FCS in future conflicts

[Granite_State]

Kreker,

What's your make on this?

http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/p...ocumentID=4058



Posted today at DefenseTech.

I have to admit, even as an Armor guy I'm a skeptic of the FCS from what I have been briefed - how much armor are we looking at, and what kind of direct fire systems will be incorporated?

After Iraq, most of the FCS assumptions I was presented at CCC in 2001 seem to have been obliterated by reality in Iraq ....

Great post. That was my understanding of the FCS too, that sensors and data processing is supposed to mitigate the need for heavy armor. Don't see how that can possibly work in a low-tech LIC/IW/COIN environment. Seems to me like the RMA meets reality yet again.

T.X. Hammes had a great article on the central assumption of the RMA, eliminating the fog of war, being flawed, and he was writing in about 1998 I believe. I'll see if I can find it.

[Granite_State]

Two simple examples, Somalia and Iraq, will suffice to show that an enemy can defeat at least one grid – in these cases our sensor grids -- and force us to fight from a position of information INFERIORITY.

The Somalis defeated our sensor grid by blending in with the civil population in Mogadishu. Our systems could not see inside the buildings nor tell the “good” guys from the “bad” guys when they were outside. All our sophisticated collection systems were unable to inform US commanders that the Somalis had developed an aggressive, well-developed defensive system to counter our raid tactics. We did not even know they had brought massive numbers of rocket-propelled grenades back into the city. As a result of the failure of our sensor grid, our commanders were completely surprised by the vigorous and rapid reaction to our early October raid. The result was 19 American dead and our withdrawal from Somalia.

Clearly the Somalis had Information Superiority. They knew what tactics we would employ; exactly where our forces were stationed; what routes we would use to reinforce the Rangers; how we would react to a helicopter shot down. They even knew the importance of immediate international media coverage of the event. They had a plan to get members of the media to the scene, get them to record it and get those pictures on the air.

Contrast the decisive Somalia action to the hesitant UN/US action and ask yourself which side had a superior understanding of the tactical and operational picture.

A second example where sophisticated sensors have not given us an advantage is the current crisis in Iraq. For all our tremendous capabilities, we do not know where Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are. We do not know how he will respond to air attacks. We do not know how the Arab masses will react to a sustained campaign. We don’t have his command and control system precisely located. The list of what we don’t know is longer than the list of what we do know. This is against an enemy we have focused on for over 7 years! Clearly, the fundamental uncertainty in war has not changed.

In the Iraq case, all three sensor girds failed. Our sensor grid failed to provide a perfect view of the battlefield. Our command and control grid has failed to provide a clear, coherent course of action and remains tied up in both internal and international debates about what that course of action should be. Finally, even if we had a course of action, our engagement grid might not be able to execute it. Our precision weapons are useless against targets we cannot locate. Even if the target is located, the precision weapons may not be useable due to political or humanitarian restraints. Saddam is an expert at placing military targets inside installations such as hospitals, mosques, etc. All three grids essential to Network-Centric warfare have been defeated by a not particularly well run Third World nation. The real world has shown that Network-Centric Warfare cannot guarantee and advantage.

http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/hammes_netwar.htm

[Cavguy]

Great post. That was my understanding of the FCS too, that sensors and data processing is supposed to mitigate the need for heavy armor. Don't see how that can possibly work in a low-tech LIC/IW/COIN environment. Seems to me like the RMA meets reality yet again.

T.X. Hammes had a great article on the central assumption of the RMA, eliminating the fog of war, being flawed, and he was writing in about 1998 I believe. I'll see if I can find it.

After having watched us in Iraq struggle to find IED's with technological means, and utilized some of the most advanced methods out there - we're still not finding/defeating all the IED's (remember, it only takes one) with thermals, robots, mine flails, ECM Jammers, infrared, and even more futuristic clearing devices I can't discuss here.

Kreker, am I to believe that FCS has somehow developed some super secret new tech that can find the IED's with its next-gen tech and protect my guys despite low armor? If they did exist, I am sure they would have been fielded already (I can see the next "60 Minutes": Army has had IED defeat technologies it wont field until FCS, soldiers continue to die awaiting gear)

Don't get me wrong, I'm not against technologyor the new systems. I think having a common platform will do wonders for logistics and maintenance. I just feel the system's capabilities are being far oversold, especially since no one has seen an actual FCS prototype yet. Several FCS tech spin-offs recently have improved other systems But the "network will detect and ID everything" ad for FCS doesn't match the reality I have experienced, and it frankly worries me.

It's not about identifying the enemy CRP and AGMB anymore ... It's Id'ing the insurgent who now has learned how to evade detection in urban terrain by UAV's (the smart ones know exactly how to avoid technical detection) and target weak points in our systems. And placing precision and devistating fire at engagements of as little as 5 meters or less with armored vehicles. No defeat mechanisim I have seen advertised can react to an RPG fired 10m away - which is very common in Iraq. If we're banking on NLOS missile systems - I haven't seen a ranged missile system yet that can be used at less than 75m arming distance .... RPG-22 Tandem warheads are even showing up in Iraq. So if we go light on the armor and expect the tech to protect us ....

