I really wish that when Warden revised "The Air Campaign" he would have done some deeper thinking and gotten rid of many of his (poor) historical examples. The thinking there is so deeply rooted in traditional Air Power talk. For example:
First, territory is a dangerous enchantress in war. Serious wars are rarely won by capturing territory, unless that territory includes a vital political or economic center of gravity, the loss of which precludes continuing the war. The capture of France in 1940, significant though it was, did not win the war for the Germans. France was not the center of gravity of the anti-Axis coalition -- even before the United States entered the conflict. After World War II, the United States, not Western Europe, became the center of gravity in any conflict between the Soviets and the western powers. Territory may well be the political objective of a campaign, but it rarely should be the military objective. Territory will be disposed of at the peace conference as a function of the political, military, and economic situation at the war's end.
Even though he trots out the capture of France, he ignores the fact that Hitler didn't consider France the center of gravity for the anti-Axis coalition. It was a piece that had to be taken to either attack Great Britain or to secure his back door for the fight with what he considered his real enemy: the Soviet Union. And if territory "rarely should be the military objective" then we're in trouble. While he only mentions 2-3 cases where air power shouldn't be the main option, he finds more cases where air power should be the main option and goes into more detail to support his case. He also ignores cases where Navy air was more suited for a task...focusing on Kenny's operations supporting MacArthur and ignoring the carrier raids into the Sea of Japan (and other areas) that did much to cripple Japan's coastal shipping and throw off its defensive planning. He also ignores the non-combat impact of air power. Airlift and other assets can have a major impact in COIN, yet he says air power is of marginal use against a self-sustaining guerrilla enemy. Traditional air power perhaps...a non-traditional application certainly not!

I always took Warden's Unified Theory as being more an argument for total air power cloaked behind the talk of jointness that the Air Force often brings out when it wants to absorb or claim primacy in a function or area. "The Air Campaign" has some very sound operational dictums in it...some are even visionary. But he falls short when he starts looking at elements beyond targeting and targeting theory (and his 5 Rings and COG talk is really about targeting).

We use "The Air Campaign" as a textbook for a course here, so I've read it more times than is likely healthy.... I'll stop now....