All that is old is new again.....

[Tom Odom]

G'day Guys,

Tom,

not that many of us Aussies have cable - and I reckon we have got no hope of seeing any of those movies on our 'free to air' TV. And, of course, I did not have the advantage of seeing them during their original theatrical release like you did...

There ya go...

Try to be nice....

I saw 'em on a Saturday matinee for a nickel ticket

And by the way, the Aussies have heard of video and DVDs have they not?

Tom

[Mark O'Neill]

There ya go...

Try to be nice....

I saw 'em on a Saturday matinee for a nickel ticket

And by the way, the Aussies have heard of video and DVDs have they not?

Tom

G'day Tom,

Of course, we have heard of them.........

Cheers

Mark

[jcustis]

It seems instead our tactics are often driving adjustments in our strategy & policy as what works on the ground is slowly translated up the food chain and then incorporated. It seems we could save allot of time and treasure by being more realistic up front.

RT, I think you are hitting a nail somewhere with this statement, but it sounds as though you expect the situation of the ground to be the other way. If so, could you expound on it a little more?

I would agree that strategy should shape tactics only in as much as the strategy sets a framework. I don't know if it's at all that bad that tactics shift/adjust/morph must faster than strategy can, and the strategy expands/contracts to incorporate "lessons learned", so to speak, of the tactics.

As for your point about being more realistic up front, are you referencing the proclamations to the media that have been made concerning our strategy shifts in Iraq? Would you say that the administration should have been saying, "We will be adjusting our tactics as necessary..." while avoiding talk of strategy?

[Rob Thornton]

[QUOTE]

Quote:
It seems instead our tactics are often driving adjustments in our strategy & policy as what works on the ground is slowly translated up the food chain and then incorporated. It seems we could save allot of time and treasure by being more realistic up front.

RT, I think you are hitting a nail somewhere with this statement, but it sounds as though you expect the situation of the ground to be the other way. If so, could you expound on it a little more?

I would agree that strategy should shape tactics only in as much as the strategy sets a framework. I don't know if it's at all that bad that tactics shift/adjust/morph must faster than strategy can, and the strategy expands/contracts to incorporate "lessons learned", so to speak, of the tactics.

As for your point about being more realistic up front, are you referencing the proclamations to the media that have been made concerning our strategy shifts in Iraq? Would you say that the administration should have been saying, "We will be adjusting our tactics as necessary..." while avoiding talk of strategy?[/QUOTE]

JC,
Good points. I guess I'm trying to establish the linkage between our policy objectives, to our strategy then down to the tactics. LTC Kilucullen pointed out that the big strategy shift was in securing the population (to facillitate the political solution & stability) not in the "surge" which was just the means to implement the strategy. I think we've kind of walked through this from where we started in 2003. I've met some of the ARCENT planners from OIF 1. Their biggest regret seems to be not being able to fully account for the PH IV piece - however I'd argue that would be a tough one to have visualized and articulated with the type of certainty needed to sway the tide as it were at the time (coming off of OEF, and the OSD dynamics).

The folks on the ground have sorted this one out - at a cost. It was not an easy one, but I think we've done a pretty good job of it. This has been fed back into policy and strategy and then back down to tactics where new direction is executed. I'm not sure it could've gone too much differently given the "perfect storm" type conditions that seem to surround us when fog, friction and chance are played out over extended time.

I should've phrased the "realism" remark more as a question. It is hard to place many of the decisions made in 2003-2005 in their proper context since we are influenced so much by 2006-2007. Even n 20 years we'll be prejudiced by how things eventually work out, and what goes on in between now and then.

What I'd like to see is a policy - strategy / match for where we go from here. With all the bluster on who is the enemy and who should be next, where we go from here in Iraq, what is at stake, etc. - I see very little of the realism that acknowledges why its very likely that we will be involved in the region and even the world.

Imagine the possible difference in Iraq and CENTCOM strategy if up font we'd qualified and articulated that the access to natural resources is a vital interest to U.S. (our security, our economy, our prosperity, etc.) and that the growing and persistent threats of terrorism, WMD, coercion, blackmail etc. by non-state actors and irresponsible states in today's globalized world cannot be allowed to threaten those vital interests because nothing is isolated anymore. The world has changed and we must adjust.

Imagine if as ugly and unpalatable as it sounds, we made a long term commitment up front - but did not decide that the solution to every problem and problem set was a hammer. I think it translates down the food chain. I think it helps to break the rotational mind set we had at the tactical level initially. When you make a long term commitment to something, it changes the way you consider it, and how you apply ways and means towards its solution. It also effects the political schedule.

When problems are looked at holistically and in depth with as many of the possible permutations as possible considered it becomes more then just this or that administrations policy and it becomes more then just a military (or other element of national power) problem. Our policies need to be seen in the context of "grand strategy" I think. We need to spend some real time thinking about how the ways and means we apply to address a specific problem (on some scale) or conditions change the relationships with other areas and create or possibly even work toward addressing those problems. This should help us from living paycheck to paycheck (or supplemental to supplemental).

We recently discussed on another thread an OP/ED piece on what to do about Iran. Its amazing to me that nobody talks about the long term effects of disrupting the other roles Iran plays in the global and political body & economy, and how our actions might create other big regional and global problems, or that the perception of unilateral rhetoric might lead to the type of global instability that requires others to challenge us to make decisions with long term impacts.

I'm always amazed at how much something old can tell us about ourselves. Consider the Peloponnesian War - specifically the events that led to the failure of the Sicily campaign. It was a kind of perfect storm as well where bad leadership at all levels, bad policy, bad strategy and bad tactics all converged. Consider how the state to state perceptions changed throughout the war as it morphed and influenced how people viewed their world and what was right or wrong. Consider how the war began in the first place and why the interim peace failed. When you read it, it sure feels familiar in many ways.

What I hope for is this. We will dutifully consider where we are at, where we need to go and how we will get there while being fully cognizant of the need to constantly re-evaluate our situation in the context of things often beyond our control. I hope that this will lead us to foreign policies that are more realistic in terms of flexibility, and more enduring and bi-partisan in terms of their commitment. I hope that the strategies we use to achieve these ends of foreign policy can transcend the scope of the next (relative) election so that the time tables reflect the realities of the world political body and not just our own - the world marches to many different local beats - not just the echoes of Washington's. I hope that by changing the perspectives on policy and strategy we can make DOTLMPF changes that allow us to develop and execute tactics that synchronize more with the needs established by conditions on the grounds vs. those conditions that exist solely in D.C.

[jcustis]

Imagine the possible difference in Iraq and CENTCOM strategy if up font we'd qualified and articulated that the access to natural resources is a vital interest to U.S. (our security, our economy, our prosperity, etc.) and that the growing and persistent threats of terrorism, WMD, coercion, blackmail etc. by non-state actors and irresponsible states in today's globalized world cannot be allowed to threaten those vital interests because nothing is isolated anymore. The world has changed and we must adjust.

I'd totally agree with such qualification. The only thing I'd add would be a linkage to the vital interests of the peoples of the region. perhaps we should have worked harder on the front end at building a coalition among neighboring Arab states.

Then again, maybe they were on to something and could chart the dark waters ahead.