William S. Lind :collection (merged thread)

[Infanteer]

If you read the discussion between Guderian and Von Kliest about the crossing of the Meuse River, the allocation of the Main Effort is made without any references to units at all. They are actually worried about avoiding to have to do two river crossings, instead of one, and where the boundaries of the French 2nd and 9th Armies are.

Main effort always intrigues me as Western armies adopted "Intent, Scheme of Maneuver, Main Effort and Endstate" as essential pieces of the Concept of Operations but never really attempted to qualify these things.

The best understanding I have of how to apply the main effort is an action/effect so as to amplify one's intent. In the absence of any direction on the field of battle, a commander simply considers his commander's intent for "what to do" and his main effort for "how to do it".

"The battalion's main effort will be the seizure of Hill 123, which will allow us to dominate the enemies lines of communication. B Company will be on the main effort."

Units can be mentioned, not "as" the main effort but "on" it. If something happens, the main effort can be shifted ("main effort is now on interdicting Hwy 7") or the who is on it can be ("B Coy hit an obstacle belt, A Coy made it through - A Coy is now on the main effort") - the key here indicating that all actions and fires with in the unit should be in support of A Coy now vice B Coy.

Anyone else understand it differently?

[William F. Owen]

This may help, from:
UK ADP Land OPs.

Main Effort
0618. While Main Effort is not a principle of Mission Command, it is an essential concept that balances unity of effort and freedom of action. The Main Effort is a concentration of forces or means by which a commander seeks to bring about a decision. It is a mental tool to provide a focus for that activity which a commander considers crucial to the success of his mission. Unity of effort is enhanced through the selection and maintenance of the aim and concentration of force. Both are supported by designating a Main Effort.

0619. A Main Effort is given substance in three inter-related areas. The first is in the manner in which a force on the main effort is supported. This might require grouping extra combat power to the main effort and the allocation of priority for combat support and combat service support. The second area relates to the tasks and purposes given to commanders who are not on the main effort but have to support it directly or indirectly. This might include the employment of echelon forces and reserves and the sequencing of shaping, decisive and sustaining operations. The third area is the practical integration of main and supporting efforts into a concept of operations. This might require the narrowing of boundaries to concentrate force, requiring economy of effort elsewhere.

0620. Giving substance to a main effort is directly related to achieving a decision in tactical action. The Main Effort should be expressed as a single action together with the principal force undertaking that activity. A Main Effort described as ‘the seizure of Objective GOLD by 4th Armoured Brigade’ is more useful than ‘the seizure of Objective GOLD’ because it informs the force as a whole as to who should be supported. A land tactical commander should have only one Main Effort within the concept of operations for a given battle or engagement. It is mandatory for subordinates elsewhere to support the Main Effort, in order to ensure its success and hence the fulfilment of the higher commander’s intent. Commanders of combat, combat support, combat service support and command support elements should assume that they are to support the main effort unless specifically ordered otherwise.

0621. In combat, shifting the Main Effort is the principal means available to a commander to respond to a changing situation. By the simple articulation of a switch of Main Effort, subordinates should change the focus of their support without further detailed orders. This requires a thorough understanding of the concept of the Main Effort and particularly the duty of subordinates to support it in practical ways. The Main Effort should be shifted once the commander can identify a more effective manner of achieving his mission. The mission and the broad concept of operations remains the same but shifting the Main Effoto exploit an unexpected opportunity.

[slapout9]

"The battalion's main effort will be the seizure of Hill 123, which will allow us to dominate the enemies lines of communication. B Company will be on the main effort."

By my understanding you would never say anything like that. It would go more like this. Company B will be the Main Effort in order to allow the Battalion to accomplish their mission of dominating Enemy LOC. Reference Hill 123.

This would allow to change the objective (location) should it become necessary because the point is not to seize the hill but to do something to the Enemy LOC.

If you have the book see Wyly's lecture on the Concept of the Objective.

[William F. Owen]

By my understanding you would never say anything like that. It would go more like this. Company B will be the Main Effort in order to allow the Battalion to accomplish their mission of dominating Enemy LOC. Reference Hill 123.

OK, so...

0620. Giving substance to a main effort is directly related to achieving a decision in tactical action. The Main Effort should be expressed as a single action together with the principal force undertaking that activity. A Main Effort described as ‘the seizure of Objective GOLD by 4th Armoured Brigade’ is more useful than ‘the seizure of Objective GOLD’ because it informs the force as a whole as to who should be supported. A land tactical commander should have only one Main Effort within the concept of operations for a given battle or engagement.

