FCS in future conflicts

[Kreker]

Kreker,
That's a great narrative, but how does it fit with the reality of interfacing with people on the ground in a time where even the HMMWV is seen as less useful than the classic open air jeep?

Good Day MountainRunner,
Good question. The FBCT ground Soldier (all Soldiers serving in close combat, maneuver support, and maneuver sustainment systems who fight outside there FCS vehicles) ensemble features the same software capabilities, networked communications, and embedded training as found on the vehicles. As a minimum, each Soldier system is able to integrate a Soldier radio that can communicate as well as interact with sensor fields, UAVs, UGVs, and networked fires. Leaders have additional capability. The Soldier radio enables the Soldier to transmit and receive digital messages, orders, reports, and graphics. The radio can send and receive digital, voice, text, video, pictures, operational graphics, and overlays. The Soldier will be interoperable with current (legacy) and future C2 systems, as well as Joint, Interagency, and Multinational C2 systems. Will have to wait and see about the latter. This may not have fully addressed your question. Again, PM FCS is incorporating lessons learned from the ME, so I would hope that a Soldier being on the ground interfacing with HN forces, civilians, refugees, and displaced civilians, will have the means to interoperate/support the mission requirement.

[TT]

Hi Kekar,

Thank you for addressing the issue of FCS (a recent report said that the Army has come up with a new name but so far has not released what this is).

A question I have is how resilient is the FCS? This question arises from its ‘system of systems’ concept. A general argument is that the more complicated an interdependent system, the more likely it is that something will not work or go wrong, and the greater the possibility of a resultant damaging cascade across the system. I know you said that ‘tactical FBCT formations are more survivable … than current tactical units in the COIN urban environments’. Nonetheless, a question has to be to what degree is it possible, or even likely, that the functional elimination or even reduced capability of parts of the system could lead to substantial system degradation or even system failure?

I am not purely thinking of the consequences of lethal combat, but also the possible (probable?) use of electronic counter measures by an opponent. The possibly of the FCS networked system being seriously degraded or even collapsing in the midst of combat is a terrible prospect.

Thanks!

[Kreker]

Hi Kekar,

Thank you for addressing the issue of FCS (a recent report said that the Army has come up with a new name but so far has not released what this is).

A question I have is how resilient is the FCS? This question arises from its ‘system of systems’ concept. A general argument is that the more complicated an interdependent system, the more likely it is that something will not work or go wrong, and the greater the possibility of a resultant damaging cascade across the system. I know you said that ‘tactical FBCT formations are more survivable … than current tactical units in the COIN urban environments’. Nonetheless, a question has to be to what degree is it possible, or even likely, that the functional elimination or even reduced capability of parts of the system could lead to substantial system degradation or even system failure?

I am not purely thinking of the consequences of lethal combat, but also the possible (probable?) use of electronic counter measures by an opponent. The possibly of the FCS networked system being seriously degraded or even collapsing in the midst of combat is a terrible prospect.

Thanks!

Hi TT,
The Army plans on releasing the new name at the AUSA National Convention in October.

On your second and third points, the Battle Command Network (BCN) is an interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for collecting, processing, displaying, disseminating, storing and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers and support personnel. That said, the BCN dependability results from the network’s redundant, multilayered architecture, reliability of network components, and the network’s capability to withstand attack. Not only is the network dependable and secure, but it is to be self-configuring, self-healing, and survivable. I’ve included a word document that provides a basic overview of the BCN.

Thanks.

[Anthony Hoh]

Kreker,
My problem with this kind of technology is that the "Army" wont find the time to train the analog methods. As an OC I have followed the SSG that could not do simple mounted land navigation due to his dependace on the BFT. This unnamed Soldier had taken this route twice before. We made multiple "route corrections" and by 3 oclock in the morning I was ready for him to hook his tow bar to my vechile and drag me around the "box" at his lesiure. Super cool guy technology is great. But it will fail me. Technology still has to be fielded by the right people. I feel as if the Army is trying to overcome the soft underbelly of the Nintendo generation with technology. When what Soldiers need is tougher realistic training with no batteries included. Are any of the technology experts talking about how much training time will be consumed by mastering these imporved digital systems? And will their be time for me to teach a SSG how to do terrain association on a map? I have seen the FCS video at the last AUSA convention. I admit its cool and it briefs well. I have seen some of the stuff upclose, as we have an RDECOM rep next door to me. However I feel lethality needs to take a backseat to personality in a COIN enviroment. Give me 1.2B and I would teach every Soldier in the Army basic Arabic now that would save lives.

[Kreker]

Hi Anthony,
You bring up very valid questions and concerns. I don't have the answers. I will say that the FCS program is the first procurement that includes training as one of its key perfomance parameters. Which means that training receives equal attention to the other KPPs (e.g., networked BC, survivability, networked lethality, sustainability/reliability). Embedded training is to be present on all FCS platforms. For the MGVs the crew will have access to databased TSPs, to conduct training on their platform in a LVC environment. There are also to be CCTT like trainers in the FBCT. The crew can use the TSPs or they can modify conditions within a TSP to adjust the difficulty during training or build a TSP to support a mission rehearsal.

That doesn't answer the mail on training in an analog environment, unless planned and resourced in the schoolhouses, units, and CTCs, which falls on the leadership to make it happen.

