The MW celebrities have passed their creative period. There are few post-2000 MW celebrities, and those few tend to have their own area of specialty.Originally Posted by Infanteer
...of interest, has there been any new Maneuver Warfare literature? Seems like a dead concept to me.
The MW celebrities have passed their creative period. There are few post-2000 MW celebrities, and those few tend to have their own area of specialty.
They Missed The Whole Point!
After listening to The Boyd Tapes from Polarbear IMO there is very little Boyd in the Handbook, in fact the Marine Corps just about missed the whole point of Boyd's theory. Boyd was not a Maneuverist........ he was a Stonewall Jacksonist "Mystify,Mislead and Surprise!" That is a condesed version of the Boyd theory.....bit more to it. I especially like his M&M theory on creating matches and mis-matches in the enemy. More as I have time. oh yeah there is a whole lot of Warden in Boyd's theoryor there is a lot of Boyd in Warden.
Great minds trained alike think alike?
or "Birdmen of a feather"???..oh yeah there is a whole lot of Warden in Boyd's theory
Birdmen or Stealthmen
More Stealthman then Birdmen. In the Air it is the Stealth Fighter on the Ground it is the Guerrilla that blends perfectly with the Civilian population. It destroys their OODA loop. If you cannot Observe the Enemy you're whole OODA loop-decision cycle is messed up. You are inside the enemies OODA loop and all he can do is react to an unseen threat.or "Birdmen of a feather"???
In the military, we call that "good tactics", not "Boyd Tactics" or "maneuver warfare".
Bird. Nothing stealthy about either of them.
The OODA loop has some merit for aerial combat, I guess -- don't know, not a fighter jock but it does make a certain sense.
For Ground Combat, different apples...
Guerillas rarely blend perfectly with the civilian populace, they can most always be picked out pretty easily. Whether you can do something about the ones so identified is another matter entirely and it generally accedes to politics, not tactics. I've engaged in staring contests with a bunch of Gs in towns in several countries. We both knew I knew -- and we both knew neither of us could do what was needed at that time and place...
Rarely in ground combat does the OODA loop apply. It sounds really cool and logical but in practice, a number of factors interfere with one's ability to apply the idea. Stealth -- in the form of terrain, vegetation and a lot of other factors including the old fog of battle / Murphy's Law bit -- plus the screw ups of ones subordinates or the enemy (or good put unplanned or unanticipated actions by either or both) tend to reward not the one who's inside another's loop but the one can react the most rapidly and effectively and that entails a number of variable most of which are not controlled by whoever gets inside the other guy's loop. It's not a solo thing like aerial combat, a lot of other folks are involved and just one of them can mess up everybody's loops.
In fact, most real success I've had in ground fights involved the other guy thinking he was inside my OODA loop even when I had no idea where he was much less what his loop entailed...
Infanteer's right. That was being done before 'Maneuver Warfare' became a flavor of the day. Even before Warden or Boyd were born. Before Thomas Jonathan Jackson was born. Believe it or not, even before I was born...
This thread is enlightening but confusing. While I understand that many people dive into the weeds in their analysis of MW and other constructs...I still don't see concrete evidence to justify the casting aside of Boyd's OODA loop.
I must be either stupid or very poorly educated.
Don't cast it aside, then...
MW is far older than is the term in its current usage...
Unfortunately, most ground combat occurs in the weeds...Not suggesting that it be cast aside. As I wrote, I see obvious air combat applicability and acknowledge that it has operational and strategic value. It's just that it does not have too much applicability to ground combat at echelons below Corps (often and Division even more often). Deciding what, who, when, where and how to fight can and should use an OODA like approach. Once the scrap begins however, on the ground as opposed to in the air, there are too many factors and actors that can impinge to make the OODA loop the most important or even a very important factor. At least IMO. YMMV.I still don't see concrete evidence to justify the casting aside of Boyd's OODA loop.
Simply; don't discard it but also do not take it as the holy grail. It's just another one of many useful aphorisms.
The killer argument for this is that the loop is a simplistic and misleading fiction, as are many staff procedure checklists. Everything happens at the same time, not sequentially.
Moreover, new orders follow before the effect of a previous order (or mission) can be understood.
To follow the OODA loop would actually be too slow, for leaders would wait with their next step until they have observed their last action's effect.
The OODA loop is furthermore badly overhyped. Similar and partially even more advanced concepts have been developed since the 70's, one such example integrated blue AND red loops instead of Boyd's weird omission of the red one.
