A new Air Control policy?

[Stan]

Hi Stan/Tom. OK dry baby food in the desert..... Great way to loose weight....sounds like a Paris Hilton diet plan

Hey Slapout,
Actually, the 'air drop' was less than 3 clicks from the Nyiragongo Volcano (approx. 4 kilometers high). Tom and I lived less than 10 clicks from this bugger and she was always smokin'. Got to send you a jpeg.

There was a time we hoped she would just bust and save us a ton of trouble

The real diet however was cholera.

[carl]

Gentlemen,
As a serving USAF officer and graduate of the USMC SAW I am concerned that your posts misunderstand the service's corporate viewpoint on the relevancy of airpower to the COIN fight. Take a look at Frank Hoffman's link posted 6 Aug to MGen Peck's article, "Airpower’s Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare." MGen Peck provides statistics showing airlift moved over 1M personnel and 90K pallets of cargo using 50K airlift sorties last year in OIF/OEF. USAF strategic and tactical airlift sorties overwhelmingly outnumber air-to-ground strike missions in support of worldwide operations in OIF/OEF.

This brings to mind something I observed at a C.O.B. for the time I was there. It seemed that about 40% or more of the heavy airlifters serving the base were Russian aircraft, AN-12's and IL-76's, with east European crews. The 40% figure is a subjective guess, but for every C-17 that landed 1.5 IL-76's landed and there were rather more Antonovs than Hercs.

Could this reliance on former Soviet aircraft and pilots to supply what seems like a big part of our airlift be a problem in the the future? What if Vladimir decides he doesn't want these guys to do this and pressures them to stop?

This apparent shortage of airlift I don't blame on the USAF though. They keep asking for more C-17's and the Pentagon keeps saying no.

[Culpeper]

I hope I am off the mark, and I admit my comment was a bit sardonic. But it seems very curious that the AF has substantially increased their forces in country (if I remember reading the stories right) at a time when fast movers toting big bombs are probably less needed than ever.

True the AF isn't a politician looking for votes, but it is a bureaucracy looking for money,and "bureaucracy will do its thing." (that is a paraphrase from the title of a book.)

Uh, these guns on target are a lot easier for the ground troops dealing with a problem than having a platoon leader order one of his squads to deal with the problem. The fight doesn't have to be fair. I'm an advocate of CAS and the increase of USAF personnel taking on more and more of an on the ground approach to getting guns and bombs on target. The Air Force doesn't mind the Army calling in a strike from the ground but the Air Force would prefer an Air Force grunt such as a ROMAD or CCT doing this work. The USMC wrote the book on CAS and so if there is more USAF assets being used than you can bet the Marines are way ahead in this department. Now, in the old days you had an Air Force ALO, which was a fighter pilot on the ground, usually at battalion level and above, calling in strikes. You might recall in the movie, "Platoon", the scene during the final battle a NVA sapper running into the USAV TOC and blowing up the ALO (played by Oliver Stone) and his ROMAD. But that was the way they used to do it. Today, every level within the Army has Air Force personnel working much closer to the fighting trained not only in Air Force doctrine and tactics but Army doctrine and tactics as well. In fact, most of these Air Force guys are so deep into the Army that the minority find themselves stationed on USAF air bases and most have completely lost the work "9 to 5" Air Force mentality. I don't think anyone is stealing the show and I doubt you will find a single grunt complaining about an A-10 Thunderbolt using his guns and bombs to give a guy a break. We are either going to learn to master joint operation with sister services or we will go back to the days when the Air Force couldn't direct a Navy or Marine CAS strike because the Air Force don't understand the company language. One step forward. Two steps back. I have a little practical experience in this area. When I was in we got rid of Carter and Reagan broke the plate on the old ways. We had to start getting up before sunrise and run five miles, jump out of air planes, actually inspect, maintain, and operate our equipment, learn to shoot, go through Army infantry training. It was truly the beginning of joint special operation training. Only they forgot to tell us that. So, as you can see, my viewpoint is that anything that has to do with small wars today has special operations at its core. And that includes exclusive and deadly use of of air assets. I whole heartedly disagree that the use of air power is a sign of weakness or a Plan B. With today's precision guided weaponry air assets are here to stay. This is something that has been ongoing since the days of bombing during WWII when only 20% of a strategic bomb load got within a thousand yards of the intended target. CAS wasn't much better during that period as well. Baby, we have come a long way since then. For the average grunt, CAS is death on call.

