Whenever I read statements like that I always wonder about the writer's understanding of just how hard it is to do simple things in combat - call it friction if you want.Even though the Army has been fighting the shadowy insurgency for four years in Iraq, it has been slow to change its conventional approach: massing firepower on an enemy's formations.
The United States invaded Iraq with the world's most technologically advanced army and soon found itself losing to a nimble, adaptive enemy whose most effective weapons are the cell phone and Internet. The speed with which insurgents in Iraq adapt has confounded American military leaders. Army officers say they change tactics almost weekly because it takes insurgent cells just days to adjust to new techniques.
I'd argue that for the size of the U.S. Military, or for any organization our size we've done OK at changing. So what does it take to move from "OK" to "really good"?
Consider that change is not just "cause we want to" - our responsibilities as defined by roles and missions, strategic documents etc. are self imposed (at the strategic level) constraints. Those constraints drive a host of other constraints - budgets, programs, etc. To change those requires accepting risk at all levels that will justify the type of changes of scale and speed some have called for - but its still risk. If you are going to go before the political leadership and talk about them signing up for risk, then you better be prepared to explain why we should do it and how we are going to mitigate it.
The further you go up the food chain, the more miltary leadership has to converse (sometimes argue?) with political leadership. This is as true with regards to our own government as it is with foreign governments.
I'd also argue there is more opportunity to adapt at the tactical level, in fact that is usually where trends occur and then are communicated up, become codified and institutionalized. It could be that as "change that works" makes its way up, its risk is mitigated through promotion (could be an idea or person), dissemination into the mainstream (through CALL, OES/NCOES or others), or by the sheer value of its success. Adaptation at the operational and strategic levels occur over a broader period of time through the effort required to ovecome the physics resisting change. This might also be overcome by a dynamic figure at the top - but even that is prone to resistance from the intitution - ala "we'll just wait the bastard out".
So big change in big organizations is not easy. Its a damnable process given life by the fear of getting it too far wrong or by protection of rice bowls. The relevance and utility of change are not going to be as plain as the nose on your face to everybody at the same time -particularly if their perspective is radically different from yours or if the gap is large - does anybody really think that SEN X with no military experience fundamentally understands what SGT Y does in Ramadi - or vice-versa? You have to bridge that in a way that makes sense to everybody.
We can do somethings better with minimal organizational risk - like: promotion of leaders who have demonstrated ability in line with our professed values so that they become a broader and more influential agent of change; recognizing the need for at least a portion of our force to reflect current and immediate realities while still pursuing other capabilities we may require in the long term; and conversing more fully with political leadership to match ends, ways and means that result in an up to date assessment of how we see our strategic roles.
It makes you wonder if one of the key reasons it takes so long to win a COIN campaign is because it takes so long to institutionalize change in a manner that we are able to mobilize all the resources and organize at all levels in a manner that makes sense?
I've seen allot of indications over the past couple of months that the organization is adapting and willing to discuss reflecting capabilities that seem to make sense at the expense of some % other capabilities. Documents like NSPD-44, the weight given to SSTRO be on par with other military missions, the curicula at the AWC, the congressional emphasis on MRAP, the retired guest speakers themes we've seen here, the discussion by many inside D.C. even the latest presidiential candidate speeches would seem to indicate as a whole, we are starting to get it.
I just hope we get it right!
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