I think something that has to be recognised is that missions require a terrain reference. If you were out to destroy an enemy Battle Group, then that would be predicated in terms of terrain. You cannot just chase them all over creation.Originally Posted by slapout9
"Destroy all enemy within the Battle Group AO" - see boundaries. - Is a valid mission. If the enemy gets away (and he shouldn't), then new orders, more planning. Maybe very quick plans, but you can never predict enemy action
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Yes!
Yes! By knowing your fellow officers (the guys on your left and right flanks, for example) that knowledge builds TRUST which is an essential element to mission orders. I would argue that mission orders can be very scary because sooner or later the order receiptant is going to be someplace you don't expect. Your first reaction is you are going to say what in the hell is he doing there? But knowing your folks will help in trusting the decsions they are making to support your mission.
I always thought that the IOT part of the order was what defined aufragstaktik type commands with the terrain and the (immediate) enemy being factored in on that basis. But now, not so sure...
Yes, an area of Maneuver!
To me the ME is nothing but the dead German guy talking about.....the right force(designated unit) at the right place(objective) at the right time(changing events) against an opponent who will react.
CvC's use of Schwerepunkt is very different from the Wily/Lind version. The German manuals of 1934 have a distinct phrase for "Main Effort" - it is not Schwerepunkt!
... again this is where idea of "Manoeuvre Warfare" is problematic. Foch wrote about the main effort. It was central to his teaching, as was "mission command". Main Effort is not unique or even a part of MW.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Excellent point and I very much agree with you and Fuchs. However...
That is not always possible in major combat operation or a very large war with a mobilized force including reserves and new accessions and personnel turmoil induced by heavy casualties.
While totally agreeing with your premise, it simply may not always be as possible as it is in peacetime or even in a period of limited and minor warfare as today. I suggest that the current requirement -- and it is that, a requirement, to obtain the degree of trust required -- of 'knowing people' is a direct result of our current mediocre training, a shortfall that plagues both the Army and the Corps (though the Corps admittedly is slightly better than the Army in this -- that it is smaller helps in all aspects).
More effective training, particularly Officer and Enlisted initial entry training, would enhance trust today and may be imperative in the future.
Correct, along with a total overhaul of the personnel system that shuffles people along far too quickly and locks in the "up or out" that also hampers the building of trust and competence.
We no longer field a conscript army...so why are we saddled with training and personnel systems that were developed for such an army?
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Yes, there is also a German term for "decisive point" that I read in a book (will have to find it) but decisive point seems to be more what MW was talking about or wanted to talk about, and they are very different as I recall. Off to locate the book.
Deja-vu
You need to be careful here less you fall afowl of the same issue of Lind and Wyly. You can see this in Gudarians book Panzer Attacks. Schwerepunkt was translated to "point of main effort". As I said before that sent us inspecting maps looking for the "point". This took a couple years to work through but after some conversations with modern day german generals, they explained the mis-translation. They also explained the "focus of main effort" or "focus of effort" was a truer translation and that fits better into what slap said: "the right force (designated unit) at the right place (objective) at the right time (changing events) against an opponent who will react."
Last edited by Polarbear1605; 06-25-2010 at 06:08 PM.
The book is:
"On The German Art Of War-Truppenfuhrung" by Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki
page 109 paragraph 389
"In order to properly deploy the attack force,the commander must know early on the decisive points of the enemy position. This information is necessary for the determination of the point of main effort."
My interpretation is decisive points are "Gaps" in the enemy position. The point of main effort would be the "Location" opposite those "Gaps". That location is where the "Attack Force" (designated main effort unit) should go.
This is why I believe Colonel Wyly said a ME is not just naming a specific unit but also WHERE that unit should be. The two go together you can't have one without the other. And you can't know where to put the ME without understanding the Enemies... Surfaces and Gaps.
The meaning was likely much more encompassing.
It could be a fording, a difficult to defend stretch of a river, a sector defended by a formation in disorder or at low readiness, a front sector with inadequate strength and much else.
