Culture battle: Selective use of history should not be used to justify the status quo

[Ken White]

Let's assume that's true. I don't know if it is, or isn't, but if it is.....

Since the division is now acting more like a corps why not go the final step and organize permanently into big separate brigades commanded by a brigadier? The brigadier could have one or two colonels under him in case something smaller was needed for a specific mission. They could command ad hoc combat commands (or something similar to a Marine Corps MEU designed to fit the Army's needs) of one or two battalions for a specific mission.
. . .
. . .
And if you don't like those ideas.....we could always call them legions and subdivide them into cohorts!

Strength and honor!

The Pen-tagun will revolve on its axis! You're eliminating Major General spaces. Absolute no-no, that...

(Even though you're really right on big brigades, the command structure and the lineage and patch bit. That's been proposed many times and what I said has always defeated it -- that and the WW II mentality. Which is ironic because other than North Africa, we really fought all of WW II as RCTs, the divisions just tried to keep up and for the most part, did the repple depple, beans and bullets bit...)

[Norfolk]

Let's assume that's true. I don't know if it is, or isn't, but if it is.....

Since the division is now acting more like a corps why not go the final step and organize permanently into big separate brigades commanded by a brigadier? The brigadier could have one or two colonels under him in case something smaller was needed for a specific mission. They could command ad hoc combat commands (or something similar to a Marine Corps MEU designed to fit the Army's needs) of one or two battalions for a specific mission.

Tradition and heraldry could still be maintained. You could still have the 82nd Airborne Brigade, etc. In fact, a lot of historic division shoulder patches that haven't been worn since WWII might have to come back for brigade HQs. The National Guard does that now.

You could also divide the U.S. into brigade districts. This would probably meet our needs for "tribalism" and a sense of primary group somewhat better than the British regimental system. A soldier from a particular region could still serve with his region's combined arms brigade even if he did not want a combat arms MOS. Not so for a single branch regiment drawn from a particular region.

And if you don't like those ideas.....we could always call them legions and subdivide them into cohorts!

Strength and honor!

Rifleman, you have articulated something that I have been thinking about for some time now, which is the idea of returning to the old system of brigading regiments. Now, the exact composition of such brigades would obviously depend upon their role. For example, I'd like to see an Armoured Brigade composed of 2 Regiments of Armoured (mechanized) Infantry and a Regiment each of Armour, Artillery, Engineers, and a Recce Battalion (at least),et al , bumping brigade back up to the level that it had in the US Army prior to McNair's Triangular Division (but not necessarily dispensing with the triangular arrangement, let alone return to the old Square Division, unless that proved to be tactically better). Division in turn would likewise be bumped up back up to the same level as it had pre-c.1940, and Corps in turn would displace Field Army; "Army Group" would simply be what you find in NATO (a multi-national group of army corps). Think about; in the entire US Army, their would be at most 2 corps commander slots, and that's including both Active and Reserve Components.

There's something oddly satisfying just imagining the howls and screams emanating from the galaxy of the stars as 2-,3-, and 4-star types fell from their lofty heights with no inflated formation structures to "justify" their holding of excessive rank. It feels kind of good...until Ken comes along and administers the usual dose of grim, depressing reality.

P.S.: While I'm still dreaming, I'd like an Infantry Brigade of 3 Regiments of Infantry (foot), a Regiment of Artillery, and a Battalion each of Armour, APCs, Engineers, Reconnaissance, etc.; basically what the good old-fashioned regular infantry divisions used to be, but much better-led and -trained.

All right, dreaming over.