1977 Lawson Command-Control Cycle (sense-process-compare-decide-act / under influence by environment, own forces and desired state). At the latest by 1985 it was a two-sided model.
source: Hughes, "Fleet Tactics and Coastal Command", 2nd Edition, pp.213 ff
You hit the nail on the head!
Bumper, I cannot agree with you more...most criticisms of Boyd have little factual basis...see the four examples above
OODA loop is not simple and it is just a portion of the theory. I think the beauty of the theory is that it not only works for air combat but also at the small unit tactical ground level. It also works at the strategic level but folks want to criticize it with sound bits learned at military career level schools.
The Body Theory is not something new and therefore it is in fact "good tactics". Boyd's research is extensive, unlike his critics, and where folks grab bits of the historical study they miss he is presenting his thinking process. He is pulling things apart looking for what works. The Boyd brief is how he got there, how he took things apart and put them back together. There is more to the theory than the OODA loop…there is a “Cheng and Ch’i” aspect to Boyd’s Theory that has been largely missed. One criticism of Boyd that is true is he didn’t write a book…we have the briefs but they miss a lot of the explaining he did at the briefs. Gentlemen…talk is cheap…
"If you want a new idea, look in an old book"
Re-submit for those interested
Re-submit for those interested
"If you want a new idea, look in an old book"
The Real Boyd Loop
Here is what Boyd actually said from The Polarbear Tapes(sounds like a spy novel)" Create a mismatch between what he should respond to, as opposed to the actual reality he should respond to in order to survive." That is the Real Boyd Loop and it has been hidden by default or by design for a long time. We have been Boyded (distracted and disoriented) by this OODA stuff.
Or the nail hit something...
As one of the examples from above, let me assure you that my references to OODA Loops and ground combat are factual. As evidence, I can merely state that I am still here and if I'd been fooling around with OODA loops I likely would not be. Doesn't get much more factual than that and 200 pounds of evidence ought to count for something even if it is old....most criticisms of Boyd have little factual basis...see the four examples above
I strongly disagree with you that the OODA loop has much applicability at the tactical level of ground combat (almost anything can and will have some applicability...). Certainly it can and should be applied on occasion but my observation has been that those occasions are rather rare. Fuch's observations above are accurate, Start trying to orient and you'll waste time. In close terrain, you'll find yourself flanked or worse. One must also consider that Boyd was an exceptional person, not everyone is and trying to apply the rules used by super bods when one is an ordinary bod can lead to embarrassment -- or worse...
We agree it has strategic value -- in fact, I'd say it has great Strategic value and can be applied quite often. It can in the right circumstance have Operational value and Tactical value -- though that last is where it is most likely to get muddied because of all the impactors and the relative quality and experience of the combatants.
Many of Boyd's theories have merit and as you imply, singling out the OODA loop is simplistic but I was responding to Slapout9's citing of the theory and Bumperplate's follow on. With respect to that extract from Boyd who is, after all, just one of many decent military theorists, I'll repeat what I said earlier re: the OODA loop:
"Simply; don't discard it but also do not take it as the holy grail. It's just another one of many useful aphorisms."
As one of the examples from above, let me assure you that my references to OODA Loops and ground combat are factual. As evidence, I can merely state that I am still here and if I'd been fooling around with OODA loops I likely would not be. Doesn't get much more factual than that and 200 pounds of evidence ought to count for something even if it is old.
I strongly disagree with you that the OODA loop has much applicability at the tactical level of ground combat (almost anything can and will have some applicability...). Certainly it can and should be applied on occasion but my observation has been that those occasions are rather rare. Fuch's observations above are accurate, Start trying to orient and you'll waste time. In close terrain, you'll find yourself flanked or worse. One must also consider that Boyd was an exceptional person, not everyone is and trying to apply the rules used by super bods when one is an ordinary bod can lead to embarrassment -- or worse
Let’s try again…can you give some factual evidence, an example, where Boyd’s OODA loop was not at work at the tactical level…let say company or platoon or squad level. You can pick the war. Remember…Boyd Theory…is not new and is, after all, nothing more than good tactics or an aphorisms.
We are wrestling with a lot of baggage here…maybe we should start a new thread titled “Boyd Theory”. I am serious here. Maneuver Warfare was an attempt to translate the theory into doctrine…it was a good try but needed to be worked, evaluated and changed. The sin is not continuing the work that proved or disproved the theory. I am open to good arguments…but I am waiting….and waiting…and waiting. As Americans, our attention is easily distracted with new bright shiny buz words that achieve self applause. We can go back to the theory and sort this out.
Fuchs statement is another great example of what I am talking about here.