[carl]

Culpeper:

This boils down to a question, I think, of how much is enough? Most of what the USAF can bring (AC-130s and A-10s excepted) may be too much for the situation as it stands. I just don't see the critical need for extra B-1s, F-16s, Tornados, and F-15Es.

Every squad leader would probably love to see a section of A-10s overhead at all times. But it would cost too much for the returns you would get. At any one time you only have so many resources available. Are those resources going to be better used on fast movers hauling big bombs or would they be better used on giving everybody serious Arabic language instruction or setting up a nationwide ID system like Bing West talks about?

There may also be a point of diminishing returns with airplanes. They need big bases with big runways and a lot of people to maintain the planes and the base. All those people have to be protected and supplied. All the convoys to supply them have to be protected as do the roads etc, etc, etc. If there weren't so many planes all the ground forces dedicated to protecting them and their bases could do something else.

I just don't trust the high ranking aviator generals not to run around like kids with a hammer looking to pound something.

[Culpeper]

Those are all good points. I might point out that the F16 and even F15 can perform CAS quite well and you can never have enough aircraft stacked up during the day waiting for a mission. Nevertheless, the presence of a large air force goes beyond the so-called "low intensity" conflict on the ground. It also adds to the show of force capability for the entire region. If a show of force is a diplomatic tool that can prevent a conflict elsewhere in the region than the cost-benefit has no limit.

[LawVol]

Of course, CAS is invaluable to the infantry and has an obvious role in COIN. However, bombs on target is typically a tactical answer to a strategic question when it comes to COIN. For all the precision technology we have, civilian casualties are inevitable. This, in turn, creates additional enemies and provides talking points for the insurgent IO campaign and the media. Employing our air assets with a focus on the desired end state (e.g. stability) would pay greater dividends IMO.

As for a show of force, I'm not sure we're actually getting a positive return on that. Our insurgent enemies do not seem to care about a show of force. They fight us despite our technological superiority and are doing quite well it would seem. As for our regional enemies, I would think that a huge show of force with a large Air Force presence would work the opposite way. Look at it throught their eyes. Here we have the world's most powerful country with the world's most effective and technologically superior air force and it cannot defeat insurgents with small arms using car jacks to launch rockets. Using overwhelming force to crush a gant only works if you actually crush the gnat. But this isn't that type of war. A new approach is needed that realizes that our tools for mission accomplishment aren't only lethal.

This type of fight requires something we Americans typically lack: patience. Sure the tendency is to want pay back. I feel this too on an initial level. But over-reliance on that mentality simply creates additional problems. By looking to non-lethal solutions perhaps we can fix the issue rather than simply defer it. I read a quote just today from Gen Patreaus who said that money is ammunition. He is absolutely right. By using money for reconstruction and other humanitarian type projects, we gain more ground than by simply resorting to the knee-jerk reaction of bombing. Either way we're spending money, but one way allows us to take the form of facilitators rather than occupiers plus we gain the moral high ground, something we should not underestimate given world opinion.

Okay, off my soapbox.

[Granite_State]

I've been reading stories about the increased use of airstrikes in Iraq and Afghanistan for at least a couple of years now, it seems to me that increased use of airpower is being adopted as a necessary expedient because of the ground force not being large enough in either theater. I think Tom made a comment to that effect in a thread a couple months ago.

Even with precision-guided munitions, there is plenty of collateral damage. I understand that CAS saves a lot of American lives, but it strikes me as being like the force protection argument, that in the big picture our obsession with casualty counts creates more enemies and leads to strategic failure. I also realize coalition forces are very careful with CAS, just saw something the other day on the Blackwater battle at the CPA compound in Najaf in 2004, when strike planes were repeatedly pulled back for fear of civilian casualties. But if most of the past practitioners of COIN are to be believed, airpower is one of the worst tools you can use, alongside artillery.

