My gut says that many are being too sanguine regarding the US military escaping involvement in a post-OIF "blame game." I don't see it. I hear very little insistence upon specificity in fault finding in general and for the military in particular. For instance, Tom Ricks often writes of the failure of the generals during these past six years or so in a fashion that creates the vision of pervasive imbecility. I don't say that Tom intends this effect, but I don't see the balance. In a day when folks aren't reading, and they are forming their oppinion on what they're told by someone else, the role of pieces and approaches like that cited above will be much greater than just direct readership. Bottom line: the general public believes that the senior military folks are generally not good, and while there is always room to debate this, it misses the point.

The point seems to be that when an administration in the US decides to engage in a protacted conflict without engaging the national will, John Q. Public doesn't understand why the effort is necessary in the long run. When the administration fails to provide a plausible vision of success and a general plan to get there, the lack of durable domestic support is exacerbated.

So "what will play out in the public discourse?" is one question, and "what lessons will be learned?" is another, and "what subsequent action will be taken to improve capability and capacity?" is yet another.