Culture battle: Selective use of history should not be used to justify the status quo

[Steve Blair]

Properly controlled and administered, it probably has value--post-Cardwell reforms versions anyway. But I do not think that we want to try to develop it along the lines of geographic recruitment and home base staging areas used by the Brits (and French for that matter). BTW, I thought we went through this whole exercise back in the late 80s-early 90s--I seem to remember wearing regimental crests on the right pocket or some other location depending on which variant of shirt/sweater/jacket/blouse you chose to wear, honorary colonels, and all that other mumbo-jumbo. I guess it was an idea whose time had not yet come, eh?
Maybe we just didn't have catchy enough names, like John Wayne's Own Rifles (sort of like the Queen's Own Hussars) and such.

The US Army never used home basing as a concept for its regiments. It was kicked around a few times in the 1880s or so but never took root. The Army has tried reviving regimental traditions from time to time, an effort that has been somewhat successful in cavalry units (partly because of their organization and partly from the cav mystique) and less so in other units. I'd hazard a guess that part of the reason for that is the reflagging and such that usually accompanies such "efforts," making them counter-productive. Our rotation/personnel 'development' programs (even in peacetime) also don't lend themselves to stable units.

[Ken White]

I concur here as long as the quality isn't gold-plated too.

True. One of the better Generals I knew had a big sign on his desk that said "Best is the enemy of good enough." System didn't like that philosophy so he departed with only two stars...

Again I agree. What I don't understand is, that given the nature of the threat out there for the foreseeable future, why we are throwing huge sums at Joint Strike Fighters, Littoral Combat Ships and FCS family of vehicles.

Rock and a hard place. We have to be a full spectrum force. I truly do not know anyone at all knowledgeable who questions that. That means having a ready source of JSFs, LCS and such. Production of prototypes does not offer an adequate test and ability to correct flaws for operational hardware, thus a production run is needed. The more you make, the cheaper they get -- and stuff is so expensive today that any economies are seized, even red and fishy ones...

Besides, both those two do in fact bring potentially useful for the next 20 years or so capabilities to the table. JSF in particular has some great capabilities.

That also is the kind of quality that keeps the rest of the world honest. That quality -- and the obvious quality of the troops today (plus the huge number we alone in the woorld have with combat experience, something many forget) help in forcing others to contemplate the kinds of threat we will face for the next decade or so rather than something far more dangerous and messy.

I didn't come here to be insulted. As you note, OODA has some merit in certain forms of high intensity engagements. It is not a panacea though.

Sorry 'bout that.

You have a major piece of the puzzle. We also need to do a much better job at the whole info war piece. By that I mean we need to stop being "spin doctors" and start being purveyors of the truth, in a way that makes sense to the civilians who are getting caught between our troops and the bad guys hiding behind those civilians.

Totally agree. All bureaucracies go into the spin and self defense mode when they screw up or get attacked; the Armed Forces generally do it relatively ineptly. I will defend them to a very slight extent by pointing out that the lesser lights in Congress (the 481...) do have a tendency to showboat, ask inane questions (inanity topped only by the main stream media) and bloviate for hours about things not germane; that tends to make the services reply in kind. Not defending it but there's a lot of egg out there.

I couldn't agree more, which is why I suggest we need more than just light infantry in theater. I believe the target you had in mind is more bureaucratic, on this side of the Atlantic, and clustered in offices around Capitol Hill or near Arlington Cemetary. That target is a self-licking ice cream cone and I'm not sure how to engage it. Turning up the heat hasn't worked in the past.

Not if your light infantry is properly equipped and well trained -- and we're getting there. There'll always be a need for other arms and services but we could significantly cut the number required with better training and the right gear.

Gotta point the heat at the right place. Congress; the rest of the system can self correct if that major impediment is repaired. Vote out all incumbents repeatedly and they'll get the message. Only one I ever voted in for reelection was Sam Nunn when I lived in Georgia -- and I now regret that. Vote 'em all out!

[Ken White]

Properly controlled and administered, it probably has value--post-Cardwell reforms versions anyway. But I do not think that we want to try to develop it along the lines of geographic recruitment and home base staging areas used by the Brits (and French for that matter). BTW, I thought we went through this whole exercise back in the late 80s-early 90s--I seem to remember wearing regimental crests on the right pocket or some other location depending on which variant of shirt/sweater/jacket/blouse you chose to wear, honorary colonels, and all that other mumbo-jumbo. I guess it was an idea whose time had not yet come, eh?
Maybe we just didn't have catchy enough names, like John Wayne's Own Rifles (sort of like the Queen's Own Hussars) and such.

