Culture battle: Selective use of history should not be used to justify the status quo

[Nat Wilcox]

Nat, let's try and get together for several low tech products (aka beers) and really chat about this. I think we have moved the discussion totally away from its original intent.

Agreed, though I don't know when I'll next be roughly in your neck of the woods. Linda seems sour about going home to Montreal these days... But I know it will happen soon.

In the meantime, I will soon have a grand opening of a brand new thread devoted to the national security argument for trade protection, where we can dissect it in messy detail, hopefully with lots of funny examples and gross exaggerations.

[marct]

Hi Nat,

Agreed, though I don't know when I'll next be roughly in your neck of the woods. Linda seems sour about going home to Montreal these days... But I know it will happen soon.

Okay, let me know when you do get there - I can always arrange to pop down for the day. Or, you could mosey on over to Ottawa .

In the meantime, I will soon have a grand opening of a brand new thread devoted to the national security argument for trade protection, where we can dissect it in messy detail, hopefully with lots of funny examples and gross exaggerations.

Sounds great - I'll save up misleading and highly exaggerated examples for it.

Marc

[wm]

I think the economics discussion has hijeacked this thread ong enough and has adequately reponded to MarcT's allusion to the Chinese economic nuclear option.

I wan t to respond to other points raised and remind all that this thread started with discussing an article that claims we are misusing history to make doctrine and policy decisions.

Two respondents wanted more clarification on my point about AirLand Battle (ALB) being used to justify the Big 5 weapons systems. I was pointing out that had two effects, one cathartic and one expensive. I submit the need for catharsis has passed. However, I am concerned that we now have some much invested (both in the services and in the defense contracting world) in big weapons systems that it becomes hard to jump off the "big war" horse that was allowed to grow during the Reagan years. The Army "needs" to have a big war mindset in order to be a winner in the budget turf battles. Troops on the ground are a very cheap investment compared to a littoral combat ship, an F-22 or F-35, and even an MRAP vehicle. In a world where the size of your budget dictates where you stand in the power pecking order (which I submit is the world of the US Federal Government), bigger is always better. Small wars tend to come with small price tages (at least in terms of investment portfolios/procurement and RDTE and dollars). The Navy figured out a while ago that you need a big fleet in order to be able to justify a big O&M budget. Similarly, the Army "needs" big wars in order to justify big budgets. I accept Tom's point about the need for the Big 5 in the world of the Soviet Threat. (Well, maybe the Big 4--DIVAD was little more than a bailout of Ford Aerospace, which speaks to my point about being wary of the military industrial complex.) We probably still need some big ticket systems, if for no other reason than as a conventional war deterrrent. This last brings me to MarcT's "refutation" regarding Rome's status.
At least until the time of the Emperor Julian, the Persians were only a regional power. They were deterred from doing more than fooling around on the Roman Empire's eastern border because of the capabilities and reputation of the Roman Legion. Usually Rome lost battles to Persia when it tried to expand further east, using poor generals (like Crassus). Once the Seljuk Turks arrived, things started to change. But by then, Rome was fragmented, just as deserving of the title "the sick man of Europe" as the Ottoman Empire a millenium later and its former military might held no deterent power.
Regarding MDMP: MDMP provides, to folks who need it, an organizational construct to conduct effective and focussed critical thinking. When done right, MDMA helps folks to stay on task and not get too distracted or mired in minutiae. Unfortunately the process sometimes becomes more important than the desired end state. In this regard using it is like applying tactics (or almost anything else that requires some creativity); some folks just don't really get the hang of it and confuse following a process correctly with success.

[wm]

I think the economics discussion has hijacked this thread long enough and has adequately reponded to MarcT's allusion to the Chinese economic nuclear option.

