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Thread: Adapt Or Die

  1. #41
    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Default Don't slam the Powell Doctrine yet ....

    Quote Originally Posted by MattC86 View Post
    In regards to Steve and Tom, I wonder if the different geopolitical realities of now vs., say, 1975 may make a difference. My hope, I guess, is that since the Army (and the Marine Corps, but the Army in particular) can't just refocus on "the right war" that suits their doctrinal preference, they will continue to focus on small wars and COIN. I think that with the specter of future insurgencies, regime changes, and nation-building on the horizon, we can't just say "we don't do this kind of stuff," which was essentially what the Powell Doctrine was all about.

    Matt
    Good point. We don't have a Soviet Union to run back to, and China is hardly a conventional peer competitor in the next 20 years. COIN and IW will make up a large part of what we must contend with. Unless we go back to 1920's/30's isolationism .....

    However, I would say that part of our troubles in Iraq stemmed from not following the Powell doctrine - that a) We didn't have a strategic plan b) we didn't send overwhelming force. Those two decisions are the primary reasons Iraq went into chaos - we never filled the order/security vacuum early, and nature abhors a vacuum. Add in all the root causes of insurgencies were present and Voila! Iraq 2003-2007. Even if we had had good COIN operational concepts, tactics, and education in 2003, it wouldn't have compensated for a lack of a workable strategy.

  2. #42
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    We recently went throuh a COA development excercise (UNCLASS) for a COCOM (not as part of COCOM JPG, but as a class assignment) based on some future events. The COA we adopted based on how it came out in the comparrison was heavy on UW.

    Frankly it was a bridge to far as we fleshed it out and realized the ammount of time and the types of resources required were possibly beyond our ability to generate or sustain, and that the guarentee of mission success was too low by comparrison.

    However, that has never stopped a COA from being adopted, particualrly if at the moment it appears to be the most most politically palatable given recent memories or what have you, and you can wish away some of the hard stuff because its hard to qualify or quantify in a .ppt deep COA.

    It did get me thinking though since there is much discussion about how the Operational Environment is changing, and what it requires to succeed in it. Are we (in general) starting to acknowledge the need for greater capacity in UW to address irregular and assymetric threats in an evolving OE? Do we need them to provide policy more flexible strategic alternatives? If we do, then how much of it do we need, to supplant large scale capabilities, traditional capabilities? How does our strategic culture "the American Way of War" play into our ability to adapt/change? How much of this should be limited to improving SOF capacity, and how much should become the purview of GP forces? How can we get "economies" in certain areas - ex. If a GP soldier has extensive knowledge of COIN and FID, can he pull some degree of double duty in UW tasks such as training an insurgency?

    What does this say about how we spend our $$$?

  3. #43
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default If, by capacity...

    Quote Originally Posted by Rob Thornton View Post
    . . .

    . . .

    It did get me thinking though since there is much discussion about how the Operational Environment is changing, and what it requires to succeed in it. Are we (in general) starting to acknowledge the need for greater capacity in UW to address irregular and assymetric threats in an evolving OE? Do we need them to provide policy more flexible strategic alternatives? If we do, then how much of it do we need, to supplant large scale capabilities, traditional capabilities? How does our strategic culture "the American Way of War" play into our ability to adapt/change? How much of this should be limited to improving SOF capacity, and how much should become the purview of GP forces? How can we get "economies" in certain areas - ex. If a GP soldier has extensive knowledge of COIN and FID, can he pull some degree of double duty in UW tasks such as training an insurgency?

    What does this say about how we spend our $$$?
    Hi, Rob

    you mean simply training and developing some sideline expertise, then given the post Cold War world, I'd say it's long overdue.

    The Weinberger Doctrine, co-opted by Powell was an overt effort to tailor Congressional and White House thinking to avoid this fact of life:
    "However, that has never stopped a COA from being adopted, particualrly if at the moment it appears to be the most most politically palatable given recent memories or what have you, and you can wish away some of the hard stuff because its hard to qualify or quantify in a .ppt deep COA."
    It worked as long as there were nice (or cautious) guys in the White House. Five such in a row from Ford to Clinton was an unusually long run for such types. However, it was never a very realistic idea and it was always destined to be -- and is -- as they say OBE...