Does that help?

[slapout9]

Does that help?

Better,but list the action you are going to take against the enemy. 4th Armor Bdg. will block enemy force X from doing .......ref point hill 123. Point being fight the enemy not the ground. Sieze hill 123 sounds like I should stick my bayonet in it as opposed to sticking it in the enemy.

[William F. Owen]

Better,but list the action you are going to take against the enemy. 4th Armor Bdg. will block enemy force X from doing .......ref point hill 123. Point being fight the enemy not the ground. Sieze hill 123 sounds like I should stick my bayonet in it as opposed to sticking it in the enemy.

Sorry, but are describing the mission? The point is the ME is implicit to the mission.
If the aim is to capture Objective Gold, then destroying the enemy until he is unable to contest it, is also implicit to the mission.
A lot of mission verbs are very bad at this. My favourite being "delay," which is usually meaningless.

[slapout9]

Sorry, but are describing the mission? The point is the ME is implicit to the mission.
If the aim is to capture Objective Gold, then destroying the enemy until he is unable to contest it, is also implicit to the mission.
A lot of mission verbs are very bad at this. My favourite being "delay," which is usually meaningless.

That was part of Wyly's point, if you assign an objective it may be obsolete by the time you get there. Example if the enemy moved from hill 123 would you still seize it or find out where the enemy is so you can accomplish the mission. Your point is well taken about mission verbs.

[William F. Owen]

That was part of Wyly's point, if you assign an objective it may be obsolete by the time you get there. Example if the enemy moved from hill 123 would you still seize it or find out where the enemy is so you can accomplish the mission. Your point is well taken about mission verbs.

If Hill 123 dominated "Route Gerbil" , then yes you would. If the enemy refuses to hold terrain, then what purpose is he serving. Sooner or later, you will fix him and destroy him.

[slapout9]

If Hill 123 dominated "Route Gerbil" , then yes you would. If the enemy refuses to hold terrain, then what purpose is he serving. Sooner or later, you will fix him and destroy him.

That's the point orient on the enemy not the ground. And if you do find him on hill 123 eating lunch on route gerbil then kill him.

[William F. Owen]

That's the point orient on the enemy not the ground. And if you do find him on hill 123 eating lunch on route gerbil then kill him.

And this is where we get into the dissonance at the heart of MW. My mission maybe terrain defined to enable other operations. You may have to take Hill 123, to provide armoured freedom of action on Route Gerbil to enable 13 Armoured Brigade to isolate the enemy in Snoop-town.

This is where Boyd's orient on the enemy not the ground, becomes misleading. Guderian had to secure crossing points on the Meuse regardless of where the French Army where. 2 PARA were told "Capture Goose Green."

[slapout9]

This is where Boyd's orient on the enemy not the ground, becomes misleading. Guderian had to secure crossing points on the Meuse regardless of where the French Army where. 2 PARA were told "Capture Goose Green."

I don't think so, in fact that is exactly what MW is. Guderian had to secure crossing points, that's a mission, where(objectives) is left up to local commanders. The bridge he goes to secure may be blown up by the time he gets there, but that is no excuse for mission failure,he should go and find fording points or carry bridging equipment with him.

But why did you capture Goose Green? Because you want to deny it to the enemy. What you want to do to the enemy(mission) always comes first and generally remains constant. Where (the objective) is very changeable, more than one location to skin the cat.

[William F. Owen]

I don't think so, in fact that is exactly what MW is. Guderian had to secure crossing points, that's a mission, where(objectives) is left up to local commanders. The bridge he goes to secure may be blown up by the time he gets there, but that is no excuse for mission failure,he should go and find fording points or carry bridging equipment with him.

Your missing the point. You need to take and hold terrain. You cannot always be chasing the enemy. "Capture the Airfield at X"

But why did you capture Goose Green? Because you want to deny it to the enemy. What you want to do to the enemy(mission) always comes first and generally remains constant. Where (the objective) is very changeable, more than one location to skin the cat.

Entirely symbolic. It was seen as a political necessity to capture somewhere. - and it was the only land bridge between the two major islands in the East Falklands.

[slapout9]

Your missing the point. You need to take and hold terrain. You cannot always be chasing the enemy. "Capture the Airfield at X"


Entirely symbolic. It was seen as a political necessity to capture somewhere. - and it was the only land bridge between the two major islands in the East Falklands.

