Higher HQ just gave me another misssion I have to go doOriginally Posted by William F. Owen
. I will respond later.
The Russians would get hold of Patterns? Sorry, why was that an issue?
Well that is Gold DUST!!! Cos that is the first I have heard of a whole brief being recorded!! Seriously!After AWS I learned my lesson and when a student at CSC I did record the brief on cassette. I guess I need to get that converted to CD so I can post it/send it out.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
There's about an hour or more on Youtube.
I know. It's still not all or even one of the briefs.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Afraid of the Communist Hordes!!
At the time, MW was a method to fight outnumbered and win, at least, that is what we said in those days. I think in Boyd's mind, if the Russians adopted it ...game over? Remember, this is back in 79-81 time frame and we were trying to think of how a Marine BLT could defeat a Russian Army Group.RIGHT!
I just dug the cassettes out of the old cardboard box room. There are eight 60 minute cassettes; 5 are labeled "Patterns in Conflict"; one is labeled "Organic C" (Command) and two are labeled "On Strategy". Looks like I managed to get three lectures. I remember CSC would not schedule Boyd as a lecture for the whole class but they did allow a small group of us to meet in a conference room. I threw a hand cassette recorder into the middle of the table...quality is not the best.
PM Sent
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
1-Surfaces and Gaps seems pretty easy to me. Weapons will usually be surfaces and gaps will be the ranges of theirs vs. yours. It works in the defense the same way as the offense. The ME would be the unit and location from which you expect the attack to occur, and be prepared to change that based upon the situation.
2-ME is part of MW based upon the book, it's just different based upon your war fighting philosophy.
3-Wyly goes into great detail over the confusion over Mission vs. Objective which is why I thought and think that was one of his most important lectures. And it is very relevant to today's current situation. IMO the definition of the "objective should be confined to a location from which you can best accomplish your mission". And be prepared to change that constantly based upon how the enemy acts and reacts.
4-I understand what you mean by tactics can be unit variable and I agree with that. The tactics of a company have to be different than that of a platoon or squad or there wouldn't be any reason to have such organizations. But what I think Lind and Wyly were driving at were the guiding principles that underlie all Tactics and I think they did a pretty good job overall.
5-The principles of tactics may be 5 things or maybe less, Wyly and Lind made a good start. Mission,ME,Surfaces and Gaps need to be there but I might add Time as the fourth principle. Indeed Time may be the ultimate principle. Just my opinion.
There is one part in the MW Handbook I recall, where Lind talks about the surfaces and gaps issue. With a commander talking about the difficulties in identifying a genuine gap and in a trap (i.e. a path of less resistance that will lead you into the enemy's killing area) he states that it is an art, and some people will have the skills, imagination and flair and others will not.
The mentality that we bypass all obstacles and enemy strengths in order to find the indirect approach through which we can, with minimal attrition, dislocate his ability to defend against us is a little on the optimistically ethereal side, in my opinion. Better we are prepared to come up against an enemy position, apply overwhelming force through combined arms through which he can't resist and then exploit as required rather than rely upon the orchestrated, undefinable artistry of the so-called 'manoeuvrist approach'.
As I said earlier, I think MW has got a lot right for the wrong reasons.
The whole narrative-imposed-where-narrative-does-not-fit reminds me very much of a quote from a recent New Yorker article:
Indeed, surface-and-gaps makes sense in the MW reading of warfare but it doesn't have all that much utility to a commander under fire and fatigued when he has to penetrate an enemy defensive position without walking into a pre-planned EA."as the Bacchae knew, we always tear our Gods to bits, and eat the bits we like... Certain kinds of truth are only convincing in a narrative. The idea, for instance, that the ring of power should be given to two undersized amateurs to throw into a volcano at the very center of an enemy's camp makes sound and sober sense, of a kind, in Tolkein; but you would never expect to find it as a premise at the Middle Earth Military Academy."
'...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
Donald Kagan
1-both Lind and Wyly talk about it and yes if you blindly follow easy terrain sooner or later you will end up right in the middle of an ambush. There suggestion was, if you run up against a surface where there is no apparent gap then find the weakest part of the surface. The whole defensive perimeter is not going to be of equal strength, which is why one of them (I think Wyly) called it soft spot tactics.
2-In later additions they talk about Combined Arms just as you have, in fact that became one of the later added principles of MW. To my way of thinking it just adds confusion to the idea of the main effort. To me the ME could very well be an artillery unit or air unit used to blow a hole in the enemies surface and make your own gap instead of just blindly walking or riding around searching for one.
Certainly, that's one perspective. I just see the construct of surfaces/gaps to be of little utility to the commander on the ground. As a way of analysing combat it's fine, but it isn't robust or solid enough a tool to be employed by a commander. It's too open to external factors, the least of all being a perceived knowledge of the enemy in the midst of battle that's simply unrealistic.
As unattractive as the idea is, and it was brushed upon earlier, competent drills, SOPs and tactics will be of far greater assistance. Knowing how to advance to contact, the battle drills to go through and how to apply them to the situation remains fraught with uncertainty and demands flexibility - but the battle drills provide a framework for success.
