William S. Lind :collection (merged thread)

[Chris jM]

This gets back to Boyd’s classic match up between the F-86 and the Mig -13 in the Korean War. The success of the F-86 was it could transition … bank left, bank right…faster than the Mig because of the F-86 hydraulics. Each time the Mig observed a transition he would react but would eventually realize he was falling farther and farther behind…until he brain turned to dish water (Boyd terminology) and he did nothing but fly straight. The six 50 cals the F-86 packed quickly settled the issue. I would argue that Vaux’s objective was the enemy as Wyly discusses. ...The enemy realizing the enemy was now behind them and in fact mingled with them and because they could not transition quick enough their cohesion broke. The enemy that tried to response were quickly killed … end game… no options when you dead.

I don't want to sidetrack the issue, but the Korean war air combat allegory is a little over-used and simplistic. The F-86 was also apparently superior to the MiG-15 due to greater pilot visibility. I think the claim that the OODA loop allowed the US pilots to win by a faster decision making cycle is misleading - if you look at the doctrine, where the USAF employed decentralised (as opposed to the Chinese/ North Korean ground-based intercept controllers) command and employed better trained pilots, the majority of the engagements were won by the USAF selecting a position of advantage from which to attack their MiG adversaries from as opposed to mid-combat manoeuvring. I read this in a hard-copy MA thesis which I don't have access to, and while I apologise for the lack of references it does 'ring true' logically (to me, anyway).

This doesn't take away from 'MW theory' at all, but rather adds to it in different ways if you are a believer. Tempo and speed is important but remains far from a silver-bullet. Having a tactical advantage (altitude and the element of surprise in the Korean air war, occupying an ambush position by night behind an enemy position) is more important than seeking to 'get inside the enemies decision cycle' and 'dislocate' or 'destroy cohesion'. The importance placed upon pursuing abstract, undefinable and illusive/ unpredictable second or third order effects is one of the key weaknesses of MW theory in my limited understanding of it.

[slapout9]

Once the breaches were completed, or a gap was created, one battalion executed a “rollup” by suppressing positions with artillery and looping behind them and attacking from the rear. Imagine a line of enemy company positions. You’re the Iraqi company commander in one of those positions. As the arty that was falling on your trenches shifts to your fellow company commander’s position; you come out of your hole, the company on one flank is in the process of surrendering, the position on the other side is getting hammer by arty, and you look to the rear to see a Marine mech company closing in on your position from the rear. Another hands in the air monument. In a few hours that battalion rolled up the better part of an Iraqi division. I mention LtCol Vaux because he was an instructor at AWS the same time as Col Wyly.

1-This is exactly what I mean by concealed movement. The bold highlights show that the attack was successful because the Marine attacking movements were concealed! If the artillery did not suppress (conceal the marines movement) the attack might not have succeeded.

2-The Artillery suppression is what I mean by the Main effort(as opposed to combined arms) in this case, everything else hinged on that succeeding, supporting attacks that followed were more in line with the deployments of the commanders reserves. Which Wyly has a lecture on in the book also, which was also deleted when newer editions were written. When ever Arms are combined they have to be synchronized in order to avoid friendly fire incidents, that synchronization is alot like the concept of establishing or switching the main effort to me. Why can't artillery be a main effort and then switch to an air strike main effort and then switch to an infantry main effort?

3-Wyly says during his lecture in the book that whenever they(the AWS class) use the term objective it will mean a geographic reference point.... But he does have a couple of lines were he talks about a "Mobile" enemy being the objective, but even then he talks about referring to it as a "enemy mortar position"

We are just going to have to find Colonel Wyly and wake him up and ask him.

[Fuchs]

I like to emphasize camouflage, concealment and cover, but I dislike the emphasis on concealment in the last few posts.

Suppressing artillery fires and a combination of mech infantry and artillery fires should rather be discussed with terms such as "shaping" or "combined arms".

[William F. Owen]

Artillery suppression can only work on positions that have been identified, and are vulnerable to suppression. - Look at IWO JIMA, not all or even any positions were identified and all mostly invulnerable to to the preparatory barrage - thus carnage!

[Fuchs]

Indeed, smoke (blinding, not suppressing) is often the better choice.

Last I heard was that HE and smoke make up an alarmingly small share of standard artillery munition load in Western NATO's arty battalions, though. The HE share is going back to huge in countries that signed the cluster munitions ban, of course.

[slapout9]

Indeed, smoke (blinding, not suppressing) is often the better choice.

Wyly actually makes that point in one of his lectures.