[wm]

Rifleman, you have articulated something that I have been thinking about for some time now, which is the idea of returning to the old system of brigading regiments. Now, the exact composition of such brigades would obviously depend upon their role. For example, I'd like to see an Armoured Brigade composed of 2 Regiments of Armoured (mechanized) Infantry and a Regiment each of Armour, Artillery, Engineers, and a Recce Battalion (at least),et al , bumping brigade back up to the level that it had in the US Army prior to McNair's Triangular Division (but not necessarily dispensing with the triangular arrangement, let alone return to the old Square Division, unless that proved to be tactically better). Division in turn would likewise be bumped up back up to the same level as it had pre-c.1940, and Corps in turn would displace Field Army; "Army Group" would simply be what you find in NATO (a multi-national group of army corps). Think about; in the entire US Army, their would be at most 2 corps commander slots, and that's including both Active and Reserve Components.

What you describe was actually very like the concept plan early on in Army transformation discussions. Above the brigade-sized Units of Action (UA) were to to be 2 command and control headquarters levels, or Units of Execution (UE)--some (UEx) would have combined division and corps HQ functions while others (UEy) would be HQs that combined Corps and echelons above corps (EAC) functions. I seem to recall that there was going to be a significant reduction in the number of Army two-, three-, and four-button command slots because of the consolidations into these UEx's and UEy's.

Well, UA's became Brigade Combat Teams of various sorts (heavy, light, sustainment, maneuver enhancement, fires, etc)--ostensibly because UA was a less meaningful term and was hard to understand by the Army in the field. And, rather than getting a decrease in the number of division and higher HQs, another Combatant Command (AFRICOM) has appeared on the scene.

I don't know for sure why the UEx/y construct disappeared (I had moved onto other work by that time), but I suspect that Ken White had his finger pointed in the right direction. The problem of "casing the colors" for such tradition and glory covered units as the "The Big Red One," 'Rock of the Marne," "Old Ironsides, "All-America," and "Screamin' Eagles" may have something to do with it as well. We (the Army at least) seem to have a certain affinity for the hostorical lineage assocciated with some of those names. I haven't figured out why (other than for "emotional" reasons) we still have a division numbered 101, 82, or even 25 in an active force that has had fewer than 20 total divisions for over 20 years now.

[Rifleman]

I haven't figured out why (other than for "emotional" reasons) we still have a division numbered 101, 82, or even 25 in an active force that has had fewer than 20 total divisions for over 20 years now.

I haven't figured out why (other than some sort of "We can't do it that way because it's never been done that way." attitude) we can't have brigades numbered 101, 82, 25, etc.

If the Army wants to preserve the history of it's fighting divisions, well, anyone for a 9th Brigade Combat Team, "Old Reliables," or a 17th Airborne Brigade, "Golden Talon?" Or does that just make too much sense?

"It's never been done that way," many will say. "That's not how heraldry works," say others.

Well, now, before the regiments were disbanded and that GOOFY! system of having a battalion trace it's lineage to a lettered company of some regiment came into being.....it had never been done that way either. Somebody just decided it was going to be that way.

[Tom Odom]

Well, now, before the regiments were disbanded and that GOOFY! system of having a battalion trace it's lineage to a lettered company of some regiment came into being.....it had never been done that way either. Somebody just decided it was going to be that way.

Officially this is CMH's role. Unofficially, the elephants active and retired really make the decisions.

Tom

[Ken White]

Officially this is CMH's role. Unofficially, the elephants active and retired really make the decisions.

Tom

And the latter have more clout than many realize...

Agree with the thread trend above, Bdes with the old Div designations -- and patches.

I've never been a fan of the triangular concept. The Germans developed it to cope with a predominately Reservist Army and we and the Brits adapted it for our WW II mostly conscript Armies. The theory was that the odd number would force flexible thinking.

First flaw in that is most people are smarter than the 'really-smart-people-in-charge' generally think they are. The second is that you cannot force an inflexible person to think flexibly and the third is that lack of combat power at company level creates way too many problems that an excessive number of small battalions won't solve...

I've long thought that the ideal Armor Battalion would have two Tank and two Armored Rifle Companies plus a Reconnaissance Company / Cav Troop (not platoon) -- with the Infantry mounted in far more heavily armored PCs (NOT IFV. Converted tanks...) would be far more tactically flexible and easier to train.