    The probability is that there will be a lot of brush fires and we'll need to be able to tend to them along with being prepared fro medium notice mid-level and resonably decent notice major war. We have got to be full spectrum. The kids can cope with it. I wish I was more certain that some of the senior folks can do so...

    I think we need to help them shape policy with respect to capabilities, stop saying "Yessir, Yessir..." We 'can-do' ourselves to death.

    Our culture is not going to change, ergo we will have to -- that message came out of the late sixties and was duly ignored. Then along came DS/DS -- and as one guy I worked with at the time said "We are in trouble now; 100 casualties in 100 hours will be the new paradigm and we'll likely never see it again..."

    I also think SOF is about as big as the sustainment pool will support -- and I think it's big enough. They need badly to do a role and mission sort out. The GP forces are capable of doing much more than we have them do and that major error needs to be fixed.

    Heh. I think it says the same thing about spending our $$$ as we all know to be true -- we waste a lot...

  4. #44
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Ken,
    I also think SOF is about as big as the sustainment pool will support -- and I think it's big enough. They need badly to do a role and mission sort out. The GP forces are capable of doing much more than we have them do and that major error needs to be fixed.
    I guess that is what I'm thinking. I've seen the GPs do some incredible stuff. Things I might've considered the purview of SOF 5 or 10 years ago, I now see GP forces conducting. Part of its manning, equipping and training, but some of it happened because it just had to given the OE.

    So I'm thinking how does the experience we've gained over the last few years translate into the needs of tomorrow? Do we need for example new Joint doctrine that examines the relationship and integration of GP forces and SOF?

    you mean simply training and developing some sideline expertise, then given the post Cold War world, I'd say it's long overdue.
    I think that is probably the place to start - ask the question, "what would it take to succeed at a long term (5-10 years) major campaign where the CFSOCC was the supported CMD for the largest chunks in a place where the benefits do not fit the OEF model because the conditions are very different?"

    I guess we are also wrestling with this on a larger scale as JSOC has the lead in the GWOT - is the military in general organized, trained and equipped to be a supporting effort? Of course, if the answer is no, or maybe even not optimally, then maybe we should be asking why, what would it take, what is the Delta, and how long would it take?
    Regards, Rob

  5. #45
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Unhappy Devil, details and all that...

    Rob:

    Agree with you on the GP forces, the talent is there and our repeated failure to use that talent has bothered me for many years. The kids (E1-O5) are capable of doing so very much more than we allow them to do. My belief is that failure is due partly to mindset -- we still have a lot of WW II / draftee Army hangups I believe -- partly due to the fact that training money is hard to justify to the parochial communities and to Congress and partly due to the fact that the conversion to a centralized personnel system / human resources regimen led to too many efficiencies for the personnel 'managers' and none for the broader institution.

    I think there positively must be better coordination and relationships between the 'conventional' Army and SOF / SOCOM. both communities are at fault here and I have long believed that creation of the SF Officer branch was a very bad move (so was Aviation branch but that's another thread another day). The movement between a basic branch and SF kept folks in a total Army mindset; that has been lost. It also allowed senior people with SF experience to command or serve on the staff of conventional forces and enhanced cooperation between the two communities.

    "I think that is probably the place to start - ask the question, "what would it take to succeed at a long term (5-10 years) major campaign where the CFSOCC was the supported CMD for the largest chunks in a place where the benefits do not fit the OEF model because the conditions are very different?"
    Let me toss that back at you with a counter question. Do you think that this polarized US society with its sound bite attention span will accept long term campaigns of 5-10 years?

    Lastly, thoughts on " what would it take, what is the Delta, and how long would it take?" First; a comprehensive sort out of the world as we see it and of potential conflicts that might require our engagement (which must not lose sight of the absolute fact that we must be a total spectrum force). The QDR nominally does this but it is actually a bureaucratic shuffling of the deck chairs (I know a lot of people but in a lot of hard hours on it but it is still what it is and no more) so I'm talking a comprehensive review entailing (shudder!!) getting the HASC and SASC involved (God, I hated to write that... ).

    That should lead to a roles and missions adjustment which should concentrate on removing the branch and community parochialism (good luck with that... ) by DoD initially and then by the Army in it allotted share of those things. Then a plan must be developed to get us there.

    The Delta, I believe is a recognition of the sheer raw capability of units to do many diverse jobs and that the enablement of this power is simply training (and doctrine as a base).

