There's more truth in that comment in the context of this sub-thread than
you probably realized...
I am not sure which book or version of the book you have/read/or accessed but practically every point you raised is addressed by Lind or Wyly in the version I have.Originally Posted by William F. Owen
The Exception is of course is what I called your War Fighting Philosophy. Other than that it's all pretty much in there.
I have the 1985 Westview Press first edition. I know it raises each point but it does not provide any convincing arguments.
One example is the supposed differences between the 5-paragraph order format and "Mission type orders" - which is just plain wrong. Page 30.
The issue of gaps being entrances to ambushes (Fire Sacks) Page 79- is never dealt with adequately, .
a.) in terms of guidance. - the need to conduct the break in battle.
b.) in terms of actually understanding the problem - the fact that up to 50% of the enemy maybe a mobile reserve.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Looks like a good read, I hope to get time to read it properly this week. Thanks.
'...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
Donald Kagan
OK, I know this Monograph very well. How is anything to do with MW?
This work is most often cited as an example of good planning and command. - do not plan more than is actually required or possible.
If we accept it was something to do with MW, what would make it the opposite?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Observe away, no offense taken. Honestly though, no - I'm far from a metrics man.
Rather I deliberately take the 'nay-sayers' stance as I find I learn most here by critically quizzing them/ you. I don't intend to come across as the argumentative type - and I hope that I'm not raising petty argument for argument's sake. I will make no apologies, though, in continuing to draw you and others here into debate - I'm learning far more via this means than others, both professional and academic. I took a post-grad paper on Insurgency in '08, and I'm not exaggerating when I say that a single post here receives more knowledgeable, critical and enlightening comments than my entire collection of essays and presentations received during that course. I agree with Fuchs' signature - why exclusively discuss agreement? Group-think is something best avoided.
I agree with you in a lot of what you say. However, I would challenge your view in that the system and the organisation relies upon producing and fielding the mechanics.
Perhaps I'm tackling this in the wrong manner - basically, how could the system develop it's artists without undermining it's own structures enforcing the basics of tactical success that demand mechanisation in most undertakings (tactics, logistics, appreciations, etc)?
It seems that your/my system is sufficiently good at a) providing sufficient quality forces, b) having those forces adapt to meet the demands placed upon it and c) getting the right people to the right spots, when required. Reference Eisenhower, McChrystal for the last one. I can accept the first two have built in inefficiencies when worked as a templated, linear model in terms of personnel progression (which is, at heart, what we're discussing), but how can you do it otherwise without damaging the working system?
Trust me, I like the idea of a meritocracy based upon purely upon outputs and abilities rather than assessed/ proven ability in replicated training. I just don't see it as feasible given the flaws inherent to any large organisation of people. Judging, identifying and then elevating those artists seems to me an aspirational task that will be codified and regimentalised (hence: mechanised) at all turns.
My point exactly! The 'artist' of MW is the wrong way of looking at it - better we find and promote those who can do the mechanics of designing, executing and adapting combined-arms plans well. We know how combined arms works within our doctrine and TTPs, so lets reward those who demonstrate ability in that field.It has little or nothing to do with maneuver warfare; or, more correctly, maneuver warfare has little or no effect on who is a good combat commander and who is not.
'...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
Donald Kagan
The Real Deal
Here is a copy of Lecture 3 the main Effort. It starts out with Col. Walters but about half way through is Col. Wyly's lecture.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/document...ort_Primer.pdf
Thanks but the Main Effort is,
a.) Common to all Warfare - not unique to MW. Foch wrote about it extensively. - for the avoidance of "parallel battles."
b.) is Entscheidende Stelle - decisive point in German. NOT Schwerepunkt!! - that is the "heavy point." - the COG! That is wrong!
c.) - see Paragraph 323 of the 1935 Truppenfurhung. Also paragraph 389 - the determining of the Main Effort.
d.) Soviet Doctrine talks about the ME as well, but usually in terms of "main attacks" and "Secondary Attacks."
All of these are nothing to do with MW. Everything MW talks about, that makes sense, is a normal and commonly used facet of warfare.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Just my opinion, but since they were presented as lectures with TDG's(Tactical Decision Games) Wyly nor Lind wanted to give a prescribed schoolbook solution they wanted to instill a thinking process where the student arrived at his own solutions to the problem presented.
Also,I checked the page numbers of the examples you gave and they are the same. I have an old paperback edition (wasn't going to drop 50 bucks for a hard copy) so I wasn't sure if it still had all the information in the original version.
I learn new thing here every day...
That, as our Martha Stewart used to say, is a good thing...