[TT]

Kreker,

Thank you for the explanation. If it all works as hoped, then resilience may not an issue. I for one tend to be a bit sceptical about claims made for immature future technologies, particularly when the tech package is as complicated and forward leaning as the FCS system is. But only time will tell.

TT

[Anthony Hoh]

Kreker,
Thanks for the prompt response. I understand some may consider the analog training as a obviously necessary componet. I just dont hear any "buzz" about it, so I worry an EM charge will render the Army of the future useless. I hope when the TSP's are developed "they" take the time to show several was to manage and in some cases work around or without our digital systems.

[Cavguy]

Kreker,

What's your make on this?

http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/p...ocumentID=4058

The program was initiated as an attempt to find the means for the Army to rapidly deploy overwhelming combat power in response to overseas crises. FCS vehicles were intended to weigh less and require less logistical support than current heavy weapons while retaining the same, or better, levels of lethality and survivability.

The Army’s goals for FCS networking architecture are: to augment connectivity inside Army units and with other services, to increase situational awareness and understanding on the battlefield and to further synchronize operations. The idea is that superior information will allow soldiers to hit their enemy first instead of relying on heavy armor to withstand a hit. Put another way, the concept assumes lighter armor is an acceptable trade off for more communications and computers because the network will routinely permit soldiers to find, identify and kill enemy anti-armor systems before they have a chance to attack. Based on the deployment of prototypical systems in Iraq since the beginning of the war there, analysts at CDI are unaware that this concept has achieved even rudimentary feasibility. Indeed, the devastating success of enemy IEDs and EFPs in Iraq has led to the deployment of heavier armor, not lighter, and an acknowledgement that the enemy rarely permits itself to be found and identified by sensor hardware.

Posted today at DefenseTech.

I have to admit, even as an Armor guy I'm a skeptic of the FCS from what I have been briefed - how much armor are we looking at, and what kind of direct fire systems will be incorporated?

After Iraq, most of the FCS assumptions I was presented at CCC in 2001 seem to have been obliterated by reality in Iraq ....

[kit]

Good Day MountainRunner,
Good question. The FBCT ground Soldier (all Soldiers serving in close combat, maneuver support, and maneuver sustainment systems who fight outside there FCS vehicles) ensemble features the same software capabilities, networked communications, and embedded training as found on the vehicles. As a minimum, each Soldier system is able to integrate a Soldier radio that can communicate as well as interact with sensor fields, UAVs, UGVs, and networked fires. Leaders have additional capability. The Soldier radio enables the Soldier to transmit and receive digital messages, orders, reports, and graphics. The radio can send and receive digital, voice, text, video, pictures, operational graphics, and overlays. The Soldier will be interoperable with current (legacy) and future C2 systems, as well as Joint, Interagency, and Multinational C2 systems. Will have to wait and see about the latter. This may not have fully addressed your question. Again, PM FCS is incorporating lessons learned from the ME, so I would hope that a Soldier being on the ground interfacing with HN forces, civilians, refugees, and displaced civilians, will have the means to interoperate/support the mission requirement.

If he's so busy interfacing and communicating, when will he find the time to shoot back? Can we say, "sensory overload?"

[kit]

When I first heard of the FCS several years ago, my first thoughts were of Ike's warning about the military/industrial complex. Later, when I learned a little more about it, I came to the conclusion that FCS is an example of equipment driving organization and tactics, rather than the other way around.

For at least the forseeable future, our wars are likely to be small, less-intense, nation-building and insurgency operations. While such high-tech, whiz-bang gizmos as FCS have a role to play, they won't be able to provide the key element in the population security activities which are a necessary precursor to successful operations in that environment: Manpower, in sufficient quantities to control events on the ground, at street level, on a day to day basis. In other words, ground troops in large numbers. All the wonderful interfacing, interconnectivity, firepower and manueverability provided by the FCS will have little impact on patrolling neighborhoods and making the target population feel safe in their homes.

I'm afraid FCS is nothing more than the ultimate expression of the philosophy that "grunts" are obsolete and anachronistic. I'd submit that our experience in Iraq shows the fallacy of that idea.

[Kreker]

When I first heard of the FCS several years ago, my first thoughts were of Ike's warning about the military/industrial complex. Later, when I learned a little more about it, I came to the conclusion that FCS is an example of equipment driving organization and tactics, rather than the other way around.

For at least the forseeable future, our wars are likely to be small, less-intense, nation-building and insurgency operations. While such high-tech, whiz-bang gizmos as FCS have a role to play, they won't be able to provide the key element in the population security activities which are a necessary precursor to successful operations in that environment: Manpower, in sufficient quantities to control events on the ground, at street level, on a day to day basis. In other words, ground troops in large numbers. All the wonderful interfacing, interconnectivity, firepower and manueverability provided by the FCS will have little impact on patrolling neighborhoods and making the target population feel safe in their homes.

I'm afraid FCS is nothing more than the ultimate expression of the philosophy that "grunts" are obsolete and anachronistic. I'd submit that our experience in Iraq shows the fallacy of that idea.

Hi Kit,
Couldn't agee with you more, thus twice the number of boots on the ground in a FBCT than a HBCT.
Cheers.