I want to respond to other points raised and remind all that this thread started with discussing an article that claims we are misusing history to make doctrine and policy decisions.
Two respondents (Tom and Nat) wanted more clarification on my point about AirLand Battle (ALB) being used to justify the Big 5 weapons systems. I was pointing out that ALB had two effects, one cathartic and one expensive. I submit the need for catharsis has passed. However, I am concerned that we now have so much invested (both in the services and in the defense contracting world) in big weapons systems that it becomes hard to jump off the "big war" horse that we remounted during the Reagan years. The Army now "needs" to have a big war mindset in order to be a winner in the budget turf battles. Troops on the ground are a very cheap investment compared to a littoral combat ship, an F-22 or F-35, and even an MRAP vehicle. In a world where the size of your budget dictates where you stand in the power pecking order (which I submit is the world of the US Federal Government), bigger is always better. Small wars tend to come with small price tages (at least in terms of investment portfolios/procurement and RDTE dollars). The Navy figured out quite a while ago that you need a big fleet in order to be able to justify a big O&M budget. Similarly, the Army "needs" big wars in order to justify big budgets.
I accept Tom's point about the need for the Big 5 in the world of the Soviet Threat. (Well, maybe the Big 4 --DIVAD was little more than a bailout of Ford Aerospace, which speaks to my point about being wary of the military industrial complex.) We probably still need some big ticket systems, if for no other reason than as a conventional war deterrrent. This last brings me to MarcT's "refutation" regarding Rome's status.
At least until the time of the Emperor Julian, the Persians were only a regional power. They were deterred from doing more than fooling around on the Roman Empire's eastern border because of the capabilities and reputation of the Roman Legions. Usually Rome lost battles to Persia when it tried to expand further east, using poor generals (like Crassus). Once the Seljuk Turks arrived, things started to change. But by then, Rome was fragmented, just as deserving of the title "the sick man of Europe" as the Ottoman Empire a millenium later, and its former military might held no deterent power.
Regarding MDMP: MDMP provides, to folks who need it, an organizational construct to conduct effective and focussed critical thinking. When done right, MDMA helps folks to stay on task and not get too distracted or mired in minutiae. Unfortunately the process sometimes becomes more important than the desired end state. In this regard, using it is like applying tactics (or almost anything else that requires some creativity); some folks just don't really get the hang of it and confuse following a process correctly with success. So I agree with Mark O. And Mark, I do not see Col Foresman as prescient. Instead, I agree with his view that we are misusing history. More specifically, we are using too shallow a view of history.
On this last point, I submit that much of the 1976 FM 100-5 fell afoul of the same flaw--it was a kneejerk response to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The 1986 version of 100-5 cleaned up a lot of the short-sighted inclusions. I view the two documents as a set wiith the 1986 version serving as an important revision that corrected misperceptions by too many in the field regarding what was really important in the 1976 version.
I've rambled on too long with this riposte.

[Ken White]

...
I want to respond to other points raised and remind all that this thread started with discussing an article that claims we are misusing history to make doctrine and policy decisions.
Two respondents (Tom and Nat) wanted more clarification on my point about AirLand Battle (ALB) being used to justify the Big 5 weapons systems. I was pointing out that ALB had two effects, one cathartic and one expensive. I submit the need for catharsis has passed. However, I am concerned that we now have so much invested (both in the services and in the defense contracting world) in big weapons systems that it becomes hard to jump off the "big war" horse that we remounted during the Reagan years...

All true but you omit the overarching role of Congress in this sad state of affairs. They don't like to pay for training or too much OM, no impact on the State or District. Big ticket hardware items OTOH bring money nation wide when all the subcontractors get rolled in. The Army is guilty but so are the other service and DoD but the most guilty of all are the Congroids who love that system...

If you meant the purging of 'Viet Nam' thinking from the Army was the catharsis, I'd suggest it was really not needed and in fact did not stand us in good stead.

...This last brings me to MarcT's "refutation" regarding Rome's status.
At least until the time of the Emperor Julian, the Persians were only a regional power.

Uh, I'm not sure Cyrus, Darius and ol' Xerxes would agree with you and the Egyptians, Babylonians and most of Greeks in what is now Turkey probably wouldn't. The Punjabis and Afghans might not agree either...

On this last point, I submit that much of the 1976 FM 100-5 fell afoul of the same flaw--it was a kneejerk response to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The 1986 version of 100-5 cleaned up a lot of the short-sighted inclusions. I view the two documents as a set wiith the 1986 version serving as an important revision that corrected misperceptions by too many in the field regarding what was really important in the 1976 version.
. . .

We can agree on that...

[wm]

All true but you omit the overarching role of Congress in this sad state of affairs. They don't like to pay for training or too much OM, no impact on the State or District. Big ticket hardware items OTOH bring money nation wide when all the subcontractors get rolled in. The Army is guilty but so are the other service and DoD but the most guilty of all are the Congroids who love that system...