Seems to me that proper control and administration may be part of the problem. British Army traditions post Cardwell did an amazing amount of good -- all destroyed by "good personnel management practices." The 'human resources' fetish is just dangerous. The British Army today is having many of the same problems we are having due to that fallacy. Sad. In both cases.

We did try that starting in the early 80s -- that was one of Shy Meyer's many good contributions to the Army. Unfortunately, his attempts to cut MilPerCen in half -- it would not have been needed if we had truly implemented his plan -- were stopped dead by all those civilians living in northern Virginia flooding the Capitol and he was told to back off. MilPerCen survived, grew and is now the US Army Human Resources Command. May God have mercy on the Army. The 41s will not, those guys eat their young.

A properly set up regimental system will be self tending and will not need control or administration to speak of. Meyer's plan was good, the bureaucracy just waited him out.

The names aren't necessary. The closest you can get to a regimental system today is the 82d Abn Div. Folks leave there and go on short tours or long ones (mostly to the two other Airborne units) and return to Bragg. When they get back, they fight to go back to the same Brigade. Unit loyalty is strong; maybe not Brit post-Cardwell strong but close to it. Try to put a 504 guy in the 325 and he'll rebel -- and vice versa.

There is the disadvantage you cite of group think -- that is also a plus. Group think has saved the day in ground combat on many an occasion. Ask the Marines. There is also a significant advantage. Those Officers and NCOs returning to the same units keep other Officers and NCOs honest. In a typical Army unit, if you have a dirt bag for a peer, you'd like to get him boarded out of the Army -- but he's leaving in six months, it's too hard to do, so you don't bother. Or you're leaving and you don't bother. In a unit with personnel continuity, one will not tolerate the slackers.

Which reminds me -- to all you future Chiefs of Staff out there; AR 600-200 says any NCO that gets selected by the centralized board will be promoted unless his Commander writes a letter to have him removed for cause. Commanders do not have time to write letters about marginal people so slackers get promoted just by sticking around. When you get to E Ring, change that to read the person will NOT be promoted unless the Commander writes a letter.

[Steve Blair]

For anyone interested in this thread, I'd also recommend reading the COL Foresman article also in AFJ on Culture Battles- a good piece on our Military Culture - I'd hate to see it overlooked.
Best Regards, Rob

Agree 100%, Rob. Foresman is spot on when it comes to the nature of the medium-term conflicts we'll be facing, and has some very thoughtful observations about how to prepare for them. It's similar to the discussion I've seen (mostly through student papers) regarding the proper role of cavalry in a future force structure. There is thought going on outside the Iraq framework...and that's good. But we also need to keep in mind the tools and techniques needed to fight in an environment like Iraq...or Afghanistan...or Somalia. Different conflicts with different objectives and a structure that will see the military in a secondary (but necessary) role. Indian Wars or Banana Wars, anyone?

[Steve Blair]

We are not fighting grand wars but, rather, are waging small campaigns from squad to brigade level hourly, daily, monthly, until the counterinsurgency is defeated or neutralized.

This, to me, is one of the most interesting lines in the article. Forseman manages to capture the history of most of the Army's combat operations in a single sentence. Aside from the big wars (Civil War, the World Wars) this has been the Army's main combat experience. Yet it's also the one the Army has historically tried to run from or discard doctrine for.

[tequila]

This, to me, is one of the most interesting lines in the article. Forseman manages to capture the history of most of the Army's combat operations in a single sentence. Aside from the big wars (Civil War, the World Wars) this has been the Army's main combat experience. Yet it's also the one the Army has historically tried to run from or discard doctrine for.

I'd argue for two main reasons. Historically the Army's status while fighting those small wars has not been a high one. Those wars (Banana Wars, Plains Indians Wars, Philippine insurrection) were generally not looked on as major national priorities and the Army was treated as such. Only when the nation felt a genuine threat (WWI, WWII, Civil War, Cold War) did the armed forces rise in both social and economic status. Upon achieving institutional prominence, normal institutional and bureaucratic preservation factors kick in. Few bureaucracies are are willingly downsized.