The usual complaint I hear about that is that the span of control is too great -- my usual response is that we over control everything...

[wm]

The Germans developed it to cope with a predominately Reservist Army and we and the Brits adapted it for our WW II mostly conscript Armies. The theory was that the odd number would force flexible thinking.

First flaw in that is most people are smarter than the 'really-smart-people-in-charge' generally think they are. The second is that you cannot force an inflexible person to think flexibly and the third is that lack of combat power at company level creates way too many problems that an excessive number of small battalions won't solve...

I've long thought that the ideal Armor Battalion would have two Tank and two Armored Rifle Companies plus a Reconnaissance Company / Cav Troop (not platoon) -- with the Infantry mounted in far more heavily armored PCs (NOT IFV. Converted tanks...) would be far more tactically flexible and easier to train.

The usual complaint I hear about that is that the span of control is too great -- my usual response is that we over control everything...

Ken,
I thought the Germans went to a triangular arrangement across the board during the later stages of WWI because casualty rates produced an inability to adequately fill their original square organizations. (I seem to remember the reserve formations were triangular when initially mobilized as well.) I thought a similar kind of reorganization occurred, for similar reasons, with the formation volks grenadier division later in WWII.

Anyway, both triangular and square formations have good reasons for their adoption from a fire and maneuver perspective. Span of control is a red herring. A typical 1980s US Army heavy division commander had at least 3 maneuver brigades, a cav squadron, a brigade-sized Divarty, and a Discom to command, not to mention assorted elements that got passed down DS/GS/attached from Corps. (Yeah, I know he had two 1-star Assistants to help out too). We even bumped up the Engineers to a Bde-sized force as well. I do not recall any of those commanders complaining about having their span of control exceeded.

[Norfolk]

And the latter have more clout than many realize...

Agree with the thread trend above, Bdes with the old Div designations -- and patches.

I've never been a fan of the triangular concept. The Germans developed it to cope with a predominately Reservist Army and we and the Brits adapted it for our WW II mostly conscript Armies. The theory was that the odd number would force flexible thinking.

First flaw in that is most people are smarter than the 'really-smart-people-in-charge' generally think they are. The second is that you cannot force an inflexible person to think flexibly and the third is that lack of combat power at company level creates way too many problems that an excessive number of small battalions won't solve...

I've long thought that the ideal Armor Battalion would have two Tank and two Armored Rifle Companies plus a Reconnaissance Company / Cav Troop (not platoon) -- with the Infantry mounted in far more heavily armored PCs (NOT IFV. Converted tanks...) would be far more tactically flexible and easier to train.

The usual complaint I hear about that is that the span of control is too great -- my usual response is that we over control everything...

Ken, this sounds a lot like the Commonwealth Combat Team organization. Take an Armoured Regiment with four Tank Squadrons, attach two of them out to a pair of Armoured Infantry Battalions, and pair an Armoured Infantry Company with each of the remaining two Tank Squadrons and the Regimental Recce Troop (platoon) (reinforced by Brigade Recce Squadron [company] if necessary), and whalla!, you can roll over anything in your path up to half your size with hardly breaking stride, and whip anything several times your size on the defence.

We would pair a Tank Squadron and a Rifle company, with the Tank OC commanding the Combat Team in open terrain, the Infantry OC in close terrain. The usual use for these Combat Teams was as Brigade counter-attack or blocking force with two Infantry Battalions up front (of course) in the defence. But in the offense, the Combat Teams would move very fast; if enemy infantry was encountered, the Tank Squadron (at least 2 out of its 4Tank Troops) would provide the base of fire with 1 or 2 tank troops accompanying the rifle company in the assault with APCs providing additional suppression from the flanks; if enemy armour was encountered, the Infantry Company assumed a hasty defence on suitable ground while the Tank Squadron fought a covering force battle and lured the enemy armour into the trap set by the Rifle Company. Once the infantry had worked the enemy over, the tanks counter-attacked.