[Polarbear1605]

1-This is exactly what I mean by concealed movement. The bold highlights show that the attack was successful because the Marine attacking movements were concealed! If the artillery did not suppress (conceal the marines movement) the attack might not have succeeded.

Wait a minute! I thought we were discussing if concealment is part of maneuver as defined by Wyly/Lind (and therefore Boyd). We seem to have gotten off track here talking about suppression and other technique details that always come out in these discussions.
No! MW is not concealed movement…that is a technique. MW is two (you and your enemy’s) time sensitive decision making processes competing within the same environments. (Wow! I think I am proud of the last sentence.) The examples I gave, I thought, demonstrated two competing decision processes. Competing (because it is combat, usually with a winner and a loser) where faster or shorter decision cycles not only move us closer to a favorable outcome but also cuts inside our opponents decision cycle and stretches or lengthens his cycle by generating confusion and disorder. The issue is how do we accomplish this or how we hold it all together with all the moving parts, gears, wheels, people, politics, enemy and planets whirling around in that battle space.
Geez! I can’t leave this thread alone for a second, not ever for Fathers Day…lol.

[Chris jM]

MW is two (you and your enemy’s) time sensitive decision making processes competing within the same environments. (Wow! I think I am proud of the last sentence.) The examples I gave, I thought, demonstrated two competing decision processes. Competing (because it is combat, usually with a winner and a loser) where faster or shorter decision cycles not only move us closer to a favorable outcome but also cuts inside our opponents decision cycle and stretches or lengthens his cycle by generating confusion and disorder.

'Two decision cycles' is just too simplistic, isn't it? You don't fight an enemy commander in an isolated duel ala a chessboard - as a battalion commander you might be attacking an enemy company position, say. That enemy company commander is part of a Bn, who in turn is part of a Bde, etc etc. Each commander has his own reserve our counter-atk reserve, not to mention the neighboring companies to the one your trying to defeat.

So against whom do you 'generate confusion and disorder' by 'cutting inside your opponents decision cycle'? The enemy, as in the FF, will have dozens of different decision cycles whirling around and interacting simultaneously if we use the Boyd analogy. Saying that we are fighting any one of these - or even saying that we are fighting them all simultaneously - is more or less a meaningless pursuit... no?

And happy father's day, too.

[Fuchs]

Robert Leonhard's "dislocation" framework about maneuver warfare is so far the most impressive thing that I saw on the topic of maneuver warfare.

[slapout9]

MW is two (you and your enemy’s) time sensitive decision making processes competing within the same environments. (Wow! I think I am proud of the last sentence.)

That's my fault....but I was getting to the time question just had to work up to that. I am looking for a certain passage in the book. Is what is strange about it is, that whoever wrote the passage didn't mention his name. I'll put it up in a minute.

[slapout9]

I have the paperback edition and on the second printed page is this.
The title of the page is called: "About The Book And Author" then there is this statement about halfway down. "The purpose of Maneuver Warfare is to defeat the enemy by disrupting his ability to react,rather than by physical destruction of forces."

Now here is where I get confused on the time and concealment thing. If I do something that makes me invisible/concealed either by technology or some type of trick, I have all the time in the world! but yet I don't have to be faster than my enemy. So I don't understand why always trying to be faster through the decsion/Boyd cycle is going to be an advantage. Relative to the highlighted statement above, although time is important the main point (purpose) of MW seems to be to disrupt his ability to react not just simply be faster??

[Kiwigrunt]

I have the paperback edition and on the second printed page is this.
The title of the page is called: "About The Book And Author" then there is this statement about halfway down. "The purpose of Maneuver Warfare is to defeat the enemy by disrupting his ability to react,rather than by physical destruction of forces."

Now here is where I get confused on the time and concealment thing. If I do something that makes me invisible/concealed either by technology or some type of trick, I have all the time in the world! but yet I don't have to be faster than my enemy. So I don't understand why always trying to be faster through the decsion/Boyd cycle is going to be an advantage. Relative to the highlighted statement above, although time is important the main point (purpose) of MW seems to be to disrupt his ability to react not just simply be faster??

That is assuming that your enemy is static and either not expecting anything or just waiting for something to happen. Yet if they are competent then they too are likely to want the initiative so they too may be up to something. Just because you are manoeuvring and assuming you are not being seen, doesn’t guarantee that you are not being seen. In that case, the more time you take, the more time you give the enemy to react.