    We're likely to look at a series of small operations where a far better trained and equipped SOF element will be required; one that can operate (and / or will be allowed to operate) without a massive support and backup structure. Yes, there will be risk -- but that's war in the fast lane, risk is endemic.

    There'll be other, somewhat larger operations where either light infantry (mostly) or Stryker / FCS folks are required with or without SOF accompaniment. There may be a few cases where Armor is also required in small quantities.

    Lastly, full scale war where all that plus a lot of Armor is needed. My gut feel is that the percentage ratio of SOF : Light : Medium : Heavy employment over the next 10-20 years will be on the order of 60 : 30 : 10 with full acknowledgment that the world situation can change rapidly due to unforeseen events. Still, I think a major restructure of the AC and RC are necessary with potentially a smaller more lethal AC and a larger RC. The allocation of GP maneuver combat Brigade sized elements should be about [ AC / RC] 20 / 8 Light + 8 / 0 Pcht; 8 / 4 Medium; 12 / 24 Heavy. My bet is we'll have adequate warning of a need for a lot of Heavy Brigades.

    Time is always an element but it shouldn't take more than two years to get a role and mission sort out and promulgate a long term plan; say another two to reorient doctrine and training and two to three to get that training embedded, get the equipment in place. So, say seven years plus a fudge factor due to the slowness of our overlarge bureaucracy, the operations that may intrude and the parochial food fights that will have to be quelled; say 10 years in total. Long in some senses, in others, not long at all -- takes far longer than that to develop and field major hardware.

    Just one old guys thoughts...

    Ken

  6. #46
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Let me toss that back at you with a counter question. Do you think that this polarized US society with its sound bite attention span will accept long term campaigns of 5-10 years?
    Well, a good question. I guess the things that come to mind is that you don't always know what you've stepped in until you've tracked it home. I suppose a serious terror event in the homeland could inflame public passion to the point where they called for retribution on a large scale. Or, it could start much differently. The more something costs in terms of treasure and time, and the longer it takes to succeed, the more the public will sour on it, and the more divided the house.....

    I also think there is a difference in terms of how concentrated or diffuse it may seem. If we had a great deal of people engaged over a long term, and over a large geographical area (global) it does not seem to have near the media appeal - without the guarantee of a graphic depiction, the media just doesn't cover it well, without media coverage, its not as much of a public or political issue.

    I could see the media covering the flash & awe of an "air piece" or something that sells, but they might not have the patience for long term UW on the front or back ends. It seems to easy for them to go find a natural disaster or celebrity with personal problems.

    I think that is the political appeal of a COA that was heavy UW and light on a conventional footprint. It concerns me when COAs are picked more for political economies then overall chance of success - however, that does not mean it won't happen.

    Well, those are the concerns, but they may describe a worst case vs. likely employment. I think the GPs picking up large scale FID requirements and the combat advisory mission are the more useful (in a broad sense) and would hopefully negate allot of the potential large scale campaigns by building HN security capacity on both a bi-lateral and regional scale. If a need did arise, the GP knowledge across the force by having done those two functions would be very handy in augmenting SOF UW capability in areas requiring less specialization, but SOF like capabilities just the same - just because we must surge capacity in a region or country doesn't negate the other important missions across the globe.

    Lastly, full scale war where all that plus a lot of Armor is needed. My gut feel is that the percentage ratio of SOF : Light : Medium : Heavy employment over the next 10-20 years will be on the order of 60 : 30 : 10 with full acknowledgment that the world situation can change rapidly due to unforeseen events. Still, I think a major restructure of the AC and RC are necessary with potentially a smaller more lethal AC and a larger RC. The allocation of GP maneuver combat Brigade sized elements should be about [ AC / RC] 20 / 8 Light + 8 / 0 Pcht; 8 / 4 Medium;
    12 / 24 Heavy
    . My bet is we'll have adequate warning of a need for a lot of Heavy Brigades.

    Time is always an element but it shouldn't take more than two years to get a role and mission sort out and promulgate a long term plan; say another two to reorient doctrine and training and two to three to get that training embedded, get the equipment in place. So, say seven years plus a fudge factor due to the slowness of our overlarge bureaucracy, the operations that may intrude and the parochial food fights that will have to be quelled; say 10 years in total. Long in some senses, in others, not long at all -- takes far longer than that to develop and field major hardware
    A ARNG buddy told me the ARNG has a big (and growing) appetite for the ME (Maneuver Enhancement) modular BDEs given their utility in support of enabling civil authority/HN/Nat Disaster type missions. This is probably a good thing. The 60/30/10 employment figure seems like a good place to start, but the distro would argue for a good deal more capacity on the SOF/SOF like end.