[Ken White]

It is a needed capability but is also, unfortunately, a typical US response to a problem -- substitute technology for training and throw money at it.

While the capability has many uses and is important, it cannot be allowed to get center stage and be seen as the ultimate answer. In any war, people will provide that answer and we need to realize that the excessive centralizing effect of the current approach to network centric warfare is inimical to flexibility and innovative thinking -- technology will impose severe limits on tactical and even operational flexibility if not contained.

I agree with Hammes' premise but the quote illustrates a couple of minor and perhaps unintentional omissions on his part. The failure in Somalia was not of sensor capability. It was in very small part a failure of intelligence -- specifically a failure on the part of the intel folks to just listen to people on the ground who were trying to tell them facts and placing more reliance on technology than people. The largest failure was in the tactics and techniques. As he says, the Somalis what we would do and knew how we would react to events. One of the most damning critiques of US military performance I've ever read was a quote from a Somali Militia 'Colonel' who said "We knew what the Americans would do. They had done the same things six times. In war no one should ever do the same thing twice." That is just flat embarrassing...

He also missed the point that Iraq was also an intelligence failure of some magnitude. The lack of Humint created the gaps that he cites. Sensors and technology are great but they cannot do everything so his central premise is correct but he did not suggest a corrective for the problem he identified.

Nor did he address the political and perhaps psychological factors. A broader failure in Somalia was the Clinton order to get Aideed and Adm (Ret) Jonathan Howe's ineptitude and intransigence. The subsequent pullout was a terrible decision and arguably, along with Carter and Reagan failures to confront Islamist probes and a few other backdowns put us where we are today. The political aspects of the failures in Iraq are more nuanced and diverse and are, IMO, definitely not restricted to the civilian leadership.

The possible psychological factor is that too many in the Armed Forces have become entirely too risk averse -- that is a current US societal trait and the Armed Forces are a reflection of society but whatever the source, it needs to be fixed...

In any event I agree now with his premise -- particularly that JV 2010 was and is dangerous -- as I did when I first read that article nine years ago when I was still a Proceedings subscriber. I disagree that the failure of the sensors, etc. were a significant part of the problem in either case he cites . Rather, over reliance on them became a problem in both cases -- that is a doctrinal and training, not a technological failure. He does sort of allude to that.

However, I thought then and still think he needed to offer a prescriptions for improvement. As the old saw says, "Any idiot can find a problem, the genius provides a solution..." Old Boss of mine told me never to mention a problem without having a recommendation to fix it in hand...

The prescriptions are simple:

The political calculus needs to be refined and finished before commitment. Do not over rely on technology. Do not over centralize C2. Train people well. Let them do their jobs and trust them to do that.

[Kreker]

Kreker, am I to believe that FCS has somehow developed some super secret new tech that can find the IED's with its next-gen tech and protect my guys despite low armor? If they did exist, I am sure they would have been fielded already (I can see the next "60 Minutes": Army has had IED defeat technologies it wont field until FCS, soldiers continue to die awaiting gear) ....

Cavguy,
Have been on vacation so there's been a lapse on my part. Very good posts by you, Granite State, and Ken. Technology is the driver for FCS. As mentioned in the article FCS's future rests in adhering to technology maturity. In some cases, the FCS contractors have made decent gains and in some cases they are behind their goals. Thus the write-ups from GAO, CBO, etc.

As to the question of IEDs, the FCS team is working with JIEDO, as are others, in trying to find solutions. To my knowledge the technology is not there yet. If one is to believe what FCS is to bring to the fight, then here's one scenario: UAVs perch on high urban terrain to monitor key facilities and routes. UAVs and UGVs both monitor subterranean entrances and exits. THey "see" and "sense" through structures, inside subterranean complexes, and through urban clutter including electronic interference and battlefield rubble to detect personnel and equipment. Sensor packages discriminate between COBs and combatants, detecting weapons, explosives, and other threats.

Bottom line is technolgy will drive FCS's success. Many are skeptical. I admit that in some cases I have my doubts as well. HR McMaster wrote a good article about the future of transformation and about dominate knowledge in future wars.
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/...ons/S03-03.pdf


Regards.

[Rob Thornton]

Bottom line is technolgy will drive FCS's success. Many are skeptical. I admit that in some cases I have my doubts as well. HR McMaster wrote a good article about the future of transformation and about dominate knowledge in future wars.

Kreker,
I know many of the technologies are coming across OK. I've been to a quite a few of the demos, wrote quite a few trip reports., and done quite a bit of thinking on it - I was one of the robotics guys for the Experimental Element (and also an OPs Officer in MCG1 at the CAB and FBCT level for the experiments) - granted I left the program in 06 to serve on a TT, but I know the obstacles well. However, I think all must be wary when claims are made when inextricably linking technology and success without qualifying the critical role people play in fighting wars.