The Germans taught us this. Kurt Meyer was held in Canada for a few years after WWII, and he starting writing all these letters on tactics and operations to the Army General Staff. Someone at General Simond's office (or the General himself) got interested, and went down to New Brunswick to talk to Meyer. Meyer soon returned to Germany, but the Army spent the next 10 years experimenting with his concepts and rewriting its doctrine. By the 1970's, German Doctrine was set in stone in the CF. Amongst other things, the Germans do not split companies up and cross-attached platoons between them like other Armies often do. They think that it creates confusion and dilutes combat power. They don't even really like cross-attaching between battalions under some circumstances. The Canadian Army is too small too use pure battalions according to the latter, except for the odd infantry battalion, and the Brits liked to have Square Brigades so they could form two Combat Teams in each Infantry Battlion/Armoured Regiment.

Ken - love the Nammer HAPC, best there is, and better than any IFV. And General Simonds, of course, invented the HAPC (the Kangaroo) in Normandy. It can take a long time to learn, or re-learn, the lessons of warfare.

As to CMH and the old general and colonels: in the Commonwealth the old Colonels (of all kinds) often tend to wield a political clout that trumps that of the serving officers of the Regiments.

[Ken White]

Tanks, Infantry and the recon guys (all ours are too small and IMO, not as well trained as they could be -- that from an old 19D [among other things ]...). Attachments and OpCons have their uses but the more limited they are, the better. That building block process unquestionably works but units with organic power that train and live together operate far more effectively.

The maintenance and training aspects as objections are vastly overstated and are pretty much parochialism distilled to protect spaces for branches.

Did I ever mention replacing Branch loyalty with unit loyalty...

I'd also add, for big war purposes, an organic FA Battery, realizing todays Batteries have the firepower of WW II Battalions. We can centralize the effects of fires from some distance today.

[Rex Brynen]

ove the Nammer HAPC, best there is, and better than any IFV.

I'm not so sure--leaving aside having only a .50 on a chassis this heavy, have you seen how small the rear door is for dismounting?



Its not clear if they've fixed this on the production version, using the Mk 4 chassis.

OK, off topic *lol* ...and back the the original thread...

[Ken White]

on it and the tendency of some commanders (vehicle and unit) is to think they have a light tank and misemploy the vehicles. That's why I said APC and not IFV...

The IFV was IMO always a very bad idea. Norfolk is correct in that the Ram conversion to the Kangaroo was a great idea.

(Which means y'all could convert your Leopard C1s to APCs... )

Door's big enough; ramps are only handy if you want to haul cargo -- again, tending to set the vehicle up for misuse. The only real advantage is to load casualties (misuse, IMO *) I suspect the Israelis will have tracked and Armored ambulances nearby and as evacuating casualties is not the Infantry Squads job -- nor should it be -- the need for a wide entrance is at least arguable.

* Of course, I'm a Dinosaur, trained by folks who'd been in WW II and who told me that the only thing I was to do to a casualty was take his ammo and chow -- and if the BAR man, also his weapon -- and never the water or field dressing. So I made the folks who worked for me in both Korea and Viet Nam do the same thing. Others mileage today may vary; we are a kinder and gentler world. Which is probably a good thing -- if it stays that way, if not you may want to resurrect the Dinosaurs...

[wm]

Did I ever mention replacing Branch loyalty with unit loyalty...

Talk abou heresy. Norfolk's need to find a good covered and concealed position after his faux pas about the airborne on the About Airmen thread is nowhere near as great as your need will be when the TRADOC branch school leaders and MILPERCEN (oh excuse me, Human Resources Command) assignment folks find out what you want to do to their fiefdoms.

[Norfolk]

I'm not so sure--leaving aside having only a .50 on a chassis this heavy, have you seen how small the rear door is for dismounting?



Its not clear if they've fixed this on the production version, using the Mk 4 chassis.

OK, off topic *lol* ...and back the the original thread...