MW and battle-drills aren't mutually exclusive, but I don't see MW as adding anything of great value to the battle-drills concept. Tactics will succeed when combined arms are applied properly, regardless of how one views 'tempo', 'surfaces', 'mission command' and so forth. MW might be right in parts (the God we tear to bits and consume what we like) but it isn't the whole picture, and it isn't a silver-bullet to victory.
Combined arms is, IMHO, absolutely the most important tactical construct that has to be taught and employed for combat success. I have seen it become confusing due to poor thinking - for example, I have seen it defined as the combination of Battlefield Operating Systems so that suddenly logistics becomes a 'combined arms'. Sure, supply is essential but surely combined arms are those things we have that affect the enemy.2-In later additions they talk about Combined Arms just as you have, in fact that became one of the later added principles of MW. To my way of thinking it just adds confusion to the idea of the main effort. To me the ME could very well be an artillery unit or air unit used to blow a hole in the enemies surface and make your own gap instead of just blindly walking or riding around searching for one.
I'd suggest your view of MW that assumes knowledge of the enemy - more so than ever will be possible. MW, I believe, is right in parts but for the wrong reasons. Instead of trying to being clever, as MW tells us, we are far better off focussing upon being technically proficient at tactical drills at all levels.
I don't think MW is dangerous but rather that it represents unnecessary complication. It won't directly lead us to disaster but it does not represent the best possible practise.
'...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
Donald Kagan
I'm not a Lind fan but he got that bit right.
Totally true and while even the best artist isn't infallible, a good artist will be beat a good mechanic at his art.That is the mechanical solution -- it is necessitated by the democratic nations rather foolish effort to be fair in promoting people to command; if one cannot have an artist, one must give his mechanic all the tools available and if one uses more mechanics than artists, then one must have tons of tools......Better we are prepared to come up against an enemy position, apply overwhelming force through combined arms through which he can't resist and then exploit as required rather than rely upon the orchestrated, undefinable artistry of the so-called 'manoeuvrist approach'.We can agree on that as a generalization but Lind and others are correct on the Art versus science bit and the benefit of having a few artists.As I said earlier, I think MW has got a lot right for the wrong reasons.Not necessarily; depends on the Commander. For most, generally mechanics, you're obviously correct. For the rather more rare artists, not necessarily -- far more often than not they'll pull it off, even against the odds...Indeed, surface-and-gaps makes sense in the MW reading of warfare but it doesn't have all that much utility to a commander under fire and fatigued when he has to penetrate an enemy defensive position without walking into a pre-planned EA.
The problem is that a democratic and 'fair' personnel system in a bureaucracy cannot tolerate artists..
Until there's a big, real, tough war (see Freyberg, B) ...
How, though, do we identify the artists vice mechanics? Training is able to produce and test competency based upon known, established and proven criteria. Some flair and artistry is allowed within this framework - charismatic leaders often get promoted, for example. Beyond that, the most successful military commanders are really products of their own organisation and training (at least, in my view of things). Claiming someone is an 'artist' is really just saying we can't identify or understand his or her way of working.Totally true and while even the best artist isn't infallible, a good artist will be beat a good mechanic at his art....Lind and others are correct on the Art versus science bit and the benefit of having a few artists.:
I see the science-vs-art debate as placing overly simplistic guidelines upon military undertakings. Better we look at competent vs less-competent within the framework of what we do know and can assess.
And if popular perceptions are correct, artists are only appreciated only once they're dead. I'm not sure that depending upon post-death popularity is that desirable a quality for military leadership
'...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
Donald Kagan
That is not my view...that is how I understand the Handbooks view. Someone once asked me if I was a maneuverist or an attritionist. My response was I am a bothist
So does MV, and the text and pixels expended on it, benefit the artist or the mechanic…or both (or none)?
With other words, is the differentiation between artist and mechanic/scientist pertinent?
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
Apologies then - I was putting words into your mouth. I am in complete agreement with what you are saying above, with both F&M complimenting each other. Only the most basic and ill-informed reading of MW (or any doctrine, I would posit) would suggest otherwise. Unfortunately the allure of 'manoeuvrist' minimal losses for maximum gains means that it is taught almost as an antithesis to combat - that we can defeat the enemy without having to fight him, cue the Sun Tzu quote about subduing as being the acme of skill. As a platoon or company commander that doesn't really help all that much.That is not my view...that is how I understand the Handbooks view. Someone once asked me if I was a maneuverist or an attritionist. My response was I am a bothist
Understand, though, that you win this argument by default. Come 0800 hours most days I don a uniform, drink from the company Kool Aid and sell the party line of MW being all that and a bag of chips!!
'...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
Donald Kagan
On that I will have to say good night. Here is a present that maybe you can take to work with you. It is Army MW from WW2. I have posted it before but here is the link so you can have a quick look.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf
I'll bet you like metrics...