I'd like to look at it and its context in the original. What's the chapter?
Last edited by Fuchs; 06-25-2010 at 07:46 PM.
Absolutely, you could do a great more by saying a "Gap" is any enemy Vulnerability.
It is Chapter 6-The Attack page 109 in my book, paragraph 389.
Wow, your book sucks. I hope there's a better English translation of TF available.
It's a very trivial paragraph.389 Für den Ansatz des Angriffs ist es wichtig, die Punkte der feindlichen Stellung, die über ihren Besitz entscheiden, früh zu erkennen. Dies ist für die Bestimmung des Schwerpunktes des Angriffs ausschlaggebend.
My translation (as close to the original as I can, therefore no good grammar):
Or in short, in my words:389 For the preparation of the attack it is important to recognize the points (~parts) of the enemy position (~defensive network) that decide over its possession early on. This is decisive for the setting of the Schwerpunkt of the attack.
"Don't forget that you should attack a dominating hill in order to throw the enemy out of his nearby trenches."
Fuchs, man that is a great translation.
THis is from the Stackpole copy of Truppenfuhrung as well. The translation of 389, does not say "Heavy Point." Is that not correct?
Do Entscheidende Stelle and Schwerepunkt mean the same thing?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Actually, I don't think that "entscheidende Stelle" is really a defined term, it's just two words that make sense in combination.
You better set up your Schwerpunkt at a entscheidende Stelle, for else you have made a mistake, but the two aren't the same if you did a mistake (or weren't able to set up/move your Schwerpunkt in time).
"heavy point" is nonsense in my opinion. "Schwerpunkt" is the German word for "centre of gravity" in physics, and CvC misunderstood Newtonian Physics to such an extent that he adopted the term for a very different meaning in the military.
Schwerpunkt was in the practice of 1870-1945 (and later as well) about a concentration of the own strength to gain local superiority at a point where you want to decide the battle or break through.
The move from Napoleonic warfare to front line warfare* changed the meaning a bit (you needed to keep all parts of the line strong enough to enable the units there to fulfill the basic functions of a front line* - and single battles were rarely as decisive as Sedan).
* It's actually interesting to think about the basic functions of a front line even though such a thing is unlikely to appear in modern warfare. The reason for my interest is exactly the expectation of its absence; we will lack the functions of the line, so it's valuable to understand what we're missing and probably need to replace with something else.
To replace the functions of a static linear defence in mobile warfare is quite challenging, a prime candidate for potential shortcomings of modern armies.
Last edited by Fuchs; 06-26-2010 at 11:49 AM.
I agree, but the point is, when CvC uses it, we know what it means. He left a categoric definition, which is both useful and demonstrable in terms of teaching.
I also understand what "Main Effort" and show how it works.
....but "Schwerpunkt" and "Main Effort" are not the same thing! - despite the fact that some German Doctrine seems to use the two terms interchangeably.
That is insightful and I concur - but front lines are a symptom of proto-modern warfare. "Front lines" are absent from the majority of recorded military history.* It's actually interesting to think about the basic functions of a front line even though such a thing is unlikely to appear in modern warfare. The reason for my interest is exactly the expectation of its absence; we will lack the functions of the line, so it's valuable to understand what we're missing and probably need to replace with something else.
To replace the functions of a static linear defence in mobile warfare is quite challenging, a prime candidate for potential shortcomings of modern armies.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
The German doctrine (officially, we never had such a thing - we dislike the word "Doktrin")certainly doesn't use the word "Main Effort". Even the anglophile Willmann didn't use it.
So what is the second word in use really?
I suspect yet another translation problem...
Well Truppenfuhrung was "Doctrine" - it was taught. British "Field Service Regulations were "Doctrine" as well. All manuals are doctrine.
So basically, despite being completely different things, both things get call "Schwerepunkt?" - again, the current British Translation, explicitly says "Main Effort" - as in "entscheidende Stelle"
So how do we resolve it?I suspect yet another translation problem...
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
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