. It upsets the bureaucracy and the personnel folks who want objective criteria only to determine who gets to do what. It also upsets the politicians who want everyone to be treated fairly. Heh. What they really want is no complaints from non selectees that cannot be shown to be based on objective data so they can say "you didn't make the grade and this proves it." A proven competent and experienced commander who says "...promote Heebly, he's good; do not promote Phugabosky, he'll get people killed.." is anthema to the 'system.'

...- charismatic leaders often get promoted, for example...

Charisma has nothing to do with it; competence in an art form -- and combat is an art, not a science -- has everything to do with it. Not one of the best Commanders I had in combat was charismatic -- only three of about a dozen got to be Flag Officers, the system does not tolerate guys who are great tactically but not pretty or socially adept.

A mechanical Commander trained conventionally who is a good mechanic and has some experience will beat an inexperienced intuitive Commander. He will rarely beat an experienced intuitive Commander.

Beyond that, the most successful military commanders are really products of their own organisation and training (at least, in my view of things). Claiming someone is an 'artist' is really just saying we can't identify or understand his or her way of working.

I agree with your first generalization, though that's from our choices, not from necessity nor is it demonstrably better than other processes.

I disagree with the second. To put it as simply as possible, that 'artist' will arrive at correct decisions by pretty much the same process as will a good mechanical type -- he or she will just do it faster and is highly likely to omit some steps. There's been plenty of research and there are tons of papers out there. Googling "Intuitive Military Commanders" gets 616K hits, most garbage but some gold. (LINK).

The issue is not that we cannot do it; the issue is that in democratic societies in peacetime who have a fetish for worrying about a huge mobilization force, the dual emphasis of PC 'fairness and objective criteria' and designing training to mass produce people for spaces it isn't going to be done.

Not to worry, as I said, they always come out in wars. Then a lot of the mechanics get to take charge of Post Exchanges...

I see the science-vs-art debate as placing overly simplistic guidelines upon military undertakings. Better we look at competent vs less-competent within the framework of what we do know and can assess.

Yeah, many say that. That's what we're doing now. How's that working out for us? Most mid grade and young senior NCOs and Company and Field Grades in the US will tell you not so good...

And if popular perceptions are correct, artists are only appreciated only once they're dead. I'm not sure that depending upon post-death popularity is that desirable a quality for military leadership

The desirable quality is a competent, experienced practitioner who can win and keep more of their own troops alive while doing so. I've seen a lot of intuitive commanders, artists in that sense, do that -- I've seen a lot of mediocre mechanics get too many people killed unnecessarily while failing to successfully complete missions and then get promoted because, screwed up or not, they had checked all the right boxes, they played that system you cite.

[William F. Owen]

1-Surfaces and Gaps seems pretty easy to me. Weapons will usually be surfaces and gaps will be the ranges of theirs vs. yours. It works in the defense the same way as the offense.

But that is a simplistic and mostly wrong model for proto-modern war. Weapons fire across frontages, and weapons are mobile. Weapons can also mass fire in time and space - artillery. The proto-modern defence aims to have surveillance, fires and reserves (+50%). The analogy of surfaces and gaps, simply does not apply. It would not have applied at Cambrai, Hamel, Port Arthur, Iwo Jima, or even Kursk and El Alamein.
The surfaces and gaps model is a set up to make MW work and it only uses examples where it can be applied. Crossing the Meuse, Operation Micheal etc.

The ME would be the unit and location from which you expect the attack to occur, and be prepared to change that based upon the situation.

Direction of enemy threat?

-ME is part of MW based upon the book, it's just different based upon your war fighting philosophy.

I don't have a "war fighting philosophy." I adhere to what works. We have a huge body of work to adhere to, we just seem to want to ignore it, because its simple and not-sexy.

IMO the definition of the "objective should be confined to a location from which you can best accomplish your mission". And be prepared to change that constantly based upon how the enemy acts and reacts.

So objectives are terrain? That makes sense, if given as part of the mission.
"Seize intact the Bridge at XYZ, by 21:00 and hold until relieved."
"Capture and hold Hill 1234 by 21:00."

But what I think Lind and Wyly were driving at were the guiding principles that underlie all Tactics and I think they did a pretty good job overall.

Yet no mention of the Core Functions which could by some said to be the guiding principles of tactical doctrine. Moreover Core Functions are completely absent form MW as far as I can tell.

The problem I have with MW is it's lack of precision, rigour, and history. If someone tells me (and they have) that the USMC as grossly lacking in tactical training, and MW was a forcing mechanism, the OK. BUT taken out of that context, MW sets you off down a false trail, where a lot is wrong.
As someone pointed out, would be still talking about MW if it had been called "Competent Warfare."