I thought it was axiomatic, "intuitively obvious to the casual observer," that getting Federal funds flowing to the constituents of our elected representatives, especially to those who make big campaign contributions, was the underlying source of enpowerment to the various parts of the Executive Branch (like the various Military Services). BTW, one-year O&M money doesn't keep one in the eyes of constituents as long as necessary if one happens to be serving a 2 or 6 year term. Ever wonder why ship procurement funding is 5-year money while other procurement appropriations are only for 3 years? (Answering this question might have a lot of explanatory power for the question raised on another thread on the proliferation of Navy Department personnel as COCOM and higher leaders.)

If you meant the purging of 'Viet Nam' thinking from the Army was the catharsis, I'd suggest it was really not needed and in fact did not stand us in good stead.

If by Viet Nam thinking you mean TTP for fighting low intensity and counterinsurgency conflicts, I agree with you. The thinking I meant had to do with how the Army viewed itself and how it thought the rest of America viewed it--as second class citizens, not really good for much. ALB was one of several things that ernabled the Army to give itself a new sense of purpose and raise its opinion of itself after it had become hollow during the years of the Ford and Carter presidencies. This in turn was a means that enabled General Sullivan to push his "no more Task Force Smith" campaign to keep the Army from getting hollowed out again during the "peace dividend" downsizing years.

Uh, I'm not sure Cyrus, Darius and ol' Xerxes would agree with you and the Egyptians, Babylonians and most of Greeks in what is now Turkey probably wouldn't. The Punjabis and Afghans might not agree either...

I had in mind the Parthians and, to some extent, the Sassanid Persians. The Achaemenid Persians, like Cyrus II, Cambyses, Darius, Xerxes, and Artaxerxes as well as the Seleucid Empire successors to Alexander functioned well before Rome was at the zenith of its power. Same is true for the Egyptians--the last Pharoah was supplanted about the time of Julius Caesar, whose realm was analogous to the America of Teddy Roosevelt, I think.

[Nat Wilcox]

I don't know whether anything is ever obvious about the behavior of the Federal government... One of my political science buddies used to pull a pack of cigarettes from his pocket as an illustration of the sometimes fractured and incoherent nature of public policy in democracies, in an introductory class on same, saying to students "For example, the Federal government has both 'grow it' and 'don't smoke it' policies for this."

Having said that I think y'all rightly point out that, however military spending was historically parceled out, that creates a constituency against change in the manner of that spending. But I think that is defeatable in the medium to long term; it is simply a matter of slowly building an alternative coalition.

I am not so sure of the argument from bigness. It may be a far more economically wasteful act to chop up the pork (profits and jobs) flowing from the production of five big systems into 435 shares, than it would be to chop up the pork flowing from fifty smaller systems into 435 shares. Here, by waste, I mean the economist's notion of "lost surplus" or "deadweight cost"...if you like, "potential pork" that simply goes up in smoke, that is goodies that no interested party gets to pocket. Other things equal, the political economy of democracies does indeed like to parcel out more as opposed to less pork. So if pork goes up in smoke, that's a bad thing from the viewpoint of Bismarckian sausage-making (less sausage to go around). If there were an alternative way of spending the same amount of taxes and spreading more sausage around, leaving other things equal, then in general a democratic legislature would prefer that.

My hunch is that bigness vs. smallness (of individual weapons systems and/or spending categories) is probably a red herring, political-economy-wise. Total levels of spending, and historical patterns of spending, though, are real considerations here, I think.

[marct]

Hi WM,

Uh, I'm not sure Cyrus, Darius and ol' Xerxes would agree with you and the Egyptians, Babylonians and most of Greeks in what is now Turkey probably wouldn't. The Punjabis and Afghans might not agree either...

I had in mind the Parthians and, to some extent, the Sassanid Persians. The Achaemenid Persians, like Cyrus II, Cambyses, Darius, Xerxes, and Artaxerxes as well as the Seleucid Empire successors to Alexander functioned well before Rome was at the zenith of its power. Same is true for the Egyptians--the last Pharoah was supplanted about the time of Julius Caesar, whose realm was analogous to the America of Teddy Roosevelt, I think.

I think that getting the exact time period is probably crucial. The Achaemenids were definitely in the superpower category, while the Partians were, at best, a regional power. I would put the Sassanids as a superpower as well, certainly by 610 (see map below).



