Northern Ireland (merged thread)

[Mondor]

I guess it is a matter of definition. If victory, meaning the political objective, was to force the armed groups to give up armed struggle then the UK was victorious. If one defines victory as militarily crushing the enemy and forcing them to accept your solution then there was/is no victory in NI.

Once the troubles started and it became clear that a military/reaction only solution was not going to work the UK government(s) shifted gear and worked to end the political support for the Provos. It took some time but I think that there are lessons to be learned here. Once the UK shifted their mind set and addressed local grievances then the support for “active service operations” by the Provos dried up. (Massive oversimplification of this conflict thrown in at no charge!)

I think we should look at both the stated and unstated goals. In Iraq the stated goal is a viable democratic Iraqi state. However the administration’s primary focus of effort seems to be on achieving a military defeat of the enemy (insurgents, terrorists, rogue militias, terrorist state proxies, etc.). Perhaps a shift to something more than the current focus on a military solution provided by the US and a political solution provided by the Iraqis might be worth exploring.

[Uboat509]

It is dangerous to make comparisons between N. Ireland and Iraq. There are definite similarities to be sure but there are some important differences as well. The troubles were not about religion. The catholics and protestants did not hate each other because of their particular religious beliefs. For the purposes of the conflict "Catholic" and "Protestant" could be considered ethnic groups rather than religious sects. It wasn't/isn't about whether or not you believe in the saints or take communion it was/is about whether you grew up on the Falls road or the Shankill, whether or not you believe in a united free Ireland or a British Northern Ireland. I'm not saying that that is not present in Iraq but I believe that the differences in religious beliefs between Sunnis and Shia are still central the to fighting (with a healthy dose of good old fashioned racism toward the Kurds thrown in). Zarqawi (SP?) was said to have hated the Shia more than the coalition. The British had to address the political but could pretty much ignore the religious. That is not the case in Iraq where we must pay attention to both the religious and political. At least that is the way I see it.

SFC W

[Mondor]

I’ll agree that there is a danger in comparing different conflicts, but it is not a new danger to comparative studies. Having said that, I’ll have to disagree with your analysis on the role of religion in NI conflict. Religion played a primary role in cultural identification. Victimes/casualities were nearly always identified by their religious affiliation. People refer to areas as being not just republican or union, but protestant and catholic. To ignore the impact of religion in NI would be a grave mistake. The same as ignoring the impact of the sunni and shia tensions on Islam in general or the differences between shias amongst the twelvers, the ismaili, and the zaidiyyah. Either way, the compression between the two conflicts focusing on religion as being the primary cultural identification is valid.

Forgive me if I mix my tenses here, I still have a hard time using the past tense when referring to the NI conflict.

[Jedburgh]

From the Jan-Feb 07 issue of Military Review:

Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a "Long War": The British Experience in Northern Ireland

...The totality of the British intelligence experience in Northern Ireland, both its successes and challenges, is what makes it a valuable example from which to draw insight to shape contemporary COIN intelligence operations. Had the practices from earlier British conflicts transferred seamlessly and flawlessly into the fight against PIRA, the value of the Northern Ireland experience as a case study would likely be much more limited. Given the adaptability of insurgent groups and the specificity of local circumstances, effectively implementing COIN operations will almost always demand learning and adaptability on the part of military and intelligence organizations. These units must shape themselves appropriately for the fight, apply the right tools to collect and analyze intelligence, and use the intelligence effectively against the insurgency. The British experience provides lessons in all these areas....