This always made sense to me:
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/six_easy_paragraphs.htm

[LawVol]

That is perhaps the best explanation I've read. I'd add a caveat to your statement, however. [I]Lethal[I] airpower is perhaps one of the worst tools. Although I have a few irons in the fire right now, I want to look into the British approach to insurgency particularly the Northern Ireland troubles. Slapout sent me a recently completed study the British Army did and it is facinating thus far.

I tend to lean more toward an LE approach to this war. Surely there are some negatives, but I think the positive outweighs.

[Jim Stratton]

Gents,

The discussion here about airpower's relevancy to the COIN fight is a good one, but I want to make sure we keep a couple of facts in mind (by the way, I understand the relatively new JP 1 tries to settle the COIN/IW debate once and for all by settling on IW).

1) There is a difference between airpower and the Air Force. Airpower is brought to bear regardless of the service providing the platform, and is a critical component of the current, joint interdependent fight. Airpower, writ large, covers a broad spectrum from airlift, ISR, air superiority, CAS, etc. The Air Force, on the other hand, is engaged in the current fight in many capacities other than airpower. The most heavily stressed MOS's at my fighter wing are most definitely NOT pilots. Our security forces, air traffic controllers, logisticians, medics, and civil engineers maintain a constant rotation to OIF/OEF. In fact, their units are never up to their full TO&E at home station because some portion is always deployed. The warriors in my wing are those who drive gun trucks from Kuwait to Victory, dig wells in HOA, provide a coherent battlefield picture to commanders, try to patch up maimed Americans at Balad, and patrol outside the wire at Kirkuk. Ignoring the contribution of these Airmen ignores the way the USAF has adapted to the current fight, all without the depth of manpower that the Army has as a result of their larger manpower pool.

2) The only reason we employ kinetic airpower in Iraq or Afghanistan is because a ground commander requested CAS, not because the USAF is fighting its own fight. Per joint doctrine, there should be a JTF in Iraq and one in Afghanistan in order to synchronize the actions of subordinate commanders in the AO. One does not exist, usually explained "because the fight is to distributed." The Combined Air Operations Center's (CAOC) role has essentially devolved to ensuring all the Joint Tactical Air Support Requests (JTARs) floating up from battalions across the AO are met. The CAOC is most definitely not employing kinetic airpower on its own, separate campaign outside of MNC-I or ISAF's fight. That there has been no consistent gnashing of teeth over the lack of CAS by ground commanders is a testament to the effectiveness of the CAOC in meeting these requests. The fact is, the 'surge' of airpower to Iraq is as a result of the 'surge' of JTARs due to the current offensive, not because USAF senior leadership is trying to win battles inside the beltway. Check out the following link for a more complete picture, [URL="http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aunews/archive/0215/Articles/ResponsetoIsAirForceCommandandControlOverlyCentral ized.html"]

To the hearts and minds vs. collateral damage points from LawVol, I completely agree. However, in my experience collateral damage (and fratracide) resulting from airpower carries with it a bigger stigma than collateral damage resulting from ground forces. I have not been able to find the statistics, but I would hazard a very educated guess that there have been more civilians killed as a result of stray M-4, SAW, Bradley, DPICMS et. al. fires than from errant bombs in Iraq and Afghanistan. The point is, and I think we both agree, that the so-called traditional American way of war that involves maneuver supported by fires may not be the solution in an IW conflict, regardless of where those fires come from. Every dead civilian as a result of coalition fires means a step closer to success for the insurgents. Unless we fundamentally change how we approach the fight and significantly limit our fires, regardless of the source, we will always have trouble winning hearts and minds. I for one, though, would find it hard to tell a company commander with troops in contact to maneuver without supporting fires as he was taking casualties.

[Cavguy]

As for a show of force, I'm not sure we're actually getting a positive return on that. Our insurgent enemies do not seem to care about a show of force.