As for Rome, well, it's an interesting problem. Very powerful state, but hellaciously poorly organized in goverance, especially in the succession issue. Civil wars in 67-68 (the Year of the Four Emperors), 225-304 (he Barracks Emperors Period) and pretty much in the crapper by 412. A resurgence under Justinian (mainly Belasarius' reconquests), and then falling apart again by 610 in the East.

Personally, I think Byzantium is a better model for the current situation and, if you want an analog of the ALB, look to Basil II's heavy Cataphractoi. The themata organization of the Byzantine empire is a closer analog of the current US systems - provincial semi-professionals, national army, and PMCs all wrapped up in a highly bureaucratic state organization.

Marc

[Ken White]

axioms...

My point was that your comment alluded only to the DoD reactions (wrong though they be). While "...getting Federal funds flowing to the constituents of our elected representatives, especially to those who make big campaign contributions, was the underlying source of enpowerment to the various parts of the Executive Branch (like the various Military Services)" may be intuitively obvious to the casual observer, the fact that Congress drives that and effectively forces DoD and others to play their game needs to be trumpeted loudly at every opportunity else the corrupt, flawed and inefficient system will not change...

No, I don't wonder why ship procurement is five year money and aircraft procurement is three year money and most other procurement is one or two year money. I know why -- and that, too, needs to be stopped. Those turkeys use the Constitution when it suits, regularly defeat efforts to put the Federal government under GAAP and use the convoluted budget process to buy votes while totally obscuring the tricks they play on the electorate.

Agree on the TTP and also on the self image bit. Pity that Gordy's campaign wasn't more effective. That it was not is partly the Army's fault but more the fault of Congress and the way they do business. Lot of SASC and HASC staffers have pet rocks...

Diffrentiated Persians versus undiffrentiated Persians...

...Same is true for the Egyptians--the last Pharoah was supplanted about the time of Julius Caesar, whose realm was analogous to the America of Teddy Roosevelt, I think."

We can disagree on that.

"...My hunch is that bigness vs. smallness (of individual weapons systems and/or spending categories) is probably a red herring, political-economy-wise. Total levels of spending, and historical patterns of spending, though, are real considerations here, I think."

You are correct in the political economy sense but very wrong in the political and practical senses. It isn't a red herring, it drives the train and it is wasteful, inefficient, ineffective all too often, unresponsive to true military needs. Far more importantly, it is a very significant contributor to that total level of spending..

[Nat Wilcox]

You are correct in the political economy sense but very wrong in the political and practical senses. It isn't a red herring, it drives the train and it is wasteful, inefficient, ineffective all too often, unresponsive to true military needs. Far more importantly, it is a very significant contributor to that total level of spending..

Ken, I think it would be a real shame for ideas like yours, and those of others, to not happen due to undue pessimism about the political economy of the thing, so I'm going to stay with this a bit more.

It is true that as a historical matter total defense spending and very big and expensive systems have gone up together, that historically those two things have been correlated. But that correlation isn't inevitable. Part of creative engineering is imagining one's way around what seem to be inevitable correlations, say as between the weight of an engine and the torque it generates. To the extent a clever engineer can figure out how to relax such a correlation, say by the use of innovative materials, she can engineer an improvement in zero to sixty.

Replacing five big packages costing 50 Bil apiece by fifty small packages costing 5 Bil apiece is quite possibly such engineering from the viewpoint of political-economic selling. I wouldn't be a bit surprised if it is actually easier to sell the fifty small than the five big packages...not only from a strict political economy perspective, but also from a psychological one.

Salesmen well understand the principle of dividing a large cost package into its components and selling them one at a time...the cost of each part being smaller, it is easier to sell it. This is a frequent tactic when you buy a new pair of glasses or a car...it is to get you to accept a sequence of small additional costs. The same principle has been studied in the realms of the psychology of political persuasion and escalation of commitment.

I submit that, if anything, the intuition that it is politically easier to get to total budget X by means of 5 large steps of size X/5, versus 50 smaller steps of X/50, is probably backwards, given almost everything I know about political economics and the psychology of selling. If y'all would rather have the fifty small packages rather than the five large ones, and fifty small ones will generate the same or even more total pork for legislators to deliver back home at equal total defense spending, the thing seems doable to me. All that is needed here is to imagine the 50 smaller packages...and this is what you do so well, and I enjoy learning so much from you.

[Ken White]

Ken, I think it would be a real shame for ideas like yours, and those of others, to not happen due to undue pessimism about the political economy of the thing, so I'm going to stay with this a bit more.