Also, those wars arguably did not constitute major investments of national interest. The nation would not have suffered unduly if the Banana Wars had never been fought or won, or if Dewey had handed Aguinaldo independence in 1899. Arguably the Army is not like any other government service - it is the government's ultimate insurance policy, and as such should prepare first and foremost for the ultimate emergency - a war for national survival, which will always be a big, conventional war and not a tiny foreign insurgency.

[Steve Blair]

Actually the status of the Army itself rose very little during the Civil War. That of Volunteer units did, but even during the war there was a distinction made between the two.

And my point was not to discard preparations for major wars. I'm not sure why people always seem to assume that it's an "either-or" proposition. My point is that the Army has often failed to preserve the lessons of its more frequent combat arenas in preference for other conflicts.

[Tom Odom]

I'd argue for two main reasons. Historically the Army's status while fighting those small wars has not been a high one. Those wars (Banana Wars, Plains Indians Wars, Philippine insurrection) were generally not looked on as major national priorities and the Army was treated as such. Only when the nation felt a genuine threat (WWI, WWII, Civil War, Cold War) did the armed forces rise in both social and economic status. Upon achieving institutional prominence, normal institutional and bureaucratic preservation factors kick in. Few bureaucracies are are willingly downsized.

Also, those wars arguably did not constitute major investments of national interest. The nation would not have suffered unduly if the Banana Wars had never been fought or won, or if Dewey had handed Aguinaldo independence in 1899. Arguably the Army is not like any other government service - it is the government's ultimate insurance policy, and as such should prepare first and foremost for the ultimate emergency - a war for national survival, which will always be a big, conventional war and not a tiny foreign insurgency.

What struck me about this article and this line in particular is that I have heard it before. As a CGSC student (and former CSI-CGSC instructor) in 1988, I was fresh back from Lebanon and Egypt as a UN observer who had just lost 2 close friends. I signed up to do a second masters using Shaba II as a thesis and one of my thesis readers was Dr. Gerald Linderman--the guest historian at CSI that school year. I had already written LP 14 on the 64 Congo Crisis and Jerry Linderman had been a young foreign service officer in the Embassy in Leopoldville during that time. But as the guest historian, Jerry gave a guest lecture one evening on the future of the US Army and he used the pax-Americana metaphor to describe the probable role of the US armed forces in the conflicts to come. Then as now, there were those in the audience who not only did not get the message, they actively disputed its meaning.

Foreman's article is head and shoulders above Gentile's.

Thanks for the tip, Rob!

Dave and Bill--we need Foreman on SWJ!

Tom

[wm]

Arguably the Army is not like any other government service - it is the government's ultimate insurance policy, and as such should prepare first and foremost for the ultimate emergency - a war for national survival, which will always be a big, conventional war and not a tiny foreign insurgency.

This is a dynamite observation IMO. We Americans have a knack for insuring against the worst case. It is captured in the public values of our legal system where we would prefer to let a thousand guilty people go free than let one innocent be punished wrongly. We seem to need to have the "big gesture"
Here's another example.
Notice the push to put cardiac defibrillators all over the place? I have no idea what the statistical probability of a person suffering a heart attack on an airplane is, but I doubt that it justifies the cost of putting defib units on every commercial pax jet in the US.

Please do not construe this post as my support of the "grand gesture" as a policy.

[Ski]

I was involved in this process with the ARNG, and from what I was told by some of the floks at CMH, the AC had massive greybeard pressure to keep the lineage as static as possible.

I'd add that funding lines played a large role in how this developed. If OPTEMPO funds were sent to the BCT Commander directly instead of flowing through the MACOM-CORPS-DIV levels, it would have nutured some of the CG's power and control of the BCT's.

From the same excellent article. Note of course that transformation --originally billed as eliminating much of the divisional and corps structure in favor of modular brigades--has morphed into a preserve the division and corps structures through creeping additions. How much of that has to do with culture and how much is proponent rice bowl thinking coupled to keeping GO slots is hard to say. Of course, that too is a cultural issue.

Thanks, Jon!

Tom

[Granite_State]

I was also referring to the Old Army system where the regiment was the largest organized unit maintained in peacetime. Officers tended to stay within their own regiments for some years, and each developed its own personality and methods for preserving doctrine and tradition.

Like all systems, this did have some problems, but I feel that in most practical cases the good outweighed the bad. Battalions were ad hoc field organizations, as were squadrons, and not part of the regular organization.

