Northern Ireland (merged thread)

[SWJED]

24 October Washington Times - Northern Ireland Holds Iraq Lessons by Rowan Scarborough.

Some of the Army's brightest minds gathered Oct. 16 in an auditorium in the Pentagon to hear a British general explain how Britain won in Northern Ireland after 37 years of fighting insurgents and how those lessons might be applied in Iraq...

The Army lecture featured Gen. C. Redmond Watt, Britain's top land forces commander who headed government troops in Northern Ireland when the Irish Republican Army announced disarmament last year. That 37-year campaign offered a textbook of lessons on how to defeat armed groups who use unconventional warfare to kill people, military and civilian alike.

Gen. Watt told the senior Army people, who included Gen. Peter Schoomaker, the chief of staff, that the British initially made mistakes by trying for quick tactical victories instead of embracing a long-range plan.

A person at the lecture noted that Gen. Watt said Iraq is 10 years away from a "sufficient outcome." It will take that long to bring along the Iraqi security forces, disarm militants and nurture the politicians needed to sustain a democratic society.

Gen. Watt was not invited especially because of Iraq. His appearance was part of a long-standing Kermit Roosevelt Lecture series to forge close British-American ties. But his talk did give Army officials insights into how to win in Iraq.

"Listening to a British general makes sense because the British, through a hard and long experience, discovered some of the ways to force armed groups to give up armed struggle," said Mr. Shultz, author of "Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat."

He added, "The British understood there were different factions in Northern Ireland. They helped some. They worked against others. You also need to be able to degrade insurgents. That's how others have done it. This includes the Israelis and the British. The key to success was intelligence. They developed a method for local intelligence that was able to put the IRA back on its heels. The chieftains can't breathe. They have to worry about their own security. The reason the IRA finally came to the table is because they just knew they weren't going to win the armed struggle."

Iraq is just as complex, if not more so. American commanders face different types of deadly enemies. An Army officer in Baghdad said in an interview that it is now impossible to say how large the enemy is. "It's gang warfare," the officer said.

[Wagram]

I have yet to meet a British serviceman claiming that the British army "won" in NI.

Most admit that PIRA was a very hefty opponent and that they struck almost at will in some area.

They generally speak about having reached "an acceptable level of violence" but after having lost 763 KIA in "the province", the only victory for the British army is that a political process has been followed, (the Belfast Agreement); it will eventually, in all probability, end with the Sinn Féin, the PIRA's political wing, reaching power in the near future.

I don't see any victory there. Containment for sure, but victory I think not.

[Mondor]

I guess it is a matter of definition. If victory, meaning the political objective, was to force the armed groups to give up armed struggle then the UK was victorious. If one defines victory as militarily crushing the enemy and forcing them to accept your solution then there was/is no victory in NI.

Once the troubles started and it became clear that a military/reaction only solution was not going to work the UK government(s) shifted gear and worked to end the political support for the Provos. It took some time but I think that there are lessons to be learned here. Once the UK shifted their mind set and addressed local grievances then the support for “active service operations” by the Provos dried up. (Massive oversimplification of this conflict thrown in at no charge!)

I think we should look at both the stated and unstated goals. In Iraq the stated goal is a viable democratic Iraqi state. However the administration’s primary focus of effort seems to be on achieving a military defeat of the enemy (insurgents, terrorists, rogue militias, terrorist state proxies, etc.). Perhaps a shift to something more than the current focus on a military solution provided by the US and a political solution provided by the Iraqis might be worth exploring.

[Uboat509]

It is dangerous to make comparisons between N. Ireland and Iraq. There are definite similarities to be sure but there are some important differences as well. The troubles were not about religion. The catholics and protestants did not hate each other because of their particular religious beliefs. For the purposes of the conflict "Catholic" and "Protestant" could be considered ethnic groups rather than religious sects. It wasn't/isn't about whether or not you believe in the saints or take communion it was/is about whether you grew up on the Falls road or the Shankill, whether or not you believe in a united free Ireland or a British Northern Ireland. I'm not saying that that is not present in Iraq but I believe that the differences in religious beliefs between Sunnis and Shia are still central the to fighting (with a healthy dose of good old fashioned racism toward the Kurds thrown in). Zarqawi (SP?) was said to have hated the Shia more than the coalition. The British had to address the political but could pretty much ignore the religious. That is not the case in Iraq where we must pay attention to both the religious and political. At least that is the way I see it.

SFC W

[Mondor]

I’ll agree that there is a danger in comparing different conflicts, but it is not a new danger to comparative studies. Having said that, I’ll have to disagree with your analysis on the role of religion in NI conflict. Religion played a primary role in cultural identification. Victimes/casualities were nearly always identified by their religious affiliation. People refer to areas as being not just republican or union, but protestant and catholic. To ignore the impact of religion in NI would be a grave mistake. The same as ignoring the impact of the sunni and shia tensions on Islam in general or the differences between shias amongst the twelvers, the ismaili, and the zaidiyyah. Either way, the compression between the two conflicts focusing on religion as being the primary cultural identification is valid.