Rex, but the rear doors on a lot of IFVs aren't much better, except for those that have ramps. I rembmer all too well trying to get in and out of the LAV-1 which has two rear doors, and somehow (because of that stupid lip at the bottom) it usually ended up with guys piling up on top of one another as someone invariably tripped. But an increase in protection is utterly necessary, as the infantry need to get as close to the enemy positions as possible - even 200-300m away may too far for infantry squads/sections to go before enemy fire inflicts crippling losses or the infantry simply have to go to gournd, and lose all momentum - disastrous. Whenever and wherever possible, infantry should dismount no more than 100 metres away from the enemy position, and the assault position should not have to be more than 50 m away from the enemy, or the assaulting troops may suffer too many losses even before rolling into the trenches.

This means that APC must have the same protection as MBT (I think Gen. Don Starry wrote quite a bit about this) or they probably won't make it close enough to the enemy defences to get the infantry to their attack positions (both suppression and assault) without exposing themselves to heavy losses. First off, IFVs at typical infantry dismount ranges (up to 300m from enemy position) are vulnerable to both light anti-tank weapons and heavy machine guns. Only recently have some IFVs been armoured against Soviet 14.5mm AP fired by KPV HMG as close as 200m on their sides; closer than that, and the IFV's are toast as enemy dismounted HMGs fire into their sides and rip them and their passengers apart. Needless to say, autocannons on defending IFVs will do the job even better, and even the heaviest IFVs are only protected against 30mm APFSDS along their frontal arcs, and some IFVs now carry 40mm cannons. Only MBT-level protection can handle that.

Also, most infantry light anti-tank weapons are not very effective against MBT-level protected vehicles (a few like RPG-29 are on areas not covered by composite armour), and the heavier stuff has be be several hundred metres behind the front lines to work effectively both in order to arm and to "capture" targets, not to mention have enough distance between themselves and the front line so that the tanks don't get them right away. Tanks lead the APCs/IFVs and are tasked with destroying or suppressing enemy tanks and ATGMs on the way in. These are some of the reasons the Israelis have opted for the Nammer (et al) instead of IFV to replace M-113. Nammer, of course, also carries a full (if small) infantry squad of 9 men and most IFV carry only 6 or 7.

As for the 50-cal (and the 7.62 as well), that's a compromise. The Israelis have correctly identified that the primary point is to get the infantry as close as possible to the enemy position so that they can close with and destroy the enemy, without suffering such losses on the way in that either they can't complete their attack, or even if they do succeed, their losses are such that they can't beat off the inevitable enemy counter-attack. An HMG is a very powerful weapon, and paired with an MMG is very useful in all sorts of conditions. Very smart of the Israelis to have chosen what they did for the Nammer.

The problem with light cannon is space. Ideally every APC or IFV would have an autocannon that would allow them to suppress or destroy ATGM launchers out to at least 4,000m - maybe the 40mm can do that; and be able to take out anything short of an MBT at at least half that range. But an autocannon, the turret basket, its fire-control systems, ammunition bins/stowage, tools, etc., take up a lot of space, and when that means you can't carry a full infantry squad/section anymore, it's just self-defeating. Besides, the larger autocannons don't allow for very much ammo to be carried anyway, undoubtedly effective as they are. You can carry a lot more MG ammo for the same ammount of space and keep fighting.

As it is, the tanks are supposed to be providing the heavy firepower, and the IFVs/APCs the infantry to clean up in their wake. HESH fired by tank (rifled, not smoothbore) guns is vastly more effective than autocannon rounds of any persuasion; even one of the new multi-purpose rounds for smoothbore tank guns are more effective than several rounds of scarce autocannon ammo. If space in the infantry's vehicles are taken up by cannons and their ammo, there's not enough infantry to do the job, even with all the added suppression (Gen. DePuy might have disputed this point, maybe Tom or Fred can weigh-in with a contrary view here).

