BBC - Northern Ireland's Lessons for Iraq
Today's BBC - Northern Ireland's Lessons for Iraq by Mike Wooldbridge.
It is not decommissioning of arms that is the crucial issue but decommissioning of mindsets, Andrew Sens like to say, quoting what he calls a wise man involved in the Northern Ireland peace process...
I think the "troubles" in Northern Ireland offer the most lessons for those making policy decisions. As for military lessons, British intelligence operations that resulted in their infiltration of every major PIRA unit are worthy of further study. It is also worth noting that "negotiations" with the PIRA that resulted in the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 were begun in the mid-80s, demonstrating how long these things take to work-out. In the end, if the Brits can tolerate Gerry Adams or Martin McGuinnes in Parliament, maybe there is hope for the Shia, Sunni, and Kurds.
Last edited by Strickland; 01-25-2007 at 12:25 AM.
Uboat, was it you who wrote something a while ago about figuring out whether we were trying to (heavy paraphrasing here) win the counter-insurgency or defeat the insurgency? I know that's not quite it, but it was similar.
To go back to the Ireland and Iraq comparisons...We don't have 37 years, or at least the American public does not have that level of patience. The coalition is so culturally distinct from the Iraqi people that there are no comparisons there either.
I think the lower-level tactics, say in terms of RUC coordination with British regular forces, have gems to look at. In terms of the strategic and political level, I think the only points to be drawn from the N. Ireland situation must be applied by the Iraqi government and security apparatus.
Operation Banner: An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland
The military operations which started in Northern Ireland in 1969 will, without a doubt, be seen as one of the most important campaigns ever fought by the British Army and its fellow Services. That campaign is the longest to date; one of the very few waged on British soil; and one of the very few ever brought to a successful conclusion by the armed forces of a developed nation against an irregular force. This publication is a reflection on that campaign that seeks to capture its essence; it does not claim to be the definitive analysis....
......The immediate tactical lessons of Operation BANNER have already been exported elsewhere, with considerable success. Operations in the Balkans, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq have already demonstrated both the particular techniques and the levels of expertise learnt through hard experience, both on the streets and in the fields of Northern Ireland. This publication does not seek to capture those lessons. Instead, it considers the high-level general issues that might be applicable to any future counter insurgency or counter terrorist campaign which the British armed forces might have to undertake....
Last edited by Jedburgh; 02-17-2009 at 08:04 PM. Reason: Fixed link.
I don't have time to read the whole thing but it would appear that the assertion of this papper is that the insurgency was defeated by military action rather than the political process that ultimately robbed the insurgency of its popular support. News to me.
SFC W
It is usually better to read the entire document before rendering judgment on its content:Originally Posted by Uboat509
...It should be recognised that the Army did not ‘win’ in any recognisable way; rather it achieved its desired end-state, which allowed a political process to be established without unacceptable levels of intimidation. Security force operations suppressed the level of violence to a level which the population could live with, and with which the RUC and later the PSNI could cope. The violence was reduced to an extent which made it clear to the PIRA that they would not win through violence. This is a major achievement, and one with which the security forces from all three Services, with the Army in the lead, should be entirely satisfied....
As I stated I do not have time to read a 93 page document on a conflict I am not currently involved in which is why I said it APPEARS to be saying that. I skimmed what I could and everything that I saw was focused soley on the purely miltary aspects.
SFC W
The author of this report is a very good friend of mine, and it's about the best COIN study ever done by the UK.
However, there are simply too few, if any, similarities between NI and Iraq. The UK fired more rounds in 1 year in Basra than they fired in 30 years in Northern Ireland.
The real benefit of NI to other COIN environments was that the UK has developed a highly effective and professional approach to COIN that most other armies, (exception being the IDF) have lacked. When, at the height of the violence, PJHQ asked UK troops if they thought the ROE were too restrictive, the answer was generally no. Everyone understood what was professional, and what was not. - That is about the best lesson anyone can take away from the UK NI experience.
...and yes, I think we won. We convinced the IRA that whatever they did, the British Army would never leave.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Do you think that is what did it or do you think that once the Catholics felt included in the political process that the support for the Provos dried up?
SFC W
Definitely a factor, as concerns the moderate Catholic community, but the Republicans, in the shape of Sinn Fein, never gave up there support for the (P)IRA
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
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