Okay, I have to call you on this as out of your experience lane. The "show of force" is actually effective in tactical operations. Once the enemy knows airpower is overhead, and ready for use, he breaks contact. We even used a show of force to stop a AQIZ attack on a friendly Sunni tribe east of Ramadi in late '06. We didn't have good enough PID to bomb or forces in the area, so we opted for a show of force. As soon as the insurgents got buzzed, they began displacing. We followed them and rolled them up.

Many a ground commander, including myself, has used a show of force when dropping a bomb is impractical or we detect something suspicious with no troops nearby. If you've ever been buzzed by a jet in the middle of a fight, it's bone shaking.

Kind of like my avatar's quote about paint rounds, "It scares the hell out of people". (but doesn't make "pretty pictures")

[Tom Odom]

Kind of like my avatar's quote about paint rounds, "It scares the hell out of people". (but doesn't make "pretty pictures")

What's with all the negative waves, Moriarity?

[Cavguy]

The only reason we employ kinetic airpower in Iraq or Afghanistan is because a ground commander requested CAS, not because the USAF is fighting its own fight.

Exactly right. I would also add that it is not a decision taken willy-nilly, it takes A LOT of approval to drop a bomb. Obviously I can't get into specifics of what level currently approves, but I will say commanders themselves are the most hesitant to drop it. But when a unit is pinned down and taking casualties, a well placed PGM employed effectively is the best way to minimize casualties for us and for civilians. No one is dropping bombs as a first resort in Iraq, I assure you. And there's a lot of places we just won't drop no matter who's in contact.

I also can say a F-15E dropped JDAM ended a fight with insurgents that killed one and wounded two of my soldiers. The bomb imploded the house, and didn't touch the ones next to it, because of the delay. Prior to that, we had fired 3 Hellfires, tank rounds, and lots of small arms into the suburban area concrete reinforced structure the enemy was in. The JDAM used the trick. It's easy to sit here on the forum and criticize those dropping bombs - but if it was your soldiers chewed up and pinned down, you'd thank God for that CAS every day. I had the option of dropping the bomb on the structure before my soldier was killed trying to clear it, and didn't for collateral damage fears. Once he was killed and we took wounded getting him out, it just wasn't worth more casualties to do what a bomb could do for us.

[Cavguy]

What's with all the negative waves, Moriarity?

"To you, a hero is some sort of sandwich, not some nut who takes on three Tigers!"

I just love that movie. I am sure Ted Turner does too, hence it shows at least twice a month on TBS/TNT.

All tankers secretly want to be Oddball.

[Tom Odom]

It's easy to sit here on the forum and criticize those dropping bombs - but if it was your soldiers chewed up and pinned down, you'd thank God for that CAS every day.

Cav,

No one on this forum or this site makes light of casualties or the decisions regarding the use of aerial weapons. This forum is for discussion, however, from all sides.

I have written my own perspective on this for SWJ magazine. I still say there is no such thing as a collateral casualty in COIN. They are friendly or they are enemy and that means extremely selective targeting as you have alluded to. In his post Jim Stratton makes very close the same point regarding careful use of aerial weapons.

But at the same time, there are serious debates ongoing in OEF on this subject. It is not as I have said on other forums with LawVol and others discussing this an Air Force problem--it is an all service problem and ultimately it is a ground commander's decision as you state below.

Meanwhile AF leaders like MG Peck have used dismissive language in the recent past regarding consideration of collateral damage. The use of the term IW with COIN as a subcategory may clarify things; it may only add confusion because in the case of MG Peck's latest discussion he talks much about IW and little about COIN.

Finally I would also say there is a countervailing trend from certain Air Force and Naval Air senior leaders about the misuse of aerial platforms in non-lethal roles. Specifically the use of sensors on the platforms for counter-IED suveliiance. Those leaders describe this effort as largely wasted. At the same time I would suspect those sorties are rolled into the count of missions flown in support of ground operations, a figure used to support the USAF and Naval air roles in the war.

Best

Tom

[Steve Blair]

I second Tom's comments, but would also add that I'm looking for ways that the AF can contribute in a meaningful way early in the COIN effort without having to resort to kinetic methods. If we can find different ways to use what they bring to the table (rapid mobility and a good forward presence, although with the need for a long and heavy tail if they remain in place for any length of time) we may be able to avoid ground commanders having to call for tons of CAS.