1-if you kill the enemy(starting to sound like you) you want have to chase them and you want have to hold any terrain because you will have it all.

2-the only land bridge....... so your Mission is to deny that(land bridge) to the enemy in order to do, etc.

[William F. Owen]

1-if you kill the enemy(starting to sound like you) you want have to chase them and you want have to hold any terrain because you will have it all.

....but you do not know where the enemy are! - and you still have take and hold objectives. If you find em, kill em, but your mission comes first and that may be grab Hill XYZ.

[slapout9]

Your missing the point. You need to take and hold terrain. You cannot always be chasing the enemy. "Capture the Airfield at X"


Entirely symbolic. It was seen as a political necessity to capture somewhere. - and it was the only land bridge between the two major islands in the East Falklands.

....but you do not know where the enemy are! - and you still have take and hold objectives. If you find em, kill em, but your mission comes first and that may be grab Hill XYZ.

Go and find them. That is why we are in the mess we are in. We are being out Maneuvered because the enemy want play by our rules so they can go anywhere . Until we figure out how to get the population to tell us where the enemy is we can hold ground all we want but we will not win.

[Ken White]

both correct and whether the enemy, the terrain or a mission not really including terrain or enemy('destroy the Bridge at MV 123456,' or like this LINK) should be the focus is really determined by the type of warfare in which one's engaged. This:

Until we figure out how to get the population to tell us where the enemy is we can hold ground all we want but we will not win.

makes / made sense in Iraq or Afghanistan, it would've made less sense in Viet Nam and still less in Korea or WW II.

'Establish a blocking position from CY 235679 to CY 281723' and 'On order, TF 3-64 AR conducts a delaying action from RL 351717 to RL 407664...' are typical MCO missions and such broad mission orders must be employed when the disposition and strength of the enemy is uncertain -- a condition that happens quite often. Remember that in MCO, the population tends to displace to avoid being caught between the elephant herds trampling the undergrowth. 'Conduct a parachute operation to seize and hold the Airfield at JD 4604' -- which may or may not be occupied by the evil enema -- is another...

[Polarbear1605]

I hate to jump in here (well…not really) because I believe this is the only way to learn MW (with rigorous debate) …not that I am any kind of expert; I just got to see this whole thing work ONCE. Yes, MW says you should focus on the enemy, but it does not say you should ignore the terrain. I have never heard any MW guy state a commander should not go through his normal METT (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Time) analysis. The focus on the enemy part gets back to the old Sun Tzu principle (know your enemy). I think we can agree that knowing where the enemy is part of that and if you don’t know where he is … you need to figure it out relatively quickly. We were always taught that if all else fails (if you can’t find the enemy) ATTACK because if you are going after something of value he will react and expose himself.
Also there is another technique to MW called commander’s intent and mission orders. Both only work together. Mission Orders supply the “WHAT” you want and not the HOW. I would say Take Goose Green as a mission order is unacceptable but to say “Take Goose Green” in order to … deny the enemy, or provide a friendly supply port, etc. is a lot closer to mission orders.

[Fuchs]

I would say Take Goose Green as a mission order is unacceptable but to say “Take Goose Green” in order to … deny the enemy, or provide a friendly supply port, etc. is a lot closer to mission orders.

Even better is if the officers know each other well enough or were together when the decision was done or communicated and it's not necessary to tell intent explicitly any more.
The intent should actually be clear long before such short-term missions were given - for example before the march order was given.

[slapout9]

For everyone worried about jumping in, feel free. Everything I write is my interetation of the book, so here is the Adult Warning Label.
I could be wrong! So feel free to ask,adjust,and give your 2 cents worth.

[slapout9]

both correct and whether the enemy, the terrain or a mission not really including terrain or enemy('destroy the Bridge at MV 123456,' or like this LINK) should be the focus is really determined by the type of warfare in which one's engaged. This:makes / made sense in Iraq or Afghanistan, it would've made less sense in Viet Nam and still less in Korea or WW II.

Yes, and there could be situations where the military is deployed where you do literally Orient on the Terrain and Attack it Haiti comes to mind. Also General Honore' has been on TV talking about the Gulf Oil Spill saying "We Have To Kill The Oil" he is treating the Oil like an enemy and we will have move our Objectives (locations) as the Oil does......so we can kill it