“Everything happens at the same time, not sequentially. Moreover, new orders follow before the effect of a previous order (or mission) can be understood.” This statement is a distraction and does not represent any element of proof…it is opinion based on a misrepresentation. His argument is not sound by any stretch of the imagination. The Boyd Theory is not operating sequentially; in fact, it is just the opposite because Boyd’s assumption is everything does happen at once. The issue was and is how do we (assuming “we” are good guys) focus everyone’s efforts, when everything happens at once (and at the same time disorient the enemy’s focus). The first attempt was things like mission orders, commander’s intent, and focus of effort. Great try but it was version 1.0…we should be on version 4.0 or higher.
“Start trying to orient and you'll waste time” Disagree, if your saying that is part of Boyd Theory … and Boyd would argue that you orient to save time. If you land at a strange or new airport how do you orient? You normally move with the crowd in the direction of descending or ascending gates. As you move you orient as you pick up more information, you notice signs with arrows that say Baggage Claim, Passenger Pickup, Rest Rooms, and Ground Transportation. Based on that information you make the appropriate decisions to get yourself to an office, hotel or home. If you stop to orient as you get off the plane…no information, slow orientation and there you stand waiting for passenger assistance. I have seen a lot of words associated with the Boyd Theory but the phase “waste time” is not one of them.
"If you want a new idea, look in an old book"
That's classic moving of goalposts. We've had that already with Warden's theory.
These theories are so vague that everybody can interpret into them what he likes to and in the end they're useless distraction theories for lack of any practical utility.
The OODA loop turns into a blend of uselessness once you remove the sequential application. How could you be faster in a loop than your enemy if the loop is no loop?
Fact is that being quicker and make good use of it is superior in air combat, football and at times even in armour tactics ... only dumb people need an OODA model to grasp this. Sadly, there's no additional value to the OODA meme; just a lot of hype.
Bear are ponderous, they say...
A theory that disputes another theory is a non-factual critique of a non-fact.That's good -- I'm not in sales...sorry, the in all my years of experience and “I am still here” argument does not sell me…With regard to Infantry combat, not training, experience, I'll see your couple of years, triple it and raise you five? How's that? Not really the point though. The point is that my anecdotal evidence is at least as good as your untested theory.I have a couple years of experience and I am still here…and I out weigh you…now what?...thanks for proving my point.
I hope you're over 6'2" or you're a chubby Bear.I probably could if I wanted to dredge through my memory and recall a good one that made my point but that would be cherry picking so I see little point in doing so. I could also be totally objective and come up with another where the Loop was employed or evidenced but that would simply prove my point (that it is sometimes useful but is not a panacea) while also being cherry picked. Of course one can find examples in both directions. That's not the issue. The issue is who's doing what...Let’s try again…can you give some factual evidence, an example, where Boyd’s OODA loop was not at work at the tactical level…let say company or platoon or squad level. You can pick the war. Remember…Boyd Theory…is not new and is, after all, nothing more than good tactics or an aphorisms.What is this we stuff, White Man?We are wrestling with a lot of baggage here...We can go back to the theory and sort this out.
I have no particular interest in debating the pros and cons of MW theory, Boyd or Warden. IMO all three have merit; none are the be all and end all. I simply answered a post with my opinion (which is unchanged) and you countered with your opinion (which I'm sure is also unchanged and which I have no desire to try to change). Far as I'm concerned we can and should leave it at that.We can differ on that also. My experience is that the statement is reasonably accurate a good percentage of the time with respect to tactical ground combat. There are NO unequivocals in such combat in my observation.Fuchs statement is another great example of what I am talking about here.“Everything happens at the same time, not sequentially. Moreover, new orders follow before the effect of a previous order (or mission) can be understood.” This statement is a distraction and does not represent any element of proof…it is opinion based on a misrepresentation. His argument is not sound by any stretch of the imagination...Well, both the Marines when I was one and the Army when I was there used mission orders all the time. Did until you Baby Boomers screwed things up...The first attempt was things like mission orders, commander’s intent, and focus of effort. Great try but it was version 1.0…we should be on version 4.0 or higher.