I will agree that FCS will provide us with some good technology we can apply to our tactics. However, it does not provide a failsafe solution against a thinking, adaptive, and energetic enemy - adaptive, agile, innovative soldiers are the best thing to counter the enemy. Ground combat will forever remain a dirty, cut-throat and personal business as long as people are involved - technology can provide some advantages, but it does not neutralize it. While NLOS and BLOS, the gamut of FCS UMS (UAS,UGS, UGS, etc.) offer lots more data, and some options at points in the fight, its people who will make use, or fail to make use of what they see and how they comprehend its relevance to the fight.

Good tech I think is that which enables people to do their jobs better without compromising the required fundamentals. It does not seek efficiency at the expense of effectiveness.

As mentioned before, I think COL Schaill's BCT down in Bliss will inject the realism of today's challenges the program was unable to attain previously.

Best Rob

[Kreker]

Kreker,
I know many of the technologies are coming across OK. I've been to a quite a few of the demos, wrote quite a few trip reports., and done quite a bit of thinking on it - I was one of the robotics guys for the Experimental Element (and also an OPs Officer in MCG1 at the CAB and FBCT level for the experiments) - granted I left the program in 06 to serve on a TT, but I know the obstacles well. However, I think all must be wary when claims are made when inextricably linking technology and success without qualifying the critical role people play in fighting wars...
Good tech I think is that which enables people to do their jobs better without compromising the required fundamentals. It does not seek efficiency at the expense of effectiveness.

As mentioned before, I think COL Schaill's BCT down in Bliss will inject the realism of today's challenges the program was unable to attain previously.

Best Rob

Hi Rob,
Couldn't agree with you more! The Soldier will be the centerpiece of all the happens or fails to happen. Thus the 14+1+1, that's been at the forefront of all the FCS briefings (use to be 18+1+1 until the Army restructured the program in Jan 07), with the last "1" being the Soldier. I, too, was involved in the experiments conduct at the UMABL during 2004 (BSCPC).

I believe that the key tech for the Soldier will be his connectivity to and integration with the FCS network and FCS Battle Command. So we're in synch.

Regards.

[kit]

Good Day MountainRunner,
Good question. The FBCT ground Soldier (all Soldiers serving in close combat, maneuver support, and maneuver sustainment systems who fight outside there FCS vehicles) ensemble features the same software capabilities, networked communications, and embedded training as found on the vehicles. As a minimum, each Soldier system is able to integrate a Soldier radio that can communicate as well as interact with sensor fields, UAVs, UGVs, and networked fires. Leaders have additional capability. The Soldier radio enables the Soldier to transmit and receive digital messages, orders, reports, and graphics. The radio can send and receive digital, voice, text, video, pictures, operational graphics, and overlays. The Soldier will be interoperable with current (legacy) and future C2 systems, as well as Joint, Interagency, and Multinational C2 systems. Will have to wait and see about the latter. This may not have fully addressed your question. Again, PM FCS is incorporating lessons learned from the ME, so I would hope that a Soldier being on the ground interfacing with HN forces, civilians, refugees, and displaced civilians, will have the means to interoperate/support the mission requirement.

If he's so busy interfacing and communicating, when will he find the time to shoot back? Can we say, "sensory overload?"

[kit]

When I first heard of the FCS several years ago, my first thoughts were of Ike's warning about the military/industrial complex. Later, when I learned a little more about it, I came to the conclusion that FCS is an example of equipment driving organization and tactics, rather than the other way around.

For at least the forseeable future, our wars are likely to be small, less-intense, nation-building and insurgency operations. While such high-tech, whiz-bang gizmos as FCS have a role to play, they won't be able to provide the key element in the population security activities which are a necessary precursor to successful operations in that environment: Manpower, in sufficient quantities to control events on the ground, at street level, on a day to day basis. In other words, ground troops in large numbers. All the wonderful interfacing, interconnectivity, firepower and manueverability provided by the FCS will have little impact on patrolling neighborhoods and making the target population feel safe in their homes.

I'm afraid FCS is nothing more than the ultimate expression of the philosophy that "grunts" are obsolete and anachronistic. I'd submit that our experience in Iraq shows the fallacy of that idea.

[Kreker]

When I first heard of the FCS several years ago, my first thoughts were of Ike's warning about the military/industrial complex. Later, when I learned a little more about it, I came to the conclusion that FCS is an example of equipment driving organization and tactics, rather than the other way around.

For at least the forseeable future, our wars are likely to be small, less-intense, nation-building and insurgency operations. While such high-tech, whiz-bang gizmos as FCS have a role to play, they won't be able to provide the key element in the population security activities which are a necessary precursor to successful operations in that environment: Manpower, in sufficient quantities to control events on the ground, at street level, on a day to day basis. In other words, ground troops in large numbers. All the wonderful interfacing, interconnectivity, firepower and manueverability provided by the FCS will have little impact on patrolling neighborhoods and making the target population feel safe in their homes.

I'm afraid FCS is nothing more than the ultimate expression of the philosophy that "grunts" are obsolete and anachronistic. I'd submit that our experience in Iraq shows the fallacy of that idea.

Hi Kit,
Couldn't agee with you more, thus twice the number of boots on the ground in a FBCT than a HBCT.
Cheers.