I don't think we'll see something like this again, which is to my mind a real loss. Those old regiments had esprit de corps that you don't find today in many units.

I'd definitely agree on the issue of esprit de corps, a few guys I know and/or work with are ex-British Army, and a friend of mine just started at Sandhurst, and it seems like the benefits of the regimental system here are enormous.

But in the bigger picture, there are a lot of negatives too. In the past, the regimental system both retarded uniform training and institutional knowledge (see Britain's small wars from Clive on up), and even impeded modernization (cavalry regimental loyalties and fears often played a bigger role than conservatism in the slow pace of mechanization in the Twenties and Thirties).

That may all be in the past, but there are still some substantial negatives, mainly tied to parochialism, each regiment jealously guarding its perks and slice of the budget, particularly the more influential ones, i.e. Guards, Paras, etc. Lewis Page goes into some detail in his book, http://www.amazon.com/Lions-Donkeys-...0260057&sr=8-1 , which I highly recommend. My copy's in storage or I'd find the excerpts.

However, some of these negatives might be negated in a much larger army like America's, I don't know.

[Steve Blair]

The US regimental system didn't really work along the same lines in terms of budget (although the original 2nd Cavalry was an exception...it was Jefferson Davis' pet regiment when he was Secretary of War) or perks. You did see squabbling from time to time between the combat branches, but most acrimony was reserved for Staff officers.

In the Old Army most resistance to change surfaced with senior branch officers and not within the regiments per se. There was some fussing and resistance about mechanization among cavalry units in the 1920s and 1930s, but part of that had to do with the fear that a new armor branch would cut into their traditional roles (which it of course ended up doing...but then armor became as protective of its roles and uses...).

The biggest issue with the old regimental system in the US had to do with how promotions were handled. At the time it was by regimental seniority first, then by branch. That was later changed, but in the years after the Civil War there was a tremendous amount of rank stagnation.

There are certainly regimental negatives, but I'm not sure they outweigh the positives IF the system is designed correctly.

[Ken White]

Dave posted this in his "More from the AFJ" entry on the SWJ Blog.

COL Foresman neatly nails several critical items, ending with:

"The Army is transforming. In doing so, it must be willing not only to look to the past to shape how it is organized, but also to be willing to break with the past and forge new paths. This requires not only an adaptive Army but also a military of flexible and intellectually adaptive leaders. Whether transformation succeeds or fails will not be determined by how the Army is organized but, rather, how the leaders employ their forces and whether they are successful. That is the unanswered question — whether the Army can make a break with its past and the legacies of World War II to fight the wars of the 21st century."

"Culture battle."

[Norfolk]

but as Colonel Foresman says, the entire culture of the Army must be transformed, especially at the General Officer level, and no-one seems to know how to do that in practice, not even Colonel Foresman himself. To be honest though, I doubt that the service culture was even fully adapted to fighting an opponent the likes of the Wehrmacht, although DePuy and Starry and their ilk did a good job (with Abrams' full force behind them until his premature death) of reinvigorating if not quite fully reforming, the Army to face the Soviets. The Army may not be as badly off as it was in the 1970's, but in the 1970's it had some top generals who were going close to all-out to change things, and we don't really have that right now, although if many of the field-grade officers and captains that the Army has right now make it to 3- and 4-star rank over the next 15-20 years, that might change, if they don't leave first.

I am very uncomfortable with Colonel Foresman's apparent dismissal of large-scale conventional wars as something that the Army is likely to face in the foreseeable future; he may well be right, but if one occurrs anyway, an Army seeking to reorient itself towards Stability Support Operations may be caught in a difficult position. But he's still right, that the Army needs to prepare itself for SSO in particular and small wars in general. Probably the best compromise for this would be to have a heavy corps (III Corps) reserved (where possible) dedicated to large-scale, high-intensity land campaigns, and a couple of corps (I and XVIII) dedicated (along with thew Marines) to small wars and especially SSO. But that would only be possible after Iraq is stabilized and more or less able to fend for itself, and that's going to be a very long time.

It seems to me that Foresman's creative thinkers, the peole who can think and learn by themselves, are usually only tolerated and allowed to make big changes when the service culture has dug a hole so deep that even the people at the top can't see out of it anymore (Ridgeway in Korea, Abrams in Vietnam and just afterwards, DePuy in the '70s, Petraeus now). And when the people at the top are finally able to see enough daylight, they tend to replace those many of same creative thinkers with cookie-cutter careerists and afraid-to-rock the boat "can-do" followers. Foresman's right, but there's still no way to really make those changes he identifies as necessary and to make them stick.

