Gents,

The discussion here about airpower's relevancy to the COIN fight is a good one, but I want to make sure we keep a couple of facts in mind (by the way, I understand the relatively new JP 1 tries to settle the COIN/IW debate once and for all by settling on IW).

1) There is a difference between airpower and the Air Force. Airpower is brought to bear regardless of the service providing the platform, and is a critical component of the current, joint interdependent fight. Airpower, writ large, covers a broad spectrum from airlift, ISR, air superiority, CAS, etc. The Air Force, on the other hand, is engaged in the current fight in many capacities other than airpower. The most heavily stressed MOS's at my fighter wing are most definitely NOT pilots. Our security forces, air traffic controllers, logisticians, medics, and civil engineers maintain a constant rotation to OIF/OEF. In fact, their units are never up to their full TO&E at home station because some portion is always deployed. The warriors in my wing are those who drive gun trucks from Kuwait to Victory, dig wells in HOA, provide a coherent battlefield picture to commanders, try to patch up maimed Americans at Balad, and patrol outside the wire at Kirkuk. Ignoring the contribution of these Airmen ignores the way the USAF has adapted to the current fight, all without the depth of manpower that the Army has as a result of their larger manpower pool.

2) The only reason we employ kinetic airpower in Iraq or Afghanistan is because a ground commander requested CAS, not because the USAF is fighting its own fight. Per joint doctrine, there should be a JTF in Iraq and one in Afghanistan in order to synchronize the actions of subordinate commanders in the AO. One does not exist, usually explained "because the fight is to distributed." The Combined Air Operations Center's (CAOC) role has essentially devolved to ensuring all the Joint Tactical Air Support Requests (JTARs) floating up from battalions across the AO are met. The CAOC is most definitely not employing kinetic airpower on its own, separate campaign outside of MNC-I or ISAF's fight. That there has been no consistent gnashing of teeth over the lack of CAS by ground commanders is a testament to the effectiveness of the CAOC in meeting these requests. The fact is, the 'surge' of airpower to Iraq is as a result of the 'surge' of JTARs due to the current offensive, not because USAF senior leadership is trying to win battles inside the beltway. Check out the following link for a more complete picture, [URL="http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aunews/archive/0215/Articles/ResponsetoIsAirForceCommandandControlOverlyCentral ized.html"]

To the hearts and minds vs. collateral damage points from LawVol, I completely agree. However, in my experience collateral damage (and fratracide) resulting from airpower carries with it a bigger stigma than collateral damage resulting from ground forces. I have not been able to find the statistics, but I would hazard a very educated guess that there have been more civilians killed as a result of stray M-4, SAW, Bradley, DPICMS et. al. fires than from errant bombs in Iraq and Afghanistan. The point is, and I think we both agree, that the so-called traditional American way of war that involves maneuver supported by fires may not be the solution in an IW conflict, regardless of where those fires come from. Every dead civilian as a result of coalition fires means a step closer to success for the insurgents. Unless we fundamentally change how we approach the fight and significantly limit our fires, regardless of the source, we will always have trouble winning hearts and minds. I for one, though, would find it hard to tell a company commander with troops in contact to maneuver without supporting fires as he was taking casualties.