    Thanks for your thoughts, Rob
    Last edited by Rob Thornton; 08-11-2007 at 12:49 AM.

  7. #47
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Default A very concise description of our very broad problem

    we still have a lot of WW II / draftee Army hangups I believe -- partly due to the fact that training money is hard to justify to the parochial communities and to Congress and partly due to the fact that the conversion to a centralized personnel system / human resources regimen led to too many efficiencies for the personnel 'managers' and none for the broader institution.
    I have been trying to articulate that in my mind. This is why I think we have a hard time holding on to some of the best talent - we don't put round pegs in round holes (in more then one way) at this level - its just not efficient. This may be the thing that bothers me most and typifies why adaptation and change is so hard - we have made it so - maybe we even like it that way

  8. #48
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Good thoughts...

    Quote Originally Posted by Rob Thornton View Post
    Well, a good question. I guess the things that come to mind is that you don't always know what you've stepped in until you've tracked it home. I suppose a serious terror event in the homeland could inflame public passion to the point where they called for retribution on a large scale. Or, it could start much differently. The more something costs in terms of treasure and time, and the longer it takes to succeed, the more the public will sour on it, and the more divided the house.....

    I also think there is a difference in terms of how concentrated or diffuse it may seem. If we had a great deal of people engaged over a long term, and over a large geographical area (global) it does not seem to have near the media appeal - without the guarantee of a graphic depiction, the media just doesn't cover it well, without media coverage, its not as much of a public or political issue.

    I could see the media covering the flash & awe of an "air piece" or something that sells, but they might not have the patience for long term UW on the front or back ends. It seems to easy for them to go find a natural disaster or celebrity with personal problems.

    I think that is the political appeal of a COA that was heavy UW and light on a conventional footprint. It concerns me when COAs are picked more for political economies then overall chance of success - however, that does not mean it won't happen.

    Well, those are the concerns, but they may describe a worst case vs. likely employment. I think the GPs picking up large scale FID requirements and the combat advisory mission are the more useful (in a broad sense) and would hopefully negate allot of the potential large scale campaigns by building HN security capacity on both a bi-lateral and regional scale. If a need did arise, the GP knowledge across the force by having done those two functions would be very handy in augmenting SOF UW capability in areas requiring less specialization, but SOF like capabilities just the same - just because we must surge capacity in a region or country doesn't negate the other important missions across the globe.


    A ARNG buddy told me the ARNG has a big (and growing) appetite for the ME (Maneuver Enhancement) modular BDEs given their utility in support of enabling civil authority/HN/Nat Disaster type missions. This is probably a good thing. The 60/30/10 employment figure seems like a good place to start, but the distro would argue for a good deal more capacity on the SOF/SOF like end.

    Thanks for your thoughts, Rob
    Rob:

    Good comments.

    I agree with you on all the first part. I know some here do not like the 'one third rule' but I'm personally convinced that while it is indeed a broad generality, it's a good rule of thumb. The key, of course, is retaining the support of that middle third and my belief is that much of that support got lost in Iraq because of the very poor job done in 2003-2005. We're seeing a slight turn around on that as the situation there improves. The public is fickle and the majority don't have a clue militarily (except for one or two, most of the media don't even know how to spell .mil).

    The foul ups in Iraq were not the fault the guys who were there at Brigade and below (and even some above that level) and did the best they could with the hand they were dealt -- but it does point an accusing finger at most of the the senior leadership of the Army in the 1975-2005 period. A lot of folks tried to tell them that we needed to work on counterinsurgency and nation building and they blew it off.

    They had a minor and IMO flaky excuse from '75 until '91 if for no other reason than the evil budget battle and getting goodies in the POM -- but after 1991, there is no excuse for failure to adapt. I'll give Shinseki credit for starting but it was too little,too late (plus he blew it with the beret... )

    Still, we'll have to play any in the near future as they lie and my suspicion is that the middle third will support the effort as long as it is successful and DoD (and the Army) don't try to BS their way in public as we did in Viet Nam and Iraq initially. The PR effort by DA has been really bad and they've even screwed up the stupid Scott Thomas Beauchamp kerfuffle.