It is true that as a historical matter total defense spending and very big and expensive systems have gone up together, that historically those two things have been correlated. But that correlation isn't inevitable. Part of creative engineering is imagining one's way around what seem to be inevitable correlations, say as between the weight of an engine and the torque it generates. To the extent a clever engineer can figure out how to relax such a correlation, say by the use of innovative materials, she can engineer an improvement in zero to sixty.

Replacing five big packages costing 50 Bil apiece by fifty small packages costing 5 Bil apiece is quite possibly such engineering from the viewpoint of political-economic selling. I wouldn't be a bit surprised if it is actually easier to sell the fifty small than the five big packages...not only from a strict political economy perspective, but also from a psychological one.

Salesmen well understand the principle of dividing a large cost package into its components and selling them one at a time...the cost of each part being smaller, it is easier to sell it. This is a frequent tactic when you buy a new pair of glasses or a car...it is to get you to accept a sequence of small additional costs. The same principle has been studied in the realms of the psychology of political persuasion and escalation of commitment.

I submit that, if anything, the intuition that it is politically easier to get to total budget X by means of 5 large steps of size X/5, versus 50 smaller steps of X/50, is probably backwards, given almost everything I know about political economics and the psychology of selling. If y'all would rather have the fifty small packages rather than the five large ones, and fifty small ones will generate the same or even more total pork for legislators to deliver back home at equal total defense spending, the thing seems doable to me. All that is needed here is to imagine the 50 smaller packages...and this is what you do so well, and I enjoy learning so much from you.

or you should, anyway, that I completely agree with you -- in theory. I have made precisely the same argument to a good many senior people over the last forty years (well, the first thirty of that forty). They all agreed -- but when they got in a position to affect some of those changes, they were overcome by alligators and nothing changed.

While I am in concert with you on the need and possibility, I'm all too aware of the rather more twisted realities.

My suspicion -- nah, my very firm belief -- is that a large part of the problem is the bureaucracy and, in this case, specifically the DoD and the service bean counters. They, too have a vested interest in keeping the system opaque and convoluted; it enhances their power, enlarges their empires and they stoutly resist any attempts toward openness, sensible procurement law or, more importantly, accountability. They are masters at diffusing responsibility. You haven't lived until you've been an attendee several years of large command Program and Budget Advisory Committee meetings and watched the almost criminal ability to cast things so that a committee decision is made confirming what the J8 guys want and thus no responsibility accrues to the Eight. No one is accountable, the Committee said...

Agree that a clever engineer can do what you suggest. In fact, I've seen a number of folks do just such engineering jobs, even done it myself and I'm not that clever. Some slip through particularly if you have a slow resource guy -- and a lot of them are but the smart ones will catch you -- most fall prey to business as usual. In the eyes of the budgeteers and the procurement community, the system ain't broke and they durn sure do not want it fixed. Thus, I think the issue is not ability to do what you suggest but a concerted effort on the part of some to insure that does not happen.

The congressional staffers were mentioned ecause they are a big part of the problem in that regard and they have clout in DC that far exceeds their capability...

And as I said, a lot of those folks have pet rocks -- or axes to grind. They also do not want that to happen; they like their power as well.

Pure politics also enters the fray. In 1964, we troop tested the AR15 (M16 to be), recommended keeping the M14 for worldwide service and buying a few AR15s for special purpose units. DA agreed. DoD said no. The fact that the then M14 contract holder, TRW, had contributed to Nixon's 1960 campaign and Colt had contributed to Kennedy's I'm certain had no bearing on Robert Strange McNamaras decision...

Fast forward to 1977. The Army was testing two tanks and two helicopters. The fact that Bell and GM were doing well at the time meant their slightly better products were sidelined to buy a Chrysler tank and a Sikorsky helicopter because the latter two companies were in the doldrums. The purchased products are good enough; the ones rejected were just slightly better. Politics, not economics rule.

Go to the MRAP procurement; look at what was bought and where the plants are.

Another significant factor -- that is also, in its own way, political -- is the friction and trading between communities in the Army. The Bradley M3 was a quid pro quo from the Armor School for Infantry School support of the M1 buy -- a deal that also chopped the M8 MPG that the Airborne Division could've used though that vehicle itself was a political compromise and the Armor School did not want it.

Shy Meyer tried to fight the system, so did Sullivan, Shinseki and Schoomaker. The system just waits them out and then settles back down.