When the British Paras first advanced (movement) towards the bridge at Arnhem they had their ability to act and react disrupted by an inferior and adhoc kampfgruppe Krafft, which very quickly manoeuvred into a linear blocking position. Had Krafft not been so swift, things might have been very different. Krafft may have been one of those artists……since he had no instruction on MW or OODA. So Polarbear’s quote on MW seems to be quite accurate here:

MW is two (you and your enemy’s) time sensitive decision making processes competing within the same environments.

But is that not applicable to warfare in general?

[slapout9]

When ever Arms are combined they have to be synchronized in order to avoid friendly fire incidents, that synchronization is alot like the concept of establishing or switching the main effort to me. Why can't artillery be a main effort and then switch to an air strike main effort and then switch to an infantry main effort?

Speaking of Boyd, I think this is very Boydian. Sometime ago he wrote a paper about aircraft design and energy and maneuverability. I am paraphrasing now but basically he said it wasn't the overall fastest fighter that would win, it was the one that could "switch" maneuver states. Now I am not exactly sure what he meant by that, but I think my above example would or could apply?

[Polarbear1605]

Now here is where I get confused on the time and concealment thing. If I do something that makes me invisible/concealed either by technology or some type of trick, I have all the time in the world! but yet I don't have to be faster than my enemy. So I don't understand why always trying to be faster through the decsion/Boyd cycle is going to be an advantage.

I like your questions because they get the old grey matter moving again.
I am 99% sure Wyly, Lind and Boyd would all say the same thing. You don’t have all the time in the world. No matter what advantage you have going for you, it will be fleeting. For example, soon or later someone is going to think of a way to detect a stealth bomber. A stealth bomber is not invisible, not even to radar (understanding its radar signature is the size of a humming bird) and somebody it going to figure out how to counter it. Any advantages you have you press because it is much better to have the enemy reacting to you vs you reacting to the enemy.

[slapout9]

I like your questions because they get the old grey matter moving again.
I am 99% sure Wyly, Lind and Boyd would all say the same thing. You don’t have all the time in the world. No matter what advantage you have going for you, it will be fleeting. For example, soon or later someone is going to think of a way to detect a stealth bomber. A stealth bomber is not invisible, not even to radar (understanding its radar signature is the size of a humming bird) and somebody it going to figure out how to counter it. Any advantages you have you press because it is much better to have the enemy reacting to you vs you reacting to the enemy.

It was a good question,but you gave a better answer,especially the highlighted part.

[William F. Owen]

"The purpose of Maneuver Warfare is to defeat the enemy by disrupting his ability to react,rather than by physical destruction of forces."

Now here is where I get confused on the time and concealment thing. If I do something that makes me invisible/concealed either by technology or some type of trick, I have all the time in the world! but yet I don't have to be faster than my enemy.

Exactly! - like an Ambush. It's preparation not speed. Speed is not linked to surprise, except when it means doing something the enemy is unprepared for. - Time, Space, and Nature, being the three qualifications of surprise.

So I don't understand why always trying to be faster through the decsion/Boyd cycle is going to be an advantage. Relative to the highlighted statement above, although time is important the main point (purpose) of MW seems to be to disrupt his ability to react not just simply be faster??

Correct. As Fuchs and I were discussing off line, an young Israeli Martial Artist guy I know looked at the OODA loop, and pointed out that the aim was never to be faster, but always to slow the other guy down. Competing for speed is actually meaningless.
If it was race, your first action is to trip the other guy.

[Fuchs]

It's a bit more complex.

Speed/quickness/rapidity has effects on many levels. A small advantage may have great effect on the ability of the enemy to shoot back (the famous first shot kill of MBT combat), while the same small advantage would be useless on another level (few seconds are meaningless in brigade staffs).

Overall, I'd say that the speed difference counts, and it has diminishing returns (adding xy speed advantage provides a lesser benefit than the previous xy speed advantage).

[slapout9]

Yes Time is an interesting quality. If I was going to arrest Bruce Lee the one thing I would be sure of is that he would be faster than me. So I would switch my main effort and pull my gun and shoot the fugger.

Figuring out that you need to switch and what to switch to and being quick about it seems to be where time is the factor, but it doesn't necessarily mean faster but in in a sense having more accurate judgment of what is going on IMO.

[slapout9]

If it was race, your first action is to trip the other guy.

Yes, that is Strategery as Bush the second would say... Strategy is a lot like criminal behavior(break the rules!) to me anyway.

[William F. Owen]

Strategy is a lot like criminal behavior(break the rules!) to me anyway.

Well yes. Criminals use strategy. Usually not well, but they do.