That's not an insult, just an observation. The world in that respect is divided into those who wish to apply them and those who do not...By observation and subjective judgement. Subjectivity is anathema to bureaucracies and politicians because it is, after all, only an opinion. Whereas objectivity produces empirical results. Which can be and often are fudged...But not much. It upsets the bureaucracy and the personnel folks who want objective criteria only to determine who gets to do what. It also upsets the politicians who want everyone to be treated fairly. Heh. What they really want is no complaints from non selectees that cannot be shown to be based on objective data so they can say "you didn't make the grade and this proves it." A proven competent and experienced commander who says "...promote Heebly, he's good; do not promote Phugabosky, he'll get people killed.." is anthema to the 'system.'Training is able to produce and test competency based upon known, established and proven criteria. Some flair and artistry is allowed within this framework...Charisma has nothing to do with it; competence in an art form -- and combat is an art, not a science -- has everything to do with it. Not one of the best Commanders I had in combat was charismatic -- only three of about a dozen got to be Flag Officers, the system does not tolerate guys who are great tactically but not pretty or socially adept....- charismatic leaders often get promoted, for example...
A mechanical Commander trained conventionally who is a good mechanic and has some experience will beat an inexperienced intuitive Commander. He will rarely beat an experienced intuitive Commander.I agree with your first generalization, though that's from our choices, not from necessity nor is it demonstrably better than other processes.Beyond that, the most successful military commanders are really products of their own organisation and training (at least, in my view of things). Claiming someone is an 'artist' is really just saying we can't identify or understand his or her way of working.
I disagree with the second. To put it as simply as possible, that 'artist' will arrive at correct decisions by pretty much the same process as will a good mechanical type -- he or she will just do it faster and is highly likely to omit some steps. There's been plenty of research and there are tons of papers out there. Googling "Intuitive Military Commanders" gets 616K hits, most garbage but some gold. (LINK).
The issue is not that we cannot do it; the issue is that in democratic societies in peacetime who have a fetish for worrying about a huge mobilization force, the dual emphasis of PC 'fairness and objective criteria' and designing training to mass produce people for spaces it isn't going to be done.
Not to worry, as I said, they always come out in wars. Then a lot of the mechanics get to take charge of Post Exchanges...Yeah, many say that. That's what we're doing now. How's that working out for us? Most mid grade and young senior NCOs and Company and Field Grades in the US will tell you not so good...I see the science-vs-art debate as placing overly simplistic guidelines upon military undertakings. Better we look at competent vs less-competent within the framework of what we do know and can assess.The desirable quality is a competent, experienced practitioner who can win and keep more of their own troops alive while doing so. I've seen a lot of intuitive commanders, artists in that sense, do that -- I've seen a lot of mediocre mechanics get too many people killed unnecessarily while failing to successfully complete missions and then get promoted because, screwed up or not, they had checked all the right boxes, they played that system you cite.And if popular perceptions are correct, artists are only appreciated only once they're dead. I'm not sure that depending upon post-death popularity is that desirable a quality for military leadership
But that is a simplistic and mostly wrong model for proto-modern war. Weapons fire across frontages, and weapons are mobile. Weapons can also mass fire in time and space - artillery. The proto-modern defence aims to have surveillance, fires and reserves (+50%). The analogy of surfaces and gaps, simply does not apply. It would not have applied at Cambrai, Hamel, Port Arthur, Iwo Jima, or even Kursk and El Alamein.
The surfaces and gaps model is a set up to make MW work and it only uses examples where it can be applied. Crossing the Meuse, Operation Micheal etc.
Direction of enemy threat?The ME would be the unit and location from which you expect the attack to occur, and be prepared to change that based upon the situation.
I don't have a "war fighting philosophy." I adhere to what works. We have a huge body of work to adhere to, we just seem to want to ignore it, because its simple and not-sexy.-ME is part of MW based upon the book, it's just different based upon your war fighting philosophy.
So objectives are terrain? That makes sense, if given as part of the mission.IMO the definition of the "objective should be confined to a location from which you can best accomplish your mission". And be prepared to change that constantly based upon how the enemy acts and reacts.
"Seize intact the Bridge at XYZ, by 21:00 and hold until relieved."
"Capture and hold Hill 1234 by 21:00."
Yet no mention of the Core Functions which could by some said to be the guiding principles of tactical doctrine. Moreover Core Functions are completely absent form MW as far as I can tell.But what I think Lind and Wyly were driving at were the guiding principles that underlie all Tactics and I think they did a pretty good job overall.
The problem I have with MW is it's lack of precision, rigour, and history. If someone tells me (and they have) that the USMC as grossly lacking in tactical training, and MW was a forcing mechanism, the OK. BUT taken out of that context, MW sets you off down a false trail, where a lot is wrong.
As someone pointed out, would be still talking about MW if it had been called "Competent Warfare."
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
"C" -- None of the
above...Only in combat and all other things being equal. Then it's quite pertinent..With other words, is the differentiation between artist and mechanic/scientist pertinent?
It has little or nothing to do with maneuver warfare; or, more correctly, maneuver warfare has little or no effect on who is a good combat commander and who is not.
Yup, there are three kinds of people in this world; those who can count and those who cannot.
And then there are the artists.
Last edited by Kiwigrunt; 06-13-2010 at 05:58 AM.
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
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