Wheels inside of wheels. Add to that the inter service trade offs.

What you suggest is totally possible, I'd applaud it. Been banging that drum since the late 60s. Have met a lot of fairly senior people who agree and also beat the drum. Yet...

I think petty politics, vote buying (to include Committee vote buying by the Services, an important factor -- without it, there'd be no Nuke carriers or V22 Ospreys), bureaucratic empire building, turf protection and risk aversion are far, far more powerful forces than they should be. Sad state of affairs.

We just have to keep pinging 'em and get the right guy in the right place...

[wm]

Ken's PBAC and cut drill horror stories are right on the money. I also alluded to the DIVAD "bailout."

On other threads, the issue of simple, single purpose systems versus complex ,multi-mission systems has been discussed--airframes and, more recently my personal favorite shell game,the FCS system of systems. We had a similar debate about the F5 vs the F15 I believe (maybe it was the F16). The arguement was --buy a lot of cheap F5s because the bad guys had us beat in the numbers game or buy a lot of capability that would let us have a higher hit probability and therefore attrit the bad guys with fewer friendly casualties. A similar argument was used to show why we would win WWIII in Germany despite the massive disproportion between US/NATO and Soviet/WP armor. Funny thing about the quality vs quantity argument. If you have enough quantity, no qualitiative edge will matter --witness what is happening now in SWA--Build an IED with enough 155 rounds in a hole and they can blow up any M1. You probably never saw the study that showed we would loss our qualitiative advantage with first round hit probability at longer ranges well before the bad guys lost their quantiative advantage.

Another thing about a few big and expensive systems versus a lot of smaller and cheaper ones--It is much harder to do a cut drill on a big system. You can make the case that all the parts are required and you need every system in order to meet your minimum capability, achieve lower cost productiuon, etc, etc. When you buy a lot of smaller, cheaper systems, it is much easier to scale back the total program without killing it. And no one wants a program killed. Since a big system progeram can't get cut very easily, its owners get to keep the big budget clout I mentioned in an earlier post. The guy with the small ticket items gets scaled back instead, (we'll maKe it up to you in the next POM cycle, promise .)

Getting caught in the meshes of political economy produces some very non-intuitive outcomes. I remember helping on a study about electric pricing for low income families. The issue was whether to offer them a lower price and subsidize the electric companies for the difference from actual costs or to make them pay full price and then send them a rebate (which would pay them the same amount they "lost" by not getting the price break up front). Seems like a wash doen't it? Au contraire! The decison was to give them the price break. The reasoning: this gave them more continuous disposable income that they would spend elsewhere, thereby bringing in more sales taxes. By the by, it also sold as the legislators "helping out those less fortunate citizens" story. Of course the subsidy to the utilities was not mentioned in public. We wouldn't want to have any negative press about "corporate welfare," now would we?

[Ken White]

We went to dinner with some old friends; he's also retired. We were talking about the soon to be shoot off between the HK 416, the SCAR, possibly some others and the M4. We both opined that the Army did not want to be 'embarrassed' by the M4 losing and would probably try to spin the results in front of Coburn who fought to get that shoot off. That caused me to recall then VCSA Riscassi testifying that "...the Dragon is the best man portable antitank weapon in the world" just before the Army junked it after a few video clips of wild rounds appeared (and Risacassi went off to be CG EUSA); that caused my friend to recall the CG AMC, one Louis Wagner, testifying that DIVAD was the answer to all prayers -- just before it zapped the vent fan in the latrine in front of network cameras...

We are not filled with hope over the upcoming rifle shoot off; the Army will do backflips to avoid any embarrassment and protect itself and justify its decisions (no matter how bad). Regrettably, most of those backflips tend to fall apart in mid air and the fallout almost invariably is more embarrassing than the disclosure or a factual accounting would be. I have not given up hope they will stop trying to tap dance on the head of a pin and substitute for a really neat PP a simple piece of acetate, a grease pencil and some brutal honesty -- but I continue to get closer to that loss of hope almost daily.

The overwhelming sentiment I hear from most of my fellow retards ranging in rank from 1SG to COL is "what the h31! is happening up there" in reference to the five sided funny farm. None of us has any sweat with the troops; they're doing absolutely great and the kids are better than we were and we know it -- and are glad of it. Not apparently true -- the doing great part -- for some of the the senior folks...