There's a time and place for metrics, they're absolutely imperative for many things. My observation has been that tactical decision making is not such a thing.Understood and not a problem.I don't intend to come across as the argumentative type - and I hope that I'm not raising petty argument for argument's sake. I will make no apologies, though, in continuing to draw you and others here into debate.I think it does, at least here in the US, for several reasons. That methodology works, it's broadly proven in two big wars and works adequately in little ones. It is easier to do than is the identification and development of talent. It is politically palatable. It allows more people to be accepted into the fold, thus allowing a larger pool from which talent may rise when needed. There are more, not least the laziness of trainers but those are the principal reasons for developing mechanical processes (like the MDMP) and the pretty much standardized use of the mechanical approach in most Armies.I agree with you in a lot of what you say. However, I would challenge your view in that the system and the organisation relies upon producing and fielding the mechanics.Heh, that, too. So many thing are indeed mechanical that casting 'mechanics' aside is impossible; it is easier to use the template for most everything. The real issue is not developing 'artists' -- it is that most Armies stifle them (and thus they leave early...) mostly due to the group think you wisely wish to avoid. I suspect that group think syndrome has different precipitators from nation to nation...Perhaps I'm tackling this in the wrong manner - basically, how could the system develop it's artists without undermining it's own structures enforcing the basics of tactical success that demand mechanisation in most undertakings (tactics, logistics, appreciations, etc)?
I wouldn't change much in the current system but I would institutionalize the acceptance of mavericks and talent to a greater extent than is now the norm. Note I say 'greater extent' rather than totally -- totally would result in unmilitary chaos...Totally agree.It seems that your/my system is sufficiently good at a) providing sufficient quality forces, b) having those forces adapt to meet the demands placed upon it and c) getting the right people to the right spots, when required.I have seen senior commanders who encouraged their talented folks -- perhaps tolerated them is a better word (give that some thought...) -- as opposed to most of their peers who would not do so. The real problem is, IMO, with the personnel policies and that problem is part politically coreect ('fair,' 'objective assessment,' 'balanced') and part ease of effort for the Per folks. Life is easier for Per weenies if every LTC is potentially able to command a Battalion.but how can you do it otherwise without damaging the working system?
I say LTC because I believe that most should be allowed to get to Captain, at Major culling begins and command and staff tracks are locked and a goodly number are allowed to command battalions -- and that's where the hard cuts start.In reverse order; that's why we're where we are; it is not infeasible, it is simply difficult and therefor avoided for the most part; war provides the ultimate meritocratic selection and democratic societies for a host of reasons are unlikely to stop training good mechanics, start accepting talented mavericks and go completely meritocratic. A hard war brings out that talent and it rises fairly rapidly to the top.Trust me, I like the idea of a meritocracy based upon purely upon outputs and abilities rather than assessed/ proven ability in replicated training. I just don't see it as feasible given the flaws inherent to any large organisation of people. Judging, identifying and then elevating those artists seems to me an aspirational task that will be codified and regimentalised (hence: mechanised) at all turns.
That's reality, I know that -- what I also very strongly believe is that a good intuitive commander can whip an excellent mechanical commander. Against an outstanding mechanic -- and a few of those are about -- you'd need an excellent or better intuitive guy. Intuition and talent give an edge, they are not infallible. There are a host of very competent mechanics out there. Kiwi Grunt modified one my smart aleck comments to say "there are those who can count, those who can't and then there are the Artists." True -- I'd modify that to say there are those who must count ot paint by the numbers; there those who can count and paint without numbers -- and Artists who can do both. Tactically speaking, the 'artist' knows when to be mechanical and when that is not advisable; he take shortcuts -- and good ones. Wars bring that out...
In the meantime, we can be happy that the system produces a large pool of competent folks from which talent can be gathered when needed and that there are some senior commanders who tolerate if not encourage talent.I don't think we're in total agreement on that but we're probably close enough for government work.My point exactly! The 'artist' of MW is the wrong way of looking at it - better we find and promote those who can do the mechanics of designing, executing and adapting combined-arms plans well. We know how combined arms works within our doctrine and TTPs, so lets reward those who demonstrate ability in that field.
I say that because I believe the odd or rare good intuitive guy who sticks around will generally demonstrate more ability...
I am glad you read it,cause when I posted it, what 2 years ago I couldn't find anybody that had ever read it or much wanted to read it, finally had to
harrass Rob Thornton into reading it while he was going through school.