Forgive me if I mix my tenses here, I still have a hard time using the past tense when referring to the NI conflict.

[Jedburgh]

From the Jan-Feb 07 issue of Military Review:

Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a "Long War": The British Experience in Northern Ireland

...The totality of the British intelligence experience in Northern Ireland, both its successes and challenges, is what makes it a valuable example from which to draw insight to shape contemporary COIN intelligence operations. Had the practices from earlier British conflicts transferred seamlessly and flawlessly into the fight against PIRA, the value of the Northern Ireland experience as a case study would likely be much more limited. Given the adaptability of insurgent groups and the specificity of local circumstances, effectively implementing COIN operations will almost always demand learning and adaptability on the part of military and intelligence organizations. These units must shape themselves appropriately for the fight, apply the right tools to collect and analyze intelligence, and use the intelligence effectively against the insurgency. The British experience provides lessons in all these areas....

[SWJED]

Today's BBC - Northern Ireland's Lessons for Iraq by Mike Wooldbridge.

It is not decommissioning of arms that is the crucial issue but decommissioning of mindsets, Andrew Sens like to say, quoting what he calls a wise man involved in the Northern Ireland peace process...

[Strickland]

I think the "troubles" in Northern Ireland offer the most lessons for those making policy decisions. As for military lessons, British intelligence operations that resulted in their infiltration of every major PIRA unit are worthy of further study. It is also worth noting that "negotiations" with the PIRA that resulted in the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 were begun in the mid-80s, demonstrating how long these things take to work-out. In the end, if the Brits can tolerate Gerry Adams or Martin McGuinnes in Parliament, maybe there is hope for the Shia, Sunni, and Kurds.

[jcustis]

Uboat, was it you who wrote something a while ago about figuring out whether we were trying to (heavy paraphrasing here) win the counter-insurgency or defeat the insurgency? I know that's not quite it, but it was similar.

To go back to the Ireland and Iraq comparisons...We don't have 37 years, or at least the American public does not have that level of patience. The coalition is so culturally distinct from the Iraqi people that there are no comparisons there either.

I think the lower-level tactics, say in terms of RUC coordination with British regular forces, have gems to look at. In terms of the strategic and political level, I think the only points to be drawn from the N. Ireland situation must be applied by the Iraqi government and security apparatus.

[Jedburgh]

Operation Banner: An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland

The military operations which started in Northern Ireland in 1969 will, without a doubt, be seen as one of the most important campaigns ever fought by the British Army and its fellow Services. That campaign is the longest to date; one of the very few waged on British soil; and one of the very few ever brought to a successful conclusion by the armed forces of a developed nation against an irregular force. This publication is a reflection on that campaign that seeks to capture its essence; it does not claim to be the definitive analysis....

......The immediate tactical lessons of Operation BANNER have already been exported elsewhere, with considerable success. Operations in the Balkans, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq have already demonstrated both the particular techniques and the levels of expertise learnt through hard experience, both on the streets and in the fields of Northern Ireland. This publication does not seek to capture those lessons. Instead, it considers the high-level general issues that might be applicable to any future counter insurgency or counter terrorist campaign which the British armed forces might have to undertake....

[Uboat509]

I don't have time to read the whole thing but it would appear that the assertion of this papper is that the insurgency was defeated by military action rather than the political process that ultimately robbed the insurgency of its popular support. News to me.

SFC W

[Jedburgh]

I don't have time to read the whole thing but it would appear that the assertion of this paper is that the insurgency was defeated by military action rather than the political process that ultimately robbed the insurgency of its popular support. News to me....

It is usually better to read the entire document before rendering judgment on its content:

...It should be recognised that the Army did not ‘win’ in any recognisable way; rather it achieved its desired end-state, which allowed a political process to be established without unacceptable levels of intimidation. Security force operations suppressed the level of violence to a level which the population could live with, and with which the RUC and later the PSNI could cope. The violence was reduced to an extent which made it clear to the PIRA that they would not win through violence. This is a major achievement, and one with which the security forces from all three Services, with the Army in the lead, should be entirely satisfied....

[William F. Owen]

Operation Banner: An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland

The author of this report is a very good friend of mine, and it's about the best COIN study ever done by the UK.

However, there are simply too few, if any, similarities between NI and Iraq. The UK fired more rounds in 1 year in Basra than they fired in 30 years in Northern Ireland.

The real benefit of NI to other COIN environments was that the UK has developed a highly effective and professional approach to COIN that most other armies, (exception being the IDF) have lacked. When, at the height of the violence, PJHQ asked UK troops if they thought the ROE were too restrictive, the answer was generally no. Everyone understood what was professional, and what was not. - That is about the best lesson anyone can take away from the UK NI experience.

...and yes, I think we won. We convinced the IRA that whatever they did, the British Army would never leave.

[Uboat509]

...and yes, I think we won. We convinced the IRA that whatever they did, the British Army would never leave.

Do you think that is what did it or do you think that once the Catholics felt included in the political process that the support for the Provos dried up?

SFC W