Tom's point about Peck's comments comes close to another point as well: at times the AF does muff its case when going public. As a service they focus on technology more than any other, and tend to speak the same way. This focus (I believe) tends to cause a certain amount of institutional blindness when it comes to doing things in different ways. All services suffer this to a degree (the FCS thread can be a good case in point with regard to the Army), and it doesn't help that in many cases technology is at best neutral in COIN.

If you've made your bones in a fighter or bomber, it can sometimes be a tough thing to admit that a transport MIGHT be the better option in some cases. And that's one of the things we kick around here; different ways of doing things. With AFRICOM on the horizon, it's best to kick ideas around now than learn things the hard way on the ground, IMO.

My take, anyhow.

[Rob Thornton]

If you've made your bones in a fighter or bomber, it can sometimes be a tough thing to admit that a transport MIGHT be the better option in some cases. And that's one of the things we kick around here; different ways of doing things. With AFRICOM on the horizon, it's best to kick ideas around now than learn things the hard way on the ground, IMO.

Steve gets at the heart of it, I think we have to move past what we are doing and on to what we are beginning to understand may be required of us. In the case of lift I think we can determine some of those requirements by asking: How much? How often? What are we moving (could be lots of stuff military and commercial capacity)? Who are we moving it for? Where are we moving it to and from (things like infrastrucutre requirements come to mind)?

It may not be all organic. It might not be all air lift. Certainly, its not the only thing we want the AF to do for us (U.S.)

This is obviously not something that is just an AF issue. It is probably one of the reasons the services have to do some soul searching and hash out missions and roles. Its also a good that the discussion will be facillitated by the HASC. We have to start the discussion about matching policy with strategic & operational cabilities/capacity.

[LawVol]

Okay, I have to call you on this as out of your experience lane. The "show of force" is actually effective in tactical operations. Once the enemy knows airpower is overhead, and ready for use, he breaks contact. We even used a show of force to stop a AQIZ attack on a friendly Sunni tribe east of Ramadi in late '06. We didn't have good enough PID to bomb or forces in the area, so we opted for a show of force. As soon as the insurgents got buzzed, they began displacing. We followed them and rolled them up.

Many a ground commander, including myself, has used a show of force when dropping a bomb is impractical or we detect something suspicious with no troops nearby. If you've ever been buzzed by a jet in the middle of a fight, it's bone shaking.

Kind of like my avatar's quote about paint rounds, "It scares the hell out of people". (but doesn't make "pretty pictures")

Okay, my comments regardng a show of force were in response to Culpepper's comments about a large air force as a show of force. I was speaking strategically. At that level, our show of force accomplishes very little. The enemy still pursues its goals and still seeks engagement. Sure it saves alot of lives in CAS, but that is not what I was talking about.

It's easy to sit here on the forum and criticize those dropping bombs - but if it was your soldiers chewed up and pinned down, you'd thank God for that CAS every day.

No one is dropping bombs as a first resort in Iraq, I assure you. And there's a lot of places we just won't drop no matter who's in contact.

First, I'll echo Tom Odom's comment that no one, including me, is making light of casualties; although I'll state that I shouldn't have to make this comment; as you do, I serve my country and grieve at every loss. That being said, the two comments seem, at first to contradict one another. They do, however, make my point. At the tactical level, it is easy to overlook the overall objective. The strategic level permits those not directly under fire to make decisions that those under fire cannot appreciate. This is probably why you cannot get CAS occasionally.

Tom: for the record, I used the term civilian casualties. I remembered our last conversation about this term vs. collateral damage.

[Jim Stratton]

I second Tom's comments, but would also add that I'm looking for ways that the AF can contribute in a meaningful way early in the COIN effort without having to resort to kinetic methods. If we can find different ways to use what they bring to the table (rapid mobility and a good forward presence, although with the need for a long and heavy tail if they remain in place for any length of time) we may be able to avoid ground commanders having to call for tons of CAS.

