Organizing for COIN at the Company and Platoon Level

[goesh]

I would want alot of flexibility, that once these basic skills are attained and working well with some elements, select squads (crews) at the Bn level can be assigned to other sectors of the AO for mentoring/intruction, on-the-spot without running up and down the Command grid - i.e. Cpt of A Co requests Cpt of E Co to send over a crew of his best cultural men, as too many of his men are having trouble mingling with the locals- that sort of thing. If it's going to be from the ground up, the chain of command is going to have to be fractured to a certain extent (probably alot). As the lads on a crew I once ran told me, "we have the time if you have the balls"

[Tom Odom]

Happy to say that CALL Newsletter 08-05 Company-level Stability Operations, VOL 7 Organizing for COIN went up today. It included CPT Gwinn's article as well as imput from CPTs Kranc and Holzbach.


Best

Tom

[Rex Brynen]

An interesting study on unit discipline and behaviour towards the local population. I'm afraid I don't have access to the original, however, so this is a report on a report on a report

I must say, however, that it doesn't entirely square with what I've heard from many Palestinians, namely that older reservists are less likely to engage in brutality or humiliation than younger IDF conscripts. The study seems to have used Palestinian complaints as its indicator--which, given how very, very rarely Palestinians would bother complaining to the IDF, may be a rather suspect measure...

Study: Sloppy soldiers more violent against Palestinians - length of tour
not factor

Dr. Aaron Lerner Date: 22 March, 2008

Correspondent Chagai Huberman reports in the 18 March edition of Makor
Rishon that a study by the Behavioral Studies Department of the IDF of over
a thousand soldiers who served in the West Bank found no correlation between
the length of duty and the propensity for a complaint to be made against
them for violence against Palestinians.

The study did find a strong correlation between the sloppiness of units (for
example gear missing/not guarded properly) and their propensity to get
complaints about violence against Palestinians.

Dr. Aaron Lerner, Director IMRA (Independent Media Review & Analysis)
(Mail POB 982 Kfar Sava)
Tel 972-9-7604719/Fax 972-3-7255730
INTERNET ADDRESS: imra@netvision.net.il
Website: http://www.imra.org.il

[Cavguy]

An interesting study on unit discipline and behaviour towards the local population. I'm afraid I don't have access to the original, however, so this is a report on a report on a report

I must say, however, that it doesn't entirely square with what I've heard from many Palestinians, namely that older reservists are less likely to engage in brutality or humiliation than younger IDF conscripts. The study seems to have used Palestinian complaints as its indicator--which, given how very, very rarely Palestinians would bother complaining to the IDF, may be a rather suspect measure...

Yes, but I have no issue with the paper conclusion, that there is a direct link to unit discipline and abuse of civilians. In fact, there's a direct correlation between unit discipline (I'm not talking about spit shined buckles, but strong leadership enforcing important standards) and almost any unit's success or failure tactically. I'm sure the NCO's on this board would confirm that.

[Ken White]

Good units don't do dumb stuff. That simple. There will always be an occasional soul that wants to be abusive or stupid; if it isn't tolerated, his fellow Troops will stop him before it even becomes an NCO issue.

[Rex Brynen]

Good units don't do dumb stuff. That simple. There will always be an occasional soul that wants to be abusive or stupid; if it isn't tolerated, his fellow Troops will stop him before it even becomes an NCO issue.

This holds true, of course, when the unit command views abuse towards the local population as undesirable--as opposed to a situation where it is considered or accepted part of a general strategy of intimidation, and encouraged.

A friend of mine, who served as an IDF paratrooper in the late 1980s, once noted that in this sense there were very different ROEs in the West Bank and in Lebanon. In the former, there were both formal and informal constraints on brutal behaviour. In the latter (pre-withdrawal), a much higher level of intimidation was standard procedure, even among the elite and highly disciplined units (not everyone plays by FM 3-24 rules).

[Ron Humphrey]

units (not everyone plays by FM 3-24 rules).

Those who represent order to others cannot do so without being accountable to order themselves. Lead by example or don't lead. Anything else leads to temp fixes without long term benefits

Just my 1 1/2

[Ken White]

This holds true, of course, when the unit command views abuse towards the local population as undesirable--as opposed to a situation where it is considered or accepted part of a general strategy of intimidation, and encouraged.

However, I suppose it boils down to what one's definition of a 'good' unit is...

I'll acknowledge that a strategy of intimidation might alter that bit but my guess is that such change would not be significant.

A friend of mine, who served as an IDF paratrooper in the late 1980s, once noted that in this sense there were very different ROEs in the West Bank and in Lebanon. In the former, there were both formal and informal constraints on brutal behaviour. In the latter (pre-withdrawal), a much higher level of intimidation was standard procedure, even among the elite and highly disciplined units (not everyone plays by FM 3-24 rules).

Elite is generally a misnomer applied to combat units and carries no connotation of especial competence or quality. I've seen 'elite' units that were tactically incompetent and most of 'em tned to breed disciplinary problems. Based on what I've seen, highly disciplined and the Israeli Army are sort of incompatible -- that BTW is no insult, all citizen armies tend to be understandably a little lax, goes with the territory. The US Army was from 1941 through 1972 officially and, today, 36 years later is just coming out of that.

I agree with Ron, that's really the determinant.