[Rob Thornton]

“The Army, like all military organizations, is defined by its culture, and the culture is defined by the history. Its culture has been defined by its overwhelming success in World War II and shaped by a perceived history of fighting grand wars. Although the culture is consistent with the perceived history, the reality is the Army has been involved in stability and support operations, not grand wars, for almost 80 percent of its existence.”

I liked the introduction – it sets the tone for introspection and puts us on the path to ask “why” we are who we are. Interesting point about the 80/20 ratio – this in itself is a question – if the ratio tells us otherwise – why is the culture the way it is? What is it about that 20% that fixes the culture within it? There is something to perceived consequences being easier to articulate, existential threats and maybe even the time spent training which fills in the cracks surrounding the times we’ve gone to war. There are probably more reasons (some of them external for sure), but if we want to understand why our default position is the 20% we have to consider them all.

“å Our junior leaders must understand We are fighting an enemy who has the advantage of interior and exterior lines — “the enemy of my enemy is also my enemy.” the nation’s goals, the environment in which they operate and how they are linked.
å The conflict requires the application of diplomatic (political), military, economic and informational elements of power by leaders at all levels.
å Whether we have it right is not immediately apparent; it is determined over time.”

From his list of points I pulled three. The first was one I’d not heard expressed this way -with the linkage to the axiom. This does not only offer an understanding of how the enemy sees his lines of operation, but provides insight on how to deny the enemy that line of operation by establishing our own.

The second reminds me of what DR. Kilcullen said about linking the narrative with our actions – also brought up in the recent piece on Strategic communications. That is – if possible – think before you act, and when possible link the action with the narrative vs. trying to invent a narrative to explain the option.

The third has to with willingness to accept risk, but with the caveat of understanding what is at risk and being able to adjust course to fulfill the objective

-All three very useful points.

“Whether transformation succeeds or fails will not be determined by how the Army is organized but, rather, how the leaders employ their forces and whether they are successful. That is the unanswered question — whether the Army can make a break with its past and the legacies of World War II to fight the wars of the 21st century.”

I don’t know if I agree with breaking from the past in general (and he may not have meant it that way) – there is a great deal to learn from it. I will sign up for understanding the past so when its bias exerts influence on me that steers me off course – I can correct for it. What I want to see are leaders who can make the best possible transition from one type of war to another so that when the nation calls we can answer. I like what the CSA said recently about looking for balance – we’ll achieve that through leaders who can function well wherever they are at, and with the means at hand – we’ll succeed where our enemies fail if we can do that faster and better then they can – that I believe is what wars call for – and it may be even more critical in the future, but perhaps only because the past is more certain.

COL Foresman has again provided us with much to consider as we make difficult choices where often there are no clear winners – but his advice about investing in leadership is without a doubt one which enables us to make the most of our choices no matter if they are particularly right, or particularly wrong – leadership will provide a way forward.

Best regards, Rob

[Norfolk]

I'd definitely agree on the issue of esprit de corps, a few guys I know and/or work with are ex-British Army, and a friend of mine just started at Sandhurst, and it seems like the benefits of the regimental system here are enormous.

But in the bigger picture, there are a lot of negatives too. In the past, the regimental system both retarded uniform training and institutional knowledge (see Britain's small wars from Clive on up), and even impeded modernization (cavalry regimental loyalties and fears often played a bigger role than conservatism in the slow pace of mechanization in the Twenties and Thirties).

That may all be in the past, but there are still some substantial negatives, mainly tied to parochialism, each regiment jealously guarding its perks and slice of the budget, particularly the more influential ones, i.e. Guards, Paras, etc.

However, some of these negatives might be negated in a much larger army like America's, I don't know.

I'd like to say that the Regimental System, when properly functioning overall, institutionalizes a degree of basic competence, and somethime outright execellence, that most other systems cannot provide under normal conditions. Probably the single most important virtue in practice of the Regimental System is that you don't have to keep re-training everyone at each and every turn in the basics, or keep having to reteach lessons learned; that's all (when the Regiment is functioning properly) more or less automatic. Obviously the troops have continue to hone the basics; but in the Regimental System there is (normally) sufficient stability and continuity of personnel and standards of training that make keeping and honing the basics much easier and more efficient while allowing for a great deal more time and effort to be used in learning about and training for much more advanced tactics and operations. Steve is very correct about the benefits of the Regiment System (when functioning properly).