I hear what you're saying about quantity having a quality of its own but I'll respectfully disagree. Serving at the height of the so-called Cold War, I was never one ounce concerned with fighting the USSR. I got my first taste of quality versus quantity in Korea in November of 1950 and I''ll take quality every time. That was initially as a tanker, BTW. Costly hardware at the time.

I later saw a bunch of studies all the way up to and including named classifications for Echelons Above Reality (to include DYBR Clearance required) the vast majority of which offered as recommendations the solution desired by the originator of the study. None of them ever convinced me to get upset about quantity; that just means more targets...

The key, as you say, is if you have enough quantity and right now the only folks that can outdo us on that are the Chinese and the Indians. The Indian Army, like all Brit legacy forces is good -- but I'm not worried about either of them. Future coalitions ar possible from other corners but adequate warning time will be available. Admittedly, I'm not serving now but one son is -- and he's not remotely worried about them or the near future either.

You, BTW, are speaking like a true Boyd devotee -- as you may discern, I'm not one...

I'm not a detractor, just not a great believer. I agree with much he says and admit to not being an Air warrior but suggest that a great deal of his theory does not translate well into ground warfare. He probably did a great service in enunciating the OODA loop -- but intuitive fighters had been doing that for thousands of years.

Nor will I be able to wake you for the next POM cycle. I'm lazy and tend to sleep through them. I always went into those PBAC things with my devious flank attacks laid beforehand, slept through them and left with most of what I needed.

The key, BTW to the SWA problem is simply more light infantry on foot. They negate IEDs and such. Unfortunately, the 30 year focus on the wrong threat to justify big hardware caused a continuing cut in said PBI and we are where we are. The new Brigades, BTW, are a step in the right direction but the design is flawed; they need three Infantry Bns and the Cav Sqn; two is not enough. Four rifle companies per Bn would be beneficial as well. Part of the problem there -- and Congressional aides and the GAO will not only tell you this, they'll beat you over the head with it -- is that the most cost ineffective thing in the world is a rifle company in peacetime. That you need them, usually quickly, in wartime and adequate training today is costly and time consuming is immaterial.

Your third paragraph is correct, of course and my only point on that item has been that Congress sticks its nose way, way too far into that bucket; DoD and the Services (and their RM folks in particular) share blame with the Congress, no question but that conglomeration is slightly more at fault simply because they are the only ones that can change the process and fix the sorry mess.

I think that proves that seven wrongs don't make a right...

Again, we're in broad agreement on what's need in those POM cycles, I just think it's far more difficult to get this ponderous elephant of a bureaucracy to shift its direction to get there. It is not impossible to shift the effort, it will just be immensely difficult.

Before you attack, you gotta pick the correct target (s)...

.

[Culpeper]

Just my pre-coffee $.02. It was an interesting article, though. Personally, I'd like to see a return to a regimental system....

Could you or anyone else expand on a "regimental system"? Thanks.

[jcustis]

I'll jump on that and say what SB was probably referring to is the Brit tradition of families serving in the same Regiment through multiple generations, as well as the career progression where a guy might leave the Regiment for a tour elsewhere, but would always return home to the same Regiment.

I wish we could achieve something like that too.

[wm]

I hear what you're saying about quantity having a quality of its own but I'll respectfully disagree. Serving at the height of the so-called Cold War, I was never one ounce concerned with fighting the USSR. I got my first taste of quality versus quantity in Korea in November of 1950 and I''ll take quality every time. That was initially as a tanker, BTW. Costly hardware at the time.

I concur here as long as the quality isn't gold-plated too.

The key, as you say, is if you have enough quantity and right now the only folks that can outdo us on that are the Chinese and the Indians. The Indian Army, like all Brit legacy forces is good -- but I'm not worried about either of them. Future coalitions ar possible from other corners but adequate warning time will be available. Admittedly, I'm not serving now but one son is -- and he's not remotely worried about them or the near future either.

Again I agree. What I don't understand is, that given the nature of the threat out there for the foreseeable future, why we are throwing huge sums at Joint Strike Fighters, Littoral Combat Ships and FCS family of vehicles

You, BTW, are speaking like a true Boyd devotee -- as you may discern, I'm not one... I'm not a detractor, just not a great believer. I agree with much he says and admit to not being an Air warrior but suggest that a great deal of his theory does not translate well into ground warfare. He probably did a great service in enunciating the OODA loop -- but intuitive fighters had been doing that for thousands of years.