    Americans (except for the leftmost third, they say) generally don't care about body bags, they care about getting the job done and doing that quickly...

    Creighton Abrams was a great General. I met him, talked to him several times and I liked him but he started the whole "we do the nations big wars" mantra and he deliberately structured the RC so they would have to be called up for any major undertaking. Anyway, recall the support the callups for DS/DS received and those deployments were over a few months even if the war was not -- that short war didn't hurt in sustaining the support of that middle third. Good idea and it worked.

    However, as a result of the Army being forced against its will to call up three ArNG Bdes for DS/DS, the then and next couple of Chiefs of Staff deliberately undid the RC organization Abrams had designed in order to enable the AC to deploy without a callup.

    We can see how well that worked...

    We do need to figure out something better than the half and half situation that now exists.

    In addition to SF and Aviators being unbranched, there needs to be more free movement betwen the AC and the RC but that's a whole different thread. suffice to say they are capable with a little refresher trainup time as they have proven very well these last few years and the bulk of the Heavy stuff can easily be put in the Guard -- and the Reserve; one of the DS/DS fallouts on the RC was to come up with the USAR being only CS/CSS with no combat units. Dumb idea -- but the Guard loves it, of course.

    I didn't lay out any SOF strength because I think the current projected by 2009/10 strength is adequate. My personal belief is that SOCOM should retain a slightly bigger and better equipped JSOC and its heirs and assigns (and get long range airplanes with really short field cape) but that the SF Groups and the bulk of the CA/PsyOps units should revert to Army control and SF should concentrate on the ID/IW missions, period.

    Interesting times...

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    Council Member RTK's Avatar
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    Fostering people with similar capabilities will require tearing down the Army and rebuilding it, says retired Army Maj. Donald Vandergriff, a vocal proponent of changing the leadership development program to create adaptive officers better suited for irregular warfare. He says the Army retains an Industrial Age development system, which is highly centralized and hierarchical and overly reliant on scripted training exercises that inculcate neither creativity nor innovation. "Young lieutenants call it the 'followership' course. They're told where to go, what to do, where to sign in [and] constantly lectured," Vandergriff says.
    Going through old threads, I came across this. MAJ(R) Vandergriff is coming to Knox on Thursday and I'm a little sad he can't stay for an entire Armor BOLC III course. I doubt his line of thinking would be the same afterwards.
    Example is better than precept.

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    Council Member RTK's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by RTK View Post
    Going through old threads, I came across this. MAJ(R) Vandergriff is coming to Knox on Thursday and I'm a little sad he can't stay for an entire Armor BOLC III course. I doubt his line of thinking would be the same afterwards.
    Had a great seminar this morning. He told us from his observation that we're looking like we're doing things correctly. Great discussions. I admire his passion for trying to improve the system, though I may not agree with everything.
    Example is better than precept.

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    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by RTK View Post
    Had a great seminar this morning. He told us from his observation that we're looking like we're doing things correctly. Great discussions. I admire his passion for trying to improve the system, though I may not agree with everything.
    You ever read "Path to Victory?". Great, thought provoking read and history of the personnel system.

    Also highly recommend an ARMOR article he wrote in the late 90's about how 4 AD fought across Europe under MG Wood only on verbal FRAGOs, no written orders.
    "A Sherman can give you a very nice... edge."- Oddball, Kelly's Heroes
    Who is Cavguy?

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    Council Member ODB's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post

    Let me toss that back at you with a counter question. Do you think that this polarized US society with its sound bite attention span will accept long term campaigns of 5-10 years?
    I know a bit late on this one, just getting up to speed on this, but this stuck out in my mind. I ask how many people in the US society has the GWOT truely affected? As far as I know no one beyond the service members and their families. There has been no sacrifice by the American society as a whole. No rationing, no tax increases, no draft. When was the last time the media even talked about the war, besides how it relates to the "best" our country has to offer to be the POTUS? (I'll leave the politics out) Yet these are the same people (in society) whose voices seem to be heard the most, and have the most influence on our decision makers today.
    ODB

    Exchange with an Iraqi soldier during FID:

    Why did you not clear your corner?

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