The US Army wouldn't be particularly inclined (though doctrine in theory allows for this) towards using a regular (ie. Non-Air Assault/Airborne/Ranger) infantry battalion in an air assault raid on an enemy HQ or airfield, but a Commonwealth Army would. Similarly, US Marines are tasked with most of the amphibious mission (Rangers have a slice of the pie too) in the US Armed Forces; but a Commonwealth Army considers amphibious assaults a normal part of the infantry battalion role. A great deal of this is making a virtue of necessity, as the money and manpower just isn't there to maintain an entire Marine Corps or a large Airborne Force (and Commonwealth Airborne Forces and Marines tend to be commando-trained, not regular infantry who happen to be on jump-status or trained in amphib ops). But the Regimental System produces efficiencies that may allow for a much more expansive range of training and taskings for what would otherwise be a rather more pedestrian infantry battalion in an Army without such a Regimental System.

Also, an ordinary rifleman in a Commonwealth Army receives 6 month's recruit and basic infantry training (with no specialization in machine-gunning, recce, assault pioneer, anti-armour, etc. - that's for later - , just rifleman training) and to a generally higher standard than most other armies, where the battalions are expected to train the troops up to snuff, taking away valuable time for other training. The Regimental System goes a long way to avoiding this last situation. And again, it (normally) provides a continuity and stability of personnel and training standards that most other systems can't surpass, although a few can match. When you join a Regiment, you are a part of it for the rest of your carrer, and will spend most or even all of your career within that Regiment. This results in a cumulative degree of professional excellence and experience that is very difficult to acquire by most other means.

But, as Granite State and others pointed out, there are, amongst others, two potentially serious problems that they have already identified with the Regimental System. The first is "Group Think". Now, as pointed out by others, this actually has benefits too, providing both a sense of tradition and example and a force of will in the face of adversity that stands in good stead at critical moments on the battlefield. But there is also the problems that when the system isn't functioning properly, "Group Think" especially resulting in nepotism and the like, can result in tactical ossification and downright moral corruption and break-down of morale and discipline. There are such things as bad regiments, and when that happens, it often takes a wholesale housecleaning by outsiders to retrieve the situtation.

The Second, and perhaps most common problem with the Regimental System is Tribalism, which not only makes it difficult to work with other Regiments, Corps, and Arms at times, also resulting in tactical ossification, but in some real unpleasantness between Regiments. For those who have never been part of a Regiment, it may be difficult to grasp the sometimes gut-level, even visceral at times, psychlogical and emotional impact that being part of a Regiment has. The Regiment is your world; the Army is a "foreign" body with which your Regiment in effect has a contract with.

Promotions in the Regiment are made by the Regimental Senate, not the Army. Each Regiment has not only its own history and traditions, but its own institutions, museums (even Battalions of a Regiment may have their own museums), libraries, messes, clubs, barracks, associations, etc., that are all directly owned (except for barracks, the Army owns these) and supported personally and financially by the members of the Regiment (and to which each member must contribute). No outsider is permitted into these places without being accompanied and signed in by a member of the Regiment. Each Regiment is kept separated from the others by a respectable and safe distance. Real unpleasantness may occur when these rules are not consciously followed.

But the best system is not the Regimental System. For all its superiority over most other systems, the WWII German Divisional System is by far the best. Generally similar to the British Regimental System, including an emphasis on local recruiting, the Divisional System (in turned prodeuced by the Wehrkreise System) is the best, and while it produced no less strong regiments than the British system, the focus of tribal identity was the Combined-Arms Division, not the single-arm Regiment. Couple this with the superb training, discipline, leadership, and Auftragstaktik with the Geenral staff System (another thread in itself), and you have the finest "System" in the world. The performance of the Deutchesheer in WWII I think bears this argument out rather well. This is the system every Army should use.

The Regimental System is not exactly a stranger to the selective use/abuse of history for noble, and less-than noble purposes, especially when used to justify or excuse tactical ossification.

A perspective from inside a Regiment.

[Ken White]

system -- and to the German system; I think the biggest advantage of the former is, as Norlfolks says:

"...When you join a Regiment, you are a part of it for the rest of your carrer, and will spend most or even all of your career within that Regiment. This results in a cumulative degree of professional excellence and experience that is very difficult to acquire by most other means."

