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  1. #1
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    Quote Originally Posted by Mark O'Neill View Post
    In the course of my work today I came across this passage from Gwynn's Imperial Policing:

    "Finally, the fact that Waziristan borders Afghan territory presented a difficult problem. Afghan sympathisers were free to cross the border to reinforce the hostile elements. To close the frontier without the active assistance of the Afghan Government was impracticable and the Afghan Government could not co-operate without incurring the risk of unrest in its own territory."

    He published this in 1936. Now, the 'Government' being harassed have 'flipped', but I suspect that there is little else different. We are dealing with an enduring, complex traditional issue. Something that I think that many of the 'lets sort Pakistan out, and our problems will be solved' pundits clearly fail to appreciate.

    Lets face it, the Brits were, in their day, 'masters of empire'. They could not sort this issue out in over three hundred years. I think that it is entirely unrealistic to expect that the US, or any one else for that matter, could have 'solved it' in the last five years.

    Rather than continually bemoaning the existence of this long standing problem, a sound strategy would be one that recognises its likely continued existence, and develops accommodations and work arounds that ultimately minimise its impact.
    Yeah, I need to go back and re-read Gwynn for my work too. I do a lot of my stuff on British use of armored cars and tanks in Waziristan in the Twenties and Thirties, and it was a constant ulcer, whether the British used "butcher and bolt" or the "forward strategy" of building roads and trying to civilize the region. Seems like very little has changed on the North-West Frontier in eighty years.

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    Default The Frontier and the British

    For a good read, lots of detail and entertaining, try Bugles and a Tiger by John Masters. He was an officer in the 4th Gurkas in that period. The bio is nothing like his novels, thank goodness. It also provides some insight into the regimental system.

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    Default Pushtunwali

    It is over 250 years since Afghanistan was cobbled together, from many ethnic groups, and two centuries since British colonisers tried stretching their writ to India's (now Pakistan's) north-western frontier, where the plains crumple up towards the Hindu Kush. Yet, in both places, a large part of the population is still wedded to Pushtunwali. Some 15m Pushtuns live in Afghanistan, or 50% of its population; and 28m in Pakistan, mostly in NWFP, representing about 15% of the population there. Most of them are ruled by their tribal code, the notable exception being where the rival Islamist code, of the stringent Saudi variety which is preached by the Taliban and quite new to Afghanistan, is strong. Islamism has rivalled Pushtunwali for centuries; it has often gained prominence, as currently, in time of war. More typically, the two competing ways have cross-fertilised in Afghanistan, each subtly influencing the other.
    http://www.economist.com/world/displ...ory_id=8345531

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    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default Imperial echoes

    Sixty years after India and Pakistan achieved independence the impact of events in the sub-continent, including Afghanistan, on British national security has returned with a new emphasis. Notably regarding counter-terrorism and fighting AQ / Taliban.

    By a twist of history the British Army, plus 'new' partners, are deployed on the other side of the Imperial border or Durand LIne in Afghanistan.

    This time our supply lines, for heavy items, run from Karachi port into Afghanistan and who drives the trucks carrying the containers? Afghans, as they dominate the haulage industry. Yes, "money talks", what we do if they stopped helping?

    Back to learning from history.

    Davidbfpo

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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    G'day Guys,

    Tom,

    not that many of us Aussies have cable - and I reckon we have got no hope of seeing any of those movies on our 'free to air' TV. And, of course, I did not have the advantage of seeing them during their original theatrical release like you did...
    There ya go...

    Try to be nice....

    I saw 'em on a Saturday matinee for a nickel ticket

    And by the way, the Aussies have heard of video and DVDs have they not?

    Tom

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    Council Member Mark O'Neill's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom View Post
    There ya go...

    Try to be nice....

    I saw 'em on a Saturday matinee for a nickel ticket

    And by the way, the Aussies have heard of video and DVDs have they not?

    Tom
    G'day Tom,

    Of course, we have heard of them.........

    Cheers

    Mark

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    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    It seems instead our tactics are often driving adjustments in our strategy & policy as what works on the ground is slowly translated up the food chain and then incorporated. It seems we could save allot of time and treasure by being more realistic up front.
    RT, I think you are hitting a nail somewhere with this statement, but it sounds as though you expect the situation of the ground to be the other way. If so, could you expound on it a little more?

    I would agree that strategy should shape tactics only in as much as the strategy sets a framework. I don't know if it's at all that bad that tactics shift/adjust/morph must faster than strategy can, and the strategy expands/contracts to incorporate "lessons learned", so to speak, of the tactics.

    As for your point about being more realistic up front, are you referencing the proclamations to the media that have been made concerning our strategy shifts in Iraq? Would you say that the administration should have been saying, "We will be adjusting our tactics as necessary..." while avoiding talk of strategy?

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