Quote Originally Posted by MattC86 View Post
In regards to Steve and Tom, I wonder if the different geopolitical realities of now vs., say, 1975 may make a difference. My hope, I guess, is that since the Army (and the Marine Corps, but the Army in particular) can't just refocus on "the right war" that suits their doctrinal preference, they will continue to focus on small wars and COIN. I think that with the specter of future insurgencies, regime changes, and nation-building on the horizon, we can't just say "we don't do this kind of stuff," which was essentially what the Powell Doctrine was all about.

Matt
Good point. We don't have a Soviet Union to run back to, and China is hardly a conventional peer competitor in the next 20 years. COIN and IW will make up a large part of what we must contend with. Unless we go back to 1920's/30's isolationism .....

However, I would say that part of our troubles in Iraq stemmed from not following the Powell doctrine - that a) We didn't have a strategic plan b) we didn't send overwhelming force. Those two decisions are the primary reasons Iraq went into chaos - we never filled the order/security vacuum early, and nature abhors a vacuum. Add in all the root causes of insurgencies were present and Voila! Iraq 2003-2007. Even if we had had good COIN operational concepts, tactics, and education in 2003, it wouldn't have compensated for a lack of a workable strategy.