The advantage that accrues is an intangible -- if one is going to stay in a unit, one wants to be with competent people who can be tolerated. In most of the US Army for many years since WW II, people tended to move every two to three years. Thus if there was a slacker, it was too easy to say "He'll (or I'll) be gone in seven months, he's not worth getting into a hassle over." The transfers don't happen as often but that is still the overarching mentality. How much those transfers lend to professional competenece and development and how much they serve to justify a large personnel bureaucracy is in the view of the beholder and grist for another thread.

An exception to this has been the 82d Airborne which, in this sense functions like a large Regiment. Men go to the Division and spend years there; they may rotate out to Alaska or Korea or even Europe but they tend to go back to the Division and will generally fight to go back to their last unit. Thus, the NCOs there are long serving and prone to come down on the marginally competent and run them off.

Thus, the advantage is, I think, the continuity and not the structure.

A downside of the system is that local recruitment. The biggest problem is that if a unit has a bad day and receives massive casualties, it can devastate a small town back home.

Then there is the tribal issue. I've heard Patricias say bad things about the RCR and heard the Black Watch say unbelievable things about the rest of the British Army. The opinion of the 3 RAR about the rest of the Strine Army is also not good. In fairness, with no local recruitment at all, the opinion of the Fifth Marines about the 1st and 7th did not bear repeating once upon a time and the guys from the 504PIR will tell you about the shortcomings of the 325 and 505. Tribalism is an acquired trait in that respect but it has been my observation in the larger Army that such tribalism and unit loyalty is less intense, mostly due to the large number of units with whom one has served in several Divisions because of an individual assignment policy.

I suggest the greatest advantage the Commonwealth Armies have is in this:

"Also, an ordinary rifleman in a Commonwealth Army receives 6 month's recruit and basic infantry training (with no specialization in machine-gunning, recce, assault pioneer, anti-armour, etc. - that's for later - , just rifleman training) and to a generally higher standard than most other armies, where the battalions are expected to train the troops up to snuff, taking away valuable time for other training."

and this:

"The US Army wouldn't be particularly inclined (though doctrine in theory allows for this) towards using a regular (ie. Non-Air Assault/Airborne/Ranger) infantry battalion in an air assault raid on an enemy HQ or airfield, but a Commonwealth Army would."

That, fortunately, is changing but is sure isn't changing fast enough. These kids and units are capable of doing much more than we ask them to and, terribly, the biggest impediments all too often are nothing more than 'fear of failure' and lack of imagination. Norfolk is too polite to say so, I'm not -- we have too much money and we tend to overspend on the wrong things and pay inadequate attention to training.

We train better now than we have in my lifetime -- we still do not do it long enough to get an inculcation of the standards and basics embedded in Joe's little psyche. We're still oriented to training WW II draftees -- and Lieutenants. The Marines do it a little better for both Officers and peons but we're shortchanging the troops. Shame on us...

[Norfolk]

Then there is the tribal issue. I've heard Patricias say bad things about the RCR

These kids and units are capable of doing much more than we ask them to and, terribly, the biggest impediments all too often are nothing more than 'fear of failure' and lack of imagination. Norfolk is too polite to say so, I'm not -- we have too much money and we tend to overspend on the wrong things and pay inadequate attention to training.

We train better now than we have in my lifetime -- we still do not do it long enough to get an inculcation of the standards and basics embedded in Joe's little psyche. We're still oriented to training WW II draftees -- and Lieutenants. The Marines do it a little better for both Officers and peons but we're shortchanging the troops. Shame on us...

Well, I guess I just had that coming to me for my rash and unthinking statements vis-a-vis how the Airborne should go to the Air Force and saying the Marines were a part of the Navy (I have since engaged in some clarification of my statements in those matters, but that's another thread)..., and Ken has been so good as to be forgiving of my "youthful indiscretion"...