I didn't come here to be insulted. As you note, OODA has some merit in certain forms of high intensity engagements. It is not a panacea though.

The key, BTW to the SWA problem is simply more light infantry on foot. They negate IEDs and such. Unfortunately, the 30 year focus on the wrong threat to justify big hardware caused a continuing cut in said PBI and we are where we are. The new Brigades, BTW, are a step in the right direction but the design is flawed; they need three Infantry Bns and the Cav Sqn; two is not enough. Four rifle companies per Bn would be beneficial as well. Part of the problem there -- and Congressional aides and the GAO will not only tell you this, they'll beat you over the head with it -- is that the most cost ineffective thing in the world is a rifle company in peacetime. That you need them, usually quickly, in wartime and adequate training today is costly and time consuming is immaterial.

You have a major piece of the puzzle. We also need to do a much better job at the whole info war piece. By that I mean we need to stop being "spin doctors" and start being purveyors of the truth, in a way that makes sense to the civilians who are getting caught between our troops and the bad guys hiding behind those civilians.

Before you attack, you gotta pick the correct target (s)... .

I couldn't agree more, which is why I suggest we need more than just light infantry in theater. I believe the target you had in mind is more bureaucratic, on this side of the Atlantic, and clustered in offices around Capitol Hill or near Arlington Cemetary. That target is a self-licking ice cream cone and I'm not sure how to engage it. Turning up the heat hasn't worked in the past.

[Steve Blair]

I'll jump on that and say what SB was probably referring to is the Brit tradition of families serving in the same Regiment through multiple generations, as well as the career progression where a guy might leave the Regiment for a tour elsewhere, but would always return home to the same Regiment.

I wish we could achieve something like that too.

I was also referring to the Old Army system where the regiment was the largest organized unit maintained in peacetime. Officers tended to stay within their own regiments for some years, and each developed its own personality and methods for preserving doctrine and tradition.

Like all systems, this did have some problems, but I feel that in most practical cases the good outweighed the bad. Battalions were ad hoc field organizations, as were squadrons, and not part of the regular organization.

I don't think we'll see something like this again, which is to my mind a real loss. Those old regiments had esprit de corps that you don't find today in many units.

[wm]

I don't think we'll see something like this again, which is to my mind a real loss. Those old regiments had esprit de corps that you don't find today in many units.

Sometimes that "esprit" was really little more than a form of group think. In the case of British regiments, this could equate to centuries of tradition unhampered by progress. Look at some of the debacles of the British Wars of Empire, up to and including WWI, for instances. More near and dear examples would be the British advance and retreat from the American colonial towns of Lexington and Concord or Braddock's defeat during the expedition to reduce Fort Duquesne (Braddock was a longtime member of the Coldstream Guards).

[Steve Blair]

Sometimes that "esprit" was really little more than a form of group think. In the case of British regiments, this could equate to centuries of tradition unhampered by progress. Look at some of the debacles of the British Wars of Empire, up to and including WWI, for instances. More near and dear examples would be the British advance and retreat from the American colonial towns of Lexington and Concord or Braddock's defeat during the expedition to reduce Fort Duquesne (Braddock was a longtime member of the Coldstream Guards).

Perhaps, but we see the same thing now on a larger scale. There were other contributing factors to the British problems (to include their officer accession system...purchase, anyone?). I'm not saying the regimental system is perfect (because there is no such thing as a 'perfect' system), but I do think it would be better than what we have now.

[wm]

Perhaps, but we see the same thing now on a larger scale. There were other contributing factors to the British problems (to include their officer accession system...purchase, anyone?). I'm not saying the regimental system is perfect (because there is no such thing as a 'perfect' system), but I do think it would be better than what we have now.

Properly controlled and administered, it probably has value--post-Cardwell reforms versions anyway. But I do not think that we want to try to develop it along the lines of geographic recruitment and home base staging areas used by the Brits (and French for that matter). BTW, I thought we went through this whole exercise back in the late 80s-early 90s--I seem to remember wearing regimental crests on the right pocket or some other location depending on which variant of shirt/sweater/jacket/blouse you chose to wear, honorary colonels, and all that other mumbo-jumbo. I guess it was an idea whose time had not yet come, eh?
Maybe we just didn't have catchy enough names, like John Wayne's Own Rifles (sort of like the Queen's Own Hussars) and such.