But the main reason I posted it is because Colonel Wyly's lecture on "The Concept Of The Objective" is not available except in the Lind book. The above Monograph comes to many of the same conclusions as Wyly did. The most important of which is the Objective has to serve the Mission and the Objective is likely to change once the operation begins. Another point the author makes is in WW2 the Objective had a different connotation than it does today, back then it was part of the commanders defeat mechanism. Kind of a "Pet Rock" of mine cause it is a form of targeting.
If you read the paper closely there are many similarities between this paper and some of the concepts presented in MW. Example the futility of trying to predict the enemy, the Mission above all else, the criticality of the Objective, the studying/orienting on the enemy,and properly resourcing units to deal with uncertainty/chaos of war and let the on scene commander apply those resources as he sees fit. Sounds a whole lot like Mission Tactics, Main Effort and Surface and Gaps to me anyway.
I had an interesting discussion on this with a CGSC instructor while discussing Leonhard's Art of Maneuver Warfare. We were discussing maneuverist vs. attrition tactics. He made the salient point that MW is best suited for an army that plans to fight outnumbered or must conserve its strength (his same criticism of Clausewitzian thought), not one that dominates. His advice was very U.S. Grant - use maneuver where appropriate but beat them through attrition and let the other guy attempt to "maneuver" out of his problem.That is not my view...that is how I understand the Handbooks view. Someone once asked me if I was a maneuverist or an attritionist. My response was I am a bothistFire and Maneuver compliment each other so I don't see the need to pick one or the other. In something as tricky as combat I would always want to have both, if maneuver worked or could work thats fine but I wouldn't want to bet my life on it.
The corallary - discussed in his book, was that attrition is necessary in offensive war which will result in occupation - an outmanevered army which takes only light casualties is a big risk long term. Ultimately the CSA, Germany, and Japan were beaten (long term) by the attritional warfare inflicted upon their populations and armies which not only physically but morally defeated them.
Could go on but it was an interesting counterpoint. Mostly I fall into the KW school - I try to figure out the context and do what works .....
Please go on, sounds like some good stuff.
Oddly enough, much of the population of Germany didn't think it had been beaten during the First World War, which was a war of attrition if there ever was one. Much of the blame for that can be placed on Field Marshal Ludendorff, who asked for the armistice in November 1918 and then postwar was the main author of the "stab in the back" theory. Possibly if the Germans had been more ostentatiously humiliated in 1918 there wouldn't have been a need for another round in 1939.
Regarding the peaceful occupations of Germany and Japan in 1945, I sometimes wonder how much of that was due to fear of what the occupying armies might have done if provoked. There was an implicit threat of worse things to come had the occupations been resisted.
That is because MW is what most normal folk do anyway. MW was not new, or even original or even a "concept." It was the USMC and others waking up to the minimum standard that had existed for 300 years.
...and this again is what all competent forces were doing. None of those things are MW. His Grace the Duke of Wellington, would have beaten them into you, as soon as you got on his staff. So would the "attritionist" Montgomery.Example the futility of trying to predict the enemy, the Mission above all else, the criticality of the Objective, the studying/orienting on the enemy,and properly resourcing units to deal with uncertainty/chaos of war and let the on scene commander apply those resources as he sees fit.
Now, if you want to ask why do we no longer do those things, then OK. Very good question, but nothing to do MW
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
How can anyone differentiate between "Manoeuvre tactics" and "attrition tactics" - other than apply force in a given context?
I do not understand the reference to Clausewitz.
...but I disagree with the Instructor. Manoeuvre/moving is risky. You are moving. If you are outnumbered that can be dumb. To manoeuvre freely you need a very solid reserve, a secure base, and very good reconnaissance. = Numbers. Attempting Envelopment and Breakthroughs with low numbers is very high risk.
"Attrition" = Killing, so logically aims at high Loss-exchange ratios. Kill a lot of them, and save your strength. - Battle of Agincourt. Khe-Sahn, Bastone = Not moving.
Again, how does it help or inform military education to artificially describe things in terms of Manoeuvre and Attrition. It's meaningless, IMO. It's a pop-up book version of tactics, that avoids education.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
The first sentence in the book is "Maneuver Warfare is not New" it then goes to explain how the first example was a cave man sneaking up behind another cave man and whacking him instead of going club-to-club. I have never read or heard anybody say it was new.
I know. Look at all the historical examples lifted from history. By NEW I meant new as "insight". It was a fraud. It aimed to mislead folks into believing a set of things that were not true, and - IMO, most folks knew they were not true.
All the things grouped together as part of MW, were normal practice, given any degree of context.
Why not call it "Competent Warfare." - If they had, would those opposing it, be in favour of "Incompetent Warfare?"
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
That would be the ultimate Maneuver
Or static manoeuvre.That would be the ultimate Maneuver
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
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