Tom's point about Peck's comments comes close to another point as well: at times the AF does muff its case when going public. As a service they focus on technology more than any other, and tend to speak the same way. This focus (I believe) tends to cause a certain amount of institutional blindness when it comes to doing things in different ways. All services suffer this to a degree (the FCS thread can be a good case in point with regard to the Army), and it doesn't help that in many cases technology is at best neutral in COIN.

Steve, I recently sent one of my officers on a deployment to JTF-HOA, and as you are probably well aware, he related how all the services there are "contributing in a meaningful way early in the COIN effort without having to resort to kinetic methods." Efforts in the Pacific (PI, Indonesia, etc.) in support of OEF are doing the same things. The ANG's State Partnership Program is also a great example. Almost every state ANG bureau is partnered with a nation around the world and they hold bi-lateral exercises and support in crisis situations. So, I'd say the AF is already doing what you call for in many ops that aren't on the front page of the NY Times.

Here's my problem with what you call "institutional blindness" in the USAF. Certainly within the service, and without if what I've read on this site reflects widespread views of the AF, there is an effort to doctrinally define how the AF can contribute to COIN. That's too narrowly focused. If all USAF officers are expected to do is elaborate on how our service can contribute, we're ceding the intellectual debate on how to do COIN in general to others. USAF officers bring a unique vision to problem solving as a result of service culture and upbringing, and not applying that vision to the wider problem of solving the tactical, operational, and strategic problems presented by COIN hurts the national effort towards designing effective COIN campaigns. There are lots of reasons why this is and as a 17 year serving officer I'm well aware of them

[Culpeper]

"To you, a hero is some sort of sandwitch, not some nut who takes on three Tigers!"

I just love that movie. I am sure Ted Turner does too, hence it shows at least twice a month on TBS/TNT.

All tankers secretly want to be Oddball.

Oddball: Well, yeah, man, you see, like, all the tanks we come up against are bigger and better than ours, so all we can hope to do is, like, scare 'em away, y'know. This gun is an ordinary 76mm but we add this piece of pipe onto it, and the Krauts think, like, maybe it's a 90mm. We got our own ammunition, it's filled with paint. When we fire it, it makes pretty pictures, scares the hell outta people! And we have a loudspeaker, when we go into battle we play music, very loud. It kind of... calms us down.

[Cavguy]

First, I'll echo Tom Odom's comment that no one, including me, is making light of casualties; although I'll state that I shouldn't have to make this comment; as you do, I serve my country and grieve at every loss.

I wasn't trying to point at anyone in specific, and I didn't mean to offend - please accept my apology. I was simply saying what is sterile here is not as easy on the ground. Regarding the "show of force" mission, it is a piece that is available in a toolkit.

That being said, the two comments seem, at first to contradict one another. They do, however, make my point. At the tactical level, it is easy to overlook the overall objective. The strategic level permits those not directly under fire to make decisions that those under fire cannot appreciate. This is probably why you cannot get CAS occasionally.

Yes, and that is why we need to focus on getting our junior leaders indoctrinated with the COIN mindset so they understand the implications of making that call. Everything depends on where you are fighting. In Tal Afar 2006, we only employed 4 hellfires and 1 JDAM in 10 months. In Ramadi 2006-2007, we probably did ten times that. Why? One enviornment was extremely kinetic (initially, until we flipped the tribes) and one wasn't.

What I learned there is that air and artillery PGM fires can be effective in a COIN enviornment, *if* used correctly. Should they be the first resort, or even the middle one? No. But they are a tool. Understanding the implications of each tool used in COIN is key, and then making the correct decisions.

As a step in the approval authority in Ramadi, we turned down certain munitions to units in contact for precisely those reasons. But let's not make the mistake of throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

Regarding FW recon for IED's, it isn't terribly effective. But I wholly support having CAS overhead. We could always get CAS on station within 15 minutes to support units in contact, even for a "show of force". In MND-N it was USAF F-15's and F-16's, in Ramadi it was AV-8's and F-18's. As long as it brought a gun and a JDAM (preferably the 250lb kind), we were happy.