But ordinarily such statements would be considered fightin' words, and the flamethrowers would come out and the offenders shown no mercy for their insolence and offence to the Regiment (and after this post, I'm going to work off my frustrations on a few PPCLI's [pronounced "picklies" - and that's the polite version]). But right now, I have to save the flamethrower for those Marines and Paratroopers who took undue offence to my earlier statements

The truth is that much of USA and USMC doctrine is actually an improvement over Commonwealth Armies' doctrine, even at tactical level. It just gets lost in often inadequate individual training as well as the personnel turbulence of US units (especially the Army). Take, for example the rifle squad or section. US Army has a 9-man squad right now, with a Squad Leader and two 4-man fire teams; USMC has its 13-man squad with its Leader and three 4-man fire teams; most Commonwealth Armies have an 8-man section right now, with two 4-man assault groups/fire teams, but the Section Commander has to pull double-duty as the leader of one of the two assault groups/fire teams, so he's not free to direct covering fire (doctrinally, the Section 2i/c, who also pulls double duty as the leader of the second assault group/fire team, does this, while the Section Commander leads the assault) on the enemy during an attack, or to move about to coordinate the defence.

Furthermore, in the advance-to-contact, the entire Section moves all at once, as one, thus completely exposing itself to enemy observation and fire. In movement-to-contact, both the US Army and the USMC squads provide overwatch with at least one Fire Team and the Squad Leader under cover as the other Fire Team (or Teams) move to cover, thus greatly reducing the risk of crippling losses to the squad. A Commonwealth Section requires the rest of the platoon to provide overwatch (and this may be a single section and the weapons det overwatching the other two). Granted, a Commonwealth Section is easy to control (it's really more or less just a big fire team), and it's quick to respond with all its firepower on contact, all at once, but it's terribly vulnerable in the meantime.

The US troops (particularly the Army, less so the Marines) just aren't given a chance to realize their potential as either individual soldiers or as cohesive units. The US Army infantry especially is not given much of a chance to really show what it is potentially capable of. It would be just as good as the best Commonwealth units, and those US Light Infantry units (as well as other types involved in the same program) that were formed and trained under COHORT twenty or so years ago were on paper almost as well-led and -trained, and probably exceeded in those same areas many, perhaps even most Commonwealth units in practice. On those occasions when it's allowed to get its act together, the US Army can shine with the best of them. Trouble is, the System usually won't let it, but the Army could do it if the System let it, make no mistake. Ken's right that the Army is still stuck in WWII training-wise, and that it programmed to produce mass quantities of mediocrely-trained troosp. It's not right and can and should be changed.

[Steve Blair]

As I've indicated before (in this thread and others) I remain a big fan of the original U.S. regimental system. It wasn't tied to geographic regions (though that was proposed from time to time) and for the most part it remained free of some of the squabbling and distinctions that Ken mentioned with the British forces (I suspect in part because none of the U.S. regiments had the sort of symbolic duties and/or functions that their British counterparts had...the Old Guard is a very modern invention that had no place in the old system). Most squabbling was reserved for branch conflicts (cavalry versus infantry and so on), but even that was rather reserved.

And Ken and I also agree about the impact of the rotation system on units.

[Rifleman]

But the best system is not the Regimental System. For all its superiority over most other systems, the WWII German Divisional System is by far the best. Generally similar to the British Regimental System, including an emphasis on local recruiting, the Divisional System (in turned prodeuced by the Wehrkreise System) is the best, and while it produced no less strong regiments than the British system, the focus of tribal identity was the Combined-Arms Division, not the single-arm Regiment. Couple this with the superb training, discipline, leadership, and Auftragstaktik with the Geenral staff System (another thread in itself), and you have the finest "System" in the world. The performance of the Deutchesheer in WWII I think bears this argument out rather well. This is the system every Army should use.

Let's assume that's true. I don't know if it is, or isn't, but if it is.....

Since the division is now acting more like a corps why not go the final step and organize permanently into big separate brigades commanded by a brigadier? The brigadier could have one or two colonels under him in case something smaller was needed for a specific mission. They could command ad hoc combat commands (or something similar to a Marine Corps MEU designed to fit the Army's needs) of one or two battalions for a specific mission.

Tradition and heraldry could still be maintained. You could still have the 82nd Airborne Brigade, etc. In fact, a lot of historic division shoulder patches that haven't been worn since WWII might have to come back for brigade HQs. The National Guard does that now.

You could also divide the U.S. into brigade districts. This would probably meet our needs for "tribalism" and a sense of primary group somewhat better than the British regimental system. A soldier from a particular region could still serve with his region's combined arms brigade even if he did not want a combat arms MOS. Not so for a single branch regiment drawn from a particular region.

And if you don't like those ideas.....we could always call them legions and subdivide them into cohorts!

Strength and honor!