I agree with the thrust of that comment but would mention that all combat commanders are not comfortable with those concepts. All of them IMO should be but too many are not -- may never be. Theory is great but it has to be implemented by people and therein lies the old rub. If you want decentralized planning and execution, you need either a major war (we get smarter during those) or you need to revamp the Personnel system and the training regimen -- both discourage initiative.You are not IMO orienting in that example, you are moving and doing while reacting to triggers and clues. That's what any good, intuitive combat commander does constantly. The not so good combat commander OTOH will be the Dude orienting at the Gate. That's the problem, the words and what they mean. More importantly, the understanding of what the words mean by he or she who implements the theory on the ground. My contention is that admirers of MW and Boydian theory assume everyone is as smart as they are and the theories will be properly implemented. They won't be...“Start trying to orient and you'll waste time” Disagree...If you land at a strange or new airport how do you orient? You normally move with the crowd in the direction of descending or ascending gates. If you stop to orient as you get off the plane…no information, slow orientation and there you stand waiting for passenger assistance.Remember you read it here first!I have seen a lot of words associated with the Boyd Theory but the phase “waste time” is not one of them.
Look at it not in the context of the acknowledged excellence of the theory but in the context of the experience and competence of leaders in the ground tactical fight who will be trying to implement the theories in an environment filled with uncertainty...
I'll see if I can respond and accurately but quickly give my perspective regarding the OODA loop & MW.
Maneuver Warfare is the term I choose to describe our "modern" doctrine. The only reason is that it's the term used most often - unsophisticated, but simple. The Lind book is something I own and have read quite a few times. I didn't take it as seminal work, but rather a synthesis and an attempt to reduce tactics to a digestible level in terms of quantity, and quality. As such I think it serves as a great template and foundation - but not a bible.
The OODA Loop makes perfect sense, in its generic on-the-street understanding. To say that humans don't observe, orient, decide and take action is to not understand human physiology. We receive stimulus, we figure out what it means, and we figure out what to do in response to it. Very simple. This is partly why battle drills are so extremely important.
This is easily extended to organizations: A BN enters an enemy's killzone and begins an effort to gain a foothold on dominant terrain to start defeating the enemy in detail within its battle positions. Sounds good. Then comes the enemy's counterattack. Now the friendly unit has a problem and must orient and take action to counter this problem. There is more to observe and orient to, and more "fog" to sift through, seems simple enough.
We speak of combined arms a lot - I always think of forms of contact. More forms of contact at the same time presents more of a problem. Presents more to observe and orient to....more things to consider....more options for action, and this takes time. A coordinated opposing force takes advantage of that time.
As for Boyd's hours of lecture, long slide shows, etc...it's not going to be perfect. It's the distillation and essence of his work that sticks out to me. The OODA loop is that essence and for me it makes sense. I can apply it to many if not all engagements. To take decision making and decision cycles out of consideration provides a mental image of two forces standing X meters apart simply firing at one another.
Even the raid to kill Bin Laden can be fitted to the OODA loop - in the past Bin Laden had been able to observe (maybe predict or guess is better?) and orient to US most likely COAs, he made decisions, took action, and avoided death (Tora Bora). Eventually the US came up with something he could not respond to fast enough and so he's now dead.
It's very simple to me. I have resigned myself to the fact that no greatly detailed warfare theory can stand for more than a day without some holes getting shot through it. The OODA Loop is not detailed. It's broad, and it's logical. How you apply it is up for endless debate. It's simplicity is what makes it easily digestible and applied for me.
And you would be completely wrong according to Boyd. Let me explain why everything you have been told about this OODA loop stuff is wrong.
You and John Boyd are going to run a race around OODA Loop track. The winner Lives, the loser dies. First thing Boyd would do is attack you morally by going up to you and saying something like "Is there anything you would like me to tell your next of Kin at your funeral?" Then he would attack you mentally by saying something like " You do realize you are running the wrong direction don't you?" And finally he would attack you physically by breaking your leg instead of just trying to be out run you.
That is Boyd's version of OODA Looping the enemy. Get the tapes and listen for yourself.
What you posted is precisely why I said "on-the-street" understanding. Very simple and not convoluted with moral, mental, and physical confounders.
Also, what you posted is a caveat leading to a tactics axiom: if you find yourself in a fair fight, then your tactics suck. The mental, moral, and physical things you describe would be effective, but not viewed as being very fair. And that's ok.
Boyd stuff is like philosophy for me: we can argue all day about whether or not the chair is blue, what is blueness, etc. But, at some point we just agree that it's blue and put in the stack with the other blue chairs. So too with Boyd, we can argue about the meaning of the OODA loop as a result of parsing out details from hours of lectures. Or, we can just take it at face value, where it's at its most valuable, and put it in our tool kit.
I use it as a conceptual teaching aid for myself and others. It works, so long as I don't try to make it graduate level, which just leads to paralysis by analysis.
Last edited by bumperplate; 05-16-2011 at 02:56 PM.
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