Adapt Or Die

[Nat Wilcox]

Thanks, Tom and John T.

I have used that analogy myself, trying to give the horse the choice between drinking or drowning. I had a young man in my office the other day and he was looking at the books after announcing he was there to see "the CALL stuff." He would pull something off the shelf and then put it back. Finally my NCO asked him if he was looking for something in particular, He said, "No. I don't put much stock in this written stuff. I just get out there and do..."

He left moments later and after confirming with my sergeant that I had heard what I thought I had heard, I told him, "That young man clearly prefers to learn by making mistakes, hopefully they won't get him or his soldiers killed."

Some horses just drown.

Why, I might just print this up to hand to certain grad students at appropriate moments (though it is a very sad thought). With or without appropriate attribution as you wish, of course.

[Tom Odom]

Thanks, Tom and John T.



Why, I might just print this up to hand to certain grad students at appropriate moments (though it is a very sad thought). With or without appropriate attribution as you wish, of course.

if it helps them learn, feel free, Nat

[John T. Fishel]

Nat and Tom--

Great line!!!!

I'll have to follow Nat's lead with my undergrad and grad students.

JohnT

[arty8]

For what it's worth, CALL made the difference between success and failure during my unit's pre deployment and mob train up and our first couple of weeks here in Iraq. I've been a fan of CALL almost since it's beginning and a single small book--"Security Force Handbook" was just the ticket. I ordered over 100 copies to be delivered to Ft. Dix, NJ, our MOB site. I told my troops that these books were written in blood and when soldiers from our first sergeant to our newest private came to my tent to get a copy I knew that my job was done. Upon arrival in Iraq, I knew exactly what questions to ask during our relief in place. I can only hope that the big army exapands CALL instead of closing it down during the next drawdown.

[Steve Blair]

This is one of the examples I like to use of the Army NOT repeating Vietnam-era institutional mistakes. During that war there was precious little information flowing from the combat zone back to training areas (except for some "search the village" courses and smaller things) until late in the war. This time around they're avoiding that mistake and making tons of good information available. Now if they'd just avoid the same sort of personnel mistakes we'd be that much more to the good.

[Rob Thornton]

While deployed I saw 3 different BCTs rotate through Mosul. What I noticed was that with each new unit, the flash to bang cycle on adaptation was shrotened. It seemed to go beyond CDR personality. The only rational reason I believe is the CTCs, CALL, veteran leadership and the rest of the loop which captures the lessons of the operational environment and feeds them into the training cycle. If ever there has been validation for this method and the resources which sustain it, I believe this would be it. It really got me thinking about how we change/adapt.

Its interesting also that some of the things we use to drive future requirements are being updated with operational experience. It is pretty dynamic. One of the big friction point seems to lie in programatic evaluation of relevancy and redirection. Another is the debate on organizational structure.

[MattC86]

This is one of the examples I like to use of the Army NOT repeating Vietnam-era institutional mistakes. During that war there was precious little information flowing from the combat zone back to training areas (except for some "search the village" courses and smaller things) until late in the war. This time around they're avoiding that mistake and making tons of good information available. Now if they'd just avoid the same sort of personnel mistakes we'd be that much more to the good.

Once the war is over, no matter the outcome, would you say it's safe to assume the Army won't ignore the COIN lessons learned so painfully like it did after Vietnam?

That FM 3-24 is the first doctrine for COIN since Vietnam is a real travesty. I hope and assume that since we won't be able to refocus on "the real war" like in the 1970s when we had Soviet tank divisions to contend with, we will properly institutionalize the COIN lessons of Iraq into a doctrine that serves not just as a stopgap for a current conflict, but one that takes a proper place within our theory and our training.

Finally, what are the personnel issues you're talking about? Individual personnel (i.e., leaders) or general personnel (deployment and rotation) policies?

Matt

[SWJED]

Matt,

Welcome to the Council - good first post and some topical questions posed. We encourage new members to also post an intro on the Tell Us About You #2... thread. Thanks, and again welcome to the SWC.

Dave

[Steve Blair]

Once the war is over, no matter the outcome, would you say it's safe to assume the Army won't ignore the COIN lessons learned so painfully like it did after Vietnam?

That FM 3-24 is the first doctrine for COIN since Vietnam is a real travesty. I hope and assume that since we won't be able to refocus on "the real war" like in the 1970s when we had Soviet tank divisions to contend with, we will properly institutionalize the COIN lessons of Iraq into a doctrine that serves not just as a stopgap for a current conflict, but one that takes a proper place within our theory and our training.

Finally, what are the personnel issues you're talking about? Individual personnel (i.e., leaders) or general personnel (deployment and rotation) policies?

Matt

Welcome, Matt!

With personnel I'm referring to the exodus of skilled combat leaders that took place after Vietnam, as well as the ticket-punching mentality among some in the officer corps during that conflict.

I would hope that the Army as an institution does not lose track of the COIN lessons that they're learning now, but like Tom I fear that they will "lose" them again. This has been a pattern going back to the Indian Wars.