[Ski]

Again, the Center of Military History had a COA where the Active Duty Divisions HQ's would have been wearing Corps HQ shoulder patches and the BCT's would have worn Divisional Patches.

I may actually be able to drag some of this material out of mothballs if given the chance. I remember 18 Corps being the 82nd Airborne Division, with the 82nd BCT, 101st BCT, 173rd BCT and 17th BCT underneath them IIRC...

The greybeards were the ones who stopped this. Retired GO's who couldn't bear to see the old 82nd or 101st Airborne Division associations be scuttled...and there was significant pushback from certain AC GO's as well.

It is very cool seeing many of the old ARNG patches back in service.

[Tom Odom]

Tanks, Infantry and the recon guys (all ours are too small and IMO, not as well trained as they could be -- that from an old 19D [among other things ]...). Attachments and OpCons have their uses but the more limited they are, the better. That building block process unquestionably works but units with organic power that train and live together operate far more effectively.

The maintenance and training aspects as objections are vastly overstated and are pretty much parochialism distilled to protect spaces for branches.

Did I ever mention replacing Branch loyalty with unit loyalty...

I'd also add, for big war purposes, an organic FA Battery, realizing todays Batteries have the firepower of WW II Battalions. We can centralize the effects of fires from some distance today.

Sounds like an ACR, Ken

but we like playing with blocks

Tom

[Ken White]

give young officers. When they get to be Chief of Staff, they should:

Change that part of AR 600-200 that says a NCO selected by the central board will be promoted unless his Commander writes a letter to remove him for cause to read "he will be promoted only if his commander writes a letter concurring." The rationale is simply that commanders do not have time to write letters to remove marginal people but they will find time to write letters for their really good people.

Nuke the Hoffman building.

BTW, I understand that HRC, concerned over the possible misapplication of their initials by someone and the potential for the word 'Command' to be seen as not in keeping with the COOP ideal of egalitarianism has considered a name change to 'Human and Unit Resources Liaison' or HURL.

[Ken White]

Sounds like an ACR, Ken

but we like playing with blocks

Tom

Same basic idea, just more combat power. As that ancient oriental philosopher once said, "whatever works..." and yep, we do, even if they don't fit together very well...

Consider the fact that a lot of great combined arms officers got their start as old style Cav Platoon leaders. Scouts, Tanks, Infantry and fire support all in one package designed for independent action. What a novel idea.

You don't suppose fear of that independent action led to the demise, do you?

[Norfolk]

Talk about...Norfolk's need to find a good covered and concealed position after his faux pas about the airborne on the About Airmen thread is nowhere near as great as your need will be when the TRADOC branch school leaders and MILPERCEN (oh excuse me, Human Resources Command) assignment folks find out what you want to do to their fiefdoms.

and let the gators get 'em when they come for us - I understand the gators down South are lately acquiring a taste for two-legged delicacies.

I wish we could convert the old Leopards to HAPCS, but like the US Army, we have to support the folks at General Dynamics to keep jobs (including those of politicians and their staffs) in Ontario and Alabama. That said, the Leopard, while a very nice piece of kit, was a little thin-skinned for my liking. But as long as it was just Armoured Toads who were going to suffer, I'd didn't much mind; after the tanks'd stopped burning, we infantry would have stripped the machine guns and anything else useful or amusing from the wrecks...have I just managed to spur yet another branch community to scream for my blood?

[Ken White]

we'll strike. It is better to give PTSD than to receive.

The C1 could be up armored, sans the turret, plenty of power -- however, I hear you on the keeping GD and the Carlyle Group from going to the poorhouse...

[Tom Odom]

You don't suppose fear of that independent action led to the demise, do you?

Wot? Independence? Can't have that...

Next the lads will be thinking

And that would be dangerous, wot?

Tell them to pull (not squeeze) the trigger every time their left boot hits the ground...

Eyes front...

No thinking...

Tighten up those ranks you slovenly bastards...

Now that is soldiering, Ken!

Tom