CHARLIE ROSE: Yes, but we what, 300, or 110 CIA and 200 special forces, the combination of that. But we had the Northern Alliance troops too.
DAVID KILCULLEN: Exactly. And my old boss, Hank Crumpton, who was a key player in that campaign, often says that, you know, the Afghans won against the Taliban. All we did was to enable them, using very flexible, agile approach, with small numbers of troops on the ground, and linking that to the (inaudible) system.
CHARLIE ROSE: And how much air power?
DAVID KILCULLEN: Well, air power -- there is a fascinating debate going on right now in the counterinsurgency community about the role of air power in counterinsurgency. Let me just -- we can talk about that later if you like. But let me just kick off that topic by saying that one of the things that Hank says is the most useful air asset they had in that period was, in fact, the C-130, that could deliver -- they could talk to a tribal leader or.
DAVID KILCULLEN: . and say, hey, what do you need? Well, people or assistance of various kinds, or food, medical supplies.
CHARLIE ROSE: And the Taliban had no means to shoot them down?
DAVID KILCULLEN: Yeah, well, they did, but we had air superiority. I mean, this is the thing. And I'm sure we're going to get into this. A lot of Army guys say, you can't solve complicated social and political problems from a flight level of 20,000 feet using guided bombs, and therefore the Air Force doesn't have a big role in counterinsurgency. OK?
That is so not true. For a start, the armies of the Western world haven't shown ourselves particularly good at solving those problems either. So it's not an air power-land power thing. It's about how we adapt to a very complicated environment.
But secondly, everything is easy if you assume air superiority. You don't need an air force to deny air superiority to a modern joint force. And you know, guys.
(CROSSTALK)
DAVID KILCULLEN: Sorry. Guys who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan will tell you that one of the most fundamental elements in that campaign was working out the system that allowed the Soviets to maneuver and operate in the hinterland of Afghanistan, and overstressing that system, particularly the air system, by the introduction of high-tech surface-to-air weapons that allowed us to essentially overstress the Soviets.
CHARLIE ROSE: Which we provided for the mujahideen?
DAVID KILCULLEN: Yes. And so you know, there's this assumption that if air power doesn't have a role in counterinsurgency. If air is doing its job right -- and you need a big air force and a powerful air force to do that -- if it's doing its job right, the ground guys shouldn't really notice it. What they should notice is the air support, the close air support for them when they are fighting the enemy. They should notice the ability to move troops around. They should notice the logistic support. But that sits under a bubble of air superiority, and I'm not -- we ignore that factor at our peril, because any smart insurgent knows that we require that, and will turn against us.
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